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
VOLUME XX.

CONTAINING EXPLANATORY AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS.

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H. F. BROWNSON.
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CAPES'S FOUR YEARS' EXPERIENCE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1850.]

THIS is an American reprint, in a cheap form, of an English work, by Mr. Capes, formerly a minister of the Anglican Establishment, who was received into the church some five or six years since. It is a sort of *compte rendu*, which the author has judged proper to furnish his former brethren who still remain in heresy, of what during four years he has found Catholicity and Catholics in Great Britain. Its author is the founder and editor of *The Rambler*, one of the best conducted and most valuable periodicals in the United Kingdom, and commends himself to us as an accomplished scholar, of a high order of ability, firm faith, and fervent zeal. His experience is written in a tone of great candor and moderation, and can hardly fail to have a happy influence on many of his "separated brethren."

While we acknowledge the ability of the work before us, and add our own experience as a convert in confirmation of its favorable report of Catholicity and Catholics, we still have some doubts about the strict propriety of such works. They seem to us in their general character to be more in consonance with Protestantism than with Catholicity. With Protestants, religion has only a psychological basis, is purely a matter of private experience, and private experience is the rule by which they are accustomed to judge of its truth or falsehood; but with us, private experience counts for little, and we are accustomed to judge private experience by our religion, not our religion by private experience. If a man has confessions to write, and can write them like St. Augustine, let him write them by all means; but as a general rule we think it better not to be too fond of parading our personal experiences before the public. If such experiences interest and attract some who are without, they also minister to their present false notions as to the grounds of religion, and hinder rather than facilitate their study of the true motives of credibility. Religion has an objective validity, an objective evidence, independent of

**Four Years' Experience of the Catholic Religion: with Observations on its Effects upon the Character, Intellectual, Moral, and Spiritual.* By J. M. CAPES, Esq. Philadelphia, 1849.

your experience or mine, and our reliance, under the grace of God, should be on that. If Protestants reject the testimony of the church herself, how can we expect them to accept ours as individuals, when ours as individuals is worth nothing, save as corroborated by hers? It is but justice, however, to Mr. Capes to say, that his book is not precisely a narrative of his religious experience, in the Protestant sense, and that it is mainly a report of facts with regard to our religion and its followers in England, which he has picked up during four years of his Catholic life, together with his reasonings and reflections on various important topics, intellectual, moral, social, and theological.

The author seems to us to have written in a form altogether more egotistical than was desirable. He apologizes for it, indeed, on the ground that, as he was relating what he had himself seen and remarked in himself and others, he could not well avoid it. He could not avoid speaking in the first person, it is true, but he could have spared us the long account in the beginning of his competency and admirable qualifications as a witness. All he says is, no doubt, true, but what was the need of saying it? Those who knew him were already prepared to admit him as a competent witness, and those who did not know him could not be prepared by his own panegyric on himself. They who would not take his word as to his experience could hardly be expected to take his word for his own competency and credibility as a witness. It would have been amply sufficient to have told in a simple, straightforward manner what he had to say, without prefacing it with an account of his own mental habits, and without interrupting the flow of the narrative to tell us that he "honestly asserts," "honestly believes," "fully believes," &c., what he is asserting. However, this is a matter of taste, and no one suffers from it except the author himself.

As a writer, Mr. Capes may be commended for his pure idiomatic English, but he is diffuse, sometimes wordy, and not always clear, direct, and forcible. He affects to write as a man of the world, as a layman, in a popular style, free from all technical terms or forms of expression usually adopted by professional writers. In this he follows the precepts of the rhetoricians, but, perhaps, without considering the peculiar circumstances in which the Catholic writing in English is placed. A Protestant writing in English on Protestantism can avoid technical terms and expressions, and abandon himself to the

current language of the people, because his Protestantism is itself vague and loose, and appears to far greater advantage in popular than in scientific language, and because the terms most appropriate to its expression have passed into the language of the market, and ceased to be technical, or, at least, become terms familiar to the general reader. But the Catholic writing in the same language on Catholicity cannot do this with safety, because his doctrines are definite and fixed, and because the terms which express them with clearness, exactness, and precision are not in common use. The English language has for three hundred years been usurped by heretics, and been chiefly used as a medium of one or another form of heresy. In its current use it is inadequate to the expression of orthodoxy, and consequently the Catholic writer is obliged, at the risk of appearing stiff and pedantic, to make a liberal use of technical terms and scientific forms of expression, if he does not choose to leave his meaning vague and uncertain. Our Oxford converts do not in general, as far as we have seen, appear to be sufficiently aware of this; they write on as they were accustomed to write before their conversion, in very good English, it is true, but with a choice of terms which leaves us perpetually in doubt whether their thought is sound or heretical.

There is also among others than converts a mistake as to the obligations of the layman writing on theological subjects to be exact in his language. We take up a book written by a layman, by the illustrious Count de Maistre, for instance, all bristling, perhaps, with errors, and errors which become heresies in the minds of unprofessional readers, and if we complain, we are told in excuse, that the author was a man of the world, that he was not a professional theologian, and therefore was not to be expected to write with exactness. We may need, but we cannot accept, this excuse. If the layman cannot write on theological topics with exactness, both of thought and expression, he has no business to write on them at all. He who assumes the doctor's office must be held to the doctor's responsibility; and it is peculiarly important that this rule be enforced in these days of journalism and lay-writing, when a very considerable portion of our popular literature is proceeding from the hands of the laity. In judging the *man*, we of course look to what he probably means; but in judging the *author*, we must hold him to what he says,—to the plain, obvious, and natural sense of his words, whether he be cleric or laic.

The tone of Mr. Capes's work is subdued, and exceedingly moderate. The author writes as if he was afraid some prim Anglican or fastidious Puseyite should suspect him of extravagance or enthusiasm. His statements are generally under the truth, and appear to the Catholic to be weak and tame. The author's motive has been a good one; he has believed that a calm, deliberate, and reserved statement will have more weight with Protestants than one in which he suffers his Catholic heart to speak out in its own unrestrained warmth and energy. But in this we believe he is mistaken. Heretics do not in our days doubt our ability, our learning, or our logic. What they doubt is our sincerity,—that we believe our own doctrines. They look upon the intelligent Catholic defending his religion as a lawyer speaking from his brief. In a word, they doubt our honesty. Hence, what we say coolly, deliberately, in measured terms, expressly for them, has little weight with them as a body. They all feel, *all*, with here and there an exception, that they are daily and hourly professing what they know they in reality do not believe, and, judging us by themselves, they conclude it must be the same with us. They not only have no faith, but they have ceased to believe faith possible. What they are most anxious to know is, not whether good reasons can be given for our church or not, but whether her intelligent members, men of learning, of good sense, of whole minds, do really believe her to be what she professes to be,—do really believe what they profess to believe. Asseverations of our honesty and of the firmness of our faith weigh nothing with them, for they know by their own experience that such asseverations cost nothing,—that a man who can profess what he does not really believe, can easily asseverate that he believes what he professes. They attend not to what we say, but to the unconscious manner, the unconscious look and tone, with which we say it.

Moreover, Mr. Capes, knowing the Protestant world as he does, needs not to be told that Protestants, save individual exceptions, under the influence of grace vouchsafed to lead them back to faith and unity, always put the most unfavorable construction on the words we use or the statements we make that they will bear. Candor and fair-feeling are not to be expected from them; otherwise we should be obliged to regard them as in good faith, and if they were really in good faith they would not remain in their Protestant communions, but would be speedily reconciled to the church. Candor and fair-deal-

ing on religious matters are incompatible with the nature of Protestants, and it is always folly to look for them. What we say will always be taken by them in the worst sense it can be. Our moderation will be termed lukewarmness, our candor will be taken as "damning with faint praise," and our forbearance to state our attachment to Catholicity in terms most consonant to our own feelings will be construed into our disgust, if we are converts, at the change of religion we have made. Moderation towards heretics avails nothing to win them, and is usually a wrong to our Catholic friends. He who knows Protestants well, knows that it is idle to try to speak so as to suit them. We shall always have the most favorable effect on them when we pay little regard to them, but speak out naturally, simply, and truly from our own full Catholic hearts, according to the instincts, so to speak, of our Catholic faith and love.

We see clearly enough from Mr. Capes's book, that his faith is full and firm, that his heart is Catholic to the core, and that his real estimate of Catholic life is hardly less high than ours; but he restrains himself in the utterance of his sentiments too much, and is too much afraid of appearing extravagant or enthusiastic, of speaking from his excited feelings, rather than from his sober judgment. He speaks of Catholicity too coldly, without that glow of feeling with which the child always speaks of his tender mother, the lover of his beloved, and he submits to a dissecting of her influence on his own mind and heart, and to the running of a sort of Plutarch parallel between her and Church-of-Englandism, which are to the warmth of our feelings half profane. What if we do appear extravagant, enthusiastic, to the heretical? The apostles on the day of Pentecost appeared to the by-standers terribly extravagant and forgetful of proprieties. Some thought them drunk, filled with new wine; but three thousand were that day added to the church. And it is rare that any, except those who appear extravagant, drunken even, to those without, have the consolation of being the instruments of adding large numbers to the faithful. Always will Catholics, filled with the spirit of their religion, and speaking and acting according to the inspirations of grace, appear to heretics and infidels to be extravagant, enthusiastic, carried away by their feelings, drunk even; for they are drunk, inebriated with the wine of the spirit. But what then? What need we care for Anglican primness, or Puseyite fastidiousness? What to us are the notions

that heretics, the enemies of God, the children of Satan, may entertain of our sayings and doings? Are we not the children of the kingdom, and shall we not run and exult to behold the bridegroom as he cometh forth from his chamber? Command us to hold our peace, and the very stones would cry out. Does not the inspired Psalmist call upon the trees to clap their hands; upon all nature, inanimate, animate, and rational, to rejoice and exult aloud? How then shall we restrain our joy when we speak of the church, our blessed mother, and of the graces we receive through her from her celestial Spouse,—of the sweet repose we experience, after years of wandering, in laying our head upon her maternal bosom, or feeling ourselves locked in her affectionate embrace, lest some sneering heretic or infidel shall call us extravagant, and be led to disregard our words? Just as if the joy that gushes from our hearts, the love that beams from our eyes, and speaks in every look, tone, and gesture, were not the very thing which, of all others, must most effectually touch his soul, and disarm his face of its sneer? We mean no censure upon Mr. Capes; we only wish to express, in the most forcible manner we are able, that cool, measured statements are not those the most consonant to our feelings, nor those most likely to persuade heretics that we who are converts have found in the church all, and far more than all, we expected, or than was promised us. There is not one of us who would not find the language of the queen of Sheba to Solomon quite too cold and weak to express how much more we have found than we looked for, when we sought admission to the Catholic communion. “The word is true which I heard in my country of thy virtues and wisdom. I did not believe them that told it, until I came, and my eyes had seen, and I had proved that scarce one half of thy wisdom had been told me: thou hast exceeded thy fame with thy virtues. Happy are thy men, and happy are thy servants, who stand always before thee, and hear thy wisdom. Blessed be the Lord thy God, who hath been pleased to set thee on his throne.”

Nevertheless, Mr. Capes sometimes forgets the restraint he imposes upon himself. The following, which is the concluding paragraph of his work, is written with deep feeling, and is very beautiful, as well as very true.

“Truly can I say with the Patriarch, ‘The Lord is in this place, and I knew it not. This is no other but the house of God, and the gate of heaven.’ The Catholic Church *can* be nothing less than the spiritual body of Jesus Christ. Nothing less than that adorable Presence, before

which the angels veil their faces, can make her what she is, to those who are within her fold. Argument is needed no longer. The scoffings of the infidel, the objections of the Protestant, the sneers of the man of the world, pass over their heads as clouds over a mountain-peak, and leave them calm and undisturbed, with their feet resting on the Rock of Ages. They *know* in whom they have believed. They have passed from speculation to action, and found that all is real, genuine, life-giving and enduring. Such, with all my sense of the awful mysteriousness of the world which is still invisible, of the fallaciousness of human knowledge, and of the argumentative points which controversy will ever urge against the claims of the Catholic Church,—such is the result of my experience of her aspect towards those who repose upon her bosom, in order that they may gaze upon the lineaments of her countenance. As a child that rests upon its parent's bosom, pressed to her heart with a tenderness that nothing less than a mother can bestow, and from that place of peace and security looks up into her eyes, and there reads the love which is its sweetest joy, so do I watch the aspect of her who has clasped me in her arms, and sustains me that I should not fall, and know that she is indeed the *mother* of my soul. I know only one fear, the fear that my heart may be faithless to Him who has bestowed on me this unspeakable blessing; I know only one mystery, which the more I think upon it, the more incomprehensible does it appear,—the mystery of that calling which brought *me* into this home of rest, while millions and millions are still driven to and fro in the turbulent ocean of the world, without rudder and without compass, without helmsman and without anchor, to drift before the gale upon the fatal shore."

The thought with which this closes is often in the mind of the convert, and is a mystery which grows upon us the more we meditate on it, because, while we see and acknowledge our guilt in remaining as we did outside of the church, we know that it was no merit of ours, it was no virtue in us, that brought us into her communion. Not to us the glory, but to the free grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

Mr. Capes first considers the influence of Catholicity in regard to intellectual freedom. We extract a paragraph or two.

"It is commonly supposed, indeed, that a man of sense and intellectual courage *cannot* believe the dogmas of Catholicism without violating the first principles of reasoning, and enslaving his judgment at the beck of a designing priesthood. So far from this being the case, I find myself compelled to act in the very opposite direction. I cannot *help* believing the truth of Catholicism in general, nor can I perceive the slightest violation of the laws of reasoning in any one of its separate doctrines. Granting the truth of Christianity as a divine revelation, my reason forces me to be convinced that no one form of Protestantism can *possibly* be true. So far as argument is concerned, I can see and feel the difficulties which exist in the way of the reception of the Christian religion as divine, and even of belief in any religion whatsoever, natural or revealed; but when once the question of the origin of Christianity is settled, though I can see and feel arguments against the Church of Rome, and admit that, so far as they go, they are difficulties which must be solved, yet I can see *nothing* in favor of any doctrinal Protestantism

whatsoever; and I can no more avoid believing in the exclusive claims of the Church of Rome, than I can help believing in the deductions of physical astronomy or of electricity. The argument in favor of Rome is precisely similar to the reasonings which establish the great facts of any purely human science, which is based upon probabilities, and not on mathematical certainties. On such morally proved sciences, whether physical, domestic, social, or political, the whole course of our daily existence is conducted. We neither eat, drink, move, talk, read, buy, sell, grieve, rejoice, or, in a word, act for a moment as reasonable creatures, except on the supposition that certain general ideas are true, and must be acted upon, although not one of them can be *proved* with all the strictness of a mathematical proposition. Yet no man in his senses calls this an intellectual bondage, or wonders that people can devote their whole lives to a course of conduct against which *some* difficulties can be alleged, though the balance of probabilities is decidedly in its favor.

“And just such is my experience of the effect of a belief in the infallibility of the Catholic Church on my daily moral and spiritual existence. I grant that there are some difficulties to be urged against Christianity, and that the proof of the infallibility of Rome is not a mathematical proof; but nevertheless, I cannot help perceiving that the balance of proof is undeniably in favor of Christianity and of the Catholic Church, and therefore I cannot help acting myself in accordance with that balance, and no more believe or feel that I am intellectually a slave, than when I believe that I am at this moment awake, though it is impossible to *prove* that I am not asleep and dreaming. Many people imagine that a Catholic lives and moves with a sort of sense of intellectual discomfort, with a half-admitted consciousness that he is the victim of a delusion; that he dreads the light of criticism and argument, and is afraid of having his opinions honestly and rigorously canvassed. For my own part, I can most solemnly assert, that, from the moment I entered the Catholic Church, I felt like a man who has just shattered the fetters which have impeded his movements from his childhood. I experienced a sensation of intellectual *relief*, to which I believe every conscientious Protestant to be an utter stranger. So far from feeling as if I had renounced the great privileges of humanity, and subjugated myself to a debasing servitude, I was conscious that now, for the first time, my faculties had fair play, that I was no longer in bondage to shams, forms of speech, pious frauds, exploded fables, youthful prejudices, or the impudent fabrications of baseless authority. * Reason, like a young eagle for the first time floating forth from its mountain nest, and trusting itself with no faltering wing to the boundless expanse of ether around, above, and below, rejoiced in her new-found powers, and looked abroad upon the mighty universe of material and immaterial being, with that unflinching gaze with which the soul dares to look, when conscious that the God who made her has, at length, set her free. To tell me, at such a time, that I was enslaving my reason by that very act which enabled her to assert her supremacy, or that I was violating truth and common sense, by embracing the most *probable* of two momentous alternatives, I should have counted a folly not worthy to be refuted. And such have I felt it to this day. I am conscious that I have embraced one vast, harmonious system, which alone, of all the religions of mankind, is precisely what it pretends to be, and nothing less and nothing more. I behold before me a mighty body of doctrine and practice, self-consistent in all its parts, cohering by rigid logical deductions, and held together by certain moral laws, which are as universally applied in every conceivable contingency, as is the physical law of gravity throughout

the visible universe. Complicated and varied as it is, and diverse in nature as are the many elements which go to make up its far-stretching whole, I can detect no flaw in the structure, no incompatibility of one feature with another, no tendency to decay, no token of failure in accomplishing all that it really professes to accomplish. I find every thing to charm and invigorate my intellect. If I am enthralled, it is in a bondage to truth; if I am fascinated, it is by the spell of faultless beauty."

The Protestant, having himself no faith in his sect, concludes that we have none in the church, and understanding very well that one is not free who is bound to believe whatever a sect, which neither is nor is believed to be infallible, teaches or commands him to believe, he concludes that we must both be and feel ourselves in mental bondage. But he falls in this into the sophism called by logicians *transitio a genere ad genus*, or concluding from one order to another, forgetting that the conclusion, to be valid, must always be in the same order with the premises. The church is not in the sectarian order, is not simply the sect claiming infallibility and supreme authority; and Catholics believing their church infallible and supreme differ essentially from Protestants disbelieving their sect, and well aware that it is fallible and liable to command what is false and wicked. Supposing the church to be what she claims to be, there is no mental bondage in being held to believe whatever she teaches, and supposing us really to believe that she is what she claims to be, we cannot feel ourselves in mental bondage in being so held. The difficulty the Protestant imagines for us grows out of his supposition that the church is for us what his sect is for him, and that at bottom we no more believe her than he does it. But this, luckily, is his mistake. Believing with us does not mean professing to believe, and actually doubting. We believe our church infallible, divinely commissioned, speaking in the name of God, and therefore that in believing and obeying her we are believing and obeying God, which is not slavery, but freedom; for God is truth and justice, our Maker, and our rightful Sovereign. Hence, Mr. Capes only asserts what reason itself asserts, when he says that one never enjoys, never knows, mental freedom till he becomes a Catholic. In becoming a Catholic we throw off the despotism of opinion, of passion, of caprice, and submit ourselves to the authority of God, and have his truth, his veracity, his word, as our authority for believing. We are freed from bondage, emancipated, and admitted as citizens into the commonwealth of Christ, and made partakers of the liberty of the children of God. On this point every convert's experience

fully confirms all, and more than all, Mr. Capes has said.

But while we accept heartily all Mr. Capes says in favor of the freedom possessed and felt by the Catholic, we cannot help thinking that he has made some concessions to his former brethren which he was not required to make, and which may be turned with considerable force against him. He concedes that there are real difficulties in the way of admitting the truth of Christianity itself, and also in the way of admitting Catholicity as its true and only form. He makes the question, aside from the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, between Christianity and infidelity, and between Catholicity and Protestantism, to be a balancing of probabilities, and concedes that in becoming a Catholic he was only "embracing the most probable of two momentous alternatives." Here is evidently an admission that unbelief and heresy are probable, although, by far, less probable than Catholicity. We are not prepared to make this admission, for in our judgment, and, we think we may safely say, in the judgment of the church, heresy and unbelief are both improbable, with not the least shadow of probability in their favor, and that every argument that can be adduced in favor of either implies its falsity; that is to say each is self-contradictory, and is refuted by itself. Unbelief is a negative quantity, wholly unintelligible save by a positive quantity; for pure negation, being nothing, can be no object of thought. No man can make a denial but by virtue of some affirmative principle, and every affirmative principle is opposed to unbelief. Every man who denies Christianity must affirm something in its place, and the principles he must affirm in order to affirm any thing in its place will, if he remains faithful to them in examining the motives of credibility, compel him to assent to the truth of Christianity. All heresy is self-refuted. It asserts too much to be infidel, and too little to be Christian. If it follows out its denials, it falls into total unbelief, which is refuted by the necessity of believing something as the condition of disbelieving; if it follows out its positive affirmations, it must accept Catholicity, for Catholic truth is a unity, is one and indivisible, and, embrace what aspect of it you will, you must, in order to be self-consistent, embrace the whole of it down to the holy-water-pot and the blessing of asses, for either it is all false, or, as St. Paul says, "every creature of God may be blessed by prayer." Moreover, if the author concedes that Catholicity is, to human reason, simply the most probable of two alternatives an acute opponent may

force him to a conclusion he may find it inconvenient to adopt. There are eminent Catholic divines who, uncensured, maintain that the law to bind must be not only probably, but certainly, promulgated, and therefore where we have not certainty,—objective certainty we mean,—we are free to follow the probable instead of the more probable. Even on principles, then, which the author cannot pronounce uncatholic, he might have innocently embraced the other alternative, refused to have become a Catholic, and have without sin remained, even after he had examined the motives of credibility, in his heresy or infidelity.

The author, no doubt, thinks that he escapes this difficulty by asserting that faith is the gift of God, and that certainty, not arrived at by reason, is attained to by virtue of this supernatural gift. But he appears to us to mistake the real question involved in his remarks. Undoubtedly, faith, in the theological sense, subjectively considered, is the gift of God, and it is only by this gift that we are able to believe with that firm adhesion of the mind which is demanded by the virtue of faith. But this is nothing to the purpose. The *donum fidei* is not an objective revelation of the truth, nor does it add any thing to the objective evidence or certainty of the faith; it is simply an infused habit of faith, giving to the mind a supernatural facility, aptitude, and strength in believing what God reveals and the church proposes. Yet, in discussing, for those who do not believe, the motives of credibility, we can make no account of this infused habit, because those who do not believe have it not, and because we cannot expect them to believe that they can have it, till we have convinced their reason that our church is the church of God. God forbid that we should, in the slightest degree, overlook the fact that faith is a supernatural gift, or the necessity of grace to incline the will and to illumine the understanding to see and appreciate the evidences of the truth of our holy religion. But our question here regards the certainty of our religion *in se*, not its certainty in our intellect; its objective certainty, not as addressed to the supernaturalized intellect, but as addressed to natural reason, and as the object, not of divine, but of human faith. Certainly human faith does not of itself suffice, but human faith is all that we seek to produce by arguments, and all that anybody ever pretends is produced by the motives of credibility. The real question here is, Do the motives of credibility, duly considered, establish to right reason the objective certainty of the

Catholic religion, or only its probable truth, making out, as Lardner says of the credibility of the Gospel history, not certainty indeed, but very high probability? Proposed in this form, although grace is requisite to subjective certainty, to the firm adhesion of the mind to the truth, no Catholic can hesitate a moment as to the answer to be given. The evidence of our church, taken at its just weight, presents a case, not merely of very high probability, but of absolute certainty, against which reason can bring no reasonable or logical objection; and the man who has examined that evidence is both logically and morally bound to believe what she teaches and to do what she commands. That is to say, the motives of credibility establish the truth of Catholicity, with all the certainty reason ever has or can require, and leave no room for a reasonable doubt; and where there is no room for reasonable doubt, there is not merely objective probability, but objective certainty. We must say all this, or concede that our religion does not respond to all the demands of reason, and that the grace by virtue of which we elicit the act of faith is a dispensing with reason, instead of being its supernatural elevation, which is the radical error of modern Evangelicalism. *Gratia præsupponit naturam*. Grace retains reason and elevates it above itself; it does not supersede it, and require us to believe without or in opposition to its dictates. In believing Catholicity natural reason is fully satisfied, finds all her demands complied with, so that she never finds herself disappointed, or in any degree opposed to what through grace is believed. This the author himself shows, and it is on this ground that he asserts that the Catholic not only feels, but actually is, mentally free. But this would not be true, if the reason saw only probability, or could see room for a doubt as to the objective truth of Catholicity.

The author has been misled, most likely, by his Oxford logic, which teaches that mathematical certainty is the only genuine certainty, and that moral certainty, or certainty by virtue of extrinsic evidence, is only probability. Yet he holds that probability is sufficient in the case. So Mr. Newman, in his *Essay on Development*, concedes that the infallibility of the church can be only probably established, and yet contends that we may be infallibly certain of the doctrines we believe on her authority; that is, we may have infallible certainty by virtue of an authority which is only probably infallible! Hence, when we tell Protestants that they have no infallible

certainty in the case of the doctrines which they profess to deduce from the Holy Scriptures, because they have only probable reasons for believing that the Scriptures are inspired, and only probable reasons that they have in their doctrines rightly seized their sense, we are altogether wrong, and must concede to Protestants, after all, that, so far as concerns the truths contained in the written word, they stand on as good grounds as we, and that all the advantage we have over them by means of an infallible church is that of an authority to preserve and define the unwritten word, and to watch over the developments of Christian doctrine, and from time to time to decide between the true developments and the false, anathematizing the latter as heresy, and taking the former up into the body of doctrine, and commanding them to be received as dogmas of faith! But, although this logic may be very convenient at Oxford, and very necessary indeed to all Protestants not confirmed rationalists, we hardly need it in the Catholic Church. As Catholics we can abide by the old rule, that the conclusion follows the weaker premise, and maintain that the certainty by an authority can never transcend the certainty of the authority itself. We concede that the evidence which establishes to human reason the divine authority of the church is extrinsic, but we do not concede that probability is sufficient for belief in that authority, nor that probability is all that this sort of evidence gives. A thing may be established as certainly by extrinsic as by intrinsic evidence, and moral or historical certainty in its order is every whit as high as infallible as mathematical certainty. It is rendered, by the extrinsic evidence in the case, as infallibly certain that our Lord wrought miracles, as it is that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and can be doubted only on the assumption of principles which render problematical the highest form of metaphysical certainty. Mr. Capes admits, or rather contends, that we have for the church the highest degree of certainty, except mathematical certainty, that the human reason ever has; we must then hold him quite inexcusable for conceding that her truth is only a probability and that in embracing her one is only choosing the more probable of two alternatives. It may be prudent to choose the more probable of two alternatives, but it is entirely to mistake the evidence in the case to suppose that we have nothing to propose to the unelevated reason but a choice between probabilities. It may seem all very wise to him to make liberal concessions to heresy, but we must

look well to it that we do not make them at the expense of orthodoxy, or that, in our generosity to Protestants, we do not forget to be just to Catholics. It is not meet to rob the children of their bread and give it unto dogs. However, we do not suppose the real thought the author had in his mind is necessarily unsound, but he has not taken sufficient care to define and express it with exactness and precision.

The author, having spoken of mental freedom under Catholicity, makes some excellent remarks on the influence of Catholicity in developing and strengthening the intellect. He proceeds to give his experience and his views of its influence on modern civilization, and from this portion of his work we must be allowed to make a brief extract.

“On the other hand, how far the course of modern civilization is impeded by the reception of Catholicism, is a question which is by no means easy of solution. From all that I can judge by experience of its effects on myself and on others, I should be disposed to say that, while it tends to the culture of the intelligence, and to the development of all the faculties of the mind to the highest possible extent, it would lead its disciples to march with a somewhat hesitating step in what is commonly termed the civilization of the age. How far it would discourage purely intellectual cultivation *apart* from religion, is a question with which I have nothing to do, as I am speaking only of what are the effects of a sincere belief of Catholic doctrines, and an earnest practice of Catholic duties, upon the thoughts and life of man. While, then, I see every token that there is not a faculty in the soul, whether it be the pure reasoning faculty, the imagination, the taste, the love of extensive and accurate knowledge, or that which we term common sense, which Catholicism does not tend directly to stimulate in the healthiest and most effective possible manner;—while I see that its sons may be impelled by a burning enthusiasm to triumph throughout the whole domain of human studies, and to bend every acquisition of mental power to the service of God and the salvation of souls;—while the Catholic will labor with unwearying energies, and with the highest abilities, in the fields of mathematics, history, philosophy, science, poetry, or fiction, just as in former days the whole course of European civilization was directed and impelled by the devoted sons of the church;—at the same time it is impossible to overlook the fact, that so far as our civilization depends on the pursuit of gain, and the restless strivings of ambition, so far it would suffer in the hands of devout Catholics. There exists in the Catholic faith a power to detach the affections from *any thing* on this side of the grave, which necessarily makes men take matters somewhat too easily to be in harmony with the notions of the present epoch. A pious Catholic, to a certain extent, sees no future, except that which commences after death. He lives for the present hour and for eternity. He has a greater tendency to take the affairs of life as they come, and to enjoy what he actually has in possession, without putting himself very much out of the way to add to his store, than is usually found among ardent and business-like Protestants. Taken *on the whole*, I do not believe that Catholic merchants, Catholic tradesmen, Catholic travellers, or Catholic bankers, will ever so successfully compete with men of the world of similar occupations as to make as large fortunes as their Protestant competitors, or to exercise as power-

ful an influence upon the economic progress of the age. We never shall, taken as a body, be the first in the nation as men of business; and I question whether we could ever be *first* (though we might be *second*) in the study of those physical sciences with whose cultivation the characteristic movement of our time is so intimately bound up. It is undeniable, that Catholics do not *care* so much as others for those objects which furrow the sober and laborious Englishman's brow, and bend him down with premature old age. Not only the general influence of their religion, as a spiritual system, but the nature of their belief in the excellence of poverty, and of the monastic and celibate life, and in the pernicious nature of excessive carefulness, and of a melancholy, anxious spirit, tends to make them sit down contented amidst reverses, and comparatively careless about worldly success, where other men would strain every nerve to struggle against the assaults of fortune, and to provide against every possible future contingency."

Here, again, with what the author means we fully and heartily agree, but we can hardly accept what he says. How is it possible to regard Catholicity as likely to impede modern civilization, since modern civilization is undeniably the product of the Catholic religion? Indeed, Catholicity is the only thing that can save civilization, and prevent the modern world from lapsing into barbarism and savagism. The author himself holds and proves this, as is clear from the remarks which follow the passage extracted. Why, then, does he intimate that it will impede rather than advance our civilization? Simply because he takes the pains neither to think nor to express himself with accuracy. What he means by modern civilization is not modern civilization, but practices and tendencies in modern nations, especially Protestant nations, directly opposed to it, namely the neglect of the higher intellectual culture, worldly-mindedness, selfishness, exclusive cultivation of the physical sciences, and excessive devotion to wealth and mere material prosperity. Mr. Capes is quite right in supposing the Catholic religion favors unworldliness, cherishes the intellectual rather than the mere physical sciences, checks the inordinate pursuit of wealth, and reconciles men to poverty; he is quite right, too, in regarding this as one of its recommendations; but by what hallucination he should have been led to regard it for this reason as less friendly than Protestantism to modern civilization is more than we are able to divine. Certainly, he is too clear a thinker to confound with our civilization the causes in operation amongst us which tend incessantly, as he himself admits, to destroy it.

We regret that he has not expressed himself with more accuracy, for he cannot be ignorant that the question between Catholicity and Protestantism is no longer a theological or re-

ligious question. It is now in reality a purely social question. As a religion, as a medium of worshipping God and saving the soul, Protestants, throughout the world, have virtually yielded the ground to Catholicity, and no longer dispute her claims. They feel that, for men who would give their souls to God, and live only for heaven, the Catholic is the best religion; indeed, the only religion adapted to their purpose. They shift the question, and now oppose our religion, though excellent in regard to heaven, as abominable in regard to earth. Admirable as a religion, it is execrable as a civilization. They pretend that it enslaves the mind, crushes the spirit, and fits men only to be mere tools and drudges; that it robs man of the nobility of his nature, forbids him to assert his manhood, and unfits him to bear a manly part in the progress of society. They institute comparisons between Protestant nations and Catholic, and tell us that in the former all is life and activity, energy and improvement; industry and commerce flourish, wealth accumulates, social and material well-being are cared for and incessantly advanced; while in the latter indolence prevails, a general want of thrift is manifest, enterprise sleeps, and every one is contented to remain where and what he was born. All this is false, no doubt, but nothing is more certain than that the notion is entertained by Protestants, and even by some Catholics, that Protestant nations surpass in civilization and temporal prosperity Catholic nations, and that the cause of it is to be sought in the difference between Protestantism and Catholicity. It is on the ground that their pretended religion is more favorable than the Catholic religion to civilization and temporal prosperity, that Protestants now seek to place the controversy with us. It will not do, then, in these times, for us to begin with the apparent concession that our religion is unfavorable to modern civilization. No matter how correct may be our meaning, we must not, even in words, have the least appearance of conceding it, for a candid interpretation of our language is the last thing we are to expect from Protestants. As little value as we set on the earth and things of time, we must not concede even this world to Protestants, although they may be willing to concede us heaven in exchange. They must have nothing, in this world or the next, at our hands, but what they are honestly entitled to, which is just nothing at all; and we must be ready to maintain against them that ours is the only religion favorable to man's true interests, whether for time or for eternity.

If Protestants retained, as a body, any real reverence for spiritual things, if they were not generally ready "to jump the world to come" if they can make sure of this world, we would waive the question they raise, for a religion is not to be tested by its relations to material prosperity, but by its adaptation to the end of all religion, namely, the glory of God in the redemption and sanctification of souls; but as they can be made to feel only on the material side of their being, as much as we despise the things of the world, we hold it important for them, not for us, to meet them on their own chosen ground,—the last that remains to them,—and prove to them that, setting aside all considerations of its advantages in regard to another world, the belief and practice of our religion are the only sure means of advancing civilization, and securing and promoting man's social and material well-being. Mr. Capes has himself proved this unanswerably, and we need but refer the reader to his luminous pages on this subject. That our religion detaches its followers from the world, and tends to make them indifferent to material goods, is, no doubt, true, and it is because this is true that it is favorable to civilization and material prosperity. It checks selfishness and increases charity, and charity makes us solicitous for the welfare of others just in proportion as it renders us indifferent to our own. Hence it is that selfishness always retards, while charity advances, civilization. It checks eagerness in the pursuit of wealth, and therefore extravagance in expenditures. All the selfish passions tend to overshoot themselves, and too great eagerness in the pursuit always misses its aim. Riches are not to be estimated by the amount produced, but by the amount produced beyond consumption. No matter how many fold you increase the productions of a people; if you increase their expenditures in the same proportion, you add nothing to their riches. Protestantism, by destroying men's faith in a future life, by depriving the people of the relish for simple spiritual pleasures, always to be had at a trifling expense, confines them to sensual pleasures, which are always expensive. Its very worldly-mindedness and craving for sensual gratification induce an expenditure for pomp and show, for feeding pampered appetites, for sustaining rivalries in houses and furniture, places and honors, which brings consumption in Protestant countries closer on the heels of production than it is ever brought in any Catholic country. Even admitting what is doubtful, that more is actually produced by a Protestant than by a Catholic people, the latter, placing their

felicity, not in sensual, but in spiritual pleasures, caring little for worldly show, and contented with a cheaper and more simple style of living, are sure to have always on hand a larger surplus beyond their wants for consumption, and therefore to be always actually richer. This is evinced by the fact, that one can live in the same grade of society in a Catholic country at less than one half the expense that is required in England or the United States, the two most favorable Protestant instances to be selected.

If from the accumulation of wealth, which is greater under Catholicity than under Protestantism,—of course we are not speaking of a Catholic people, like the Irish, ruled and oppressed by a Protestant people,—we pass to social and political well-being, we shall find the advantage is all on the side of Catholicity. The tendency of all Protestant legislation is to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer, if we may judge from the example of England, and from our own, and the worst form of aristocracy, a moneyed aristocracy, the aristocracy of money-bags, stocks, and spindles, is its favorite. The poor are ground into the dust, the rich escape. The subordinate in villainy is punished, the principal usually escapes. In Catholic countries,—really Catholic countries we mean,—the constitution of the state and society are respected; but legislation and administration, filled with an unworldly and charitable spirit, tend to protect the poor and helpless, and punishment falls with its greatest severity on the proud and lordly oppressor, on the greatest villain. Austria punishes the chiefs of the Hungarian rebellion, but spares the subordinates. Liberty does not consist in fanciful theories, in passionate declamations against monarchy or aristocracy, and the loud vociferation of the words Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, nor in well-planned and successful Jacobinical revolutions, which overturn the throne and altar, and set up the despotism of unbelief and the tyranny of the mob, but in the supremacy of law, in the maintenance of wise and just government, however constituted, and in orderly submission to its authority. That which tends to repress turbulent passions, to wean the affections from this world, to make men unambitious, indifferent to their political or social position, self-denying, disinterested, charitable, contented with spiritual occupations and pleasures, must, then, be that which will most effectually serve the cause of liberty, by drying up the source of the dangers to which it is exposed, weakening the selfishness from which the disposi-

tion to tyrannize or to rebel against legitimate authority arises, and taking from tyranny and rebellion their motive and excuse. As a matter of fact, in liberty and real temporal prosperity the Catholic nations of Europe, notwithstanding the obstacles thrown in their way for three hundred years by heretical neighbors, infidel governments, and infidel mobs, are far in advance of the Protestant nations, and have in them a vitality, a recuperative energy, that we should in vain look for in any country where Protestantism predominates. This should be so, for it is an irreversible law that the goods of this world always fly those who pursue them for themselves, and overtake those who despise and fly them for God's sake.

Mr. Capes has some profound and excellent remarks on the social crisis that has approached or is approaching in England, and shows clearly that the great social problem of the age, pressing every day more and more urgently for a solution, can be solved only by Catholicity. The great question, which socialists misconceive and are impotent to answer, and which they conceal under their demand of "the right to labor," is, say what we will, the great social question of our day. It is a fearful question, and cannot much longer be blinked, or left to the management of socialists and communists. The Protestant system of industry and economy has predominated in the modern world since the peace of Utrecht, in 1713, and it has brought the greater portion of the civilized world to the very brink of ruin. It has reduced the price of labor to the very minimum of human subsistence, and given us an immense operative class,—millions of men and women, able and willing to work for their bread, who are starving because there is no work to be had. Such is the terrible fact that stares us in the face, and affords us so sad a comment on the boasted progress of industry and material prosperity under Protestantism. This fact has to be met and disposed of, or it will dispose of the modern world. Till some practical solution is found, some effectual remedy is applied, we must expect socialist and communist movements to continue, and society to be constantly menaced with total disruption. Nothing renders men more desperate, more ready to make a revolution, than the gnawings of hunger. If you wish to be free from revolutions, take care that the people find employment, and experience no lack of provender. Mr. Capes has not gone into the question at so great a length as we wish he had, but in what he has said he shows that he understands it, has deeply pondered it, and sees

whence the remedy is to come. That the church has in her institutions, if she be cordially accepted, a sure and even a speedy remedy for the evil, he shows conclusively. We feel it necessary to add, to guard against misapprehension, that, though the institutions on which he appears to rely as the institutions of the church are as highly esteemed by us as by him, yet it is necessary to bear in mind that the church does not do her work by virtue of them, but they accomplish their ends by virtue of her. In other words, the Catholic doctrine in regard to poverty, monastic establishments, and vows of celibacy on the part of the clergy and religious, if they could obtain out of the church, would not, as parts of Protestantism, accomplish any thing good, and it is not they that give to Catholicity its power to remedy social evils, but it is it that gives to them their power and efficiency to that end. The church is one, a unity, not a union, and her power and efficiency proceed from her centre, from the Holy Ghost who dwells in her, not from an aggregate of parts. When we say monastic establishments, vows of celibacy, &c., have this or that tendency, we must always bear in mind that it is not they that contribute so much power to the church, but she that contributes their power for good to them.

There are several other points in Mr. Capes's work on which we should like to comment, and some few more inaccuracies of expression we should like to point out; but perhaps we have found fault enough, and have already said enough to incline many of our readers to think us far more ready to censure than to laud. Mr. Capes is an able man, a zealous Catholic, who cheerfully devotes his time, his talents, and his fortune to the cause of Catholicity. His errors arise from his retaining his Oxford philosophy, from his partiality for Mr. Newman's theory of development, his wish to write in a popular style, and from the low state of Catholic theology in Great Britain. From the latter proceeds his twaddle about conscientious Protestants, and wishy-washiness on the subject of exclusive salvation; both are uncalled for, and, if they do no harm, they do no good. We cannot understand why a Catholic writer should be exceedingly anxious to prove the worthlessness of his own religion, and give to those without assurances that they can be saved without embracing it. There is no reason in the world, that we can understand, why every popular scribbler on Catholic theology should be putting his gloss on the solemn definitions of the church in her general councils. She has defined, that

out of the church no one can ever be saved, and why can we not be contented to stop where she stops? Mr. Capes does not hesitate to call Anglicanism an absurdity, to deny it all religious character, or to assert, if he means what he says, the impossibility of faith out of the church; how, then, can he concede the possibility of salvation out of the church, since "without faith it is impossible to please God"? Suppose the gloss he and others put upon the definition of the church be allowable, it can be allowable in the case of no one who can know that it is allowable, for such a one has an opportunity to hear the church, and cannot be in invincible ignorance. No man can be invincibly ignorant of what is necessary, *necessitate mediæ*, to salvation, for salvation is possible to all men. A man must have this,—and faith is always *in re*, never *in voto*,—before the plea of invincible ignorance can excuse him. But we will do Mr. Capes the justice to say, that he is on this point less latitudinarian than English Catholic writers generally, and shows evidently that he does not believe much in the alleged good faith and sanctity of Protestants. He seems to wish to drop the qualification so earnestly insisted upon by those kind souls, who are afraid that they may wound the feelings or alarm the consciences of "their separated brethren."

We are glad to find that Mr. Capes insists earnestly on the great fact, that faith is the gift of God, but we are not quite sure that he is right in calling this gift, received in baptism, a special *faculty*. It is not a faculty, but an infused habit, and imparts no new faculty to the soul, but simply elevates or supernaturalizes an existing faculty.

But enough of this. Notwithstanding the faults we have found, we place a high value on this work, and have read it with great interest and satisfaction. It will be widely read, and will have a good influence on the courage and tone of English and American Catholics. It is not as bold and energetic as we could wish it, but is far more so than the productions of English Catholics during the last century and the beginning of the present. We have, unhappily, been forced to find fault with nearly all the works that have reached us from the Oxford converts. Mr. Faber is the only one of the converts whose writings we are aware of having seen, whom we have had no occasion to criticise. What we have seen from him is written in a true Catholic spirit, is Catholic to the core. Nevertheless, we have found some noble tendencies in all these converts. They nearly all seem to be free from the common

English distrust of the papacy, and if they have any errors, they are not those of the school of Charles Butler. They do not appear to think Catholicity would be improved by being remodelled after the Anglican Establishment, nor are they afraid to say their beads, or ashamed to invoke the saints, and venerate sacred images and relics. They do not appear to think that Catholicity should be one thing for Englishmen and another for Italians, and they appear to feel that their religion is really *Catholic*.

We have heretofore spoken of the freer and bolder tone that is beginning to be assumed by English Catholics; there is decidedly less namby-pambyism among them, less of that truckling and servile spirit, so incompatible with the freedom and dignity of our faith, and less of that striving to conciliate and to avoid displeasing heretics, lest our goods should be confiscated or our throats cut, hardly to be expected in the members of a church that teaches men that in dying they may conquer the world; and we attribute this, under God, in some degree, to the accession of converts from Anglicanism, but mainly to the influx of Irish Catholics. The church in England, as in this country, increases by emigration from Ireland, and it is from this source that English Catholicity has derived chiefly its courage to speak in bolder tones and stronger language. And this not only because a large portion of the Catholic population are Irish, but *poor* Irish. Your Catholic aristocracy, save individual exceptions, have too many worldly relations, and too many connections with the dominant heretical society, to permit the missionary to rely upon them with much confidence, and they will always, in consideration of their rank and large possessions, be disposed to temporize, and to give up all of their religion that can possibly be given up without giving up the whole. We regard it as a very great blessing to our own country, that at the present moment the great majority of our Catholic population are poor, and poor Irish. Our Catholicity will thus have a healthier tone, and rest on a far more solid basis, humanly speaking, than if it prevailed only among the native-born population, and the wealthier and more distinguished families. What might at first view seem against us is really in our favor, and we really feel more joy, other things being equal, in the conversion of a poor man or a poor woman, than in that of a rich man or a fine lady. The poor, they who have but few ties that bind them to the world, are more devoted to the truth, love their religion more for its own

sake, care less for appearances, and are less afraid of having the plain truth told to their heretical neighbors. The Irish have their faults,—no man pretends to deny it,—and who has not faults? But Almighty God seems to have reserved to them the special mission of restoring to the faith the nations that speak the English language, and they seem to us to be peculiarly fitted for its performance. If, then, we mark a decided improvement in the tone and feelings of Catholics in England and in this country during the last half-century, let us, who are of the old English stock, not forget to give the honor where, under God, it is due,—to the piety, the zeal, and the steadfastness of the poor Irish emigrants. And let it console them in some measure for the sufferings of poor, oppressed Ireland, that they are, by divine Providence, made the instrument of building up the church in England and the United States, and of the salvation of millions of souls.

THE BLAKES AND FLANAGANS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1856.]

As the scene of *The Blakes and Flanagans* is laid in New York, and as the design of the story is to serve the cause of Catholic education in this country, we wish Mrs. Sadlier had made it a tale illustrative of simply *Catholic Life* in the United States. She would thus have adapted it to the whole Catholic American public, and not to a part only of our Catholic population. The excellent lesson she would read our Catholic parents is needed by those of American as well as by those of Irish birth, and it loses much of its force by the special application she has seen proper to make of it. Catholicity is Catholic, and identified with no particular race or nation, and to attempt so to identify it in this country, where there is such a mixture of races, and where the Catholic body is made up not only of native Americans, but of emigrants from every European nation, is by no means to advance its interests.

We have thus far, as everybody knows, depended chiefly on

**The Blakes and Flanagans: A Tale illustrative of Irish Life in the United States.* By Mrs. J. SADLIER, New York: 1855,

the immigration of Catholic foreigners for the growth and prosperity of the church in the United States, and on the Irish more than on any other class of immigrants. The Irish immigrants are not the only Catholics in the country, as some good people imagine, but they, and their children born here, are a very large majority. In the greater number of places they make up the principal part of our congregations, and are the most active, energetic, and devoted part, and the most liberal in supporting Catholic interests and institutions. No Catholic American is, or can be insensible to what we owe to Catholics born in Ireland for our present numbers and position. But, we think, the time has come when we should cease to speak of ourselves as Irish, German, English, French, or even as American Catholics, and accustom ourselves to think and speak of ourselves in religion simply as Catholics, and in all else as men and Americans. These foreign national distinctions, though naturally dear to the immigrants themselves, who are not expected to forget their fatherland, cannot be kept up in this country, even if it were desirable that they should be. The children of foreign-born parents do and will grow up Americans, and as American in thought, affection, and interest, as the descendants of the first settlers of Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, or New York. The foreign national distinctions are, for the most part, obliterated with the first generation, and all attempts to perpetuate them, especially where English is the mother tongue, are and must be fruitless. Catholics in this country, of whatever national origin, are in general heartily tired of them. They serve only to divide and weaken our forces, to place us in a false position in the country, and prevent us from feeling and acting as one homogeneous body. We are all Catholics; we are all Americans; and our duty and our interest alike require us to avoid all expressions that must excite in ourselves or in others a feeling to the contrary. If a man is a good Catholic, and does his duty as a loyal American citizen, it is nothing to me where he or his parents were born; and if I do my duty as a Catholic and as an American citizen, nobody has any right to object to me that this is my native land. The only man for us, as Catholics, to mark and avoid, is he, whether American-born or foreign-born, who labors to stir up prejudices of race or nation amongst us, draws odious comparisons between native-born and foreign-born Catholics, and seeks to divide us according to the race or nation from which we have sprung. Such a man is an emis-

sary of Satan, and no Catholic, no lover of the country should bid him good morrow. *Nolite recipere eum in domum, nec Ave ei dixeritis.* He is worse than a heretic. Let the most worthy fill the most exalted places; let no one be chosen or rejected solely for his birthplace, or that of his progenitors. Undoubtedly, we want a national clergy, that is, national in the sense that they understand and appreciate the real interests and wants of Catholicity in the United States, and will labor for them with enlightened and true-hearted zeal; but it is not therefore necessary they should all be born or educated in the country. We have never yet sympathized, and trust we never shall sympathize, with that spirit, formerly so strong in Poland and England, which would suffer none but natives of the land to receive preferment in the national church; we will never stop to ask the nationality of the priest before consenting to receive the sacraments at his hands, or to inquire whether the prelate whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us be Saxon or Celt, before begging his blessing, or yielding him the reverence and obedience due to his pastoral office. This is the view we have always taken ever since we have had the honor to conduct a Catholic review, and it is the only view, in our judgment, proper to be entertained by any Catholic in the Union.

It is to be regretted that Mrs. Sadlier should have written her book with a different view, and in an exclusive national spirit. The distinction of Saxon and Celt does not belong to this country, and no good can come from an attempt to naturalize it here. It should never find its way into our Catholic American literature. The interests, the wants, the trials, and the dangers of Catholics here are the same whatever their original nationality. The children of all, reference had to their social condition, are alike exposed to the corrupting influences of a non-Catholic society. The children of the Blakes and Flanagans are neither more nor less exposed than the children of American-born tradesmen. The distinction here is not between Catholic and American, but between Catholic and non-Catholic. Mrs. Sadlier writes as if Irish and Catholic, and American and non-Catholic, were synonymous, and thus unintentionally adopts the views of the Know-nothings, and plays into their hands by representing Catholics as an alien body or a foreign colony in the bosom of the commonwealth. She, moreover, throws an additional obstacle in the way of the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen by enlisting their national sentiments and prejudices against our religion. But

she is quite mistaken in her assumption. The archbishop of New York has proved, in his lecture delivered in Baltimore last January, that a large majority of the Catholic population of the country are native-born Americans. For the great majority of us, this is the land of our birth, our country, the only one we have ever seen, and the only one we ever expect or wish to call our own. This is an important fact not to be lost sight of. Catholics in the United States are to all intents and purposes Americans, and, as to the great majority, cannot with any propriety at all be addressed as pertaining to any foreign nationality. Our authors and editors should recognize this fact, and say *our* country, and address Catholics here as Americans, as a homogeneous body, without reference to the fact that some of us were born in foreign countries. This, too, is what those not of American birth ask of us, and what will best please them. They have chosen their home here; they regard this as their country, love it as their country, love it as their own, identify themselves with it, and wish to be treated, not as foreigners, but as Americans, standing on the broad platform of American equality. They very properly resent distinctions made to their prejudice, but they ask no distinctions to be made in their favor. All they ask is equality, and equality is best secured to them by saying nothing about their birth-place, and treating them precisely as if they were born on American soil.

Mrs. Sadlier not being an American herself, and living under a foreign government, has not felt, as we feel, the importance of not making any distinction in our Catholic population on account of their birthplace, and has therefore failed to do us the service in her *Blakes and Flanagans* she no doubt intended, and has less served that portion of us who were born in Ireland than she imagines. She would have done better to have regarded us all simply as Catholic, since she was writing with a Catholic purpose, and spared her sneers at *native* Americans, and the expression of her contempt for the country. She will be thought by many to be simply giving expression to the sentiments of those Catholics among us who are of Irish birth, which, coupled with the movements that have for some time been going on amongst a few of them, may subject their American patriotism to undeserved suspicion. As an American, whose ancestors have been identified with the country for seven or eight generations, we protest against the distinctions she makes; for if they are made, they

will inevitably place Irish-born Catholics in a position inferior to that of American-born Catholics. We will not consent to be placed below their level, and they shall not, as far as depends on us, be placed below ours. We wish to be treated as Catholic Americans, and as Catholic Americans we make no distinction between foreign-born and native-born Catholics, except to protest against all such distinctions; and we hope all Catholic writers, authors, editors, and lecturers, will do the same, and address always the whole body of Catholics in the country, as one body, forming an integral and living portion of one American people.

But, aside from the objection we have pointed out, and which we can in some measure excuse in Mrs. Sadlier, living and writing as she does in a foreign country, we think well of her *Blakes and Flanagans*. It is a work of genius, and possesses real merit as a work of fiction; but it has a far greater merit as a work of high moral aim, intended to impress upon the minds and hearts of parents the necessity of securing a Catholic education for their children. If there is any one thing more than another that the church looks after, it is the religious education of the young. She has a mother's love for children, and says always, in the language of our Lord, "Suffer little children to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." In no way can we better prove our Catholic spirit and our love and fidelity to the church, than by laboring diligently and perseveringly for the religious instruction and training of the young. Mrs. Sadlier, in calling our attention to this great subject, and doing her best to enlist all our zeal in its behalf, has done well, has done nobly, and deserves, as she receives, our gratitude.

Owing to the multitude of immigrants pouring in upon us before we have had time or means to prepare for their reception, to the poverty, and we may say little education, of large numbers of them, to our want of churches, priests, and proper teachers, and the absolute necessity of providing for the administration of the sacraments to those ready to perish for the lack of them, we have not been able to do all for our children that we could wish, nor all that was necessary; but we cannot, whether native-born or foreign-born, be justly accused of having been indifferent to Catholic education; and an impartial judgment will honor us for what we have thus far done, rather than condemn us because we have not done more. That some of our children have been lost for the lack of proper looking

after we cannot deny ; but all have not been lost, as is evident from the fact that the majority of us now living have been born in the country. In an old Catholic country, with permanent congregations, plenty of churches, a full supply of priests, and a completely organized hierarchy, there is all the machinery for education at hand, and it is easily placed in operation. But here all is new, and we have had every thing to create at once, in a moment, and with very inadequate means at our disposal. No suitable provision could be made for the young without the hierarchy, without priests, churches, and fixed congregations. Without these, where was to be our centre of operations, who were to be our teachers, and who were to furnish the means? We have thus far had, it would seem, enough to do to effect the ecclesiastical organization of the country, to gather congregations, erect churches, provide for the education of the clergy, and to get ourselves into a position in which we could devote ourselves to looking after and educating the children.

We doubt if even our well-informed friends have duly considered what has been done by Catholics here since 1785, five years before the first bishop for the United States was consecrated. At that time we numbered only about thirty thousand, now we count at least two millions and a half. Then there were only four or five churches in the Union, now there are nineteen hundred and ten ; then there was no bishop, now there are seven archbishops and thirty-five bishops ; then there were only twenty-two or twenty-three priests, now there are seventeen hundred and sixty-one. We had then no theological seminaries ; we have now thirty-three, besides five preparatory seminaries. We had no college ; we have now twenty-six incorporated and nine unincorporated colleges. There was then no female academy, and now we have one hundred and thirty-seven. Now when it is considered that three fifths of these churches have been built, and these seminaries, colleges, and academies have been founded, during the last sixteen years, it must be conceded that we have not been wholly idle, or sparing of our means. When we take into the account that our colleges exceed in number those of any Protestant sect, and surpass, with three or four exceptions, in the beauty and extent of their edifices, any others in the country ; that our churches number among them not a few of the largest, most splendid and costly in the Union ; and add our convents, nunneries, female academies, hospitals, and orphan

asylums, we are ourselves at a loss to determine whence have come the means to erect them. The means have come, in chief part, from those who within the last thirty years have come into the country, with little except their hands and industrious dispositions. Some help has, indeed, come from abroad, but far less than has been represented, and by no means so much as we have contributed to pious, charitable, and other objects in Ireland alone, to say nothing of any other foreign nation. While engaged in building these churches, colleges, academies, hospitals, orphan asylums, &c., we could not be expected to provide equally for the education of all our children, especially the children of the very poor; and before we had erected them, had permanent congregations organized, a spiritual home for Catholic parents provided, the hierarchy established, and a supply of priests and teachers obtained, we neither had nor could put in operation the necessary machinery for looking after and educating the mass of poor children whose parents were unable themselves, no matter for what cause or causes, to give them a proper religious training. Looking at the difficulties we have had to contend with, the much we have had to do, and the unsettled and moving character of a large portion of our population, our poverty, and our comparatively few priests and still fewer teachers, it would be unjust to blame us for the past, or to cast the shadow of a reproach upon those who have thus far labored to provide for our Catholic wants. We have done much, far more than could reasonably have been expected; and if we are still behind Lower Canada, which is substantially a Catholic province, we are, as to the life, vigor, energy, and prosperity of our Catholicity, behind no other Catholic population on this continent.

So much we have felt due to ourselves to say in our defence against the charge of neglecting Catholic education, brought against us especially by our Canadian neighbors. But we admit that what was sufficient for our defence in the past will not suffice us in the future. We have no longer the same excuse, the same inability. There is now, owing to a rush of immigrants, throwing an immense Catholic population into the country in want of every thing, altogether faster than it has been possible for us to provide for them, or for them to provide for themselves, an immense number of Catholic children unprovided with the means of Catholic education. These we must now look after, and we shall be inexcusable if we do not. Many of them are orphans or half-orphans; and large num-

bers of others, from a variety of causes, receive and can receive no education at home. Their parents, where their parents are living, are in many cases too poor and too unacquainted with home education, to train them up, in this non-Catholic country, in their holy religion. All the life and energy of the parents are exhausted in efforts to obtain the bare necessaries of physical existence. Besides, a very considerable portion of our people are from a country where it was not so necessary to look after the training of the young as it is with us. Let a child grow up wild in Ireland and he will still grow up a Catholic, for the tone of society, the very atmosphere of the country is Catholic; but neglect a child here, and he is equally sure to grow up a Protestant or an unbeliever. It is not every parent who has to delve from morning to night, that at once perceives this difference, or is able to bring himself on the instant to take the precautions required by it. These and other kindred causes have thrown upon our hands a large number of children from five to sixteen years of age, who are in great peril, and whose wants are not met by the arrangements we have hitherto been able to adopt. But to suppose our bishops and clergy, or even our laity, are insensible to this fact, would be a great mistake, and a grave injustice. The whole Catholic public is becoming alive to it, and when we consider what they have already done, in the way of erecting churches and providing for the education of the children of the more easy classes, we may rest assured that some way will in an incredibly short space of time be found to meet the emergency.

There is no doubt that one of the first and most necessary measures for the protection of our children is the establishment of Catholic day-schools. They are certainly doing great good, and must be supported, not only for what they themselves do, but for the opportunity they will afford of doing something more. But we cannot agree with Mrs. Sadlier that they are themselves sufficient to secure our children. In her story the children of the Flanagans grow up good Catholics, and the children of the Blakes bad Catholics, or no Catholics at all; and she would have us believe that the difference is all owing to the fact that Tim Flanagan sends his children to a Catholic school, and Miles Blake sends his to the public school. But in the progress of her story she unwittingly assigns other causes amply sufficient of themselves to account for it. The system of domestic training in the two families is very different. Miles Blake himself is represented as a sorry sort of a

Catholic, who holds to the church from the force of habit and a point of honor, rather than from any earnest conviction or living faith. He is utterly unconscious of the dangers to which his children are exposed, and takes no pains to protect them. It cannot be beaten into his head that his son Harry can ever turn his back either on the old faith or the old land. Instead of teaching Harry his religion, and leading him to love and practise it, he encourages him to fight those who speak against it, and procures him many a broken head in quarrels with non-Catholic boys. The boy knows little of his religion, knows nothing and cares less for Ireland, and has only his pugnacious qualities developed and commended by his father, who hears of his fights with great glee, and bids him "give it to the Yankee boys." What wonder that he grows up indifferent to his religion, and that, when he finds out that this is his native country, and that, after all, he is himself a Yankee boy, he loses his respect for the church, for his father, and his father's original country? Hardly any thing good could have come of him, had he gone to St. Peter's school, so long as he was so injudiciously treated at home.

Tim Flanagan is an Irishman as well as Miles Blake, his brother-in-law, but he is a sensible man, who loves his religion and understands the dangers to which in a city like ours the children of Catholic parents are exposed. He turns his attention to bringing up his children, not foreigners in their native land, but Catholics, not to fight and knock down Yankee boys under the pretence of vindicating the old faith or the old land, but to be practically Catholics, loving their religion, and seeking to honor it and their father's native country as well as their own by their virtues and their correct and winning deportment. With such a father and his judicious training, Ned Flanagan would have passed through the public schools, even, with comparative safety. The home influences would have counteracted to a great extent the unfavorable influences of the school-room. The Catholic school, being as it was a very excellent school,—not such as some we have seen,—was unquestionably an advantage, but even without it, Ned Flanagan would never have been a Harry Blake; nor with it would Harry Blake have been a Ned Flanagan. More depends on home and the family than on the school, and when parents are sufficiently interested and disposed themselves to train their children right at home, there is less danger than Mrs. Sadlier would have us believe in our public schools, bad as they are.

She has not made out her case. To have done that she should have subjected both parties to the same home influences, and have made the difference of schools the only difference to which the different results could be ascribed. Her own good sense and correct observation got the better of her theory.

Let no one, however, infer from these remarks that we like the common-school system, so long as it is in the hands of non-Catholics, or are indifferent to the establishment of Catholic schools. We need these Catholic day-schools, as we cannot doubt, since our bishops and clergy, to whom the decision in such matters belongs, are everywhere laboring to establish them. All we wish to do here is, to guard against expecting from our own day-schools what they of themselves alone will not and cannot give, and against attributing to the public schools what is really the fault of Catholic parents themselves. The public schools are ruinous, if our Catholic parents trust to them and neglect or but ill perform the duties of domestic or home education; but when parents understand and faithfully perform their own duties, and themselves bring up their children in the fear and nurture of the Lord, the public schools will rarely of themselves cause our children to apostatize. The blame we cast on Protestants and the public schools is much more frequently deserved by Catholic parents who neglect entirely, or worse than neglect entirely, the religious education of their children. But this fact does not lessen the importance or the necessity of Catholic day-schools; for it is impossible to make all who are able even to watch with proper care over the faith and piety of their children, and be always on hand to answer any difficulty that may be suggested to the child's mind, or to remove instantly any false impression the lessons of the school-room or of school companions may have made. Many parents, finding themselves here in a strange country, poor, disappointed in their expectations, or corrupted through evil example, fall into habits of intemperance, and are unable to exert any but a bad influence on their children. The poor children have no home, and are worse than orphans. Others would do their duty, but never themselves having received a good home education, do not know how to do it; and, with the best dispositions in the world, do, by their over-indulgence or over-severity, or by both combined, more to alienate their children, in a country like ours, from their religion than to attach them to it. Another class of parents are equally too poor, and necessarily too much engrossed with procuring the bare means of

subsistence, to be able to give their children a religious education, to watch over their faith and morals, and to protect them from the dangerous influences to which they are exposed. Finally, there is a large class of orphans, who have no relatives or none that are able to adopt them and supply a father's or a mother's care. These considerations are sufficient to show that we cannot rely safely either on the public schools or on home education; and that schools of our own are very necessary, especially since there can be no hope of the state's consenting to authorize separate schools, as it should, for Catholic and Protestant children. Undoubtedly, then, the first step in preserving our children is to establish, wherever practicable, and at the earliest moment possible, parochial schools.

But these schools even will not suffice without the co-operation of parents, or without a substitute of some sort for that co-operation. We do not find that all who are educated in Catholic schools are Ned Flanagans. Many a Harry Blake, or even worse, has come out from our colleges. The fact is well known, and is deplorable; where lies the fault, it is not for us to say. All we would say is, that our boys go to college, are surrounded, as we suppose, by Catholic influences during their college life, come out sometimes well disposed, and, after a year or two, begin to neglect their religion, and, finally, stray away and are no more heard of as Catholics. It would be unjust to attribute this sad result to the good fathers who, in general, have charge of our colleges, for they do all that men in their situation can do. We bring no accusation against anybody; we refer to the fact to prove that Catholic schools alone will not accomplish the end we have in view. The principal reason in the case of the graduates of our colleges is that, on going forth from the care of their alma mater, they find no Catholic society, no Catholic public opinion, to encourage, protect, and sustain them. If they enter not a seminary to study for the priesthood, they are thrown into non-Catholic society, exposed to non-Catholic influences, and, perhaps, soon adopt the notion that their Catholicity is in the way of their getting on in the world; and, also, not unlikely, that they are not treated with as much warmth and consideration by the clergy and the better class of Catholics as they think themselves entitled to, or as they had expected. If they have not parents of standing and judgment, piety and intelligence, who maintain an influence over them and are capable of directing

them, they are in great danger of becoming, if not apostates, at least lukewarm Catholics. We fear that not so much has been done as might be, to save these young men. Nothing will do more to save them, than the feeling that Catholics, especially the clergy, take a deep interest in them, consult their welfare, and are desirous of engaging them in every way possible in the service of religion, and of advancing them in life. The way to retain our young men, college-bred or not, is to place a generous confidence in them, to devise ways and means by which they can take an active part in promoting Catholic interests. We lose them by giving them nothing to do, and leaving them to run away with the notion that they are regarded as of no importance, are counted for nothing, and must seek their friends outside of the Catholic body. But even here we see, as things settle down, the complaint we might be disposed to make is begun to be removed. We are establishing all over the country young men's institutes—associations looking to the intellectual and literary improvement of the members, and to the direct or indirect advancement of Catholic interests. In these institutes our young men, especially our educated young men, can take part; find an outlet for their internal activity, an employment for their learning and talents, and a gratification of their social feelings, and laudable desire to distinguish themselves. They get enlisted too, actively enlisted, on the side of their religion, and, consequently, become more interested in it and more firmly attached to it. We have seen this in Albany, Cincinnati, St. Louis, New Orleans, and other places. They create a Catholic public opinion among Catholics, and a Catholic public opinion, too, that extends beyond Catholics and acts on the whole population of the city. It is not easy to estimate the amount of good that has already been done by these institutes; certainly not the amount that would be done were they established in all our cities and large towns, as they easily might be. In these institutes, as much should be done by the members as possible, and it is very desirable that young men be encouraged to come forward as lecturers. Here is room for improvement. The institutes have been too ambitious of getting lecturers of reputation from abroad, which often occasions a heavy expense, and embarrasses the infant society, besides defeating one of their chief ends—that of developing and employing the talent and learning of the young men in the place. We do not want lecturing should become a business or profession for any one. These associa-

tions need not excite any distrust on the part of the clergy, and, as a general thing, they do not and will not. We have found the clergy almost everywhere their warm and efficient patrons. They are not, and should not be organized without the good will of the clergy, who should have the power to suppress them, the instant they seem likely to exert any influence unfavorable to religion; but it is desirable, we think, that they should be managed chiefly by the young men themselves, and that as much latitude should be allowed them as is compatible with their fidelity to the church. In this country it does not answer to attempt to hold our young men with too tight a rein. The dominant sentiment of the country is liberty, and this sentiment is as strong in our Catholic young men as any other; perhaps even stronger. We must yield much to that sentiment, and leave our young men all the liberty in these institutes compatible with their faith and duty as Catholics. This can be done with more safety here than elsewhere, because liberty is less a novelty in this country, and there is here less disposition to abuse it. Occasional abuses there, of course, will be; but, when they are small, we must wink at them, for we are never to expect perfection in any thing human.

Another excellent way of preserving our young men is to enlist them in societies or associations for protecting or instructing poor Catholic children, in what are called Young Catholics' Friends' Societies. We grow attached to that we labor for, and we often secure our own salvation in seeking that of others. The clergy are too few, and have too many duties to be able themselves to look after the multitude of our poor children, to gather them together, and give them that spiritual instruction which they need. They must be assisted in this so necessary work by the laity. But here again we have already begun the work, and nothing remains but to extend and perfect it. In Boston, Baltimore, Washington, Portland, Syracuse, Newark, Brooklyn, New York, and we know not in how many other places, these associations already exist. They accomplish a double object. They are of great spiritual utility to the members themselves, engage them in a Catholic work, and develop in them a Catholic public spirit. They deepen their love of their religion, strengthen their attachment to the Catholic body, and secure them graces which enable them the more easily to resist the non-Catholic influences of the country. They enlist them anew, and in a visible manner, in the army of our Lord, and make them feel that they

really are soldiers in his service. The more we can enlist in this way, the more do we protect, and the more are we able to effect for the children of the poor.

We know not why there need now be any of our children lost that human aid can save. We are aware of the difficulties which have heretofore existed, but they do not exist now, or at least only in a far less degree. Now we have our hierarchy, and a large number of priests; the country all dotted over with churches, and wherever there is a church, a congregation. Very few Catholics now live so remote from church that they cannot, occasionally at least, hear mass. We have a laity able and willing, if called upon, to do all that the laity can do to assist the clergy in the religious instruction of the children who cannot receive a proper religious education from their parents. Alone, the clergy, we admit, cannot do all that needs to be done; that is, they cannot do it with their own hands. But they can in this matter multiply themselves a thousand-fold, by calling to their aid the young men and women of their parish, employing them to find out the children and to bring them to catechism, and, under the direction of the pastor, teach them the catechism itself. Some may have it for their mission simply to teach Christian doctrine, others to look after the children of parents unable or too careless to send their children; others still may have it for theirs to raise funds to clothe decently the children of the destitute. In this way the whole congregation may be engaged as a committee of safety for the rising generation. The parish might be divided for this purpose into districts, and special persons appointed to look after the children of a particular district, and thus every Catholic child would be known, looked after, and protected. Not a child could then be lost or tampered with, without the whole congregation knowing it, and, if necessary, rushing to its rescue, and the soul of any one child is worth more than all this would cost. The thing is practicable enough, and is no more than some Protestant sects are doing to steal our children from us. Can we not be as active and as vigilant as the enemies of our religion, and do as much to save them as they to destroy them? The thing is already done in many places, and it needs only to have attention called to it, in order, after a little time, to have it done everywhere. It is nothing new, it is no suggestion of ours, and we are doing nothing but simply urging the extension of that which already exists.

Our Catholic women, too, can do a great service, not only

in teaching girls the catechism, as the young men do our ooys, but in looking after them in the depths of poverty and misery, clothing them, and bringing them together, and teaching them plain sewing and various other things which they should know, and which they cannot learn from their parents. This is a work for our rich and fashionable women, and for all in easy circumstances. They do it in many places already, and perhaps to some extent wherever there is a Catholic congregation. It is a work congenial to the heart of a true Catholic woman, and a work that would be of vast service to those who live in society, in preventing them from being too much engrossed with the world, and protecting them from its evil examples. It would make them feel more deeply their Catholic faith, and more sensible of the fact that all Catholics are equal members of Christ's mystic body. They do much, and God bless them for it, but we want them to do on a large scale, though in a quiet manner, what is now done only on a small scale. Let them each for herself form the resolution, that no Catholic girl in the land shall be lost for the lack of Catholic care and instruction. With so many thousands at work with all the zeal and devotion of the female heart enlightened and exalted by the grace of God, no one would dare reproach us, that we do not know how, in this country, to save our children to the church. We must all set to work, old and young, male and female, to assist our clergy in saving this multitude of children God has blessed us with, and who are the future hope of the church and the country. It is our duty, and at present our most pressing duty, and in no work can we engage with a greater certainty of drawing down the blessing of God upon ourselves and our republic.

This will have, in various ways, a good effect on our children. Children have a public opinion of their own, and are more governed by it than grown up people are by theirs. Now a large number of our children are lost, because they have got the notion that they are not regarded as of any importance to the church, and that nobody in the church cares much about them. They thus corrupt and pervert one another. But what we are urging would give them a just public opinion. They would feel that they are cared for, that they are the special objects of regard, and that the whole Catholic body is interested in their welfare. They would feel that they belong, not only to the church by their baptism, but to the Catholic body; and that, if they are lost, it is their own fault, not the fault, the indifference, or the neglect of others. They

would be drawn to the church by gratitude for her care of them, her tenderness to them, and her wise foresight for them, and they would strengthen and confirm one another. Each would become a sort of lay missionary to the other. The history of the martyr ages tells us of what children at a very tender age are capable; and if we get up among them what we venture to call a Catholic *esprit du corps*, we may defy, in general, the efforts of sectarians, philanthropists, and infidels, to seduce them from us. To this same end, it is important that every pains possible be taken to bring children to church, and enable them to hear the best music we have, and to witness the imposing ceremonial of the Catholic service. The splendid services of the church make a strong impression on young minds, give them associations which will render them incapable of ever being satisfied with the cold, dry, and prosaic services of the Protestant temple. Let our children have all the advantages possible of the Catholic service, and let them witness whatever is solemn, grand, and imposing, and have as many processions and performances of their own, in connection with religion, as possible. Whatever is pleasing or attractive in their young lives, should be associated with their church; for, in this country, it is through their hearts and their convictions, not simply by force of parental or pastoral authority, that they are to be preserved to Catholicity.

These are various things, which, it seems to us, are needed, in addition to the Catholic day-school, to secure the end our friend Mrs. Sadlier proposes to us in her *Blakes and Flanagans*, and all these things we have already commenced. We must indeed regret the many losses we have had in past times, but we are unable to see how they could, taking things as they were, have been avoided. But, if we suffer equal losses in future, we shall be inexcusable, and shall have no right to expect the blessing of God upon the church in America. We are in a condition now, if we but put forth all our strength, and use all the means in our hands, to save the present rising generation. We have only to continue and extend what has already been commenced. Whether we shall do so or not, it is not for us to say; but, looking to the past, the fair conclusion is that we shall.

We have, undoubtedly, reached a crisis in Catholic affairs in this country. Hitherto we have had foreign immigration, not only to provide for, but to rely upon, and the most thus far done has been done by foreign-born Catholics. Immigra-

tion is now rapidly diminishing, and seems likely to become in a few years too insignificant to mention. The future of Catholicity here, as the archbishop of New York has well remarked, depends, under God, on the Catholics now in the country, the majority of whom are native-born Americans. The responsibility now rests on us. We can no longer hope for accessions from abroad to make up for losses at home. In a short time, we shall be deprived of the wisdom, the experience, the sterling piety, zeal, and energy of those foreign-born Catholics to whom we owe our present commanding and prosperous condition. We are to be thrown back on ourselves, and left to our own resources, as native Americans. How we shall meet the crisis, we know not. We contemplate it not without some misgivings. Yet, when we remember that the God of our fathers is our God, and that God is here as well as in old Europe, we hope we shall not suffer the good work to languish in our hands. We trust the good God will not desert us, and we hope we shall do our best to prove ourselves not wholly unworthy of the trust committed to us. Yet we have a great work before us, and not easily shall we be able to prove at the end of seventy years a progress relatively as great as that made since 1785. We are saddened as well as gladdened at the prospect before us, and fear that the children will hardly make good the places of the fathers.

Nevertheless, it does not become us to despond. It becomes us rather to prove that Catholicity loses none of its virtue by passing into a native American heart, and that even Americans can be good Catholics, live, and, if need be, die for their religion; that our natural power, energy, and activity, do not desert us on our becoming Catholics, and that it is possible for us to hold as high a rank in the Catholic world as we now hold in the commercial and industrial world. Let us strive to prove it; and, as the first step towards it, let us lose no time in putting in operation all the machinery necessary to save the present rising generation, the future hope of the church and the republic.

THE CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1856.]

MR. HENRY DE COURCY is a Frenchman who came to this country ten or a dozen years ago, for the laudable purpose of making his fortune, as an agent or partner of a French commercial house in this city, which purpose, we are happy to learn, he effected, and that having effected it, he has returned to his native France. While here he took great interest in church matters, contributed several articles to the *Freeman's Journal*, and did regularly the American affairs for the *Univers*, as Mr. Gondon does those of England for the same Paris newspaper. He had zeal and industry, very likely good intentions, but he never approached to the slightest understanding of the American people or American institutions, and those of his contributions to the *Univers* on American subjects or on Catholic affairs in the United States, which have fallen under our notice, are marked by a silliness, ignorance, impertinence, and untruthfulness, which we have rarely seen matched. We have never seen any thing from his pen that indicated large thought, or manly and liberal feeling. His mind is narrow and one-sided, and instead of being a broad and liberal-hearted Frenchman, such as France often sends us, and to whom as Catholics we willingly acknowledge our debt of gratitude, he is the little man of a clique, incapable of seeing what little he does see, save as lessened and distorted by being seen through its spectacles. He appears to have come here with the impression, not uncommon among European provincials, that the Americans are for the most part native Indians, and still in their original savage state, saving a few gleams of civilization emitted by French missionaries to furrow for an instant their darkness, and we cannot discover that he ever became aware of his error. A man less qualified to write on American society, American institutions, or the church in the United States, it were hard to find, and we beg our friends in France to place not the slightest confidence in any statement, opinion, or judgment of his concerning any thing American.

**The Catholic Church in the United States: A Sketch of its Ecclesiastical History.* By HENRY DE COURCY. Translated and enlarged by JOHN GILMARY SHEA. New York: 1856.

Aided by his learned translator, Mr. Shea, he has in the work before us collected a certain number of facts, documents, details, and anecdotes, not without interest, nor without importance for such portions of our ecclesiastical history, but the work before us is not itself history. It is a series of newspaper articles, if we may so speak, on church matters in the United States, hastily thrown off and carelessly strung together. They might pass without much censure as the chance contributions to a Parisian journal by a French traveller willing to give his countrymen such information of the doings of French missionaries in this heathen land as fell in his way, but they should never have been collected into a volume, and far less have been "done" into English. We can conceive, and we say it with sorrow, no good purpose their publication can answer. They have a foreign and hostile tone, and can have no other effect here than to set Catholics of one nationality by the ears with those of another, and to deepen the impression in non-Catholic American minds, deep enough already, that Catholicity is in this country a foreign religion, and that whoever embraces it makes himself virtually a foreigner. From his long residence here he will be presumed to have associated with Catholics and to have expressed their sentiments. There is a snappishness, and ill-nature, towards non-Catholic Americans, running through the greater part of the volume, which if taken to be characteristic of Catholics would embarrass us not a little, and greatly strengthen the hands of our enemies. It is a great mistake on the part of our foreign Catholic friends to suppose that they can serve the cause of Catholicity here by abusing non-Catholic Americans.

The American people are a frank, plain-dealing people, and wish those who address them to speak out in free and manly tones, from honest and ingenuous hearts. They love courage, boldness, and independence, but they despise littleness, meanness, crookedness, blarney, and vituperation. Tell them their faults in a straightforward way, in a free, manly tone, without passion or ill-temper, and they will respect you; but attempt to play the virago with them, and they will despise you, or kick you out of their way. The Americans, like Englishmen, are proud, not vain, nay, too proud to be vain, and you must win their respect, and make them feel that your good opinion of them is worth having, before you can influence them by appeals to their love of approbation. It may be their misfortune or their crime that they care so little about your opinion

of them, and are so insensible to your gibes or your sneers, but that they think too much of themselves to be moved to change their conduct by any thing you may say against them, is a fact that you must take into the account in your dealing with them. They look upon Catholics here as the weaker party, and the judgment of Catholics, unsupported by the manliness and vigor of their character, their personal dignity and self-respect, will count for little with them. To scold them, to tell them that they have lost your good opinion, and that unless they behave differently you must *cut* them, will only call forth from them the gruff reply, "Who the devil are you?" We are simply describing, not defending; and we merely tell foreign Catholics what they are to expect in their dealings with non-Catholic Americans. As long as Catholics are here the weaker party, and want the power to render their views efficacious, their good or their bad opinion will not be taken into serious consideration, and they can gain nothing by arguments addressed to vanity or love of approbation. To suppose it were as great a mistake as to suppose that their respect is to be won by tameness and servility. The American admires courage, he respects power, and if you have not much of either, you can reach him only through his sense of justice. Convince him that his course towards you is essentially unjust, and he will change it, for he cannot be unjust without forfeiting his self-respect, and it is always his own self-respect, not your approbation, he seeks.

Mr. de Courcy appears to be ignorant of this trait in the American, nay, the so-called Anglo-Saxon character, and writes as if the true way to bring non-Catholic Americans to treat the church properly is either to flatter or to mortify their vanity. But he should know that in dealing with them it is pride, not vanity, he has to deal with, though sometimes, it grieves us to confess, the pride of provincials or colonists, rather than of the denizens of the metropolis. We have not as a people wholly forgotten as yet the sense of colonial dependence, and many of us still look to England as our metropolis. This is one of our weaknesses, but a weakness of which we are every day getting the better. A few more such diplomatic victories as those recently gained over English and European statesmen by Mr. Secretary Marcy, and we shall get bravely over it, and cease to look for our metropolis out of our own country. Ignorant of the real American character, Mr. de Courcy has adopted a tone better fitted to excite their contempt than to

command their respect, and at the same time well adapted to irritate Catholics themselves against our non-Catholic countrymen. This is the worst of all. The aim of Catholics in or out of the country should be its conversion. It is a low and narrow view of our duty to suppose that it is simply to protect and preserve the Catholics already here, and it is a grave mistake to suppose that we can advance in the discharge of our duty as Catholics, by means which irritate us against, or alienate us from, our non-Catholic countrymen. Our duty is, after that of preserving our own faith, and bringing up our children in the way they should go, to do all in our power to win to the church all those who are without. But we cannot labor with any effect for this, unless we love them, and make them feel that we are prompted to it only by our sincere and disinterested affection for them. We are not here in an old Catholic country, where the great body of the people are really or nominally Catholic, and all we have to do is to repulse heresy or infidelity; but in a missionary country, where the mass of the people are non-Catholics, and what we have to do is to convert them to the true faith. This we cannot do by means which alienate them from us, or us from them. Love begets love, and our love must beget their love. The love of God in us, must beget the love of God in them, and bind them and us together in the bonds of a never-failing charity. We must bear with their indifference, their hardness, their stubbornness, and even with their injustice to ourselves. We must not return wrath for wrath, railing for railing, or wrong for wrong. We must overcome anger by meekness, hatred by love, and unbelief by faith. We regret, therefore, that Mr. de Courcy did not see proper to write in a more kindly feeling towards non-Catholic Americans, and exhibit more of that blessed charity which never fails, and without which faith and zeal are but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal.

We regret also that Mr. de Courcy had not a mind and heart large and liberal enough to comprehend that all Catholics are brethren, and that Catholicity soars above all the petty distinctions of nation or race. He is a Frenchman, but it was his duty to write with the stern impartiality of Catholic truth. In writing on the church in this country, it was his duty to write for the glory of God rather than for the glory of France and Frenchmen. France aided us generously, if you will, in our struggle for national independence,

although she had her own ends to answer by separating us from her maritime rival; French Catholics have contributed their full share to the planting, growth, and prosperity of the church in our country, and never will an American Catholic forget the services rendered in past or present times by holy prelates and missionaries of French origin and education. But in doing liberal justice to French Catholics, we see no necessity of forgetting that others have labored not without success in the same field. As an American by birth and lineage, we cannot forget, to say nothing of native Americans, the Carrolls, the Neals, the Fenwicks, the Ecclestons, the Spaldings, the Reynolds, that Belgians, Hollanders, Russians, Poles, Spaniards, Englishmen, Italians, and last, but certainly not least, Irishmen have also rendered us important services. No nationality has the monopoly of the glory of founding and promoting Catholicity in the United States. The writer who provokes invidious comparisons between the various nationalities of which our Catholic population is composed, is our enemy, and not our friend. The French revolution, which exiled religion, virtue, and nobility from France, sent us in early times a large proportion of our most laborious, eminent, and most successful missionaries, and Frenchmen, or men of French descent, fill at this moment a larger number of American sees than are filled by men of any other nationality, except our own. We complain not of this; we rejoice that it is so, for we are as opposed to the introduction of Know-nothingism into the church as we are to its introduction into the state. But we do complain of Mr. de Courcy for seeming to be unable to see any good in the country that has not come from France, for calling up the recollection of difficulties, jealousies, and envyings which were better forgotten, and speaking disparagingly of illustrious prelates who have deserved well of Catholic America, but who happen not to have been of French birth or lineage. He has wronged in particular the memory of the first bishop of Charleston, and cast unworthy suspicions on his character and services. We treasure the memory of a Maréchal, a Cheverus, a Flaget, a Dubois, a Bruté, as a part of the wealth of our infant church, but we treasure with equal pride and affection that of John England. Mr. de Courcy leaves the impression on his readers that no Irish-born prelate in this country has ever understood his position, or worthily discharged the duties of his office; but we are aware of no prelate we have had, whatever his nationality, that better un-

derstood his position as a Catholic bishop, or the position to be assumed and maintained by Catholics in the United States, than Bishop England. We have had, as far as our knowledge extends, no bishop who more thoroughly divested himself of that Europeanism, borrowed from the secular society, which can never take root here, and ought not to do so if it could; or more thoroughly identified himself with the country and her institutions. We have no sympathy with his Gallicanism, which, by the way, he renounced before his death, and we do not deny that he made some mistakes, and did not always discriminate with sufficient care between American principles and the popular understanding of them by American politicians, but he sought with true wisdom and true-hearted loyalty to represent the church before the American people in her Catholicity, free from all foreign nationalisms which would tend to conceal or mar her loveliness, and to make Catholics understand that their relation to the American republic and government is one of concord and affection, not of antagonism and hatred. His policy, if we may so speak, was American, and substantially what we urged in the article on the Mission of America.* We have visited Charleston for ourselves, seen with our own eyes and heard with our own ears from those who knew him well what have been the results of his episcopal labors, and we cannot suffer a single remark to be uttered in disparagement of him without making such protest as we may. He was a great prelate, a great man, a learned man, an able, eloquent, and accomplished writer and orator, and the standing and tone he gave to Catholics in his own diocese are such as we would see given to them in every diocese in the Union. If he differed in opinion with another bishop it does not necessarily follow that he was wrong. We speak not of the living, we provoke no comparisons between them and the dead. Among living prelates there may be many that will rival, and even out-rival the late Bishop England, although of Irish origin like himself, and now often misapprehended and misappreciated by honest, intelligent, and well-meaning Catholics. We laymen who write on ecclesiastical affairs are very liable, with the best intentions in the world, to pass judgment on matters of which we know nothing. No layman, whatever his zeal, his learning, his talent, or his piety, is able to judge the adminis-

*Brownson's Works, Vol. XI, p. 551.

tration of any bishop, for no layman does or can know all the difficulties a bishop has to contend with, the complicated and delicate affairs he has to manage, or the compromises in order to avoid greater evils he is frequently obliged to make. While it is lawful for us as laymen to defend the bishop who is assailed, or whose character is disparaged, we should be chary of breathing a censure against any bishop who has not manifestly forgotten his character and office, whether living or dead. We have spoken of Bishop England as an act of justice to his memory, and because we have been ourselves accused of injustice, and we fear we have not always been just to him. But let that pass. What is principally our concern at present is to enter our indignant protest against Catholics in Catholic matters setting up one nationality against another. There is not only bad policy, but there is forgetfulness of Catholic dogma as well as of Catholic charity in it. In our country men of all nationalities have labored faithfully according to their gifts and opportunities for the salvation of souls and the interests of the church, and he who would institute invidious comparisons or excite jealousies between them is doing the work of Satan, and is a firebrand in our Catholic community. French Catholics have laid us under a deep debt of gratitude, but they have done it as Catholics, not as Frenchmen. Belgian, Dutch, and German Catholics have also done us and are doing us great service, but by their Catholicity, not by their distinctive nationalities. So of Italian, Spanish, and English Catholics. So in a degree certainly inferior to none must be said of Irish Catholics, who with their children constitute the largest and most active portion of our Catholic population. Yet they have served the church as Catholics, not as Irish, and our gratitude is due them as Catholics, not as Irishmen. We know them, love them, honor them, and are grateful to them as Catholics; and as Catholics, not as Irishmen, will they receive their share in the glory of contributing to the growth and prosperity of the Catholic religion in the United States. They are nothing to us as *Irishmen*. In religion we know no national distinctions, and if we ever allude to them, it is to rebuke the ill-judged and dangerous attempt to bring them into the church, or to make the church in this country the monopoly of any nationality. We censure no man for his nationality; we judge no man by his nationality; and we suffer no man to censure us, or attempt, especially in our own native land, to abridge our freedom of speech

or action, for our own. Religion is catholic, not national. and whenever we find any man attempting to foist a distinctive nationality on the church, or, under pretence of religion, a foreign nationality on our country, we shall judge it our duty to rebuke him, and do all in our power to defeat his mad attempt. Mr. de Courey has done us great disservice by his petty national prejudices, and by provoking comparisons and calling up recollections not unfitted to disturb our peace and good fellowship.

We cannot, furthermore, understand on what principle Mr. de Courey has composed his book. It is a strange jumble of facts and opinions, thrown together without any perceptible order or bond of union. Professedly it contains the history of Catholicity only in five states, Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey, but in reality it glances at the church in the whole Union, and gives a complete view of it in no diocese or state. The author has apparently no conception of the relative importance of facts, and often dismisses matters of great significance with a passing allusion, and dwells even to tediousness on minute details of no interest or importance. What is creditable to his own countrymen he relates with fulness, as well as what is discreditable to Catholics of other nationalities. He dismisses Mount St. Mary's College, Maryland, certainly one of the first literary institutions we have, with a passing note, and spends pages in describing others of little importance. In giving the history of the church in New York, he notices, under the head of the New York diocese, what has been done by our present illustrious archbishop only within what is that diocese now, without giving him credit for what he had done in the dioceses of Albany, Buffalo, Brooklyn, and the half of Newark, before the division. This is not just, for it is due to the archbishop that his administration should have credit for what it did out of the present diocese as well as in it, when his diocese included the whole state, and half of New Jersey. The truth we suppose to be that Mr. de Courey had only a fragmentary knowledge of Catholic affairs in the country, knew not where to seek the requisite information, and concluded that what he did not know could hardly be worth knowing. The work is carelessly translated, and still more carelessly printed. The translator transfers the French word *préventions* untranslated, and has paid no attention to the purity of his mother tongue. In one place we are told that Archbishop Carroll was the son of

Charles Carroll, and in another that he was the son of *Daniel Carroll*; in the one case making him the brother and in the other the cousin of *Charles Carroll of Carrollton*. He was, we believe, the first cousin of the venerable signer of the declaration of American independence. In one place we find events spoken of as having happened in 1886, which is, we believe, still future. The author, we presume, intended to write 1586. These inaccuracies, and they are legion throughout the volume, are for the most part typographical, and due to the carelessness of the proof-reader. How far errors of a more serious character have crept into the narrative, we are not, we are ashamed to confess, familiar enough with the Catholic history of our own country to say.

But enough of fault-finding. With all its errors, crotchets, short-comings, omissions, and commissions, we have not been able to read this volume without edification, or without having our love and veneration for the fathers of the American church increased. Let us say frankly that they were greater men, and better understood the difficulties and duties of their time and position than we have, somehow or other, been led to believe, and we are half afraid that in our ignorance we may have said things that might seem unjust to their memory. If so, deeply do we regret it. Times change, and the course most proper to be adopted at one time is not always the most proper to be adopted at another. And never have we intended any thing we have written to be in the slightest degree disrespectful or ungrateful to them; but had we known in the outset as much of their difficulties, their labors, their trials, their struggles, their self-denial, their prudence, their wisdom, and their enlightened zeal, as we are able to gather even from the crude statements in the book before us, our heart would have warmed more to them, and we should have referred to them in terms of far deeper gratitude and affection. It really seems to us that they did better in their day and generation than we are doing in ours, and that the laity of those early times, considering their means and numbers, effected more than we effect at present. But perhaps this is an illusion common to all persons when contrasting what they see in the present to be done, with what they see that a past generation has done. Yet if we of the present generation do our duty as well as our fathers did theirs, we shall do well. It was no slight work that of conciliating Protestant prejudice, and gaining a position for Catholics in a country so hostile as ours was

when our first bishop was consecrated. Perhaps the French urbanity and high cultivation served us then far better than would have done that bolder, more energetic, and more uncompromising spirit which we have sought to stimulate, and which is more in accordance with the American character; and though we deny the justice of the charge of harshness and severity which in the beginning was brought against our *Review*, we can well explain and excuse it.

We have spoken severely against Mr. de Courcy's volume, for we do not like it, and there are things in it not unlikely to do harm; but yet to those who know how to pick it out, there is much useful information in it, and as the production of a man engaged while writing it in making his fortune as a merchant, it deserves to be honorably mentioned. In devoting his leisure to serious studies for the interest, as he doubtless believed, of religion, he set an example worthy of the imitation of our young men engaged in business. The work, we are told, is to be continued, whether by Mr. de Courcy himself or by his translator we are not informed. We should prefer that it should be by his translator, to whom we are indebted for several valuable historical works. The fault with Mr. Shea is his want of proper artistic skill, and his carelessness as to style and diction. He has ability, great industry, and might with proper time and care continue Mr. de Courcy's work in a manner to serve the cause of religion, and secure the gratitude of the whole Catholic community. A history of the church in this country is needed, and especially by the numerous converts added daily to the number of the faithful, to enable them to place themselves in possession of the Catholic tradition of the country, to which for the most part on their conversion they are strangers. It would enable them to understand better Catholic things in America, and to avoid many misapprehensions and misjudgments to which they are now almost inevitably exposed. Written with taste and judgment, not from a national but a Catholic point of view, with the requisite information and accuracy, in a loving spirit, without exaggeration or acrimony, passion or prejudice, it would be one of the best books we could put either into the hands of our own youth or those of non-Catholic Americans. Mr. de Courcy cannot write it; Mr. Shea ought to be able to do it, and were he to do it, and to do it as well as he can, he would find his account in it.

But if he proposes to do any thing of the sort, his best way

is to let the present work go, and begin his history from the beginning, that is, from the landing of the first settlers of Maryland; for though the church was earlier planted in other sections of what is now the Union, Maryland is the real mother of American Catholicity. Or if he should adopt Mr. de Courcy's volume, it should not be without thoroughly revising it, in the light of more extended researches, and fuller information. There are far richer documents for our church history, we are told, than Mr. de Courcy has had access to, or dreamed of, and of these the historian should be careful to avail himself.

ARCHBISHOP HUGHES ON THE CATHOLIC PRESS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1857.]

JOURNALISM in its present sense is of modern origin, and dates, according to *La Civiltà Cattolica*, only from the beginning of the French revolution in the last century. Before that world-event there were gazettes, newspapers, and even literary and scientific periodicals, but no journals established for the purpose of acting directly on society, and effecting by the formation and force of public opinion great political, social, moral, or religious ends. Catholic journalism, or journalism devoted to Catholic interests, is of a still more recent origin, and hardly dates from a period anterior to the fall of the first French empire; but the encouragement it has received from the Catholic prelates in most countries and even from the vicar of our Lord himself, permits us to regard it as a legitimate calling, in which every Catholic is as free to engage, under a proper sense of responsibility, as in any other secular business. Journalism did not, it is true, originate with Catholics, or in the interests of religion, but with the enemies of the church, for revolutionary purposes; yet since it is in itself indifferent, and may be used for good as well as for evil, there is, as far as we can see, no solid reason why the church should

**Reflections and Suggestions in regard to what is called the Catholic Press in the United States.* By the MOST REV. JOHN HUGHES, D. D., Archbishop of New York. New York; 1856.

not avail herself of its capabilities for good, and suffer it to be used for the promotion of her interests, as she does the printing press itself, steamboats, railroads, lightning telegraphs, progress in legislation, or any other invention or improvement in the natural order.

Before the institution of journalism the church got along very well without it, and she could continue to get along very well were it suppressed. It enters not into her constitution, and is in no sense essential to her existence or to her efficient operation as the church of God. But it is one of the most striking characteristics of our age and especially of our country, and the chosen medium of acting on the public mind. The ablest, the most energetic and living writers of the day, instead of writing folios, or pamphlets as formerly, write leaders in the journals, or contribute articles to reviews and magazines. Journalism has undeniably become the most approved and the most efficient means through which modern thought is expressed, and the public mind is formed and directed. Every party, almost every fragment of a party has its public journal as the organ of its peculiar doctrines, opinions, purposes, hopes, or aspirations. It becomes necessary therefore for Catholics to have their journals, and to use them as a means of neutralizing the effects of the non-Catholic press, and of promoting what may be called the external interests of religion. It seems but right that they should do what they can to turn the weapon invented for their destruction against their enemies, and to convert what was designed for evil into good; and we know from the encouragement which the Holy Father has deigned to extend to us personally, and also from that so generously extended to us by the illustrious hierarchy of our country, that it is so. With the generous co-operation of the Catholic laity with their clergy, we see no reason why the Catholic press, in a very short time, should not become in the hands of Catholics even more efficient for good than it has hitherto been for evil in the hands of our enemies.

As yet, Catholic journalism is in its infancy, and is far from having developed all its capabilities. The Catholic public have not yet given it full play, and are as yet hardly prepared to regard it as an approved mode of promoting Catholic interests. They find it, in some measure, foreign to their habits as Catholics, and distrust it the moment that it goes beyond the province of the gazette or the mere newspaper, or aims at something more than the publication of interesting items of intelli-

gence, or the refutation of some foul calumny on Catholic persons or Catholic institutions, and attempts to enter into the discussion of the great living questions of the day and to obtain for them a Catholic solution. They have not taken a sufficiently broad and elevated view of its real province, and are startled rather than edified by its rising to the level of its mission. They but imperfectly appreciate its liberty in matters of opinion, and are too ready to visit an error or what they suppose to be an error in matters of opinion with a severity due only to an error in matters of faith. The conductors of Catholic journalism are to a great extent uncertain as to the legitimate sphere of the Catholic journalist, and are sometimes weak and inefficient through a laudable fear of encroaching on the prerogatives of authority, and sometimes mischievous through their rash assumption of the province of the pastors and doctors of the church. But these defects and errors of both people and journalists are due to the infancy of Catholic journalism, and to the want of clear, distinct, and definite views of its legitimate sphere. They will be corrected with time, and disappear in proportion as Catholic journalism comes to be more fully and more universally recognized as a lawful calling, and its rights and duties are better understood and more clearly defined. For a long time to come, Catholic journalism is likely to be an approved institution for the defence and support of Catholic interests. It will always be outside of the church, below the church, and in the natural order; but still, as the representative of a just public opinion, it will come, like true civilization, to the defence and support of religion against her external enemies. It has and can have no spiritual authority; it is and can be no institution in the church, but is and may be an institution outside of the church, devoted to her interests, and capable of rendering her valuable external service, through its action in forming and directing public opinion.

Our own so-called Catholic press has, no doubt, the errors and imperfections incident to its youth, and the heterogeneous character of our Catholic population. As Catholics, in all that pertains to religion proper, they are homogeneous, and of one mind and one heart; but in all other respects they are about as diverse as it is possible to conceive them, and nothing is more natural, if nothing is more to be regretted, than that the diversity which obtains among them should have its representatives in the press. That this diversity has had its rep-

representatives, and that the utility of the press has been impaired thereby, and some injury done to Catholic interests, must be conceded. The archbishop of New York, ever vigilant as becomes the faithful and zealous pastor, sees and deplores it, and with a view to remedying the evil, and preventing the press in future from fostering any divergent tendencies there may be among us, has written and published the highly interesting and important document now before us. His aim has evidently been to restore harmony where it has been disturbed, and to remind the press that Catholics should live and act in unity, and that it forgets its duty when it sows divisions among them. He is deeply impressed with the dangers that threaten our internal peace; he thinks these dangers, partly incidental to the diversity of our Catholic population, have been greatly increased by certain journals conducted by persons professing to be Catholics, but never recognized as Catholic by the proper authorities, and he has wished to disclaim them, and to warn the Catholic public against encouraging them. Thus he says:

“The only ground on which the writer of this paper would feel himself authorized to present his views in relation to the Catholic press, is a ground of zeal and interest for the universal harmony and union, not only in faith, but also in charity, of all the scattered members of the church of God, who are to be found spread over the surface of this now great empire, extending from the southern boundaries of Canada to the northern limits of Mexico, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. These Catholics are not homogeneous in the order of natural birth, inasmuch as not all have been born in any one country; but they are homogeneous in the supernatural order, by which God has provided that they should be spiritually united into the one church, which is not the church of any nation, but of all nations without distinction—holy, Catholic, apostolical.

“One of the greatest calamities that could fall on the Catholic people of the United States, would be, if allusions to variety of natural origin should ever be allowed to distract their minds from that unity of hope and mutual charity which results from the communion of saints.

“For some time past it has been observable that this so called Catholic press has exhibited, especially in the North, divergencies well calculated to excite attention, if not alarm. On the one side it has been assumed that the success of religion in this country depends on the continuous influx of emigrants, especially those of Irish origin, and that religion vanishes in proportion as the Celtic feeling dies out in this country—that the national character of the American people, and more particularly as it affects the first and second generation of emigrants, is hostile to the Catholic religion—that the best method of perpetuating the faith in this country, so far as the Celtic race is concerned, is to keep up and perpetuate a species of Irishism in connection with the faith.

“On the other hand, it has been assumed with equal confidence, but not on any better foundation, that our holy faith will labor under great

disadvantages, and can hardly be expected to make much impression on our countrymen, until it can be presented under more favorable auspices than those which surround foreigners. In short, that, if it were rightly understood, its principles are in close harmony with those of our constitution and laws—that it requires only a skilful architect to dovetail the one into the other, and to show how the Catholic religion and the American constitution would really fit each other as a key fits a lock—that without any change in regard to faith and morals, the doctrines of the Catholic Church may be, so to speak, americanized—that is, represented in such a manner as to attract the attention and win the admiration of the American people. Now, in the opinion of the writer, the prevalence of either of these two systems would be disastrous to the cause of the church.

“The church is not a foreigner on any continent or island of this globe. The church is of all nations, and for all nations, as much as the sunbeams of heaven, which are not repudiated as foreign under any sky. In fact, truth, no matter by whom represented, is at home in all climes; and this not simply in matters of religion, but in matters of history, arts, and science.”

We are unable to conceive any thing more Catholic or more in accordance with Catholic interests than the purpose here expressed. We have ourselves, as our readers well know, written several articles with the same purpose, and we will not affect to conceal the gratification it affords us to find our archbishop adding the weight of his position and character, and the aid of his powerful pen to a cause which we have had so much at heart, and which is so intimately connected with the peace and prosperity of our Catholic community. We have labored earnestly to prevent the division of our Catholic population into classes according to their respective birthplace or national origin. The lesson we, in our humble way, have done our best to impress on our readers is, as the archbishop so happily expresses it, that “the church is not a foreigner on any continent or island of this globe. The church is of all nations, and for all nations, as much as the sunbeams of heaven, which are not repudiated as foreign under any sky.” There are no national distinctions in the church, no distinction between Jews and gentiles, Greeks and barbarians, for God hath made of one blood all the nations of men, to dwell on all the face of the earth. This lesson we have repeated almost *ad nauseam*, so anxious have we been to impress it on the minds of our readers. The archbishop expresses our own views far better than we could ourselves express them in the following truly Catholic passage:

“Now, in view of these facts, neither clergy nor laity can afford, as Catholics, to have any distinction drawn among them in our periodicals, as among natives and foreigners. In the Catholic Church there are no

natives. There is the nativity of baptism subsequent to the natural birth. There is the adoption by grace of every soul, whether introduced into her communion during the period of infancy or in adult life. Neither are there foreigners in the church of God—it is one Lord, one faith, one baptism.”

Thus we wrote, in perfect accordance with this, in our *Review* for last October* :—“In religion we know no national distinctions, and if we ever allude to them, it is to rebuke the ill-judged and dangerous attempt to bring them into the church, or to make the church in this country the monopoly of any nationality. We censure no man for his nationality ; we judge no man by his nationality . . . Religion is catholic not national.” We had previously written † :—“Catholicity asserts the unity of the race, the common origin and brotherhood of all men, and nothing is more repugnant to its spirit than to judge men by the race from which they have sprung, or the nation in which they were born. Never should we treat any race with contempt, or claim every virtue under heaven for our own. Away with these petty distinctions and miserable jealousies. What is it to the Catholic that the blood that flows in his brother’s veins has flowed from Adam down through an Anglo-Saxon or a Celtic channel? Through whichever channel it has flowed, it is the same blood, and has flowed from the same source. All men are brothers, with one and the same Father, and one and the same Redeemer.” If there is any one thing more than another that we have felt it our duty to do all in our power to repress, it has been precisely the disposition that we saw fostered in certain quarters to insist on national distinctions, and to renew here on this continent and among Catholics the old war of races, and it is no little consolation, amid the misapprehension to which we have been subject, and the abuse we have received, to find the illustrious archbishop of New York laboring expressly and avowedly, with earnestness and vigor to the same end.

The archbishop speaks of two divergent tendencies, of two opposing systems, and seems to imply that there is springing up amongst us an American Catholic party opposed to Catholics of foreign birth. Whether such be or be not the fact he is a better judge than we, and it is a matter that we shall not allow ourselves to discuss. We only wish to have it distinctly understood that, if there is any such party, we have no connection with it,

* *Ante*, p. 46. † Brownson’s Works. Vol. XVIII. p. 307.

have never been and shall never be its organ. We are American by birth, education, connection, habit, and sentiment, and intend to remain so; but we should deprecate the formation of a party hostile to foreign-born Catholics, as much as the archbishop does the formation of a party hostile to American-born Catholics. Undoubtedly, as an American convert we have our mind and heart principally set on the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen, and are in the habit of looking upon Catholic questions and proceedings in their bearing on these countrymen of ours, whom we so ardently desire to see converted; but never with feelings of hostility or indifference to our Catholic brethren of foreign birth. We have heard individuals, some of native, some of foreign birth, contend that the church will never take root here and prosper as she might till we have an indigenious clergy, but we have never entered into the discussion of that question. As we understand it, the uniform policy of the church has been, in all ages and countries, to provide for each country, at the earliest practicable moment, a native clergy, and such, we are assured, is the policy, as far as practicable under the circumstances, pursued by our own venerable hierarchy. It has never entered into our head or our heart, to question the wisdom of that policy, or to arraign the church at the bar of public opinion for having uniformly pursued it; but we have never suffered ourselves to draw or suggest comparisons between American-born and foreign-born clergymen, and we have never forgotten that a large proportion of our laity are foreign-born, and that for them an American born and educated clergy would not be a native clergy. We refer here to what we wrote on this whole question of nativism and foreignism in the article on the Blakes and Flanagans.* And in our *Review* for October last, we say † :—“ We are as much opposed to the introduction of Know-nothingism into the church, as we are to its introduction into the state.” It is but simple justice to us to regard such expressions which abound in all our articles touching the subject, as qualifying what might otherwise seem to favor exclusive Americanism. They should be taken as indicative of our real sentiments, and if the same weight had been attached to them by our readers, which we ourselves attached to them when writing, nobody would ever have dreamed of ranking us with a party, even

* *Ante*, pp. 23-27. † *Ante*, p. 44.

supposing such a party to exist, that seeks the exclusion of foreign-born clergymen or foreign-born laymen; and we are sure that it is owing to their having been overlooked, or being regarded as insignificant, although designed expressly to save us from being misunderstood, that we have been so widely and so strangely misapprehended. Let those who have interpreted our articles as unfriendly to foreigners, or as unduly American, re-read them, and regard their qualifications which are always inserted, and suppose that we really mean by them what we say, and they will be as much surprised as we have been by their misapprehension of our sentiments.

We speak not for others: but, speaking for ourselves, we assure the archbishop that we have never contended that the principles of our religion may, by a skilful architect, be dovetailed into our civil and political principles, or that the doctrines of the Catholic Church can or should be *americanized*. The system he speaks of and justly reprobates, has always been entirely foreign to our habits of thought. As an American and a convert, and therefore thinking we might understand non-Catholic Americans better than persons who have not been born and brought up in this country, we have, presumptuously perhaps, ventured, we own, to throw out, from time to time, various suggestions as to the best manner of presenting the arguments for Catholic truth to the non-Catholic American mind. We have not hesitated to suggest, nay, to maintain, that the method usually adopted by our popular works of controversy, is not the one best adapted to make the most favorable impression. We have contended that the *arguments* for the church, not her *doctrines*, may be presented, and even ought to be presented, in a manner better fitted to affect favorably the mind of our non-Catholic countrymen. We have, also, ventured to express our conviction, that various things, not of faith, nor of universal discipline,—things usually regulated, in other countries, by concordats between the ecclesiastical and civil authorities,—may be, and need to be modified here, if we wish to secure to the church, in her temporalities, the full benefit of our civil laws. We have gone no further. We have never been in the habit of contending that the church should be conformed to the secular order, and it has, as our readers well know, been made a grave charge against us, and we have been half menaced,—in jest, we presume,—with excommunication for it, that we assert too absolutely the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal.

We have never represented the principles of Catholicity as peculiarly adapted to those of our civil and political institutions, but we have labored to prove that there is no necessary mutual repugnance between them; and therefore have concluded, on the one hand, that we may be good Catholics and loyal Americans, and on the other, that we may be loyal Americans and good Catholics. We have done even this, not for the purpose of assigning a reason why men should be either Catholics or republicans, but to refute the popular objection, that the church is incompatible with our political and civil institutions.

Undoubtedly, we have contended and still believe that there opens in this country a glorious field for the spread of Catholicity, and for the church to exert her full influence on civilization. But we have never dreamed of a neo-Catholicism, or even of a new development of Catholicity; yet we have hoped and believed, and still hope and believe, that there will be effected here, under the influence of Catholicity, a new development of *civilization*, or a higher and truer civilization, which we never confound with Christianity, than the world has hitherto enjoyed, because we believe the church has here a fairer field for the exercise of her social and civilizing influences than she has ever hitherto found. In this we do not seem to differ at all from the archbishop, who himself says:—

“But in the annals of church history, there has never been a country which, in its civil and social relations, has exhibited so fair an opportunity for developing the practical harmonies of Catholic faith, and of Catholic charity, as the United States.”

We have believed and believe that this opportunity will not be neglected, and have done what we could to urge our Catholic brethren to avail themselves of it, and thus realize on this continent, not a new and better *religion*, but a new and higher *civilization* for the world.

The archbishop does us the honor of commenting on some opinions which we are supposed to entertain, and which he appears to regard as too hopeful in respect of our countrymen. Alluding to us he says, “Whilst he, in his zeal, is sanguine of hope, that the predispositions of his countrymen, whom he knows well, are especially adapted to the reception of the Catholic religion, we fear that the reality will not correspond to the anticipation.” Yet he cannot mean this as a reproach, for he asserts, “it is a relief and a consolation to believe that one

who knows his country and his countrymen so well as Dr. Brownson, should cherish such hopeful anticipations of the future, in regard to the church of God." We presume he will agree with us that, as a general rule, hope is a better counsellor than fear, and that it is better to err by being too hopeful than by being too desponding. We are not aware of having represented the predispositions of the American people as specially favorable to the reception of Catholicity; we have always represented the great body of them as hostile or at least as indifferent to our religion; but we have believed them disposed to have some sort of religion and not likely to be much longer contented with their Protestantism. The progress of the American mind, we believe, will force them before long to choose between Catholicity and no religion, and brought to that point, they will prefer the Catholic religion to none at all. We have represented our countrymen as greatly in need of the Catholic religion, even under a political and social point of view, to cherish their patriotism and to preserve the republican liberty they so ardently love, and we have believed that, if once converted, they would carry into their Catholic life those natural virtues of boldness, energy, enterprise, and perseverance for which they are now so remarkable, because our religion does not destroy the natural, but elevates, purifies, and directs it. The archbishop is not the man to reproach us for this.

Moreover, we are not aware that, since the first year after our conversion, we have expressed any very sanguine expectations as to the speedy conversion of our countrymen. We have, indeed, combatted the discouragement, almost despair, into which the Know-nothing movement, very unnecessarily, as it seems to us, drove some of our Catholic brethren, and have done what we could to stimulate hope and zeal for the conversion of our countrymen. Undoubtedly we have continued to hope not only in spite of all untoward appearances, but even in consequence of them. The Know-nothing movement has done more in two years to bring our religion before the American people and to force them to examine it, than all our journals could have done in twenty. Why should we not hope? Does not God want this country converted? Do not the church, the saints, and all good angels pray for its conversion? Is not God, is not all heaven, is not all that is good on earth on our side, not only to encourage us to hope, but to stimulate us to exertion? What need we for the conversion of the

country, but that the Catholics in it should set about effecting its conversion with all the strength of Catholic faith, Catholic charity, and Catholic zeal? Undoubtedly it will not be converted if Catholics despair of its conversion, cease to make efforts for it, and instead of keeping alive their hope and quickening their zeal by fixing their eyes on every favorable symptom, and availing themselves of every favorable opening, they only express the hopelessness of the task, or suffer their minds to dwell only on the discouragements the enemy throws in our way, or the obstacles that are to be overcome. In a work of this sort hope tends to fulfil its own prophecy. Why shall we damp the zeal, chill the hopes, and unnerve, by our fears, the efforts of our friends? No doubt the conversion of this great country to the church is as difficult as it would be glorious; but what then? We are not obliged to do it, or to undertake it, in our own name or strength alone. When we engage with pure hearts, sincere zeal, and ardent hope in God's work,—and the conversion of non-Catholics is always God's work,—we have the right, in virtue of his goodness and his promises, to count on his working with us, and preventing our working from being in vain.

The archbishop may be thought to be less hopeful than we, but we think this would be unjust to him. We are not more hopeful than his own remarks on the Catholic press warrant us in being. He proves that the first generation have not been neglected, nor the second generation lost, as it has sometimes been alleged, and, furthermore, that under all the disadvantages under which our religion has thus far labored the church has been making progress in the country. We beg his permission to call the attention of our readers to the following extract from his well matured and eloquent pages:—

“In reference to this topic of the actual condition of the Catholic Church in this country, it is necessary to make just discriminations, before arriving at fixed conclusions. That the Catholic religion has lost not a few of the first generation, and still more of the second, is undeniable. But is this the only country in which such things happen? Are we not inundated with reports of apostasies in various parts of Ireland itself? We know the agencies by which these temporary apostasies are brought about. The progressive and awfully persuasive powers of starvation render even a false religion, which offers bread and bibles, less odious from day to day, to the wretched beings who have, at least, no alternative but a choice between death and falsehood.

“The loss to the faith in this country is of a somewhat analogous character. Among grown up and instructed Catholics, an instance of deliberate apostasy—that is, renouncing the Catholic faith, and professing

some other nominal creed, is exceedingly rare. But in vast numbers of instances the parents of children, who had emigrated to this country, died before they were able to make any provision for their unhappy offspring. In other instances, they lived, or rather languished, under the trials incident to their condition, without having the ability to imbue the minds of their children with the principles of Christian doctrine. The consequence has been, that these children, taken charge of by the public, grew up entirely ignorant, and sometimes ashamed of the creed of their fathers. Under similar circumstances, similar results would occur in any country; and no one who is impartial, will for a moment pretend that results of this kind are necessarily an evidence of the withering influence which some of our editors supposed to be exercised on the growth of Catholicity, by the civil and political institutions of the United States. There is a sense in which the church may be said to have lost those children, but a truer form of expression would be to say that she had never gained them—inasmuch as the providence of God permitted that they never had an opportunity of knowing their religion. Consequently, in their case, there has been no such thing as a renunciation of the doctrines of Catholic faith, with which it was their misfortune never to have been acquainted.

“If, on the other hand, we turn our attention to what would be a much truer test of the progress of the Catholic religion, there are abundant evidences to show that it is not retrograding. If we can point to instances in every state, in every diocese, almost in every parish, so called, in which Protestants of the most cultivated minds, most unblemished personal characters, have borne their testimony, actuated necessarily by the grace of God, to the overwhelming evidences of the truth of the Catholic religion; if this testimony has not been in theory only, but reduced to practice by their renouncing doctrines in which they had been reared, and embracing those of the one, holy, Catholic and apostolic communion, at the sacrifice of temporal interests, of long and cherished friendships, rising by that same grace of God superior to the tyranny of human respect; then who will say that our religion is not making progress in the United States, or that there is essentially any thing in its requirements incompatible with the genius and feelings of the American people? Compare these witnesses, who in mature life bear such testimony to the truth of the Catholic religion, which they embrace, with the alleged falling off of the unfortunate offspring of emigrants or others, who really never had an opportunity of knowing what that faith is, and who consequently never could, as a moral fact, renounce it, and the impartial reader will be enabled to judge, so far as the power and honor of the Catholic religion are concerned, how the balance might be adjusted between loss and gain.

“Now it is certain, that the converts to the Catholic faith in the United States are very numerous; and in point of respectability, many if not all of them, entitled to rank in the first class of American citizens—natives of the soil.

“Should we not, in gratitude to God, but in deep humility at the same time, feel great satisfaction at this result? These persons give a species of worldly standing to our religion, which, however, its Divine Founder did not leave to be dependent on the great ones of the earth. Among professional men, officers of the army and of the navy, lawyers, physicians, jurists, geologists, merchants, &c. &c., including a very considerable number of Protestant clergymen, the Catholic Church has welcomed to her fold, and taken to her bosom no small number of distinguished converts.”

To perceive the full force of this extract we must consider

what we had to do and what we have done. Here we must be permitted to cite a passage from our article on *The Blakes and Flanagans*—

“Owing to the multitude of immigrants pouring in upon us before we had had time or means to prepare for their reception, to the poverty, and we may say little education, of large numbers of them, to our want of churches, priests, and proper teachers, and the absolute necessity of providing for the administration of the sacraments to those ready to perish for the lack of them, we have not been able to do all for our children that we could wish, nor all that was necessary; but we cannot, whether native-born or foreign-born, be justly accused of having been indifferent to Catholic education; and an impartial judgment will honor us for what we have thus far done, rather than condemn us because we have not done more. That some of our children have been lost for the lack of proper looking after, we cannot deny; but all have not been lost, as is evident from the fact that the majority of us now living have been born in the country. In an old Catholic country, with permanent congregations, plenty of churches, a full supply of priests, and a completely organized hierarchy, there is all the machinery for education at hand, and it is easily placed in operation. But here all is new, and we have had every thing to create at once, in a moment, and with very inadequate means at our disposal. No suitable provision could be made for the young without the hierarchy, without priests, churches, and fixed congregations. Without these, where was to be our centre of operations, who were to be our teachers, and who were to furnish the means? We have thus far had, it would seem, enough to do to effect the ecclesiastical organization of the country, to gather congregations, erect churches, provide for the education of the clergy, and to get ourselves into a position in which we could devote ourselves to looking after and educating the children.

“We doubt if even our well-informed friends have duly considered what has been done by Catholics here since 1785, five years before the first bishop for the United States was consecrated. At that time we numbered only about thirty thousand, now we count at least two millions and a half. Then there were only four or five churches in the Union, now there are nineteen hundred and ten; then there was no bishop, now there are seven archbishops and thirty-five bishops; then there were only twenty-two or twenty-three priests, now there are seventeen hundred and sixty-one. We had then no theological seminaries; we have now thirty-three, besides five preparatory seminaries. We had no college; we have now twenty-six incorporated, and nine unincorporated colleges. There was then no female academy, and now we have one hundred and thirty-seven. Now when it is considered that three fifths of these churches have been built, and these seminaries, colleges and academies have been founded, during the last sixteen years, it must be conceded that we have not been wholly idle, or sparing of our means. When we take into the account that our colleges exceed in number those of any Protestant sect, and surpass, with three or four exceptions, in the beauty and extent of their edifices, any others in the country; that our churches number among them not a few of the largest, most splendid and costly in the Union; and add our convents, nunneries, female academies, hospitals, and orphan asylums, we are ourselves at a loss to determine whence have come the means to erect them. The means must have come, in chief part, from those who within the last thirty years have come into the country, with little except their hands and industrious

dispositions. Some help has, indeed, come from abroad, but far less than has been represented, and by no means so much as we have contributed to pious, charitable, and other objects in Ireland alone, to say nothing of any other foreign nation. While engaged in building these churches, colleges, academies, hospitals, orphan asylums, &c., we could not be expected to provide equally for the education of all our children, especially the children of the very poor; and before we had erected them, had permanent congregations organized, a spiritual home for Catholic parents provided, the hierarchy established, and a supply of priests and teachers obtained, we neither had nor could put in operation the necessary machinery for looking after and educating the mass of poor children whose parents were unable themselves, no matter from what cause or causes, to give them a proper religious training. Looking at the difficulties we have had to contend with, the much we have had to do, and the unsettled and moving character of a large portion of our population, our poverty, and our comparatively few priests and still fewer teachers, it would be unjust to blame us for the past, or to cast the shadow of reproach upon those who have thus far labored to provide for our Catholic wants. We have done much, far more than could reasonably have been expected; and if we are still behind Lower Canada, which is substantially a Catholic province, we are, as to the vigor, energy, and prosperity of our Catholicity, behind no other Catholic population on this continent."—*Ante pp.*, 27-29.

Now in doing all this our clergy have had their time and energies so engrossed that they could not direct their attention or their efforts specially to the great work of converting the country. One would think they had as much as they could do in providing the material means so essential to the preservation and prosperity of religion. Now if without the advantages we now possess, and while engaged in procuring these advantages, these material supports for the future, it is still true, as the archbishop maintains, that instances of deliberate apostasy with adults are exceedingly rare, and none of our children have been lost except those who, in consequence of the poverty or death of their parents or the inability of the clergy to reach them, were never gained to the church, or instructed in the Catholic faith; if there is no withering influence exercised by our civil and political institutions on the growth of Catholicity, and there is essentially nothing in the requirements of our religion incompatible with the genius and feelings of the American people; if the converts have been numerous, and the church has been able to gather into her fold converts from the most intelligent classes, and of the highest respectability, officers of the army and navy, lawyers, physicians, jurists, merchants, &c., including a considerable number of Protestant ministers, have we not every reason to indulge the most cheering hopes for the future? If, as he asserts, the church, under all the disadvantages of the past, has not only

held her own, but has continued to make progress in the country, what is to hinder her, now these disadvantages are in great measure removed, and we have gained a vantage ground of churches, seminaries, colleges, schools, religious houses, hospitals, asylums, and a clergy far nearer in number to our wants, from making a still greater and a more rapid progress hereafter; our losses will be fewer, and what is to hinder the conversions from being more? Evidently, it would be to misinterpret the archbishop, and to do him great injustice, to represent him as desponding, or to assume that he has not written with an express view to rebuking the complaints sometimes heard as to our alleged losses, and to establishing the fact that Catholicity is really advancing in the country. Certainly it has been his intention to encourage, not discourage, us in regard to the future of our religion in the United States. He is not, if he will permit us to say so, by any means as wanting in hopefulness as one or two of his expressions would seem at first sight to indicate. He is as hopeful as we have ever expressed ourselves, and if he thinks to the contrary, he must permit us to believe that it is because he has been led to believe that we have expressed ourselves in stronger terms than we really have. If the facts are as he himself presents them, we see nothing to prevent us from hoping that this country in time will become substantially a Catholic country.

The archbishop further alludes to us in this connection, and seems to assign us a position which we are not willing to hold, and which we have already disclaimed:—

“The learned editor of the Review, so far from being discouraged at the gloomy prospect pictured forth by one or two others in regard to the prospective decline of the Catholic religion from the period when Europeans, especially Irish emigration, shall have ceased, or been sensibly diminished, is, on the other hand, buoyant in his anticipations of the progress which the church is destined to make, as soon as she will be more generally and more widely represented by natives of the soil and less so by foreigners, who indeed, in a worldly point of view, must appear under disadvantages.”

This may be thought to imply that we stand on the side of the second system he began by describing, and that we regard the foreign immigration as an obstacle rather than as a help to the conversion of our countrymen, or to the prosperity of our religion in the United States. If such be his intention, he does us great injustice, and we respectfully, but most earnestly protest against it. In regard to those two systems, our position is precisely that which he himself, as we understand

him, occupies. Like him we reject them both. Certainly, we believe that the church has taken such deep root in our country that it could survive were immigration to cease, and certainly, also, we believe native born and bred Catholics have many advantages in dealing with their countrymen that foreigners ordinarily have not; but we have never doubted that foreign-born Catholics have other advantages which may over-balance these. Here is how we expressed ourselves on this very point in the article from which we last quoted.—

“We have, undoubtedly, reached a crisis in Catholic affairs in this country. Hitherto we have had foreign immigration, not only to provide for, but to rely upon, and the most thus far done has been done by foreign-born Catholics. Immigration is now rapidly diminishing, and seems likely to become in a few years too insignificant to mention. The future of Catholicity here, as the archbishop of New York has well remarked depends, under God, on the Catholics now in the country, the majority of whom are native-born Catholics. The responsibility now rests on us. We can no longer hope for accessions from abroad to make up for losses at home. In a short time, we shall be deprived of the wisdom, the experience, the sterling piety, zeal, and energy of those foreign-born Catholics to whom we owe our present commanding and prosperous condition. We are to be thrown back on ourselves, and left to our own resources, as native Americans. How we shall meet the crisis we know not. *We contemplate it not without some misgivings.* Yet, when we remember that the God of our fathers is our God, and that God is here as well as in old Europe we hope we shall not suffer the good work to languish in our hands. We trust the good God will not desert us, and we hope we shall do our best to prove ourselves not wholly unworthy of the trust committed to us. Yet we have a great work before us, and not easily shall we be able to prove at the end of seventy years a progress relatively as great as that made since 1785. *We are saddened as well as gladdened at the prospect before us, and fear that the children will hardly make good the places of the fathers.*” *Ante*, pp. 38-9.

The archbishop cites, with disapprobation, the following paragraph from our article on the *Mission of America*:—

“When the end we have to consult it not simply to hold our own, but to advance, to make new conquests, or to take possession of new fields of enterprise, we must draw largely upon young men whose is the future. These Catholic young men, who now feel that they have no place and find no outlet for their activity, are the future, the men who are to take our places, and carry on the work committed to us. We must inspire them with faith in the future, and encourage them to live for it. Instead of snubbing them for their inexperience, mocking them for their greenness, quizzing them for their zeal, damping their hopes, pouring cold water on their enthusiasm, brushing the flour from their young hearts, or freezing up the wellsprings of their life, we must renew our own youth and freshness in theirs, encourage them with our confidence and sympathy, raise them up if they fall, soothe them when they fail, and cheer them on always to new and nobler efforts. O, for the love of God and of man, do not discourage them, force them to be mute and inactive, or suffer them, in the name of Catholicity, to separate

themselves in their affections from the country and her glorious mission. Let them feel and act as American citizens; let them feel that this country is their country, its institutions their institutions, its mission their mission, its glory their glory. Bear with them, tread lightly on their involuntary errors, forgive the ebullitions of a zeal not always according to knowledge, and they will not refuse to listen to the counsels of age and experience; they will take advice, and will amply repay us by making themselves felt in the country, by elevating the standard of intelligence, raising the tone of moral feeling and directing public and private activity to just and noble ends.*"

Belonging as we do to the class of old men, we rather piqued ourselves on our generosity in this appeal in behalf of young men. The archbishop, as we understand him, does not object to the principle or doctrine of this appeal; he only objects to it as uncalled for, because there was no occasion for it, since the things it impliedly censures have and have had no existence. Then the worst is that we have made a needless appeal, and threw away our eloquence. This may mortify us, but it cannot be charged as a sin against faith, morals, or discipline. If, however, he has suspected in it a personal application he does us injustice, and if it has given him a moment's pain we deeply regret it, and ask his pardon. We fear he has given it an application never intended or dreamed of by us, for when we wrote this paragraph we had in our mind certain facts totally unconnected with the archbishop of New York. We are a layman, and do not regard it as within our province either to rebuke or to advise the authorities of the church in what is their own affair. We allow ourselves no liberty of the sort, and we would tolerate it in no journalist. We allow ourselves only those general remarks and appeals which we suppose any well-intentioned man, who has the interest of religion at heart, is free to make. It is possible that we less frequently have a sinister meaning in what we write than every one supposes, for we not seldom find our own simple obvious meaning overlooked, and a meaning extracted from our language and assigned to us that we never dreamed of. We regard ourselves as an honest, straightforward writer, and to suspect us of another meaning in what we say, than the one we express, is to do us great injustice. The paragraph cited has no meaning, but the one obvious on its face. If that is uncatholic, or not within our province as a journalist to express, we beg the archbishop to regard it as withdrawn.

We have touched upon all the faults the archbishop can be supposed by our unfriends to have indicated in our career as a Catholic journalist, and they are in substance: 1st, Dr. Brown-

*Brownson's Works. Vol. XI. pp. 578-9.

son takes too hopeful a view of the predispositions of his countrymen, and of the prospect of their conversion; 2d, he thinks that when the European immigration shall have ceased, or sensibly diminished, and the church is more widely represented by natives of the soil, the progress of Catholicity with his countrymen will be greater, and, 3d, he has made a solemn, almost an awful appeal for young men that was quite uncalled for. The first we have explained, so as to place us both very nearly in the same opinion, and the second we have shown is a misconception of our real position and sentiments. But supposing them all well founded, they allege nothing of a very serious character against us. Not one of them is a sin against faith, against morals, or against discipline. The most that can be said of them is, that they betray a slight error of judgment, and a rather sanguine temperament. Now, considering that we have conducted our *Review* as a Catholic periodical for twelve years, and have written for it two hundred and forty and more essays, some of them on the most difficult and delicate matters in the whole range of philosophy and Catholic theology, and considering also our extremely limited knowledge of Catholic theology, and of Catholic persons and things in the outset, the ill health, the depression of spirits, and the haste in which we have often been obliged to write, to say nothing of the distracting cares of a numerous family to provide for, educate, and settle in the world, we think we may well congratulate ourselves that the archbishop has found no graver faults to allege against us; and we cannot but believe, that had he read our *Review* with a severer disposition, he would not have let us off so easily. Certainly, we find far more in ourselves to blame and regret; and that, too, without recognizing the justice of any of the objections that have been raised against us, in relation to the question of nativism and foreignism which we have felt it necessary on several occasions to discuss.

But it is no little consolation to us to know, that whatever our faults, errors, or short-comings, the archbishop does not regard them as any serious drawback on the merits or utility of our *Review*; for if he did he would not have spoken so heartily in its praise, so heartily commended it to the Catholic public, or expressed so much regret at the prejudices that, in certain quarters, have been so unjustly excited against it. We shall be pardoned for citing his remarks in our favor:

"We regret exceedingly that many persons, at least so we have been told, are dissatisfied with some of the views put forward by Dr. Brownson. And we would regret it the more, if in reality he had given occasion for this dissatisfaction, by viewing the whole question from something like what might be called an original stand-point. At all events, there is this to be said, that if we have Catholic writers at all, their heads and their hands, their thoughts and their pens, must be guided not by another, but by themselves, in their individual capacity, and under their individual responsibility. It may be added farther, that the liberty of the press on all subjects is not to be questioned in a country like this. At the same time, there is a censorship in this as well as in other nations. The difference is, that in other countries the censorship of the press, through the medium of government agents, is exercised, in general, previously to, or simultaneously with the publication of an article—here it comes after. There, it is the judgment of an individual who acts under state authority—here, it is the censure of many individuals acting each one under the dictation of his own private judgment. Catholic editors, therefore, need not be surprised if, when they trespass too largely on the feelings of their subscribers, the circulation of their periodicals should be occasionally abridged.

"We should be exceedingly sorry if any thing of this kind should occur in the case of *Brownson's Review*. It is known to himself, at least, that several paragraphs in his writings have not been such as to merit our poor approbation. But we are told by astronomers that there are spots on the sun. And if he has written and published some things that might be offensive, he has written many others that are destined to perish never. When he and all of us shall have been consigned to the dust, writers amongst those who are to succeed us will go forth among the pages of his *Catholic Review*. 'prospecting, as they say in California, for the best diggings.' Nor will they be disappointed, if they have tact and talent for profound philosophical, literary and religious 'mining.' *But they will not give him credit.*

"But even should all other portions of his works pass away, there is one declaration of his that the writer quotes from memory, which is destined to be quoted throughout Christendom just as long as the declaration of Fenelon, on a certain occasion, when he condemned some of his own writings, because they were disapproved by the head of the Catholic Church. The circumstances and the persons differ from each other in several respects. Fenelon was an archbishop; Brownson is a layman. Fenelon condemned what he had written,—nothing that Brownson has written has been condemned; but the declaration to which we have referred, and which is imperishable, was the honorable and gratuitous proclamation from Brownson's own pen, when he embraced the Catholic faith—when he had already acquired a philosophical and literary reputation sufficient to make a proud man vain—he did not hesitate to give an example of humility that will be an edification to the Catholics of future ages as well as of the present, in stating that he 'had brought nothing into the Catholic Church except his sins.' Now there is no great eloquence in this language. It amounts to a mere truism, for whether it be the infant of three days old or the adult convert to the faith, it is all the same. Brownson brought much to the Catholic faith, but his humility would permit only the foregoing declaration to be put on record.

"We do not think, therefore, that the Catholics of New York and of the United States can afford to see *Brownson's Review* languishing or dying out for want of support. Suppose there are passages in it which some of us may not have approved of, what of that? There is not even

among these a single passage, from the perusal of which a judicious reader may not have gleaned knowledge and information. It has been useful, and we think it destined to become more and more useful, as its learned editor shall be more and more cheered in his labors by the hearty support of Catholic patronage."

We copy the pamphlet edition before us, reprinted with corrections, from *The Metropolitan*. As it appeared in *The Metropolitan*, and has been copied into several journals, it gave us some pain, for we feared a few of its expressions might be misapprehended, but as it appears in the pamphlet, with the author's corrections, it gives us none, except the pain of being thought by our archbishop, who has known us so long and so intimately, capable of allowing our national feelings to drive us into a movement in any degree hostile to Catholics not of American birth. In the *Metropolitan* edition, the archbishop is made to say, that it is known to ourselves at least, that our *Review* has contained "many articles" that have not met his approbation; in the pamphlet this is corrected: for "many articles," "several paragraphs" is substituted. The former would not be accurate; the latter is true in a general sense, although we cannot lay our finger on a single paragraph, with the exception of the one copied from our *Review* for last October, and say, this particular paragraph has been disapproved by the archbishop of New York. We know, in a general way, that our *Review* has contained paragraphs which have not met his approbation, especially on the subject of education; but we do not know what are the particular paragraphs, doctrines, propositions, or opinions, to which he objects.

We say this lest some persons should draw from his remarks, what we are sure he never intended, the conclusion, so unfavorable to us, that the archbishop has privately censured us for some articles or paragraphs in our *Review*. Such has never in a single instance been the fact. Nothing he has ever said or written to us has amounted to a censure. He has, as taking a deep interest in the prosperity of religion and in our own personal welfare, for which we can never be sufficiently thankful, from time to time, in conversation and by letter, offered us his paternal advice, and made such suggestions and observations to us as occurred to his zeal, his experience, his wisdom, and personal friendship. Differences of opinion there have from time to time existed between us, but none that we have not found him ready to tolerate or overlook. We are

bound to say that we have always found him exceedingly delicate with regard to the liberty of the press, and disposed to maintain for Catholic journalists all the freedom they can have the hardihood to ask. We have always found him in relation to those questions in regard to which there might be differences of opinion between us, disposed to concede us full liberty to follow our own judgment; and it is but simple justice to him to say that as far as we have had any relations with him, he has freely, frankly, spontaneously, given us all the liberty as an editor and writer that we can, without forgetting our Catholicity, pretend to, and we are aware of no instance in which he has shown the slightest disposition to remind us of his episcopal authority.

In the pamphlet before us, he says distinctly, "If we are to have Catholic writers at all, their heads and their hands, their thoughts and their pens must be guided, not by another, but by themselves in their individual capacity, and under their individual responsibility." In a letter addressed to us, the 29th of last August, and from which we are at liberty to make some extracts, he says, speaking of our *Review*, "Since its publication in this city, it has been my wish that your pen should be unguided by any other head or hand than your own—under, of course, a deep sense, which I know you entertain, of the responsibility devolved on a Catholic layman who conducts so important a periodical as yours." Nothing can be more liberal or more just than the doctrine here asserted, that liberty and responsibility go together, that where one is responsible he must be free, and where free he must be responsible.

We write freely, from our own mind, not from any man's dictation; but we are responsible for the use we make of our freedom. Whether we properly use, or whether we abuse our freedom, it is not for us, but for authority alone, to judge, and to its judgment, formally pronounced, we owe, and we trust shall always yield, unreserved submission. We are free within our legitimate sphere as a Catholic journalist, and authority cannot censure us, though the father may counsel us, unless we step beyond that sphere, and offend against faith, morals, or discipline. But whether we do or do not step beyond that sphere and so offend, belongs not to us but to authority to determine. If the bishop or archbishop who judges in the first instance does us wrong, our remedy is not in disobedience, resistance, or public discussion, but in appeal to

Rome, to the highest tribunal of the church. The law that governs journalists is, we take it, the same law that governs Catholics in all lawful secular pursuits. The archbishop has always been even punctilious, in our case, to acknowledge our full Catholic freedom, and he has always treated us in this respect with the greatest possible delicacy. Thus in the letter just cited, alluding to an address by the editor, given at Fordham, on the occasion of the commencement of St. John's College last July, he says, "You are aware that I did not agree with you in some of the statements contained in your address, but that right of difference of opinion is what is mutually acknowledged wherever essential principles of faith and morals are not immediately involved." The differences there have been between the archbishop and ourselves, be they more or be they less, we have always regarded, and have understood him to regard, as coming within the sphere of free opinions, where he allowed us the same right to differ from him, that he claimed for himself to differ from us; and that these differences have not diminished his interest in us personally, or impaired his confidence in our *Review*, we are assured by the letter already spoken of, addressed to us without our solicitation, and it is with sincere gratitude to him that we quote his encouraging words: "You are aware, my dear Doctor, that as regards yourself, and the *Review*, no substantial change has come over my mind from the publication of its first number. My desire is that it should increase and prosper."

There has been, in consequence of a singular misapprehension of the position and tendencies of the *Review* in relation to Catholics of foreign birth, some clamor raised and some prejudice excited against it, but as far as our knowledge extends, the good feelings and wishes expressed by him are those entertained by all our archbishops and bishops without exception. Differences of opinion on some points not of faith, and in regard to the expedience or policy of broaching certain discussions have certainly existed, and very likely still exist; but no prelate in the Union has signified to us, directly or indirectly, any loss of confidence in us or in our *Review*. The illustrious bishop of Pittsburg, who has always been one of its best friends, and for whom we have the profoundest respect, requested us to withdraw his name from the cover of the *Review*, not because he disapproved of it, not because he wished the *Review* to be discontinued, but because the secular press persisted in holding the bishops who had kindly given us their

names, by way of encouragement, responsible for all the opinions we advanced. This placed them in a false position, and was unjust, because while we enjoyed the freedom, they were made to share the responsibility. Unwilling to be the occasion of so gross an injustice to them, we, at our own accord, omitted at the beginning of the last year their names from the *Review*, so that nothing we might write should compromise them, so that the freedom and responsibility should go together, and while we took the liberty of writing what we thought proper, we alone should be held responsible. We write, as all the world knows, what we please, and we think it no more than just that we should bear the responsibility.

We have, as will be seen, commented at length on the topics presented by the archbishop in so far as related to us personally or to our *Review*, and have made such remarks, disclaimers, and explanations as seemed to us alike due to him, to ourselves, and the Catholic public. We trust we have taken no improper liberty, and have said nothing that can be construed into an offence to any one. We certainly have intended nothing of the sort. As far as we ourselves are concerned, his publication has been kindly meant, and demands our respectful and even our grateful consideration. We thank him for the interest he has taken in our welfare, and the earnest appeal he has made in our behalf. The *Review* has at times its trials, its struggles, its ups and its downs, but we do not think the Catholic public are as yet disposed to suffer it to fail for the want of support. The feeling against it in certain quarters is not so deep as might be supposed, and is at worst only temporary. There is in the Catholic community, in the laity as well as in the clergy, a deep sense of justice, and they will never fail to come to the aid of him who they see has been wronged. They have, what is more to our purpose, a deep and abiding love for every thing Catholic, and they will make almost any sacrifice to sustain a work that is sincerely Catholic and really useful to Catholic interests. As long as such is the case with our *Review*, they will sustain it, and we should regret to have them sustain it one moment longer. We look upon the crisis in our case as past. The opposition which has been somewhat severe, and has, no doubt, at times irritated us, for we are human, is not likely to increase. The discussions, which have occasioned it, have been gone through with, and are not likely to come up again. Other topics will engage our attention, and though we shall

neither try nor expect to avoid all collision of opinion, for we are and will be free spoken, we trust the current will run smoother for the future, and passion on all sides have time to subside, and mutual confidence have an opportunity to revive. With even renewed cheerfulness and hope we enter upon the fourteenth year of our *Review*, and send out the first number of its fourteenth volume, with the compliments of the season to all our friends, who we will not believe are not as numerous as ever.

AILEY MOORE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1857.]

FATHER BAPTIST has a lively fancy, a brilliant imagination, a warm gushing heart, genuine pathos, and a natural love of fun and frolic; he is a man of learning, of varied experience, and wide observation of men and things; but he is not a practised novel-writer, and lacks some of the essential elements of the true literary artist. His sketches of Irish society and especially of Irish peasant life lack the delicacy and finish of the pictures given us by Banim, Carleton, and Gerald Griffin. He overdoes his good people, deals too much in the marvellous, and fails, as a priest should, in his love scenes. His work, also, lacks unity, and properly ends with Gerald Moore's acquittal of the charge of murder. The continental scenes belong to a separate work, and the portion relating to the obsession of Emma, is told in too gross and revolting a manner, and might have been advantageously omitted. These are not precisely times when young gentleman like Frank Tyrrell are likely to be converted by witnessing exorcisms, because such things are looked upon either as mummery or superstition by our *liberal* Protestants. The author talks too much about the heart, which with him means feeling, and while justly praising the religious poor, seems to forget that the poor are not always religious. In Protestant countries they have very few of the sentiments or virtues he ascribes to them, and are

*Ailey Moore. *A Tale for the Times: showing how Exorcisms, Murders, and such like Pastimes are managed, and justice administered in Ireland, together with many stirring Incidents in other Lands.* By FATHER BAPTIST. New York: 1856.

not, under a religious point of view, much superior to the easy classes. In all Protestant countries, the poor, as a general thing, are irreligious, and seldom observe even the forms of worship. What he says is true of the mass of the Irish peasantry, but it must not be stated as true universally of the poor.

Nevertheless, *Ailey Moore* is an interesting tale, and contains materials for a dozen first-class novels. It is essentially an Irish story,—a story of Ireland's wrongs and sufferings, virtues and vices, presenting the lights and shadows of Irish life, with great truth and vividness. The author is a genuine Irishman, devoted alike to his religion and his country, and writes boldly, feelingly, and eloquently in defence of both. It is true, he tells us little that we had not been told before, but the story of Ireland's wrongs, and the sufferings of her warm-hearted peasantry for their religion and nationality, is one that will bear to be repeated, and that will always possess a harrowing interest for every unperverted heart, and especially for us Americans, since so large a portion of our population are of Irish birth or of Irish descent.

It is difficult, notwithstanding all that has been said by both friends and enemies, to form a picture of the real state of things in Ireland. When we read the writings or listen to the conversations of Irish patriots we are apt to think there is some exaggeration in the case, and that too much of what is deplorable is charged to the English government. It is difficult to avoid suspecting that a portion of the evil is to be laid at the door of the Irish people themselves, and that they have failed to make the most they could of their situation, bad as it unquestionably has been. The declamatory and passionate style in which the Irish patriots speak or write of their sufferings and the injustice of England, is not very well adapted to produce conviction in the minds of grave and unimpassioned Americans. But taking the best information we can get, and reasoning on it, coolly and impartially, we are forced to believe that it is impossible to exaggerate in the case, or to represent the wrongs which Ireland has received from the English government and the Anglo-Irish faction as greater than they actually have been. They have surpassed the power of any human language to express, especially since England became Protestant.

The English are not a bloodthirsty or a vindictive people, and though undemonstrative, they possess many noble and

generous traits of character; but taken as a body, they are proud, haughty, arrogant, conceited, narrow-minded, and bigoted. There are exceptions to this character, and exceptions much more numerous since the French revolution than before. There are English gentlemen who have travelled and had the rough corners of their characters rubbed off, their minds liberalized, and their views expanded by intercourse with the continentals, who are surpassed by no gentlemen in the world. But the genuine homebred Englishman is a bundle of conceit and prejudice, fully persuaded of his own excellence, and of the infinite inferiority of every person or thing not English. We do not believe the English have ever intended to be unjust or oppressive to the Irish, and we doubt if it is in the power of mortal man to convince them that they ever have been. It is thoroughly English to believe that an Englishman can do no wrong, and that to complain of any thing done by Englishmen is base ingratitude,—is to take an entirely false view of one's own best good, or to be carried away by faction or the blindness of party. The Englishman believes himself the noblest work of God, and that the Creator did his very best when he created him. His way of thinking and doing is the right way, and the only right way. Full of this conceit, he is unable to conceive it possible for any thing but gross ignorance or malice to dream of finding fault with any thing he says or does. He has rejected the pope, because he is his own pope, denied the infallibility of the church, because he could not admit her infallibility without denying his own. He thus strikes others, who do not hold him to be either infallible or impeccable, as arrogant and conceited, as intolerably self-sufficient, and it falls out that he is hated even when he confers benefits, and gives mortal offence even when he acts with noble and generous intentions. The English may be envied, may be feared, they may be admired for their energy, bravery, and success, but as a nation they are loved and respected by no foreign people.

It is now seven hundred years since Ireland became in some manner subject to the English crown, and yet England has not advanced a step in gaining the affections of the Irish nation. Every Irishman in whom a single spark of Irish national feeling remains unextinguished, hates the English domination, and curses the English connection. Not the slightest progress has been made towards reconciling the Irish people to the English government, or towards making them

look upon themselves as an integral portion of the empire, or its glory as their glory. The hatred of the Celt and Saxon has only been intensified and rendered ineradicable by seven hundred years of contact. This is a singular fact. The Romans were great conquerors, but after a comparatively brief time the conquered lost their hatred of their conquerors and became proud of the Roman name. Gaul was subjected by the Roman arms, and converted into Roman provinces, but it ceased to regard Rome as its conqueror, and was, when the barbarian invasions began, as loyal to the empire as Italy herself. The French have conquered Brittany and Lorraine, and annexed them to France, and yet their inhabitants, though still speaking their national language and retaining many of their old national habits and customs, regard France as their country, and are proud of calling themselves Frenchmen. Why this difference? It is not owing to difference of race, for the ancient Gauls, the modern Bas-Bretons, and the Irish are generally regarded as belonging to the same family. This difference is owing to the different genius of the respective conquerors. The ancient Roman was proud, cruel, but he could understand and respect the national feeling and religion of the conquered, in his government of them after the conquest was effected. The same can be said of the French. The Romans left the provincials their identity, and made them add to the power and strength of the empire; France, the principal heir of the Roman empire as well as of the Roman civilization, leaves also to her conquered provinces their identity, and finds her conquests adding to her power. But England tolerates nothing un-English, and makes her conquests virtual exterminations, and her conquests are never completed so long as the extermination is incomplete. The English, and in this respect we include their descendants in America, consequently ourselves, proceed always on the assumption, express or implied, that what is not English ought not to exist, and that it is impossible for a people to be prosperous, wise, virtuous, or happy in any way but the English way, or as we say here, the American way. They make war to the knife on every thing that does not smack of Englishism.

There is something remarkable in this English race both in its European and American branches. It can never live in peace with a weaker neighbor. It is hard to say what would have been the fate of Europe, if it had been a continental power. It would either have grasped the whole continent, or

it would itself have ceased to exist. It can endure no neighbors, no power beside its own, that it is able to crush. We see this in the British expansion in Asia. It has annexed nearly the whole of India, and is now annexing, or preparing the way to annex Persia on the West and China on the North. We see it also in our own expansion on this continent. We could never live in peace with the native Indians, and always contrived to pick quarrels with them, provoke them to acts of vengeance, and then make war on them, exterminate them, or drive them back, and take their lands from them. We do not annex Canada, because we should, were we to attempt it, have to reckon with the mother country, and we are not quite prepared for that as yet; but we are perpetually getting into disputes with our southern neighbors; we have already got Texas, California, and New Mexico, and we are working our way down to the Isthmus of Darien. The race seems to lack the sense of international law, and to have persuaded itself that might makes right, and that a people not able to defend its possessions has no right to hold them. The people too weak to maintain its independence has, it seems to believe, no right to exist as an independent people. How long would the little republic of San Marino have retained its separate existence had it been situated in the British Isles, or within the geographic limits of the United States?

Yet this so-called Anglo-Saxon race boasts itself the grand civilizing race of the modern world, and affects to despise all other races as inferior and semi-barbarous. But there is not a race or tribe in any part of the world that it has civilized by its arts, its arms, its missionaries, or its colonists, at least since the Norman conquest. It has gained no conquests to civilization in the East. It has gained none in the West. Undoubtedly, the United States are a civilized state where three hundred years ago roamed only savage tribes. Yet it has become so not by civilizing those tribes, but by driving them out. The colonists brought their civilization with them and transmitted it more or less impaired to their descendants, but they have never extended it to the original inhabitants. They did not civilize the Indians, they exterminated them. Now a race which civilizes no savage or barbarous people, can by no allowable figure of speech or stretch of the imagination be called a civilizing race, for it civilizes nobody, although civilized itself. We acknowledge the race possesses noble and generous traits, that it is a strong and energetic, a bold and adventurous race,

and England has retained its old constitution in greater integrity and vigor than any continental nation of Europe; but we have never been able to detect, at least since it became Protestant, the least benefit resulting from its influence in foreign nations. Its embrace is fatal. No nation has been benefited by its alliance or its protection. And its diplomatic influence in foreign states and empires has invariably been hostile to the progress of civilization. The only thing for which we are able to commend the external policy of Great Britain, is that, after having lost the monopoly of the slave trade, she abolished it, and exerted her influence to induce other nations also to abolish it. Yet the slave trade is still carried on.

Now this Anglo-Saxon race, to which probably we ourselves have the honor of belonging, is the worst race on earth to have the government of another and less energetic race; simply because of its undoubting belief in its own perfection, and its native inability to view any question from the standpoint of another race, or from any point of view save that of its own central life. It is philanthropic, I believe really more philanthropic than any other existing race, but its own intense egotism renders its philanthropy more fatal than the intense selfishness of others. It can conceive no possible way of serving any people but that of forcing upon them its own ideas, religion, and institutions. It lacks the sense of fitness, and does not conceive that the English is only one type among many, all equally types of excellence. Its injustice to Ireland, we do not believe has been consciously intended, but has resulted from its bigoted attachment to its own religion and nationality, and its honest belief that to force Englishism upon the Irish would be conferring on them the greatest possible benefit. Hence its determination to destroy both the Irish nationality and the Irish religion. It would make of the lively, mirth-loving, and devout Irishman, whose element is society, and whose life is faith, a cool, staid, sombre, unbelieving, undemonstrative, isolated English Protestant. With this thought England has, since the reformation at least, governed, or misgoverned Ireland. In order to carry out this thought she has been obliged to deprive the Catholic and national party of all power, of all property, of all rights, and to bestow all her favors on the Anglo-Irish faction, to maintain the Protestant ascendancy, and to govern through it. She confiscated the land to the benefit of Protestant adventur-

ers, or to base apostates from their religion and country, reduced the mass of the Catholic and national population to the deepest poverty, and placed them in abject dependence on Protestant landlords for the very means of earning their bread by the sweat of their faces. They were rendered incapable of acquiring landed property, they were outlawed for their religion, and placed completely in the power of their bitterest and deadliest enemies. They were exposed to the caprice of the landlord, and what was still worse, to the upstart power and grasping avarice of the middleman. Their churches were taken from them, their clergy were outlawed, and hunted down by armed soldiers; they were robbed of their schools, forbidden to go abroad for education, and forbidden to be taught even letters at home, unless in a Protestant school, and therefore obliged to grow up in ignorance or to give up their religion. They were poor and could not purchase justice, powerless and could not command it. They had no redress for wrongs, and were at every moment, and in almost every relation of life, exposed to the tender mercies of their most unrelenting enemies, who counted it a virtue to maltreat a papist.

Taking these facts into consideration it is very clear to us that the Irish do not exaggerate the wrongs they have received at the hands of England, or attribute more than its share in their miserable condition to the British government. The severity of the penal laws is now indeed relaxed, and Catholics can now acquire, hold, and transmit property as well as Protestants, but the feelings and habits of three hundred years' growth are not changed in a moment, and the old hatred and contempt still remain. The government still seeks for the most part to maintain the old Protestant ascendancy, govern Ireland through the Anglo-Irish faction, and to exclude as far as possible Catholics from all real power to protect themselves. Catholics may be appointed, as with us they may be elected, to office, but they have little or no power to serve their Catholic friends, and to retain place and influence must often show themselves more severe against them than would a liberal-minded Protestant. With us a Catholic is well-nigh lost to Catholicity the moment he is clothed with official dignity. And it is, we suppose, pretty much the same in Great Britain and Ireland. Catholics are there as well as here the weaker party, and there as well as here, though we are inclined to believe more so here than there, justice without power to back it

need not expect to be listened to. The party without power, conscious of its weakness, is forced in some measure, to supply by cunning its lack of strength. Its very existence depends on it.

These considerations sufficiently explain the state of things described in *Ailey Moore*, and make us look with a lenient eye on the short-comings of some of the Irish characters introduced. The virtues of the Irish are their own, their faults, and faults they have, are for the most part due to the unjust and blundering policy pursued by Protestant England for three hundred years towards them.

We cannot analyze the story of *Ailey Moore*, or give our readers any account of its plot or plots. We find in it a great variety of characters, the weak-minded, extravagant, and unprincipled landlord; the miserly, grasping, oppressive, intriguing, cowardly, and black-hearted agent; the Protestant parson and his wife, the Catholic priest, the angelic Ailey Moore, and her high-minded and accomplished brother Gerald, the pattern of a Christian and a gentleman; their friends, Frank Tyrrell, and his sister Cicely, persons of condition, pure and noble-hearted, destined to be converted; their uncle, the baron, who though a Protestant, would seem to be as good as any Catholic; sopers, villains, beggars; evicted peasants starving, dying, or driven to exile or desperation; the bold, fine-hearted, and energetic Ribbon-man, who takes upon himself the character of "the whip of justice," and his confederates, soldiers, policemen, pimps, virgins, assassins, profligates, the devil, &c. The chief interest of the story turns on the attempt of the agent to get Gerald convicted of murder, and to wreak his vengeance on the Moores, who have rejected his proposal for a matrimonial alliance with "our own Ailey." The real hero of the story, however, is Shaun a Dherk, the Ribbon-man, and Bidy Brown, or Gran', the beggar woman, is the heroine. Ailey is beautiful, highly accomplished, very pious, very charitable, and devoted to her old pastor, Father Quinlivan, but she is too ethereal for an earthly heroine, too unreal for flesh and blood. Gerald, though brave, and a great artist, does not effect much save to stop at great personal risk a runaway horse, rescue an innocent, beautiful Irish girl from a house of prostitution in London, whither she had been entrapped through the simplicity of her old servant, and paint his mistress as Judith, and idealize his sister into a *Mater Amabilis*. The dramatic power of the author shows itself to the best ad-

vantage in what he regards as his subordinate, and fails him in the higher and more ideal, characters. He tells us how great, good, noble they were, but he does not let us see it in their actions. Their virtue appears to have been too sublime for representation.

Father Baptist, as in duty bound by his profession, condemns Ribbonism, but it is very clear that his heart is with Shaun a Dherk, and his book will make a hundred Shaun a Dherks to one it will convert to law and order. Will the reverend author permit us to remark that the evident sympathy with which he describes the Ribbon-man and his doings, detracts much from the effect of his condemnation of Ribbonism? We may in our writings depict truthfully what we hold to be wrong, and suggest all the palliatives or excuses possible for those whose conduct we must disapprove, but to depict it with evident sympathy, and to enlist the judgment or the passions of our readers on its side, is not allowable, and we make but poor amends for the countenance we thus give to what is wrong, by a formal and professional condemnation of it at the end. Father Baptist enlists our sympathies with Shaun a Dherk, and gives us admirable reasons for defending him. When the law ceases to afford protection, when it is made by its administrators only an instrument of oppression, it ceases to bind in conscience; civil society is dissolved; men are thrown back under the law of nature, where every man becomes his own protector, and resumes the natural right of vindicating justice, and of doing whatever is not *malum in se*. On this principle alone can the Irish Ribbon-men and our Vigilance Committees justify themselves. Now the question we ask Father Baptist, is, Is the state of things in Ireland such as to justify the appeal to this principle? If he says, yes, then why does he condemn Shaun a Dherk, and exclude him from the sacraments, solely because he resorts to it? If he says, no, does he do well to enlist his own and his readers' sympathies on his side? Is it wise to inflame our passions, work us up to a sort of madness, make us just ready to strike, and then come in with wise saws, and Gospel lectures, and tell us to forbear? Why work us up to a fit of mutiny, and then forbid us to mutiny, but exhort us to be patient and forgiving? Why bring the curse to our lips, and then tell us to bless? Is this treating us fairly? Either do not arouse our vindictive passions, or give them full swing. We do not say that the reverend father is wrong in condemning Shaun a Dherk, but he is

wrong in our judgment, if he means to condemn him, in first justifying him, and enlisting all our human feelings in his support. It is not well to present nature and grace in opposition when we can help it, or to arm the passions against the authority of the priest. Authority should never create obstacles to itself, or enlist human nature unnecessarily against its commands.

There is here the great moral objection to a large portion, and that in general the better portion, of our popular literature. The author winds up usually with an admirable moral, but a moral in direct opposition to all the passions, feelings, and sympathies, his work during its perusal has excited. Now this moral tagged on to the end has seldom any power to counteract the mischief done before we reach it. *Ailey Moore* makes us curse the oppressors of Ireland, and we cannot read it without feeling that were we in Ireland, Shaun a Dherk should have in us a recruit, and one who would make war in every possible way to the death upon the base oppressors of Ireland's peasantry. We are maddened. We can hear nothing but one deep, concentrated cry of vengeance, and in vain while in this state will the author, priest as he is, seek to hold us back. If he means to manage me, to make me obey him, and follow his peace counsels, he should not first madden me, deprive me of all self-control, except in accordance with the master passion he has inflamed.

However, we can easily conceive that such books should have in Ireland far less influence in arousing vindictive passions than might at first sight be supposed. The daily reality is worse than any picture can represent it. The book is comparatively tame and feeble to those who suffer the things we only read of. The reading, no doubt, to them operates as an anodyne, and allays more than it arouses passion; and after all the concessions the author makes to lacerated feelings and the weakness of human nature, may even prepare his readers for the moral he would enforce. The author knows his countrymen better than we do, knows far better through what avenues to reach their hearts, and their understandings, and to make them love the Gospel, and yield to its blessed spirit, and we cannot doubt the purity or charity of his intentions.

We conclude our brief notice by recommending *Ailey Moore* to the public, and adding our voice to that of so many others in its praise. The author is, if we are not mistaken in his identity, one of the most active and zealous priests in Ireland,

—one who is devoting himself day and night to the means of saving our young men, and making them feel that they can not only do something for themselves, but also something for the honor and glory of God in the prosperity of religion.

THE YANKEE IN IRELAND.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1860.]

WHO Mr. Paul Peppergrass is the Catholic public already know. They know him as the author of *Shandy Maguire*, and the *Spawife*, both of which have had their admirers. *Mary Lee, or the Yankee in Ireland*, his last work, was originally published in *The Metropolitan*, and is now collected and published in a neat volume, carefully revised, and considerably changed by the author. It is not precisely to our taste, but it is, in its way, a work of merit, and indicates both genius and ability on the part of its distinguished author. It would, however, have come before us with better grace if it had been written by an Irishman in Ireland instead of by an Irishman in America. We should think it in very bad taste, to say the least, for an American to emigrate to Ireland, choose that country for his home, and to write and publish a novel, called, say, *Bridget Flynn, or Paddy in America*, designed to show up the Irish both at home and abroad. The Irish would hardly thank him for so doing, or regard him as treating his adopted countrymen with the consideration and respect due them. We know no reason why an Irishman migrating to this country, and making it his home, should take greater liberties with us than his countrymen would be willing an American settled in Ireland should take with them. But this is a small matter; for if what is written is true and just, it should be accepted without any one troubling himself with the question by whom or where it is written or published.

The author is an Irishman, bred and born in Ireland, and ought to know his countrymen far better than we; but, though he undoubtedly seizes certain salient features of their charac-

**Mary Lee, or the Yankee in Ireland.* By PAUL PEPPERGRASS, Esq. Baltimore: 1860.

ter, he must forgive us if we say his estimate of them, as we collect it from the characters introduced into his book, is far below ours. His book strikes us, as far as we have known them, to be a caricature, we had almost said libel, of the Irish national character. The Irish, in spite of all the disadvantages under which they labor in this country, are far more worthy of our love and esteem than they are as they appear in the pages of Paul Peppergrass, Esq.; and if he be really just to them, the words he puts into the mouth of Dr. Henshaw, near the close of the book, are none too severe:—

“‘He’s not the only one,’ said Dr. Henshaw, coming up behind, ‘has seen enough of Ireland. My own exproience of the country is vary short, but I think I’ve seen plenty to know it’s rather a hard place for strangers who are fond of their comforts.’

“‘You must matriculate, doctor,’ said Father John, good-humoredly.

“‘Matriculate!’

“‘Certainly. And after that you’ll feel quite at home.’

“‘Humph!’ ejaculated the doctor. ‘My matriculation then—as you call it—is ended, for I leave to-morrow.’

“‘To-morrow!’ repeated the captain; ‘nonsense! By the Lord Harry, my dear fellow, you’ll do no such thing.’

“‘To-morrow, sir, at daybreak; you may rest assured of it.’

“‘What! and Mary Lee to be married to-night, and Uncle Jerry to dance at the wedding! you mustn’t think of it.’

“‘I’ve made up my mind, captain.’

“‘But Kate—you know Kate has an apology to make about that quarrel you’ve had. She’ll never forgive you if you don’t come with us to Castle Gregory.’

“‘No, sir, I’ve been once at Castle Gregory, and that I think is quite enough for me. I thank you, captain, however, for your proffered hospitality.’

“‘But, my dear sir,’ urged the captain, ‘I should feel very sorry to have you leave with bad impressions of the country.’

“‘Humph!’ said the doctor, in reply, ‘I’m vary much inclined to think, if I remained longer, they would grow worse.’

“‘Worse!’

“‘Ay, sir, worse. Here’s abduction, robbery, forgery, riot, and murder, all in a single week. Good Heavens! Sir, there’s not such another country on the face of the globe, and what makes its condition the more deplorable is, that its religion is no longer able to redeem it.’

“‘Its religion!’ said the priest.

“‘Yes, sir; there’s not even the ghost of your old Katholeecity remaining. No, sir; what’s left is but syllabub and water gruel.’

“‘I’m sorry you think so.’

“‘And so am I too, sir. But so it is—between your deeviltry and your Katholeecity, I have had enough of Ireland. Good-by, gentlemen, good-by!’ and the doctor, having taken his leave of the party, thrust his thumbs into the arm-boles of his waistcoat, and wended his way slowly to the village inn.”

The Irish are, no doubt, impulsive, imaginative, with whom sentiment and affection, as with most people, have more weight

than logic; they love fun and frolic, and abound in both smiles and tears, but we have entirely mistaken their character, if they do not act far more from principle and less from mere impulse, and if they are not a far more sedate and self-sustained people than our author represents them. Indeed, none of the Irish writers of fiction seem to us to do full justice to the Irish character, not even Gerald Griffin. The best of them fail to catch the heroic element of the Irish nature, or to bring out its poetry. The Irish are, as they represent them, a mixture of the ascetic and the rowdy, the saint and the rapparee, great in a row, intractable and treacherous in the cause of liberty and nationality. The pictures of Irish life and character in Banim, Carleton, Lever, Lover, and even our author, make us weep over the sufferings of the Irish people, excite our pity, but rarely win our love or respect. As we read these authors, we feel that, say what they will against the English, Irishmen deserve the credit of being the worst enemies of Ireland. They present us black-hearted villains, and cold-blooded criminals whom it would be difficult to match among any other people; and they seldom fail to represent the Irish as regarding as simple venial offences, or no offences at all, things which other nations usually regard as great sins or grave crimes. We confess, that we do not trust these authors and we look upon their pictures of Irish life, manners, and society, as coarse caricatures, almost as gross libels. They are untrue, and do more to degrade the Irish in the estimation of Englishmen and Americans than could be done by a thousand such journals as *The Times*. No people have suffered so much from their own national writers, and they actually appear to better advantage in foreign than in native authors, who seem, in striving to exalt their countrymen, to succeed only in writing them down.

Now this is a phenomenon we should like to see explained. The Irish people seem to us, if not all that some of their writers would have us believe, to be inferior to no people in the world, in genuine mother wit, quickness of parts, sagacity, shrewdness, intelligence, religion, virtue, intellectual capacity, bravery, and true heroism. They furnish more than their quota of the best soldiers and officers, the first orators and statesmen, authors, journalists, and artists in the English-speaking world. They very nearly control the press and the politics of our own country, and the descendants of their exiles are honorably distinguished in Spain, France, and Aus-

tria. They are more imaginative, more genial, more brilliant, more poetic than the Scotch or English, and have no less romance in their hearts or in their history; and yet in the pages of their own national writers they bear no comparison with the English in the pages of English, or the Scotch in the pages of Scottish, national writers. Why is this? Why is it that Irish fiction almost uniformly paints the Irish hero as a rollicking, hard-drinking, fighting, blundering, devil-may-care, though, perhaps, a good-hearted fellow, and the Irish people without manliness or dignity, as compounded of fine sentiments and atrocious deeds, tenderness and ferocity, servility and independence, suspiciousness and confidence, fidelity and treachery, obedience and rebellion, bravery in a row or faction fight, and cowardice and imbecility in the national cause? Is it that we do not rightly understand the Irish national writers, and that they make an entirely different impression on us from that which they make on their own countrymen? Is it that in the low and base qualities they ascribe to them, or in the villains and criminals they present, they draw on their imaginations alone, and so overdo the matter, as do all who have not experience or knowledge for their guide? We sometimes think these writers owe their popularity to the very innocence of their countrymen, and to the fact, that they make their appeal not to their experience, but to their love of the marvellous, and to their fondness for fun and practical jokes. Probably the greatest practical joke possible would be to take their pictures as faithful pictures of Irish society. We can explain the fact, only by supposing that these writers address themselves to one or two traits in the Irish character, and neglect its deeper and nobler elements.

However this may be, we tell Paul Peppergrass, Esq., that we do not trust his account of his own countrymen, save in mere external and local coloring. There may be such characters in Ireland as he draws—characters which you cannot respect, though often such as you cannot help liking, much against your will. There are deeper, stronger, nobler, and more manly elements in the Irish character than he draws forth, and the Irish, when thoroughly understood, present as much to respect as to love and admire. To give them credit only for mere shrewdness, cunning, practical jokes, buffoonery, and revengefulness, even though mingled with many generous impulses, is to do them gross injustice, and to degrade them

from the high rank they are entitled to in the scale of nations. The great fault we find with our author and the class of writers to which he belongs, is not that he and they give the Irish more, but far less than they deserve, that instead of presenting the better side and nobler elements of their character, they seize upon its darker side, its lighter traits, or its defects even, and exaggerate and caricature them, till the real likeness almost wholly disappears. We wish some Irish Walter Scott would make his appearance and give to the genial, and warm-hearted, and, we add, brave and heroic Irish people, their true interpretation in English literature.

We hope Mr. Peppergrass is a good enough patriot to forgive us these criticisms on his delineation of Irish character, and the frank expression of our opinion, that his countrymen are far better than he paints them. We think better of them than he does, although we have never been, and are not blind to their faults, for no people are ever faultless. Our strictures do not, however, extend to all the characters in the book before us. Mary Lee is a sweet, charming girl, but is kept too much out of sight. We hear much of her, but hardly catch a glimpse of her beautiful face and lovely form. Kate Petersham is a glorious creature, full of life and mischief, tender and affectionate, leal-hearted and true, but the author has judged wisely not to marry her; for a young lady who prides herself on sailing a boat, or riding a steeple chase, "with the best blood in the county," is not precisely the woman a quiet man would take for his wife. Uncle Jerry is generous, even to a fault, but unmanned by disappointed affection. The priest, Father John, is very well, but nothing very remarkable one way or another. Captain Petersham is a good-hearted, whole-souled fellow, full of good impulses, and full also of inconsistencies, free from all malice, with his heart in the right place; constantly offending and apologizing, one whom you cannot respect much, but cannot help liking. He is not a very loyal magistrate.

The Yankee, Mr. Ephraim C. B. Weeks, is, of course, a cool, calculating villain, with a great contempt for the Irish, and a high opinion of his own country as well as of his own ability and acuteness, who visits Ireland on a matrimonial speculation, in which he also, of course, fails. Paddy proves too sharp for Jonathan, who is unable to stand before even an Irish goat, or to manage even an Irish pony. We see in the exigencies of the story, no great necessity for introduc-

ing a Yankee at all. An Irish adventurer might have played the part assigned him just as well, and in real villainy his Irish cousin, Hardwrinkle, far surpassed him. The only motive for introducing him was to show up a live Yankee, and the universal Yankee nation. In this the author is not entirely successful. Abroad, the term Yankee designates any white native-born citizen of the United States; at home it designates only a white native of one or another of the six New-England states. It does not appear in which of the two senses the author takes the term. Weeks is represented as a merchant, and a native of Connecticut; but he is also represented as a Virginia slaveholder, and as an overseer on a Virginia plantation, and nigger-driver. We cannot very well reconcile these several characters in the same person. Weeks is too low and vulgar in his language and pronunciation for any one of the characters assigned him. His vulgarisms are such as are heard only from the very coarsest country bumpkin, and some of them are never heard from any one born and brought up in Connecticut. Any man who knows well the United States, can easily tell to which state any native American he meets belongs, from his provincialisms and intonation. The intonation of Weeks belongs to Maine, his religion to Massachusetts, his notions of trade to Connecticut, and his provincialisms in part to the South and West. Weeks says he was *raised* in Connecticut: but that is not a Connecticut locution. They say at the South and West, "I was raised," but if ever in New England it is a neologism. The educated classes, and nearly all are educated in New England, say "I was brought up." In New England they *raise* stock, rye, corn, potatoes, &c., but they *bring up* children. The country people in our younger days, sometimes, said, in the same sense, "I was *fetched up*," and now and then one would say, "I was *broughten up*." Moreover, the author makes Sambo, who had been a slave, call Weeks, "Massa Charles," which indicates that Weeks had been Sambo's master, or his master's son, otherwise Sambo would not have called him by his Christian name. No American can possibly locate Weeks, and there is no one, who knows the country well, who would not pronounce him an impossible Yankee, in either sense of the word, and as much a foreigner as the celebrated Sam Slick himself,—a pleasant creation enough, but no Yankee in character or dialect, though possibly, for aught we know, a genuine Blue-nose. Taken as a representative character, Weeks represents no

national character we ever heard of; and taken as an individual, representing only himself, he may be a "Yankee in Ireland," but not in America. Ephraim has, we admit, certain American features, and some few exaggerated American notions, but he was never born or brought up in Yankee land. Had he been a true Yankee he would never have spoken contemptuously of the Irish in Ireland, at the moment he was trying to get him an Irish wife, or have given Else Curly four hundred dollars for charms and love philters. He would have been too *cute* and too close for that. If the author fails as much in his Irishman as in his Yankee, he is wholly untrustworthy.

In the work, as originally published in the *Metropolitan*, we had another Yankee, Dr. Horseman, who in this edition, we regret to see, is converted into a Scotsman, Dr. Henshaw, and from a Yankee to a Scotch reviewer. The change is no improvement, and mars the artistic merit of the book. There is no good reason for introducing Dr. Henshaw at all, and the worthy doctor is only an intruder. Who was intended to be shown up under the name of Dr. Horseman was no secret, and the motive for showing him up was obvious enough. The editor of this *Review* had the honor to sit for Dr. Horseman, and though the limner did not succeed in getting a very good likeness, he nevertheless, by means of certain labels, contrived to let the public know whom he intended to represent. There were, also, two or three points of actual resemblance between the editor and Dr. Horseman. Dr. Horseman chewed tobacco, and the editor sometimes, also, chews the "weed;" Dr. Horseman wore gold-bowed spectacles, and the editor also wears gold-bowed spectacles; Dr. Horseman spoke in a gruff, harsh voice, and the editor's voice is said to be a deep bass, and not very musical. These three points served to identify the original, especially since it was added that the picture was the portrait of a Yankee Catholic reviewer, there being but one such reviewer in the world. The motive also was plain. The author felt himself aggrieved by the reviewer's handling of his previous works, and wished, no doubt, to pay him off somewhat as Byron did his "English Bards and Scotch Reviewers." He also wished to rebuke the editor's indiscreet zeal and earnestness in insisting on the doctrine that, out of the church there is no salvation,—a doctrine quite incompatible with the false liberalism some Catholics affect, and finally, to prejudice him as much as he could in the minds of Irish

Catholics. Now here were motives enough, and fair motives enough too. An author has the right to show up his reviewer, if he can, to rebuke indiscreet zeal and misdirected earnestness, and to warn his countrymen against one whom he regards as their enemy. Mr. Peppergrass did it in Dr. Horseman as well as he could, and really made one or two hits, which we have enjoyed, and said one or two things, though in rather an ungracious tone, which we have endeavored to profit by.

Now by changing Dr. Horseman into Dr. Henshaw, the Yankee into a Scotch reviewer, the appropriateness of this part of *Mary Lee* disappears, and the author's satire loses its edge. Except to those who remember Dr. Horseman, Dr. Henshaw is nobody, serves no purpose, and has no right to be among the *dramatis personæ* of the book. We hope the author in his next edition will restore our Yankee friend, Dr. Horseman. Dr. Henshaw, in spite of his Scotch pronunciation of a few words, is no Scotsman, has nothing of Sawney in his mind, heart, or soul. No, let us have back the Yankee reviewer. It is true, there were a few personalities in the original edition, but we never complained of them; they never disturbed us for a moment, save we thought they were not quite so well done as they might have been, and were coarse rather than witty. Dr. Horseman did not offend us, and if he had done so, Dr. Henshaw would offend us still more. The author had no occasion to make any change on our account. We do not think him a good limner, but it is not likely that posterity will recur to *Mary Lee* for our portrait. We love a joke as well as any Irish friend we have, and, within the limits of becoming mirth, we can even be mirthful ourselves. The author need have no fear of our treasuring up any unkind feelings against him. His implied apology would have been amply sufficient, even had he really offended us, which he did not. So here is our hand, Father John,* only give us back our friend, Dr. Horseman, and remember for the future that Jonathan can bear with good humor a joke, even at his own expense, if it lack not the seasoning of genuine wit.

Enough of this. As a work of art, *Mary Lee* has grave defects; as a picture of life and character, we do not think it just, or trustworthy; but as a work intended to amuse, and to recall to the author's countrymen in their exile, the memory of

*[The real name of the author of *Mary Lee*, was John Boyce, a priest of the diocese of Boston.—Ed.]

scenes and incidents in their own native land, to brighten the face with a smile, or to moisten the eye with a tear; to cheer up the spirit, or to make the weary pilgrim forget for a moment his weariness and his burden,—what we presume has been the aim of the author,—it deserves high praise, and will give pleasure and consolation to many a one who can never forget, and never should forget, his own natieland, or the scenes, incidents, and associations of his early life in his own childhood's home. Under this, the true point of view, *Mary Lee* is a good, as well as an amusing book. The literature of every nation, if really national, has a genius and character of its own, and in some sense its own peculiar morality. We must never judge the literature of one people by that of another, or suppose its effect on the readers of the nation that has produced it, must necessarily be what it would be on readers of another and widely different nation. Much in *Mary Lee* would have no good influence on American readers, and yet we must not thence infer that its influence will be bad on those for whom it is written. In the Irish mind and heart much that we should object to will be corrected, and the Irish reader will extract only honey where another reader might extract only poison.

The author objects to Dr. Horseman,—we beg his pardon, Dr. Henshaw,—that in reviewing purely literary works, he brings in his Catholic faith and morals, as if no one could lawfully write or speak without writing or speaking St. Thomas. We suspect Dr. Henshaw was never quite silly enough for that, and that the author is guilty of his usual exaggeration. Dr. Henshaw would most likely tell him, that a Catholic reviewer has the right, if he sees fit, to review any book under the point of view of Catholic faith and morals, and no other; and that, too, without holding or implying that every book must positively teach Catholic faith and morals; for no man, certainly no Catholic, has the right to hold or teach, to publish or practise any thing not in accordance with the dogmas and morals of the church. The reviewer may, for reasons of his own, pass over the literary and purely artistic merits of a book sent him, and speak of it only under its doctrinal or moral character; and in doing so no one has any right to infer that he recognizes no such thing as literary merit, or has no appreciation of merely literary, artistic, or poetic beauties. Because we tell Mr. Peppergrass that it would be very improper for him to smoke his cigar, dance a hornpipe, or sing "O'er the

water to Charlie," in a church during Mass, it does not follow that we are hostile to a good cigar, to dancing, or to a good Jacobite song, in proper times and places, any more than it follows from the fact that in setting forth truth, vindicating its claims, and refuting error against it, we use logic, and insist on rigid logic, we recognize only logic, and are unable to appreciate the value of a heart, or of gentleness and affection. It is necessary to have a heart; it is also convenient to have a head, and sometimes it is not amiss to use it. Dr. Henshaw would, no doubt, admit the heart, and would only object to exhibiting it where the head is more appropriate. Every thing in its time and place.

We do not ask the writer of fiction to teach dogma or moral theology, but we do ask him to avoid doing any thing to offend either. We love amusement, and can enjoy mirth, whether in old or young, as keenly as any son or daughter of the Emerald Isle, but only on condition that neither is purchased at the expense of faith or morals, or suffered to interfere with the grave duties of our state in life. We read, perhaps, as many works of light literature as any of our neighbors, and are as able to appreciate them; and we do what we can to encourage them, within the limits allowed by reason or duty. But not, therefore, is it necessary that in reviewing a book we should look only to its literary merits, and consider only its capacity to interest or amuse. We suppose it competent for us to take into the account whether the interest it excites or the amusement it affords is an innocent interest or an innocent amusement. When Kate leaps Moll Pitcher over a six foot wall, flanked by ditches, and does it without any necessity, I may admire her courage and horsemanship, but still hold that it is a rash act, and one not to be applauded. We may admire the cunning, the dexterity, and skill of Lanty in his various tricks, and yet think some of them such as no honest man can play. We do not ask that every essay should be a homily, that every story should have a moral tacked to the end, like one of Æsop's Fables, or that every song should be a sacred hymn, or a divine psalm. We are willing to give nature fair play, but we are not willing to commend nature when it opposes faith or morals. We admire Swift, but we would not commend his *Tale of a Tub*, or recommend writers to copy his smut, although his genius was great, his patriotism praiseworthy, and he, for the most part, one of the most elegant writers in the language.

With regard to another point made against Dr. Henshaw, that he is harsh and bitter in his personal address to Protestants, we acknowledge that any one behaving as the doctor is said to have behaved is rude, ill-bred, and savage, and that we know nothing that can excuse him. There is nothing in our religion that forbids one to be a gentleman, or to observe the usual courtesies of civilized life. But there is a difference between laying down for the public at large the doctrines of the church as she teaches them, or refuting the errors against them, and speaking face to face with one who, though not yet a Catholic, is not indisposed to be convinced of the truth of our religion. In the latter case, as in the former, one must be firm and uncompromising, but should consider the state or temper of mind of the particular individual he is addressing, and speak accordingly. There is no harm in having a little *savoir-faire*, but never should we hesitate to impress, as far as in our power, on any one we converse with on the subject, that salvation is attainable in our church, and not elsewhere.

BURNETT'S PATH TO THE CHURCH.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1860.]

THE Appletons have, since the beginning of the year, published the anxiously looked for work of Governor Burnett, of California, giving in full his reasons for becoming a Catholic. The work is a goodly octavo, very well printed and done up, and must rank among the graver and more important contributions to Catholic literature made in this country. It is the work, not of a priest, nor of a professional theologian, but of a clear-headed, strong-minded lawyer, who has not suffered the law to make him forget he has a soul, or to stifle his conscience. It may have some of the defects, especially the prolixity, to which members of the legal profession are occasionally subject, and the objects may not always be grouped according to their relative size and importance; but it is written in a clear, forcible and unpretending style, in a straightforward,

* *The path which led a Protestant Lawyer to the Catholic Church.* By PETER H. BURNETT. New York: 1860.

earnest manner, and is to be judged not as a mere literary performance, but as the grave utterance of a man who really has something to say, and is pressed by an internal necessity to say it.

What strikes the reader at a glance, in this remarkable volume, is its perfect honesty and sincerity. As you read it you feel that the eminent jurist is honestly retracing the path and detailing the successive steps by which he actually came into the church; and it has a very high psychological value aside from its positive and conclusive arguments, for the objective truth of Catholicity or the divine foundation and constitution of the Catholic Church. The whole tone and character of the work inspire confidence in the author, as a fair-minded man, as a candid judge, and as one who would be as incapable of knowingly deceiving another as of deceiving himself. He has evidently inquired earnestly and honestly for the truth for his own mind, and he gives the results of his inquiries for precisely what he found them worth to himself. It is always of great interest to see what has convinced a conscientious mind, intent on saving its own soul, endowed with more than ordinary ability, highly cultivated, strengthened by varied experience, and accustomed to sift and weigh evidence as a lawyer in the most difficult and intricate cases.

The argument of the book is presented under the legal form, by the judge who sums up the case and gives his decision, rather than as presented by the advocate. To one who is familiar with the pleadings, the law, and the evidence, there can be little that is absolutely new in the argument, but the manner of putting it and of grouping the facts which must determine the ultimate decision. These strike us as original, and we do not recollect to have ever seen the argument more forcibly put or more ably and convincingly conducted. It is an argument addressed to reason and good sense, not to passion or sensibility; and we cannot conceive it possible for any fair-minded man to read it and not be convinced, although we can conceive that many a man may read it and not acknowledge himself convinced. The difficulty is, that the mass of non-Catholics, unless already touched by the grace of God, have a mortal repugnance to finding the Catholic Church proved; and the more legitimate and conclusive the argument addressed to them, the less legitimate and conclusive will they find it. They are not accustomed to find or to expect certainty in matters of religion, and they feel it a sort of insult to their under-

standings when you present them a religion which demands and seems to have certainty. The author has a truly legal mind, and he brings every question to the law and the testimony, and insists on a verdict accordingly—whereas the mass of our non-Catholics recognize no law or testimony in the case, and suppose all depends on one's own fancy or caprice. They look upon religion either as a vague speculation or still vaguer feeling. Argue your case in the most conclusive manner, so that they have not a word to say against a single one of your positions or your logic, and they will reply naïvely, "I do not *feel* with you;" and with that reply dismiss your reasoning and your subject.

Judge Burnett tells us he was originally a deist, which is very possible; but his book bears evidence that he had always a very clear and just conception of law, as the expression of the will of a legislator, or as an emanation from an authority having in itself the right to command. He has in this work only applied the principle of law, which he had always held, to the facts presented by the Catholic religion. Deist or not, his principles were always sound,—that is to say, whatever the practical conclusions he adopted for the time being, his principles were always those of reason. His law was always right; and if he came to wrong decisions, it was owing to his ignorance or misconception of the facts, or, as the lawyer would say, the evidence in the case. He needed supernatural grace, as all men do, in order to be able to elicit an act of supernatural faith; but he never needed anything more than a simple presentation of the facts in their true light, to believe firmly the Catholic Church with what theologians call human faith, or a firm rational conviction. His mind was always a sound mind. His book recognizes and accepts, in the outset, as the law of the mind, the principle of authority. It presupposes the principle accepted by the reader, and it proceeds, by a careful examination, sifting and weighing the principal testimony in the case, to elicit the truth of the church; and it will satisfy every mind that admits that principle, and is capable of following the argument. The author assumes what is true, that religion, if religion, is the *lex suprema* for the reason and will; and the question in his own mind was never whether religion is to be obeyed or not, nor, in fact, whether there be or be not a religion, but whether there be a revealed religion, and if there be, what and where is it? What and where is the court to apply it? His book is the answer.

But his mind, though a fair representative of the educated mind in its normal development, was not a fair representative of the non-Catholic mind as we ordinarily find it. We may divide non-Catholics into two classes: Idolaters of reason and idolaters of the Bible. The idolaters of the Bible, that is, Protestants, or Evangelicals, profess to take the Bible as their authority and guide in matters of religion, and make all the world over it; but while they pretend it is the Bible as interpreted by the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost, it is really the Bible as interpreted by their own ignorance, prejudices, fancies, or caprices. With these people you can, except with now and then an individual, never reason. There is no criterion or authority to which they will submit. Take them on the Bible, and show them, as you easily can, that the Bible is against their Protestantism, and they will take refuge in "inward experience," "private illumination," "the interior teaching of the Spirit," to what some call latterly "the Christian consciousness," and there is an end to all reasoning, to all argument. They have "the witness within," and what can you say? The Christian, they tell us, is one who is instructed by the Holy Ghost; they who are instructed by the Holy Ghost have the pure, infallible truth. "We," they add, "are Christians," *argal*, &c. They take their Christian consciousness to prove their doctrine, and their doctrine to prove their Christian consciousness. Press them hard, and show them that they rest all on their own subjective phenomena, and that they mistake their own fancies, caprices, imaginations, sensibilities, or the devices of their own hearts, for the illuminations of the Holy Ghost,—or at least, they have no means of proving either to themselves or others that they do not—and they fly back to the Bible, to the "written word of God," and pelt you half to death with texts of Scripture thrown in your face and eyes. The Bible is to them really no authority or guide, but a simple subterfuge, and instead of honoring, they grossly dishonor it. It is not seldom we find the heathen, when their idol does not comply with their wishes or answer their prayers and supplications, dragging it from its pedestal, sometimes with rope round its neck, through mud and filth, and ending by giving it a good scourging. These people, figuratively, treat the Bible in the same way, when it refuses to support their fancies. They subject the sacred text to no less violence, and wring and twist it in all manner of ways, to force it to comply with their wishes, and when violent interpretation or explanation will

not answer, they throw the unmanageable parts away, as Luther did the Catholic Epistle of James, which so pointedly condemns his doctrine of justification by faith alone. In Luther's estimation, this Epistle was only an "Epistle of Straw."

The other class, the idolaters of reason, are no less unmanageable. Reason is their God, but they desert its worship the moment they find it not on their side. Of all people they are the most unreasonable, and make of reason the least reasonable use. We never expect one of these people to reason. With them reason is what they fancy, or imagine, or feel,—is nothing but a collective term for all their notions, crotchets, conceits, vagaries, fancies, feelings, impressions, prejudices, half-views, false views, and no views at all. It has no law, no proportion—*ratio*—no measure, no consistency, rule, or validity. Press them on reason, they reject logic and take refuge in feeling; press them on feeling, and they fly back to logic. Their real difficulty is, not that they confide in reason, even their own reason, but that they do not confide in it, and do not even credit their own convictions. It has been well said that "the doubt of our age is not doubt of revelation, but the doubt of reason." The first faith necessary to be restored, is faith in our own reason. We have shown, time and again, in these pages, that the world, to a fearful extent, has lost its faith in the supernatural, nay, the very conception itself of the supernatural; we may go further, and add that its real scepticism, the intellectual ground of all its other scepticism, is the scepticism of reason, or of the natural order. Men do not credit reason, do not believe its authority, do not trust their own eyes, or feel sure that their knowledge is knowledge. Here is the terrible doubt that baffles our science, and renders nugatory all our efforts. Here is the grand obstacle to Judge Burnett's success. His book is sufficient to satisfy every man who doubts not of his own reason; but this doubt renders, in the first place, the majority indifferent to the question to be discussed, so that comparatively few will take the trouble to read his argument; and, in the next place, it indisposes those who do read it to trust its conclusions, although they feel that they are utterly unable to urge a single logical objection against them.

We have heard much said about the insufficiency of reason, and we have all of us, more or less labored to exhibit the wanderings of reason, and the deplorable state into which the

nations fall who trust themselves to their reason alone, in order to obtain an argument for the necessity of revelation. This method in our age becomes dangerous, and tends to produce a most fatal scepticism. Defenders of revelation are not always careful to save the appearance of presenting faith and reason in contrast, or as in mutual contradiction one with the other. Revelation is too often so presented as to appear to supersede reason, or at least as the necessary complement of reason. Some, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists, openly deny reason to make way for revelation, as they demolish nature to make way for grace. Whoever is familiar with the writings of unbelievers, especially the French infidels of the last century, against Christianity, knows that nearly all their arguments and gibes and sneers are founded on the supposition that Christians oppose faith to reason. So completely imbued is the non-Catholic mind with this notion, that nothing is more common with non-Catholics than to accuse us of inconsistency in alleging that faith must be received on authority, and yet seeking by reason to prove the fact that authority has been provided for us. It is not easy to say how much the indiscretion of professed believers in revelation, especially of the various classes of heretics who would fain pass for orthodox, has done to throw doubt on reason, and to produce the fearful and wide-spread scepticism of our age. Among philosophers the psychologists have done all in their power to reduce all knowledge to simple modes or affections of the subject, and even among apparently fervent Catholics we find the traditionalists, whose philosophical utterances have all a sceptical tendency. The church herself has felt the danger on this side, and taken precautions against it, by the articles in defence of natural reason and its capacity presented lately by the Holy See for the signatures of the leading traditionalists. The Holy See has seen the necessity of vindicating the rights, the authority, and the province of reason, and has warned us all of the evil to be combated, the danger to be guarded against. If we could convert the age to reason, we could easily convert it to Catholicity; all the great principles on which faith rests are principles of reason, principles of natural religion, included in the law of nature. In believing Catholicity, the man who really believes what is called natural religion, the truths of reason,—that is, the truths reason is competent to prove with certainty,—has no principles to change, no principles to reject or to adopt. What he has to

accept in addition to what he already holds is not in the order of principles, but in the order of facts, provable in like manner as any other facts. The incarnation is a fact, redemption through the cross is a fact, the church is a fact, judgment is a fact; heaven and hell are facts, either in the present or in the future. The supernatural order is a fact, but a fact which presupposes the natural, and which is created in accordance with the principles of natural reason, only lying in a sphere above reason.

Into this question Judge Burnett has not entered. He has not recognized nor attempted to refute this original doubt, or to reestablish the authority of reason. He takes for granted the authority of reason, supposes his readers acknowledge reason, recognize and conform to its principles, and confines himself to proving to reason the supernatural facts asserted by the church. This he does conclusively, and in doing it does all that is necessary to be done for those who really understand and accept the authority of reason. We know no author, writing a popular work, who has done it better; we are not certain but we might say, who has done it so well, so conclusively. But, unhappily, his very postulate will not be universally granted, and he must not feel that it is his fault if his work does not bear all the fruits he expects from it. We hardly know ourselves how to meet this doubt of reason, for we have nothing but reason with which to meet it. But certain we are that the doubt we have to combat is not the doubt of Catholicity. Every day we meet intelligent men who tell us, that if they believed in religion they would be Catholics, and that if they should ever come to feel the necessity of having a religion they would think of taking no other religion than the Catholic. This proves that the doubt is not of Catholicity, but of reason itself in relation to religion. Such is undoubtedly the fact. The doubt is of reason. How is this doubt to be met and removed? We confess that we are at a loss to answer this question, because we ourselves doubt if the doubt, all unreasonable as it certainly is, can be removed by reasoning. Something can be done by modifying the method of proving revelation, and more still by correcting the philosophy of the schools, in which a very considerable reform is most assuredly called for. But all this will be insufficient, and mainly preventive; not curative. Doubt and indifference are too deep-rooted and too wide-spread to be cured by it. After all, we have our doubts if in the purely intellectual order we can do

more or much better than Judge Burnett has done, in taking the authority of reason for granted, and then establishing the facts of revelation to the satisfaction of reason. Those who doubt reason must be given over as beyond the reach of reason.

But it will, perhaps, be well to bear in mind that the obstacles we have to overcome in converting this non-Catholic world are moral, rather than intellectual, and are therefore to be overcome by the preacher, rather than by the polemic, the theologian, or the philosopher. When our Lord sent forth his apostles, he sent them to teach indeed, but to teach by preaching. He sent them forth as lambs in the midst of wolves, to preach the gospel to every creature; and it was by the "foolishness of preaching" that he proposed to convert the world to himself and to gather them that are to be saved into his church. When in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries errors analogous to those that now prevail were rife, he raised up a St. Dominic who founded the order of Preachers, and St. Francis who founded an order of preachers also, who should by their example as by their words preach holy poverty, love of the poor, and detachment from the world. The only effectual way we see of overcoming the doubt and indifference of our age is by preaching. What we want are not so much authors as preachers, who with the living voice will speak to the consciences of the doubting and indifferent, and awaken in them the moral sense, now dormant, and make them feel that they have souls to be saved. Theologians, controversialists, philosophers are, of course, necessary, indispensable even, but they cannot be our chief reliance for the conversion of our cold, indifferent, and sceptical countrymen. It is lawful to learn from an enemy. The different Evangelical sects have their revivals, and they do really awaken large numbers, and sceptical and indifferent as any, by preaching to them, with passable purity, certain great practical truths of the Gospels. They borrowed a good part of their method of preaching, and of the doctrines they preach in their revivals, from us, from our missions and retreats. Their aim is to reach the consciences of their hearers, to convict them of sin, to bring home to their understandings the terrible reality of death, judgment, and hell, and to make them cry out, "What shall I do to be saved?" They aim to make them feel that they are travelling the broad road to destruction, that they are lost as they are, that they need help and can obtain it only from Christ

crucified. This sort of preaching is effectual in arousing men from their indifference, in making even worldly men feel that something must be done, and even in making them anxious to do something. Unhappily, this is as far as the sects can go. From this point onward they lack the truth, the Bread of life, and thus fail to complete the good work they commence. No doubt these awakened sinners, with hearts open to receive the grace of conversion and minds ready for the reception of the truth, soon fall away or become cold-hearted formal hypocrites, more hardened than ever; but that is not because they were not really awakened, because they were not sincere and earnest in the beginning, but because the sects have nothing to give them and are forced to leave them without support. But there is no reason in the world why our preachers cannot do all the Protestant ministers do, in arousing men from their indifference, in shaking their doubts, and in making them tremble as Felix did when St. Paul reasoned to him "of justice, chastity, and the judgment to come;" and without being obliged to stop where do the ministers, for they can fan the fire they kindle to a flame—they can give the Bread necessary to sustain the new life which they through the Holy Ghost beget.

We therefore, we own, look more to our missions and retreats than to any of our controversial works for overcoming the doubts and indifference of our countrymen. We hope we shall be pardoned for saying that we often feel when listening to sermons,—often sermons admirably conceived, finely and elegantly written, and chastely and gracefully delivered,—that the preacher hardly realizes his immense power, and hardly thinks of the souls before him that are perishing, through not being made to feel the solemn importance of the truths he is uttering. O would the preacher, we say to ourselves, were less careful of polishing his periods, and felt more deeply the import of what he is saying, and that he would be a little more in earnest to bring these souls to God. The preacher's mission is the grandest on earth: he holds in his hands a power the proudest monarch might envy,—even the keys of heaven and hell. He has the sublimest and most soul-stirring truths that can be conceived. He may speak, if he will, with the power of Truth itself, with the strength of the prayers of all saints, the sympathies of all good men and angels, and with the omnipotence of God on his side. Yet he too often speaks as though he were merely declaiming an exercise, or

because a sermon is in the routine of his duties, and has to be got off the best way it can. The preacher too often is unaware of his power, or wantonly throws it away. To be a powerful and effective preacher, it is not necessary to be a polished speaker, a graceful orator, or an adept in the excellency of men's speech. Let the man be of moderate attainments, and even moderate intellectual abilities, but a live man; let him be in downright earnest, with a heart burning with charity, and let him speak as he feels, and not a word he utters will fall idly to the ground. A sermon which affected us more, and provoked more rigid self-examination than almost any other to which we have ever listened, was on "the sign of the cross," preached by a man who mispronounced almost every other word, and had hardly a sentence of correct English from beginning to end. The most effective preachers, and the most effective with learned and polished sinners, are not your most learned and accomplished pulpit orators, who never transgress a single propriety or deviate from a single conventional rule, but the meek and humble-minded, who never think of themselves, who think only of Christ and him crucified, only of the souls to be converted and saved, and who speak right on the words their own burning charity inspires. We hope our venerable clergy will forgive us when we say we think they might make a great deal more of preaching than they do, not only for their own people, but for those not yet gathered into the fold. Let them speak with a brogue, let them speak in broken English, it matters nothing, if they only let their faith and charity, the unction of their souls, have fair play.

We regard with deep interest, for this reason, the new Congregation of the Missionary Priests of St. Paul the Apostle. This congregation is just organized, and its members have only entered upon their apostolic work; but we shall be greatly disappointed if they do not yet exert a most salutary influence in favor of our religion in these United States. They have had struggles, and they will have more and harder struggles yet, if the Lord loves them, and has chosen their congregation to do great things. The reason why we take so deep an interest in them is, that they are to be a congregation of preachers,—not simply preachers going forth to preach to heretics and unbelievers, but to all the faithful and the unfaithful,—to proclaim the kingdom of God to all who will hear, and to build it up in every heart that will submit. We

do not believe sermons designed expressly for those outside are the best even to make converts. We think the sermons best fitted to convert bad Catholics, or sinners in the church, are the best fitted to effect the conversion of sinners outside of the church. We are satisfied, from our observations, that missions are our best way not only of reaching bad Catholics, but also of reaching non-Catholics. The fact is, we are prone to forget, if Christ is in the church to save, and saves only in his church, he is also, so to speak, out of his church, in the hearts of all men, to draw them to the church, that he may save them in her communion. At the bottom of the hearts of the most sceptical, indifferent, or worldly-minded, there is a secret witness for God, for Christ, for the church. Conscience is still Catholic in most men; and when conscience is awakened, and enabled to make herself heard, there is little intellectual difficulty in the way of bringing them to the church. When their consciences are awakened, unless they are diverted from their course by some foreign interposition, they tend as naturally to the church as the rivers to the sea.

We must remember that there never has been but one religion—the Catholic—and that was revealed in substance to our first parents. It has come down to us by tradition, in its purity and integrity through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Catholic Church, broken, obscured, and sometimes travestied in the gentile world. Nevertheless, it has in some measure, and in some form, come down through all nations, and all nations retain some of its elements,—at least, some of its detached fragments. These form in every heart a witness for Christ, and the preacher may appeal with perfect confidence to them. Moreover, all the modern Protestant nations were once Catholic; and though they have broken from unity, they have brought off with them other fragments or portions of Catholic truth;—and through these portions of Catholic truth the preacher has his *point d'appui* in their hearts, on which he can support his efforts to raise them to God. The reason is plain, then, why the preacher, in preaching to Jew or gentile solely with a view to the conversion and salvation of souls, must reach them as well as bad Catholics. Most of them are, in some sense, only bad Catholics, for most of them, we must presume, have been baptized. There is, then, a solid reason why our missions should be useful to those without, as well as to those within. It is, then, desirable that they be multiplied and extended—not only the missions

of the Paulists, but of the Redemptorists, the Priests of the Missions, and of the Jesuits, with the last of whom they in some sort originated. We have heard a rumor that the illustrious Society of Jesus are about to detail several of their number to devote themselves, with the approbation of the bishops and archbishops, to the giving of missions in every nook and corner of the land, wherever Providence opens to them a door. We hope the rumor will turn out to be well-founded. We have a large body of Catholics, whose lives are most edifying; but, unhappily, there is a very considerable number of us to whom missions will not be superfluous, and it is time we should begin to think seriously of converting our non-Catholic countrymen, and securing to them the inestimable blessings and consolations of our faith. The time has come for us to dismiss our national prejudices—to cease to feel that we are foreigners in this land of liberty, and to begin our labors to make this a Catholic country. The more firmly we prove ourselves attached to our faith, the more our non-Catholic countrymen will respect both us and our religion; and the more earnest we show ourselves to spread it, and to give others the peace and security we enjoy, the more will they dispose themselves to listen to us, and pay attention to our preachers. We may have been negligent—we may have felt that it was useless to hope for the conversion of our neighbors; but if so, we may read our rebuke in the congregation of the Paulists, a noble band of priests, all converts from Protestantism. We may read it also in the book before us, by a man whom we should hardly have expected to be brought in. But in he has come, and has brought with him a heart and an intelligence that has preached one of the very best arguments for our religion that has proceeded from an American pen. It is a learned, an able, a well-reasoned, and most seasonable book. These instances, to mention no others, are a terrible rebuke both to our hopelessness and to our apathy. Are we not on the point of waking up to a sense of our duty?

We have wandered away from the book before us, and instead of reviewing it we have been giving speculations of our own. We cannot help being struck with the fact that this book is produced by a man born and brought up in the West, and that it has been written in California, by, we believe, its first civil governor after its cession to the United States. It proves that we, on the Atlantic border, are very far from monopolizing all the thought, the intelligence, or the literature

of the Union. It is a fact, we believe, that the great market for books is the South and West; more particularly, for American publications, at the West. We fancy we have here more literary polish, more classical knowledge; but whoever has travelled much in the new states, has been struck with their superior mental activity, and their greater freedom from prejudice and routine. Say what we will of the Atlantic states, northern and southern, the real American character—what is to be the future character of the nation—will be determined by the states drained by the Mississippi and washed by the Pacific. They are living now who will find our Asiatic and Australian trade more important than our European. The strength, the energy, and the governing force of our empire will be West of the territory occupied by the men who won our independence and made us a nation, and the colonies will give the law to the mother country. But we see no harm in it. These great states, formed since the federal union, are, and will be, chiefly agricultural states, and ultimately will be conservative states, serving as a check on the purely commercial states, and to preserve the institutions founded by our fathers.

The Pacific states,—and there will ultimately be four or five more,—will prove to be one of the most important sections of the Union. They bring us into contact with Asia, as the Atlantic states enable us to touch Europe. A few years will, in spite of all that may be said or done, add to the Union Mexico and the Central American states. We see no help for it, however much we may oppose it. The result will be the division into free states, and union under one federal government of the whole territory of this vast continent from the British possessions on the North to the Isthmus of Darien on the South, from the Atlantic on the East to the Pacific on the West, placed between Europe and Asia, and closely connected,—for oceans unite, not separate,—with both. A more magnificent empire never existed, and cannot be found on the globe,—an empire capable of sustaining, with ease, four hundred millions of souls, and when come to maturity, able to hold Europe with one hand and Asia with the other, to exercise the hegemony of the globe. Will this Union be preserved and freedom sustained? Both are destined to receive many rude shocks and severe trials, from within, not from without; but yet we firmly believe both will come out from the trial unscathed. The bonds of a common blood, language, laws,

manners, and customs, will go far to prevent a dissolution of the Union; but there is forming with very great rapidity another bond, which, as yet, nobody, to our knowledge, has taken any notice of,—the bond of a common religion,—the bond of the one Catholic Church. Protestantism is divided into sects, and the sects subdivide geographically. They cannot stand against the force of social or domestic institutions, but are obliged to succumb to it. They originate with the people, and live or die as the people will. They form, and can form no bond of union. The Methodist of the North cannot tolerate slavery, the Methodist of the South dare not oppose it; so the great Methodist sect divides sectionally, and each division follows the peculiar popular opinion of its section. So of the Baptist; so it will soon be, if not already, with the Presbyterian; and ultimately with the Episcopalians, if they ever have earnestness enough to care for any thing but their “admirable Liturgy,” with all that is really admirable in it pilfered from us. But the Catholic Church is one, holds the same doctrine, teaches the same morals, and enforces the same discipline in the North and the South, in the East and the West. Here, before us, is a work written on the borders of the Pacific, which is to us the same as if it had been written as well as published in this city. The author defends the one Catholic doctrine, the one Catholic Church. He believes as we believe, and we believe as he believes. We worship at one and the same altar, assist at one and the same “clean sacrifice,” and partake of one and the same Bread of life. Moreover, the hierarchy is one, united under the one American primacy of order, and the one primacy of jurisdiction as well as of order at Rome. It must be united,—and through its union under one head, all the Catholics of the whole United States are united in one body. Here is the bond that is to hold this Union together, and keep it one nation. No Catholic nation, that has retained its Catholicity, has ever lost its nationality and become extinct. In every Catholic people there is a vitality that no earthly power can extinguish, and every one has a recuperative energy that will enable it ultimately to recover from all its calamities and disasters. To the Catholic Church, now hierarchically organized over the whole Union, under one head, with one faith, one Lord, and one tongue, we look for the preservation of this Union. She, as yet, includes but a small minority of the American people, but that minority is destined to increase; and, before the sects and parties will be

enabled to destroy the work of our fathers, we believe it will have become the majority in numbers, in intelligence, in virtue, in patriotism, and in influence. Then the danger will be past. The various legitimate interests of the country will coalesce with the religious interests of the majority, and the clashing of sectional parties will be able to affect neither our peace nor our security. The question of slavery will then produce no disturbance, for slavery will then either have ceased to exist, or the condition and relations of the slaves will have been so modified as to give offence to no Christian conscience. In writing his book, Judge Burnett has rendered a noble homage to his new faith: he has, too, performed a patriotic act which will compare favorably with the most glorious deeds of our greatest patriots. Through him, California has made a more glorious contribution to the Union than all the gold of her mines, for truth is more precious than gold, yea, than fine gold.

CATHOLIC POLEMICS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1861.]

AT another time we might be disposed to give the work, the title of which we have cited, a thorough examination; for though its general doctrine is unsound, its author is a man of no mean ability, and, what is more, a man who ventures to think for himself, and really attains to some glimpses of truth. It is a work which cannot be uninteresting or un instructive to those who wish to study the varying phases of thought among non-Catholics, or the struggles of a mind brought up in either old-fashioned Protestantism or modern Socinianism to obtain a doctrine which may at least be consistent with itself. But our present purpose is different. We have selected the title of Mr. Hudson's book as a text, or an apology for a text, for some remarks of our own, having only an indirect and remote connection with the subject he treats.

Mr. Hudson's book proves that the old forms of thought in the non-Catholic world no longer satisfy, if they ever satisfied,

**Christ our Life. The Scriptural Argument for Immortality through Christ alone.* By C. F. HUDSON. Boston: 1861.

the non-Catholic intelligence. The active and vigorous minds outside of the church can no longer rest in the doctrines of Luther and Calvin, or even of Socinus and Gentilis. They are seeking earnestly for some solid ground on which they can stand, and for doctrines which they can reconcile with their own reason and understanding. They seek everywhere for truth but where truth may be found. We Catholics know perfectly well that Catholicity embraces all truth, and that out of the church there is no truth in its unity and integrity. We know perfectly well that it is only in the doctrines of our church that the truth they want can be found. Yet our church is the very last place in which they are willing to seek it, and perhaps many of them, even were they to seek it there, would not find it. Hundreds and thousands of men read Catholic books of theology where the very questions they want treated are discussed with great learning and ability, with clearness, depth, and sincerity, without finding in them any thing but unmeaning words, dry technicalities, or antiquated formulas. Why is this so? Is it not because our Catholic writers fail to address themselves to the forms of modern thought, to the idiosyncracies, so to speak, of the age? May it not be the fact that our words and formulas do not convey to those outside the truth they have for us? May it not also be that we Catholics identify, in some sort, the truth itself with the scholastic forms under which we have received it, and that we should fail to perceive it ourselves if expressed in other forms?

It is true the apostle admonishes us to "beware of profane novelties," and to "hold fast the form of sound words," but at the same time he tells us he became "all things to all men, that he might gain some," and it is clear that he never designed us to be wedded to the mere symbol, without regard to the thing symbolized. Truth is that which is needed, and he who has the truth has all that he needs. Truth never varies. It is the same in all ages and in all nations. But its expression may vary, and must in some degree vary, in order to meet the peculiar wants of time and place. It would be of little use to speak in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, to a man who understood only French, German, or English. If the truth is to reach the mind, it must be spoken in a language and expressed in a form that is intelligible to it. The truth *spoken* is measured by the mind of the hearer, not by the mind of the speaker. No matter how much truth we have in our minds,

we tell only so much truth as the mind we address can take in. When we speak we use words, and words are symbols or sensible signs. Whatever meaning we may give them, they have for those to whom we speak only the meaning which their minds give them. The meaning conveyed or the truth symbolized depends on their understanding, not on ours. Is it not the neglect of this great fact that prevents our theological works from having their proper effect on the minds of unbelievers? May it not be that we too often speak without considering whether what is clear and evident to us may not be obscure and unmeaning to them? Is it true that their failure to apprehend, embrace, and follow the truth which we set forth is entirely their fault, the effect of their perverse will?

We have no disposition to apologize for unbelievers and rejecters of the truth; yet, we confess, we cannot wholly approve a widely prevailing notion, that all error presupposes malice, and that all who remain outside of the church do so through hatred of the truth and love of iniquity. Any man who has once been a Protestant and subsequently reconciled to the church, knows well that his greatest difficulty in the way of accepting Catholic truth was in understanding it. He will tell you, and tell you truly, that in proportion as he ascertained the real meaning of the church he was prepared to accept it, and that he wanted no argument to prove it after he had clearly seen it. The church to be loved needs but to be seen as she is; the truth to be believed needs but to be presented to the mind as it is in its real relations. This follows from the common doctrine of the scholastics that the object of the will is GOOD, and that the object of the intellect is TRUTH; as also from the doctrine of St. Thomas that all sin originates in ignorance. To convert a man it is necessary to enlighten him, and all theologians teach us that the grace which converts illustrates the understanding at the same time that it assists the will. Men reject or refuse to believe our doctrines because they do not understand them, that is, do not understand them in their relations with their own intuitions or rational convictions, which, it seems to them, they cannot give up without a total abandonment of reason common to all men. May not, then, our failure to convert them, be, in great part, owing to the fact that we fail so to present them, that is, fail to present them so that they appear to them consistent with the dictates of reason and common sense? Must there not, then, be fault on our side as well as on theirs?

But here is our difficulty. It seems to be very generally understood in the Catholic community here and elsewhere, that the Catholic controversialist must never concede that Catholics can possibly err in their apprehension of Catholic truth, or in their mode of presenting it; that every Catholic writer or publicist must always proceed on the assumption that, as between them and their opponents, all Catholics are infallible and impeccable, and as wise as serpents and as harmless as doves; that to vary a single word or form of expression adopted by scholastic theologians would be to betray the Catholic cause; and that every attempt to present Catholic truth in a manner to be apprehensible by our age, and to remove the objections to it in the minds of non-Catholics by exhibiting it in a new light, or under new forms, would indicate a restless, uneasy, discontented, and querulous spirit, if not absolute disloyalty to the spouse of Christ. We are told on every side by those who affect to give tone and direction to Catholic thought and action, that it is our duty as Catholic publicists to defend things as we find them; to raise no question which may excite controversy among ourselves; to enter into no philosophical or theological discussions not acceptable to all Catholics, whether learned or unlearned; never to criticise the doings or the sayings of our predecessors among Catholic polemicists; never to take any deeper, broader, or loftier views than are taken by the most ignorant or uncultivated of Catholic believers; never to strike out any new lines of argument or to shift the ground of controversy with our opponents. We are required to follow tradition, not only in what is of faith, but in what pertains to the theological expression of revealed truth, and to the mode or manner of defending it. If we would be accounted orthodox, or stand well with the pretended exponents of Catholic public opinion, we must explain the causes of the Protestant rebellion according to the traditions of Catholics, and never deviate from that tradition in our manner of explaining and refuting its errors. We must be content to repeat the arguments stereotyped for our use, although those arguments may rest on historical blunders, metaphysical errors, and misreading of the fathers, or a doubtful interpretation of the sacred text. We are permitted to make no account of the researches of the moderns in the physical sciences, in history, natural or civil, in literary criticism, or Biblical literature; to pay no attention to the present state of the controversy between Catholics and non-Catholics,

to the new questions which have arisen, to the new ground that has been taken, or to the new modes of warfare adopted by the rejecters of Catholic truth. We are required to take it for granted that all our controversy must be with Lutherans, Calvinists, or Anglicans, on the ground, we suppose, that error is as invariable as truth. We do not, of course, mean to say that there is any Catholic, cleric or laic, who would expressly maintain this; but this much we do mean to say, that any one who does not conform to the rule here laid down will find that he has severer controversies to maintain with his own brethren than with the avowed enemies of the church, and there are few men who can maintain their credit for orthodoxy when a considerable number of their own brethren, and especially those who give tone and direction to Catholic action, are opposed to them. No men are more readily distrusted, no men are looked upon with more horror by Catholics than they who become the occasion of domestic controversy. The rule adopted seems to be not that which was laid down by the apostle, "Follow after the things that *make for peace,*" but follow after peace, or seek peace at any price.

Whoever is in the habit of reading the Catholic journals of this or any other country will bear witness that we do not state the case too strongly. The only men who have a prescriptive right to find fault with their brethren without having their orthodoxy, their zeal, or their charity questioned, are the *oseurantisti*, the men who praise the past, *laudatores temporis acti*, who stoutly maintain all antiquated formulas, hold fast to old abuses, repress all generous aspirations, and anathematize all efforts for progress. These men may be as severe against their brethren as they please, denounce them, vituperate them, vilify them to their hearts' content, and yet gain credit for their disinterestedness, their zeal, and their love of God and their neighbor. Whatever they say is true; whatever they do is right; whatever controversies they excite, whatever intestine divisions they create, are all to be accounted necessary. They may, without censure, alienate half the world from the church, or throw insurmountable obstacles in the way of the return of those who are already alienated, pursue a policy which renders the church in her action on the world offensive to the purest and noblest instincts of human nature, without doing any thing for which any Catholic shall have the right to censure them, or to find the least fault with them. The public opinion of the Catholic world sustains them, lauds their

wisdom and virtue, and condemns only those rash or froward spirits who venture to question the wisdom of their action, or to deny its salutary influence. Here is the great difficulty under which labor all men who understand their age, and would do something, however little, for the promotion of the Catholic cause. They are at once cried down as the disturbers of Catholic peace, and it is only against the weight of almost universal Catholic public opinion that they can present Catholic truth so as to be understood and appreciated by the non-Catholic world. This is a great discouragement; it takes the life out of a man, deprives him of all strength, energy, zeal, or heart to attempt any thing in the cause of God and our neighbor. Something of this has, no doubt, been experienced in all ages, and is inseparable from human frailty; but we doubt if the evil complained of, for evil it is, was ever greater or more depressing than in our own times. No man in our times is so much feared as the man who is really a living man, whose thought pierces the symbol and takes hold of the truth symbolized, who is really in earnest to enlist intelligence, science, and learning, on the side of the church, and to recover for her the direction of the intellectual movements of the age.

In our historical reading we have found no epoch in which the directors of the Catholic world seem to have had so great a dread of intellect as our own. There seems to be almost universally the conviction expressed by Rousseau that "the man who thinks is a depraved animal." There is a widespread fear that he who thinks will think heretically. The study, therefore, of our times is to keep men orthodox by cultivating their pious affections with as little exercise of intelligence as possible. There is no doubt that for the last hundred years the intelligence, at least what is regarded as the intelligence of the world, has been divorced from orthodoxy. During this period the most successful cultivators of science, of history, literature, and art, have not been Catholics, or, if nominally Catholics, with little understanding of the teaching, or devotion to the practice, of the church. The natural sciences, zoology, geology, chemistry, natural history, ethnography, metaphysics, and to some extent history itself, have been anti-Catholic, while the popular literature, that which takes hold of the heart and forms the taste, the mind, and the morals of a nation, has been decidedly hostile to the church. It is very likely this fact, that has created the aversion in Catholic minds to free and independent thought, and driven them into the ex-

treme that we complain of. They see how un-Catholic is thought in its modern forms and developments; they see how rapidly and how rashly the world rushes into the most fatal errors; and therefore they fear to trust thought, and consequently seek to restrain it. This is their excuse. Yet it is no full justification. The true policy, in our judgment, would be not to yield up thought and intelligence to Satan, but to redouble our efforts to bring them back to the side of the church, so as to restore her to her rightful spiritual and intellectual supremacy. Instead of foregoing thought and intelligence, and contenting ourselves with pious affection which, when divorced from thought, becomes a mere weak and watery sentimentality, we should grapple with them, master the age precisely in that in which it regards itself as strongest, increase our efforts to enlighten the people, and gain for them the superiority not merely in faith and piety, but in secular knowledge and science. Intelligence can be mastered only by intelligence, thought can be overcome only by thought.

There has never been an epoch in the world's history when the policy now generally pursued could have been more unwise, or likely to be more fatal, than the present. Now less than ever can we keep people in the faith by mere ignorance and prejudice, or even by early association and affection. We cannot keep our people ignorant of error if we would, and do what we will we cannot prevent them from being more or less affected by the spirit of the age. In no country have we an orthodox Cæsar to protect the flock with his armed legions, or to keep down error by civil pains and penalties, even were that desirable. The civil government nowhere protects the church, any further than it hopes to use her for its own purposes. There is no longer any reliance to be placed upon the civil power, however deeply some may regret it. The church is obliged to fall back on her own resources as a spiritual kingdom, and the last vestige of the old union of church and state, will ere long be everywhere effaced. The most the church can hope from the state hereafter is to be let alone, and it will be much if Catholics are allowed to be free in the general freedom of the citizen. Respect for authority is gone, or at least greatly weakened, among Catholics no less than among non-Catholics. Clerical admonitions and prohibitions have not the weight they once had, and men every day grow less and less submissive to their pastors; loyalty to the state has ceased to be regarded as a virtue; and filial obedience to the church is

every day growing weaker and weaker. All the old external bulwarks and defences of faith and piety, are broken down. All things are questioned. Nothing is too sacred to be examined. The authority of the church, the divine institution of the clergy, the truth of the sacred mysteries of religion, nay, the very providence and even existence of God, are brought into public discussion. Doubts on all points are entertained and boldly uttered. Nothing is regarded as fixed and certain. Now this state of things must be met, and met effectually. But how can we meet it, if thought is discouraged, free discussion prohibited, and our people kept as far as possible in ignorance of all not absolutely necessary to salvation?

We are very far from pretending that the changes which have taken place in society, in men's convictions and affections, are for the better, or not to be deeply deplored. The state of things which has passed away, and in reference to which most of our clergy have been educated, may have been far better than that which now obtains; it may be that we have fallen on evil times—worse times than the church has ever before seen—but the changes have taken place, and we have to meet things as they are, not as they were. It is idle to attempt to recall the past, to reëstablish that which has passed away. We must always take things as we find them, avail ourselves of the present, and war against present evils. The church is placed in the world to teach and to govern it; but she has her human side, and on her human side she is affected by all the changes which go on around her. Her principles are invariable and eternal, but her modes or methods of acting on the world must be adapted to its ever-varying wants. The church cannot, any more than the state, be unvarying in her external policy, because she has not unvarying circumstances or an unvarying world to meet. At every moment she must deal with the world as it is, not as it has been or as we may wish it to be. What she has now to meet are the peculiar evils of our own times; she has to meet the existing state of things. This we, her children, should understand, and we are wanting in our fidelity to her if, governed by old associations and inveterate habits, we throw obstacles in her way, and labor, intentionally or unintentionally, to hinder her from doing it.

The existing state of things is not met by a mere negative policy, or by a so-called safeguard system. No amount of pious training or pious culture will protect the faithful, or pre-

serve them from the contamination of the age, if they are left inferior to non-Catholics in secular learning and intellectual development. The faithful must be guarded and protected by being trained and disciplined to grapple with the errors and false systems of the age. They must be not only more religiously, but also more intellectually educated. They must be better armed than their opponents,—surpass them in the strength and vigor of their minds, and in the extent and variety of their knowledge. They must, on all occasions and against all adversaries, be ready to give a reason for the hope that is in them. They must be better scholars, more learned men, profounder philosophers, better versed in the sciences, more thorough masters of history, abler and more attractive writers and orators, and prove themselves in every respect the *élite* of the race. It is in vain in our times to attempt to preserve them in their loyalty to the church by the force of simple external authority, or even by their reverence for the prelates whom the Holy Ghost has placed over them. Both for those within and for those without, authority must vindicate itself,—must show that it is not merely a positive and arbitrary authority, but that it is authority in the reason and nature of things, intrinsic as well as extrinsic. Minds in our day are to be governed by respecting their freedom, not by restraining it, and men in authority must be more ready to convince than to command. Blind obedience is out of the question; submission to *men* is contrary to the spirit of the age; and the prelate must, if he would be obeyed, show that obedience to him is real, not reputed, obedience to God. There must be no shams, there must be no make-believes, but there must be everywhere the REAL PRESENCE.

We say not that it is not to be deplored that such is the case. We write not to vindicate the age, but to present it as it is. We say not but it would be far better if there were everywhere to be met only simple, unquestioning obedience; we say not that there is not something of impiety even in this questioning spirit of our times, which demands a reason even for obeying God, still more for obeying his ministers; we express, as we feel, no sympathy with this spirit; but it is the spirit that now reigns in Catholic populations hardly less than in non-Catholic populations. It is an evil that we must meet and overcome the best way we can, and the best, indeed the only way to overcome it known to us is by answering its demands. God himself condescends to reason with men, and

does not disdain to submit even his own providence to the judgment of reason. Our Lord reasoned with the Jews; the apostles reasoned with the people to whom they were sent; and the greatest popes and prelates of the church have shown themselves, at all times, more studious to convince the understanding than to overcome the will.

No doubt this policy which we recommend imposes far greater labor on the ministers of our holy religion than the one we oppose, and that it is a policy that will never be acceptable to any who are not willing to spend and be spent in the service of God. Men who love their ease, who think only of performing a certain round of prescribed duties with as little trouble to themselves as possible, and feel not deeply the worth of human souls, cannot be expected to approve it. It can be adopted only by men who are in earnest, who take life seriously, and count no labors, no sacrifices in the service of their Lord. It is not a policy for amateurs and dilettanti. It is a policy only for strong men; men with robust souls, intrepid hearts, and indomitable love; men who feel that religion embraces all truth, and is the condition of all good; men who are above the world, whose affections are placed on things eternal, and whose conversation is in heaven. It will not meet the approbation of men who recognize only the *opus operatum*, and forget that men may be instrumental in the salvation of their brethren. But for those who understand that God works through means and carries on his designs by human agencies, and that men are in some sense responsible one for another, it will be an acceptable policy. These will not shrink from, but will joy to meet and perform the labors it requires. They will enter with alacrity upon the work, engage in it with their whole souls, with all the energy and strength God gives them. Heroic souls shrink not from difficulties; their courage rises with the danger, and their strength grows with the magnitude of the work before them.

Now if we look at the work that is to be done in our day and generation, we ask, how is it possible to do it, if we are to be tied down to old forms and old methods; if we are to be deterred by fear of disturbing the equanimity or self-complacency of narrow-minded and uninstructed publicists who are not aware that there have been any changes in the world for the last four hundred years? How are we to do it, if we are to open no discussions, enter upon no line of argument, offer no explanations, attempt no solutions of difficulties which

are not already familiar to the age? How are we to do it, if we are allowed to engage in no controversy, to correct no error, to disturb no prejudice, to stir no thought? How are we to do it, if all that is permitted us is to repeat what we may find set down in our older and superannuated polemical works? How are we to do it, if we are only to follow servilely those who wrote before they could have any knowledge of the peculiar errors and peculiar wants of our times? How are we to do it, if we are bound to take the public opinions of Catholics in this or that locality instead of Catholic truth itself for our guide?

We find no fault with the great men, the great controversialists of other times. They did their work, and they did it well; they vindicated nobly, heroically, and successfully, the truth for their age; answered conclusively the objections which they had to answer, and in the form and way most intelligible to those who urged them. It is no reproach to them to say that they have not fully answered objections which were not raised in their time. What we ask is, that Catholic controversialists be allowed to follow their example, and that we be as free to grapple with the errors and speculations of our age as they were to grapple with the errors and speculations of theirs. They were free to do their work; let us be free to do ours. He who knows the age knows that there are objections to the church which are peculiar to our times, and to which no formal answer was or could have been given by our predecessors. Neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas, neither Bellarmine nor Bossuet, had to meet objections of precisely the same sort as those we have to meet. Many things could be taken by them for granted which we are obliged to prove. Many things are denied now that nobody then questioned. Though error, in substance, may always be the same, it is continually varying its forms, and it appears now under forms under which it never before appeared. Shall we be permitted to meet these new forms in the only way in which they can be effectually met, or shall we be told that we must let them alone, say nothing about them, and take all possible precautions to prevent the faithful from knowing of their existence?

The times in which we live are peculiar, and it ought not to be accounted strange or matter of astonishment that even men placed high in authority and with the best intentions in the world, should not always understand them, or at once seize

and apply the best methods of dealing with their peculiar errors. The clergy are, to a great extent, trained in ignorance of the world and in special reference to a state of things which has passed away, very likely never to return. Our seminaries train the young Levites to the work to be done in old Catholic countries, where all things are settled and the priest has little to do except to administer the sacraments and cultivate the piety and love of the people of his charge. They instruct him, no doubt, in regard to past heresies, and teach him the answers to the well-known objections to our faith urged by the older heretics. He learns the answer to the Arians, the Nestorians, the Eutychians, the Pelagians, the Lutherans, the Calvinists, and the Jansenists, and perhaps to the deists and older school of German rationalists. But he learns little of the doctrines and speculations of the more recent rationalists of Germany, who are now the only formidable enemies to our holy religion, and from whom proceed the only really weighty objections which the Catholic controversialist has now to refute. What wonder then that our clergy should, in some respects, mistake the work now especially necessary to be done, or misconstrue the labors and tendencies of those who have made it their especial study to comprehend those objections and insist on answering them in their own way?

The difficulty is not that Catholics do not know the positive doctrines of their church, but that they are not fully instructed in regard to the errors and speculations now dominant in the non-Catholic world. Our Catholic community, taken at large, not only do not understand them, but are not sufficiently instructed to understand their refutation when given. Publicists, who are as innocent of any knowledge of them as the child unborn, clamor against him who really refutes them, get up an excitement against him, and cause all the lovers of peace to look upon him as a dangerous and pestilent fellow; for usually the friends of peace blame the party in the right, rarely the party in the wrong. He who departs from routine is set down at once as guilty, and they who misunderstand, misrepresent, and denounce him, are regarded as praiseworthy. The local authorities of the church, having little time or disposition to look into the merits of the question, take it for granted that he is the offending party, and either labor to circumscribe his influence or to silence his voice. These things may be inevitable considering the frailty of human nature, but we cannot believe them advantageous to

the interest of the church. Just now popular opinion among Catholics, as among non-Catholics, identifies Catholicity and despotism, and the controversialist who seeks to prove that the Catholic religion has no natural association with despotism but is favorable to liberty and the inherent rights of man, runs the risk of being denounced on all hands as a bad Catholic. The really formidable war waged upon the church is waged by the cultivators of science and the German rationalists. Yet he who should endeavor by his explanations of Catholic theology, though adhering firmly to the Catholic faith, to disarm them of their hostility and to show the perfect harmony of science and reason with Catholicity, would most likely be accused by his own brethren of the errors he labors to refute.

The reason of this is in the fact that one cannot meet these classes of enemies without modifying many things which have been currently held by Catholics, without modifying, not Catholic tradition, but various traditions of Catholics. Whoever has studied their objections knows perfectly well that many of them cannot be answered without rejecting many notions popular among Catholics, or without important modifications of the philosophy and theology of the schools. But these modifications we are not permitted by our meticulous theologians and our philosophical professors to make; for any modifications in either seem to them to be a modification of faith itself. Moreover, having received the faith as scholastically expressed and learned to defend it under scholastic forms, these theologians and our professors feel that they would not know how to defend it if expressed under any other forms. He who modifies the philosophy or theology of the schools is looked upon as an innovator in matters in which it is not lawful to innovate; he loses or he fails to acquire the confidence of his own friends, who are sure to open a fire on him in the rear while he is engaged in doing battle with his and their enemies in front. Not because they do not love the truth, not because they do not wish to see it prevail, but because they see not the propriety, the necessity, or even the lawfulness of the modifications he proposes.

This grows out of the fact that Catholics do not carefully distinguish between faith and theology, between what is human and what is divine in the dogma, or, as we frequently express it, between the Catholic tradition and the traditions of Catholics. Faith, objectively considered, is divine, the revealed word of God, the truth invariable as God himself. It

is and must be the same in all ages, in all places, and for all intelligences. There is in it no change, no progress, no development; it is and must be the same whether men believe it or whether they deny it. But theology is human, the work of the human reason operating on the revealed *data*, the form in which the human understanding draws out and expresses in their mutual relations the contents of the revealed word. The *data* on which it operates are divine truth and invariable, but the form in which they are drawn out and expressed by the understanding is human, and variable as is every thing human. The revelation cannot vary because it is the word of God, who is perfect; but the human form may vary because the human mind is imperfect, and the imperfect can never give to that which is perfect an adequate form or expression. The human element of faith or theology is therefore variable as the human mind itself; the dogma, in so far as divine, is invariable; but even in the dogma there is a human element, because the human mind, in receiving the revelation, necessarily receives it through the medium of language or sensible form, which symbolizes it. The symbol does not interpret itself, and its significance is necessarily determined by the mind to which it is addressed. This is evident from the fact that divine revelation can be made only to intelligences or rational existences. God can make no revelation of spiritual truth to an ox, a horse, or a dog, because in these there is no intelligence to receive it, no reason to interpret the sign or symbol, that is, the language through which it is made. The church, indeed, is infallible in her definitions. But what is it that she defines? She defines the language, that is, the symbol. But the language or symbol means for the mind only what it interprets it to mean, and this interpretation will vary as varies the understanding of the interpreter. Unity of faith, therefore, depends on the unity of reason, or rather on the unity of the race. Faith, objectively taken, is always infallible, but it can be subjectively infallible only on condition of an infallible creditive subject. But the creditive subject is not infallible, and though illustrated and elevated by the grace of faith, *donum fidei*, it never becomes infallible, otherwise error on the part of the subject in matters of Catholic faith would be absolutely impossible, which we know is not the fact. Consequently the human element of the dogma itself may vary and be susceptible of progress or development, which, perhaps, is the fact which Dr. Newman intended to bring out in his *Essay on the*

Development of Christian Doctrine. Due consideration of these facts would remove that fear which so many Catholics have that any change, progress, or development in scholastic theology must necessarily bring about a change in faith, or be a change, progress, or development in divine revelation itself.

In fact, we know that theology has changed more than once with the changes of time and place. Nothing human remains or can remain always the same. The human mind is imperfect and cannot take in all truth at one glance; it goes on from age to age changing or modifying its views of truth, sometimes taking in more, sometimes less. The same words do not always have for it the same sense. Its interpretation of the symbol is more or less perfect according to its own point of view, or the stage of its progressive development. Hence it is that from the beginning the church has been obliged to make new definitions of the symbol. Continually are new definitions called for. At first it sufficed to say, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ his only Son, our Lord." This symbol was then sufficient to convey to the mind of the hearer the truth contained in these two articles of the creed. But when men began to refine on the words *heaven* and *earth*, it became necessary to give them a further definition, and define that by them is meant all things visible and invisible, that is to say, all things sensible and intelligible, in order to exclude the doctrine of the *Demiourgos*, and the Gnostic fancies of uncreated *Aeons*. It was sufficient for the primitive Christians to say, "Jesus Christ is the Son of God," because *son* is always consubstantial with *father*. But when speculation had obscured this truth, and had led to the denial of the proper divinity of the Son, and his eternal generation, it became necessary, in order to save the revealed truth, to give further and fuller definitions as we have them in the Nicene creed. When the Patripassians, losing sight of the proper distinction of the three persons in the Godhead, represented the Father as dying on the cross, it became necessary to assert more clearly that distinction, and to define that it was the Word, the second person, not the Father distinctively taken, that was incarnate. When Arius made the distinction between the Father and Son a distinction, not merely of persons, but of nature or substance, the church, in order to save the symbol, was obliged to define anew the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, as subsequently she was obliged to assert in clearer and more dis-

tinnet terms the proper personality of the Holy Ghost against the Macedonians. When Nestorius, confounding the distinction of persons with the distinction of substances, and knowing that the Divinity is one and being eternal cannot be born of woman, denied the union of the two natures, the human and divine, in the one divine person of Christ, and therefore denied that Mary is the mother of God, the church condemned him and asserted the unity of the person of our Lord. When, from the unity of the person the Eutychians concluded the unity of the two natures in Christ after the resurrection, the church added to her definition of unity of person the perpetual distinction of the two natures, as subsequently against the Monothelites she asserted the distinction of the two wills. When Pelagius loses sight of the fact that man has his destiny in the supernatural order, and exaggerates nature and free-will, the church asserts more distinctly the necessity of grace, and the impotence of man by nature alone to attain to a supernatural end. When speculators taking occasion from the condemnation of Pelagius run into the opposite extreme, and make grace operate without nature, the church reasserts against them free-will and the coöperation of nature with grace. So of all the other definitions which the church has from time to time made. All these definitions have grown out of the changes made by the human mind in what we call the human element of the dogma, that is to say, in the interpretation the human mind in its own operations gives to the sacred and infallible words of the church. These definitions do not change faith or in any sense modify it; their aim and their direct tendency are to preserve it in its unity and integrity. But they all involve to a greater or less extent a modification of previous theological forms and modes of expression. There is a great difference in form between the theology of the ante-Nicene and post-Nicene, and between the ante-Tridentine and the post-Tridentine doctors. A theologian would be justly suspected of heresy to-day were he to use expressions which were used by many of the greatest and most orthodox of the ante-Nicene writers. The mediæval writers, though they retain the faith, often depart widely from the theology of the fathers of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. Numerous modifications were rendered necessary by the definitions of the council of Trent, and still greater have been introduced by the controversies raised up by Baius and Jansenius and the papal constitutions against Jansenism.

It is contrary to the whole history of the past to suppose that no new modifications can be called for or admitted. There are numerous questions that remain yet undefined, and there are numerous opinions floating about amongst Catholics, and often supposed to be Catholic doctrine, that have not yet been defined, and against which most of the objections to Catholicity in our day are urged. Whoever reads the book before us will see that the author's great difficulty is with the common doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked, or that the torments of hell are vindictive and endless. He cannot understand how the wicked can with justice be endlessly punished, except on the ground that they continue for ever sinning. Now what is Catholic doctrine on this subject? Does the church teach that the punishment of the wicked in hell is vindictive or simply expiative? Does she teach that the punishment is everlasting because the reprobate continue everlastingly to sin?

Certainly the church teaches that they who die unregenerate shall never see God in the beatific vision, that is, be united with God by the *ens supernaturalis*. This loss or deprivation of heaven is a penalty of sin, and is undoubtedly everlasting. But has she defined that the wicked in hell are continually committing new sin, that they continue through eternity uttering new blasphemies against God, which call down upon them new showers of divine wrath? Are their hearts devoured by a literal worm that never dies? Are they subjected to a material fire that is never quenched? Are they doomed to those sensible tortures which the imaginations of our preachers so often attempt to depict? If they continue to commit sin, how can we say that Christ has triumphed over sin, that he has overcome Satan and destroyed his works? If their punishment is purely vindictive not expiative, how can you reconcile it with the love, the mercy, or the goodness of God? Would the worst man that ever lived, animated by the most vindictive passions that ever raged in the human breast, not recoil from inflicting any thing like so severe suffering upon his most bitter and hated enemies? Is there not here a point in which popular belief needs to be modified? Can the everlasting existence of evil be by any means reconciled with the universal dominion of good? Has the church really defined, and does Catholic faith really require us to believe that any thing is everlasting in the punishment of the wicked except their exclusion from supernatural beatitude?

May we not hope that the sins of this life may in some sense be expiated, and that the reprobate, though they can never receive any part or lot in the palingenesia, may yet find their sufferings gradually diminishing, and themselves attaining to that sort of imperfect good which is called natural beatitude? We know nothing in the definitions of the church opposed to this, and therefore, though only the elect can be saved, we know no authority for denying that all men may attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature. If this view may be taken, or if this theological explanation of the Catholic doctrine of hell is admissible, many of the most serious objections urged by thinking men against the church would be removed. Are we or are we not at liberty to take this view and offer this explanation? Can we hold and defend this view compatibly with our faith as a Catholic?

There are also various questions with regard to the Holy Scriptures which seem to us as yet unsettled, and which may be settled somewhat differently from the solutions which they receive in popular theology. That the Holy Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament are given by divine inspiration and contain the written word of God, is unquestionably of faith and can be doubted by no Catholic. But in what sense is this to be understood? Is it that the inspired writers were merely passive under divine inspiration, and that in writing they exercised no reason or volition of their own? Are we bound to believe that every word was dictated by the Holy Ghost, and that theology must defend every form of expression, every particular fact or statement that may be found in the Scriptures, and as given us in the Latin version called the Vulgate? Must we believe that St. Jerome had in all cases the correct and authentic reading of the original Hebrew, Chaldaic, or Greek, and that he never mistook in a single instance the true sense of a single term he translates, or the Latin word by which he translates it? Or, are we free to hold that only the doctrines or principles of our faith were given by direct inspiration, and that the writers followed their own reason, judgment, and taste, in their forms of expression, in the selection of the imagery and illustration they adopt, and in the arguments which they use or put forth in defence of the truth revealed? Is there any room left for Biblical criticism, for the collation of manuscripts, the comparison of recensions, and corrections of the text? Is it necessary to our orthodoxy that

we defend every historical statement as strictly exact, interpret literally every reference to science, to natural history, to geography, to geology, to chemistry, or to astronomy? Must we, in addition, follow in all cases the traditionary interpretation or application of texts? Must we believe the fathers, or even popes and councils, have always been infallibly guided and assisted by the Holy Ghost in the applications they have made of sacred texts, and that any different interpretation or application would be heretical or rash, although apparently demanded by the obvious sense of the words themselves? These are questions of no little importance, at least in the present state of Biblical literature and hermeneutics.

Then, again, how are we to understand the Mosaic cosmogony, the account of the creation of man given in Genesis, the garden of Eden, the seduction of the woman by the serpent, the fall of our first parents, the longevity of the antediluvian patriarchs, and the deluge? Are we to take all this as so much literal history, as a simple narration of facts, or are we at liberty to take these first chapters of Genesis in an allegorical or philosophical sense, as, according to Josephus, did the Jews, and was done by St. Augustine and others of the fathers? If not, how will you meet the objections drawn from geology and other sciences against what is written? Have we as yet answered those objections on the view taken by the scholastics? Are we able to do it? If not, how are we to defend our religion against its scientific opposers, and win back to it the science and intelligence of the age; or how can we say there is no discrepancy between faith and science?

Finally, there are questions in regard to the mutual relations of the natural and supernatural, reason and revelation, science and faith, nature and grace, that require to be examined anew and answered differently from what they appear to be answered, if answered at all, in scholastic theology. To the mass of men outside of the church, in our times, the natural and supernatural, as represented by scholastic theology, appear as contradictories, and as mutually destructive one of the other. The supernatural appears to them arbitrary, isolated, without reason, necessity, or utility, in the general constitution of things. They see not why the Creator could not in the beginning have created nature with all the powers and faculties necessary to attain to the good he designed it. In nature, so far as submitted to their inspection, he works by laws uniform and invariable, and accomplishes his purposes by a fixed sys-

tem of means adapted to ends. They see no necessity for any arbitrary intervention of Providence, no good to be accomplished by it, no reason for it. Such intervention seems to them to derogate from his wisdom, to imply a vacillation in his purposes, and to mar the symmetry and beauty of the world. All the presumptions drawn from their knowledge of nature are against the supernatural. They look upon miracles as improbable *a priori*, nay, as incapable of being proved by any possible amount of testimony. In their view natural reason and man's natural strength are sufficient, and they treat all pretences to miracles and the supernatural as superstitious and unworthy of respect. Hence the non-Catholic thought of the age is rationalistic and tends to pure naturalism. It rejects the supernatural in all its forms as superstition. Such we well know is the fact. Now, how, with our scholastic theology, are we to meet this fact? How, if we regard, as do the scholastics, the supernatural as isolated and arbitrary, are we to prove to the rationalists and naturalists of our times the fact of the supernatural, or to convince them that there is in our religion a class of facts really supernatural in their origin and character? How can we do this with the philosophy or theology in which we are brought up? There is here a real difficulty which every Catholic polemist feels the moment he begins to reason with candid, intelligent, and philosophic unbelievers.

But this is not all. Among Catholics themselves we find no little confusion on these points. On one side we find men in their effort to save nature and reason running into Pelagianism, which is virtually denying the supernatural, or the divinity of Christ; on another side, we find others wishing to save the supernatural, running into Jansenism and virtually denying the natural, or the humanity of Christ. Again, we find persons who admit the natural and the supernatural, but as disconnected, as severed one from the other,—analogous to the error of Nestorius that dissolves Jesus Christ, and denies the union of the two natures in one divine person; in contrast with these, we find also others who run to the opposite extreme, deny the distinction between the natural and supernatural, and fall into the Eutychian heresy, which denies that the human and divine natures in our Lord are for ever distinct. Everywhere we hear men extolling nature at the expense of grace, or decrying reason in order to exalt faith; nowhere do we find amongst our theologians the distinction and union of the

natural and supernatural, of which the type is presented in the mystery of the Incarnation. The consequence is that we are unable to meet the wants of cultivated intelligence, and to bring back to the church the learned and scientific among her opposers.

We know these statements will not be received with favor, but we are sure that they are true ; not true, indeed, as against Catholic faith, against the revelation of God which the church has received and maintains in its unity and integrity, but true, undeniably true, as against our modern manner of setting forth, explaining, and defending, in our human systems, that revelation. If, then, we are to carry on successfully our war against the enemies of the church, convince the unbelieving, subdue the rebellious, recover the alienated, and prepare the way for new and more glorious victories for our religion, we must be allowed to make those modifications in the human elements of the beliefs and doctrines of Catholics which the present state of non-Catholic thought and intelligence render necessary ; we must be permitted to show the harmony between rationalism and traditionalism, between the natural and the supernatural, between nature and grace, without separating them, or confounding them, or sacrificing the one to the other. We must rise in our philosophy to the point where in principle they are one, and while we scrupulously maintain their distinction we must take care that we never separate them. We must show that the supernatural, as well as the natural, originates in the creative act of God, and constitutes an order as regular, as uniform, and invariable in its kind as the natural order itself ; that miracles, in relation to the supernatural order, are no more isolated or arbitrary than the phenomena of reproduction or growth in the natural ; that each order has its own generic principles, its own laws of operation consistent with each other, proceeding alike from God as first cause and tending to God as final cause ; that in fact the natural and supernatural, reason and revelation, nature and grace, do constitute but parts of one synthetic whole. They are distinguishable, but not separable. The natural is not contained in the supernatural, nor the supernatural in the natural, but both are contained in the creative act of God, the common link that unites them. Neither has its reason in the other, but both have their reason in divine Providence.

When we have found a philosophical or theological doctrine that enables us to show this clearly and satisfactorily to human

reason, we shall have removed from the supernatural all character of arbitrariness or isolation, and vindicated for it a generic order of its own; we have thus removed the presumption against it, and rendered miracles as probable and as provable as any fact of the natural order; we have thus brought all of our religion that needs proving within the order of facts provable by testimony, and thus answered all the *a priori* objections of non-Catholics, the only objections that have not hitherto been sufficiently answered. The rest of the work for the Catholic polemist is either already done or capable of being done without much difficulty. Now what we ask is not so much that Catholic controversialists should undertake to do this work, as that Catholic public opinion should permit them to do it and sustain them in doing it, provided they attempt it in a proper spirit, with loyal intentions, and without lesion to Catholic faith. It is not liberty to depart from the faith or to construct a faith for one's self that we demand, but liberty to defend the faith "once delivered to the saints," without restraint from mere human traditions, or philosophical, or theological opinions, which it is not necessary to faith that we should respect.

This liberty may be denied; the demand for it may be treated as an indication of a disloyal temper; the exercise of it may be denounced as smacking of Protestantism; but whoever knows the spirit of the age in which we live, the nature of the objections we have to meet, the controversies we have to carry on in the higher regions of intelligence, knows, as well as any thing of the sort can be known, that, without it, it is idle to attempt any thing in the way of convincing or converting unbelievers, that Catholic polemics are entirely useless, and that there remains nothing for us but to fold our hands, close our mouths, and wait in inaction and silence the miraculous intervention of divine Providence to save the Catholic world from being reduced to a mere handful of women and children. We may boast our present numbers and flatter ourselves that we are making progress, but perhaps it would be difficult to name an epoch, since St. Peter erected his chair in the city of Rome, when the church had suffered greater losses than in that of the last ten years. We are in a crisis or a transition state, and the difficulty is that few among us seem to appreciate the fact, or, if appreciating it, have the nerve to look it boldly in the face. For the most part, we are unable to persuade ourselves that we cannot arrest the present tenden-

cy of things, and restore and reëstablish that which is past or passing away. Hence our impotence.

We ask no concession to the spirit of our times that may not be lawfully made; we ask no surrender of faith or of sound doctrine; we ask no compromise with error, no abandonment of any claim ever made by the church under her supreme pastor as the kingdom of God on earth; we ask no sacrifice of principle to popularity, no alliance of the church with temporary excitements or popular movements. We seek not popularity even in the state, far less would we seek it in the church; we are willing to suffer the reproach of our Lord, and we love our church all the more when she is in affliction, when her enemies everywhere rise up against her, and the wicked seem to triumph over her. Dearest to us is our Lord when nailed to the cross, and crying out, "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?" It is not to render the church popular, to gain for her the applause of the wisdom of this world, or the shouts of the mob, but it is that we may reach understandings, move wills, and gain souls, that we thus speak. God forgive us if we have spoken harshly, falsely, uncharitably, or unnecessarily. But here is a world lying in error and unbelief around us. The great majority, not only of our own countrymen, but of the human race, are living and dying without any true belief in Christ, or any well-grounded hope of entering with him into his kingdom and sharing his glory. And what are they, to whom the word of God and the means of life are committed, doing for their conversion? Where do we see the deep consciousness of the fact that God works by means, makes man responsible for man, and man an instrument in the salvation of man? To us Catholics seem to have lost the sense of their mission, to have become indifferent to the great work of saving souls which God has committed to them, to have become solicitous chiefly about the things of this world, about amassing or retaining earthly goods, laying up treasures on the earth, while suffering souls to perish for the lack of that bread which God has given them to dispense. So thinking and so feeling, what wonder if we, in some sense, forget ourselves, and use language which would be more appropriate from the anointed priest of God or authorized teacher in Israel, than from one who has no claim to be regarded as pertaining to the tribe of Levi? We speak as we do because it seems to us there are few left who will speak the word the age needs. We speak not in wrath, not in pride,

not in disdain or contempt of others, but because our heart is full, and the words will out. Restrain them we cannot. If they are presumptuous we deeply regret it, and hope there is yet in the world Christian charity enough to take what we say in the sense and spirit in which it is intended.

VARIOUS OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1861.]

THE following Letter is from a highly revered friend, and really one of the ablest and most learned theologians in our country, whose disapprobation cannot be otherwise than extremely painful. It was written for our private admonition, and by no means intended for publication; but, as it expresses in a brief and summary manner the objections to our views which have reached us from some other quarters, we take the liberty to lay it before our readers, simply suppressing the name of the writer, the place from which it was written, and its date:

“DOCTOR:—I have not very good news to send you to-day. I am not pleased.

“Your philosophy as a system can be maintained. But when you endeavor to make all truths, even the first and clearest principles of reason dependent and resting on it, on your intuition of God, on your *primum philosophicum*, *Eus creat existentias*, this is too much. *A priori*, the attempt to ground whatever we know for certain on a system, which, by the very fact that it is a system, and that it is contradicted by many, is uncertain, such an attempt cannot be successful. Is it not wiser to start from those simple, general principles, which have always been admitted by human reason, and leave room to no doubt or hesitation whatever; and then, as far as we can, connect our systems with them; so that, if we fail, yet those principles remain unshaken, but simply our system is more or less injured by that want of connection? This seems to be more or less advisable. But enough on that.

“About your Home Politics, you are perfectly free to think just as you choose: and what you choose may be the best.

“Also about ‘schools, public schools, Catholic schools,’ though I did not lean to your side, yet my knowledge of the country, of the state of public schools, of the resources of Catholics, was too limited to enable me to be either way very positive on the matter; especially, as bishops themselves are divided on that question. And furthermore, as you conceded that if we could get up Catholic schools well supported and managed, it would be highly desirable; and as it was only an affair of opportunity, circumstances, &c., I had not much to say against it.

"About the temporal principality of the Holy Father, you maintained that it was a serious inconvenience, in modern times, to religion itself; that the pope could do well enough, if not better, without it; that Italians were incensed against the church itself, as a spiritual and divine institution, on account of that temporality, &c. You maintained, also, that notwithstanding these considerations, no power on earth had a right to deprive the Holy Father; you condemned in the strongest terms the sacrilegious invasion of the Roman states by the Sardinians; you hoped for the church far better times and nobler triumphs, &c. I said again, at the time, that an honest man can entertain all these notions.

"But since then, I have taken a wholly different view of the case. The atrocities committed by Piedmontese, and of which I sent you some instances from the *Civiltà*, and the reaction which bursts out in every part of the kingdom of Naples, &c., have convinced me that, in poor Italy, there is to be seen now, what we enjoyed in France, during the blissful years of 1789, *et seq.*, namely, the unmitigated reign of terror, and the domination of murderers. I regret deeply having at any time said a word in favor of these basest rabble. I have been thoroughly deceived, and I believe now firmly that, in Italy, the pope is more than ever the true friend and defender not only of right, but especially of liberty; and that, if he is driven away from Rome, liberty will go with him, and disappear from where he is not. So I think now, after closer examination. *Errare aut errasse humanum est.* I should like to know if this be to your taste. I fain persuade myself that you cannot be very far from the same conviction. In fact, I see now in Italy, on the part of the pretended liberals, nothing but falsehood, hypocrisy, iniquity, abominable tyranny and cruelty, which cry to Heaven. And perhaps you yourself do not see much more, as a phrase, or rather the whole page 416 * seems to indicate.

"Also you have spoken several times against the scholastics, and in your last number, pages 287 and 288,† you say things rather harsh. Of course, I do not admit that. It would afford me great pleasure to know even one of these 'subtler errors of the day,' save those based on geology and modern discoveries, any speculative or metaphysical error, the solution or the principle of solution of which is not to be found in the books of the scholastics.

"But the article I regret most, and which is the cause of this letter of mine, is the one headed 'Catholic Polemics.' Assuredly, we must present truth in such a way as to be understood by those whom we address; and who ever denied it? But if we must proceed, as you do yourself when speaking on hell, this is another thing.

"Really, my dear Doctor, I have been horrified at it. What then becomes of the *Ite in Ignem Æternum*, of the several passages where this fire is called *Inextinguibilis*, of this well known text of Isaias: *Quis habitabit ex vobis cum ardoribus sempiternis?* and of so many others, and of all catechisms together? To say that the reprobate can be restored to the natural beatitude they might have enjoyed in *statu naturæ puræ* is a heretical proposition. Besides, if they undergo the loss of God, as you concede, and if this be a punishment, how can they feel any amount of happiness; unless you contend that the loss of God is a trifling affair; or unless you put them on the same level as children who have not been baptized; neither of which can be held consistently with the teaching of the Catholic Church? But I have no time to argue at length. It would take me a month to explain what came to my mind while reading

*Brownson's works. Vol. XVIII. p. 444. †Vol. II. pp. 146 & 147.

that article. My dear Doctor, I tell you again I feel a great deal of pain on account of it.

"Besides how can you say with justice, 'page 358,* that 'we must be content to repeat the arguments stereotyped for our use, although those arguments may rest on historical blunders, metaphysical errors, &c.' and a few lines before, that 'it is the duty of Catholic publicists never to take any deeper, broader, or loftier views than are taken by the most ignorant or uncultivated of Catholic believers, &c.?'

"I have just done reading the *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*, by Dr. Newman. Nothing can be more original, more deep, and more orthodox, and not only no ignorant Catholic, but even very few among the most learned, could go so deep, and explain so philosophically the origin and causes, &c., of Protestantism in England; and you, yourself, were you shackled and fettered, when formerly you wrote so beautifully and vigorously in behalf of the church? If you were, indeed it is a fact I never suspected in the least. Now your Review is no more the same as before. I do not know why. I cannot account for the change. But change there is, and a striking one. Assuredly, you have still admirable passages. But you have taken the habit of mixing up with them passages of quite a different nature, which grate terribly on the ears of your friends.

"I object also to the beginning of the *alinea*: 'In our historical reading,' p. 360 † It contains a real offence to the bishops, and also especially to the five last pages, from the *alinea*, 'finally, p. 373‡ to the end; except the last lines, which breathe a noble spirit, a truly Catholic heart. Ah, Doctor, if your excellent qualities could be cleared from some little defects, which impair them and lessen the fruits they can produce, you would be an accomplished man. I have no time to write any more, and this is even too long.

"Be assured that there is in my remarks, much less in my heart, not the slightest degree of bitterness against you. Nothing will ever make me forget the good you have done to the Catholic cause, and till the end I will remain

"Your most affectionate and devoted friend."

To this letter we subjoin an article from *The Catholic* published at Pittsburgh, July 13th, 1861, because it is, with the exception of the last paragraph, written with more candor and fairness, and with a graver attempt at argument than we usually meet in the columns of the so-called Catholic papers when referring to our Review:

"Towards the end of the third article of the July number of his Review, Dr. Brownson throws out some suggestions as to the real Catholic doctrine on certain points, which are combated by the rationalists of the day. He is anxious apparently to reduce the teaching of the church within as narrow limits as possible, in order the better to recommend it to unbelievers. Whatever may be said of the merits of this system in general, we are afraid that in the particular instances he has selected, the reviewer has gone too far.

"He first offers the following explanation of the Catholic doctrine of

**Ante*, p. 110. †*Ante*, p. 112. ‡*Ante*, p. 125.

hell: 'Though only the elect can be saved, we know of no authority for denying that all men may attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature.' The authority for denying this view is plain enough. All theologians assert that it is rash (and some go farther) to deny that the fire of hell is not metaphorical, but real, though no doubt, different in many respects from the fire which we have on earth. The foundation for this assertion is the frequent use in the Scripture of the word fire, to express the sufferings of the damned, under circumstances that entirely preclude any but a literal meaning. Add to this the following words of the Athanasian Creed, which every Catholic must receive as an authoritative exposition of faith, 'qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam æternam: qui vero mala, in ignem æternum. HÆC EST FIDES CATHOLICA.' And although these last words did not refer exclusively to the sufferings of the damned, yet they include this point, as well as the others explained in the symbol. Now, if the fire which torments the damned be a real fire, and be eternal, it is manifest that the explanation suggested in the Review cannot be maintained.

Again the reviewer overlooks another well-defined doctrine of the church. The Council of Florence defined, and the definition is repeated in every profession of faith proposed to the oriental schismatics that the souls of those who die in actual, as well as of those who die in only original sin, 'mox in infernum descendunt, poenis tamen disparibus puniendæ.' Now, the mildest doctrine that a Catholic can defend in regard to infants who die in original sin, is that they are excluded from the beatific, or supernatural vision of God, but enjoy that which would have been allotted to the state of pure nature. Then, according to the definition that the punishment of those who die in actual sin, is different from that of those who depart with original sin, the punishment of the first class of sinners must necessarily be something more than what the reviewer represented it to be. Nor is this reasoning unsupported by positive authority. Innocent IV. (lib. III. Decretal. Tit. 42. cap. 3. *Majores*), lays down as a principle that the punishment of original sin is the privation of the vision of God, (*carentia visionis Dei*) and the punishment of actual sin consists in the torments of an everlasting hell, (*gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*). This authoritative declaration prevents us from limiting the punishment of actual sin to the privation of the beatific vision and clearly indicates that besides this the damned have to suffer perpetual torments. And from this we think we can conclude the reviewer's question whether we can hold and defend the view he proposes 'compatibly with our faith as a Catholic,' must be answered in the negative.

"Dr. Brownson next introduces various questions in regard to the Holy Scriptures, in the settlement of which he thinks he can improve on the solutions given in 'popular theology.' The Council of Trent (Sess. IV.) has defined that God is the author of the Old and New Testaments; it gives a list of the sacred and canonical books, and anathematizes those 'who refuse to receive for sacred and canonical the entire books, with each of their parts,' as they are commonly read in the Catholic Church, and as they are to be found in the Old Vulgate edition.' To say that a book is sacred and canonical, is to say that it is inspired, or that God is its author, and this certainly forces us to defend that 'every historical statement made therein is strictly exact.' The sacred writers no doubt, 'followed their own reason, judgment, and taste in their forms of expression, in the selection of the imagery and illustrations which they adopt, and in the arguments which they use or put forth in defence of the truth revealed;' but in all this they were guarded from error by the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, and the same Holy Spirit moved them to write what they did write. This is the view of the inspiration

of a sacred book, which must be held to make good the assertion that God is the author of the entire book and each of its parts. We do not know whether the reviewer counts the Jesuit Patrizi among 'popular' theologians; at all events he has, we think, settled conclusively the question of the nature and limits of inspiration in a dissertation on the subject, which he published in Rome, in 1857, and in which he defends the view which we have briefly stated.

"Again, the Council of Trent, *ad coercenda petulantia ingenia*, decreed that no one relying on his own learning should interpret the Sacred Scriptures, in the matters of faith and morals, pertaining to the establishment of Christian doctrine, contrary to the sense which has been holden and is held by our mother the church, or contrary to the *unanimous* interpretation of the fathers. This decree is more than a sufficient answer to the question put by the reviewer in relation to traditional interpretation. A full explanation may be found in any 'popular' theology.

"Lastly, the reviewer complains that scholastic theology represents the supernatural as isolated and arbitrary. This, we must confess, is a novel view of scholastic theology. This theology follows closely the definitions of the church, and if there is any obscurity on the question of the supernatural, it is because the more difficult and abstruse points, as Pope Celestine I, long ago remarked, have not been defined by the competent authority. The reviewer must pardon us if we still prefer the teaching of scholastic theology to any unintelligible jargon about methexis and mimesis, and palingenesia, and cosmic cycles. There is no use of attempting to improve on the simplicity of faith, and as Gregory XVI. complains in his brief against Hermes, 'besides the evil wrought by those who openly defend rebellion against the church, great harm is done by those who through love and desire of novelty, always learning and never coming to the knowledge of truth, become masters of error, having never been the disciples of truth, and while boasting that they defend, in reality, attempt to corrupt the sacred deposit of faith.'"

We add also the following paragraph, which we clip from the *Catholic Mirror*, published at Baltimore, as before we get through, we shall make it the subject of a remark:

"*Messrs. Editors*.—Let me call your attention and that of the readers of *Brownson's Review*, to the page 371* of the last number, where the former champion of the church calls in question an article of Catholic faith, namely, the eternity of the pains of hell. This point was solemnly defined in the fifth general council, held at Constantinople, in the year 553. *Qui stat, videat ne cadat*.

"A PRIEST."

The writer of the letter says: "Now your Review is no more the same as before. I do not know why. I cannot account for the change. But change there is, and a striking one."

The change can hardly be great or striking, it seems to us if it cannot be told wherein it consists. Of this alleged change we ourselves are not aware. We have, we confess, for the last few years endeavored to write in our own natural style rather

**Ante*, p. 123

than in a style formed in imitation of the scholastics, in which we were never at home or at our ease. We have also taken up other questions, and have endeavored to address ourselves more to the general comprehension of the American mind, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, than we did in the beginning of our Catholic career. We labored at first to bring out and vindicate what may be called the extrinsic authority of the church; but, having said all that we had to say on that point, we have since labored more especially to bring out and vindicate what may be called her intrinsic authority, in order to show that the extrinsic is not arbitrary, mechanical, or isolated in its character and operation, but has its basis in the intrinsic, in the very nature and constitution of things. In the earlier volumes of our *Review* we labored to develop and apply to the various relations of life, social, domestic, and individual, the admonition of our Lord, *Quærite primum regnum Dei et justitiam ejus: et hæc omnia adjicientur vobis*. In the later volumes we have been endeavoring to develop and apply to the various questions that come up the theological maxim *Gratia supponit naturam*, grace supposes nature. In this, indeed, there is a change of subject very allowable and very necessary, unless we would be continually repeating ourselves, but no change of doctrine or purpose, tone or spirit.

If there has been any change of purpose or of doctrine in our *Review* during its seventeen years of devotion to Catholicity, we are unconscious of it. As far as we know ourselves we are the same man that we were at first, only trusting that we may have profited somewhat by our experience; we are, to say the least, as firm in our Catholic faith as we were seventeen years ago, as deeply devoted to the church, as anxious to serve the cause of truth, and as earnest to secure the salvation of our own soul. The only changes we are conscious of are such changes as invariably take place in every convert when his first fervor has passed away, when the novelty of his position has worn off, and he has become acquainted with the stern realities of the new world into which he has entered.

From our entrance into the church up to the present moment, those outside have consoled themselves with the constant prediction that we should change and abandon the Catholic religion, as we had abandoned the several forms of Protestantism to which we had been previously momentarily attached; and we fear that these predictions have had some influence on a certain number of our Catholic friends, and dis-

posed them from the first, if we failed to repeat our profession of faith, to suspect us of having changed or being on the point of changing back to our old misbelief or no-belief. Now we wish to say, once for all, that when we entered the Catholic Church we did it deliberately and from full conviction; we knew what we were about; we then made our solemn profession of faith and pledged ourselves to God and to man to abide by it; we then pledged ourselves to submit to the authority and hold to the doctrines of the church. We consider this pledge sufficient, and do not consider it necessary for us to repeat it in every number and every article of our *Review*. In a worldly point of view, we had nothing to gain by becoming a Catholic; in a worldly point of view, we have nothing to gain by remaining a Catholic. We came into the church because thoroughly convinced and firmly persuaded that she is God's church and out of her communion there is no salvation; we remain in the church because we retain the same conviction, the same persuasion, and know that if we were to leave her we could never save our soul, see God, or enjoy the happiness of heaven. What she teaches us, we believe; what she commands, we are prepared to do without question or hesitation. Let us know she teaches a doctrine, we ask nothing further; let us know that she declares such or such to be our duty, and we at once admit that we are bound to do it, and that if we do not, we are wanting not only in our fidelity to her, but in our obedience to God. What more can be asked of us, or what more can we say? Do you believe us? Then this is enough. Do you not believe us? Do you believe that we lie, lie to you and lie to God? Then nothing that we could say would be of any avail. But till we *persist* in maintaining some condemned doctrine, or in defending things prohibited by the church, you are bound to believe us and to be satisfied with our Catholic disposition and intentions.

That we may err, that we have erred in our writings in regard both to doctrine and opinion, is very possible; to this the best of men are liable, for, as says our reverend friend in his letter, *Errare aut errasse humanum est*. But can any one, however hostile to us, charge us with persisting in an error of any sort after it has been clearly shown to us that it is an error? Have we ever resisted authority in either doctrine or practice? We may have been ignorant of some definitions of the church, and unwittingly said things contrary thereto, but

when those definitions were brought to our knowledge, have we ever refused to accept them or to retract any thing we might have said not in accordance with them? Have we ever set, or ever shown a disposition to set ourselves above authority and to write or teach any thing contrary to the teachings of the church? No enemy can say that we have. We have for seventeen years conducted a Catholic review, and no bishop or archbishop can say that we have ever persisted in any doctrine or opinion which he informed us was contrary to our Catholic faith or Catholic duty.

Our reverend friend says: "Your philosophy as a system can be maintained," that is, maintained compatibly with our faith as a Catholic, we suppose he means. This is all we need ask, and we may pass over his criticisms, the more especially, since they do not happen to bear upon either our method or our principles. In point of fact, we have no system of philosophy, defend no system, and are opposed to all attempts to construct a system; for all systems of philosophy are abstract, and therefore lack reality. They are at best only logical representations, not of reality, or things as they are, but of our mental conceptions of things. Our philosophy, so far as philosophy we have, is realism, that is, deals with things as they really are, and not as they may exist in our abstract conceptions. When we assert *Ens creat existentias* as the ideal formula embracing all truth, we assert the real order; and we assert real being and real existences in their real relation. Our reverend friend must concede to us, that in the beginning God created the heavens and earth, all things visible and invisible; he must also concede, that what is not God, and yet exists, is creature; that what is not creature, and yet is, is God, and that the relation between God and creature, or between Being and existences, is expressed by the creative act; therefore he must concede that all truth, whether truth of being, truth of existences, or truth of relation, is embraced in the ideal formula. Furthermore, as *Ens*, or God, is real and necessary being, and includes in himself all real and necessary being, he must concede that, whatever is contingent, depends upon the creative act, and exists only by virtue of that act. How, then, can he object to our formula as the *primum philosophicum*?

We thank our reverend friend for informing us, that we are perfectly free to think as we choose about Home Politics, and also for admitting that he had not much to say against our

views on the subject of Education, especially, as he says, as the bishops themselves were divided on that question. With regard to our views of the temporal principality of the Holy Father, he says, he said and believed, when they were put forth they were such as an honest man might entertain; but he now, it would seem, thinks differently, and claims the benefit of the proverb, *Errare aut errasse humanum est*. That proverb, we suppose, may be as available for us as for him; and in all cases, and on all subjects, we trust we shall ever be as ready as he to retract any views we have expressed, the moment we are satisfied they are erroneous. The subject, however, is one which cannot be re-opened, at least for the present, in our pages. We will only say, that our friend will find in our *Review* the conviction, as strongly expressed as he expresses it, that the pope is more than ever the true friend, not only of right, but especially of liberty. Our views on the whole question, especially on the conduct of the Sardinians and the revolutionists of Italy, have been given as fully in our pages as it is necessary to give them; and we have nothing further to say on the subject, only that if we have said any thing untrue, or inconsistent with our faith or loyalty as a Catholic, we are ready to make such explanations, modifications, or retractions, as the Holy See may require of us.

Our reverend friend complains that we have several times said things rather harsh against the scholastics. This is possible; but he might have added, that we have several times said things very much in their favor. Does he forget that the scholastics have said much harder things themselves of each other, than we have ever said of any of them? Does he hold that we are bound, as Catholics, to maintain every doctrine, every opinion, every form of expression, which may be found in the scholastics, either as philosophers or as theologians? Does he maintain that the human mind has henceforth nothing to do, but to repeat, in a diluted form, the scholastics, and that it is never lawful for a Catholic to go beyond the compendiums of their speculations furnished by our modern theologians? Did not the scholastics in method, in form, and in expression, depart widely from the fathers? Wherefore, then, should it be unlawful for us, provided we hold fast to the faith, to depart in like respects from them? Am I, as a Catholic of the nineteenth century, bound to follow, in my method of philosophizing, St. Thomas, any more than St. Thomas was bound to follow the method of St. Augustine?

St. Thomas, as a philosopher, simply reproduces Aristotle, and departs from him only when forced to do so by his faith as a Christian. Is it unlawful for me, as a Catholic, to dissent from Aristotle? Must I, too, take that pagan philosopher as *Magister*, as *Philosophus*, whose *dictum* is authority in every matter pertaining to the province of human reason? If so, what say you of St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura, Thomassin, Bossuet, Fénelon, and Cardinal Gerdil, not to name others hardly less eminent in philosophy and theology, who were very far from swearing by the words of the Stagirite? We have always understood, that in philosophy the church leaves us free, so long as we do not contravene her dogmas, or depart from the Catholic faith.

The writer of the letter says: "It would afford me great pleasure to know even one of those 'subtler errors of the day,' save those based on geology and modern discoveries, any speculative or metaphysical error, the solution, or the principle of solution of which, is not to be found in the books of the scholastics." The term *scholastics* is rather vague, and our friend allows himself a very wide margin. By the scholastic philosophy we, in our remarks referred to, meant not merely that of the mediæval scholastics, but that generally taught officially in our schools and colleges, such as we find it in our more commonly used text-books. With this philosophy, which professes to follow in the main St. Thomas, and is of the peripatetic species, we have maintained, it is impossible to refute the subtler objections of our day urged against the Catholic Church. There are many of these subtler errors; but as our friend asks for only one, we will name modern pantheistic rationalism, as held and defended by recent German authors. We find in this philosophy neither the refutation, nor the principle of refutation of this subtle form of rationalism. Taking the principle of the peripatetics, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, it is impossible to refute modern sensism. Denying, with what we call scholastic philosophy, or the philosophy of the schools, intuition of God, it is impossible, by any logic we are acquainted with, to prove the existence of the supreme being as distinct from the universe; and denying, with the same philosophy, all intuition of the creative act, it is equally impossible to prove the existence of a universe distinct from God or the supreme being. It would be easy for us to show the truth of these assertions; but as we could not do it without scandalizing many worthy people, we let them stand

as simple assertions, leaving it for our friend to refute them, by refuting on the recognized principles, and by the approved methods of the scholastic philosophy—Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel, Bauer, or even the *Ethics* of Spinoza.

We do not say that it is impossible to refute these subtler errors to which we allude by the scholastic philosophy, to the satisfaction of those who are ignorant of them, or even as they may be reproduced by our professors; what we mean is, that it is impossible with that philosophy, according to its systematic principles and method, to refute them, to the conviction of those who hold them, and as they hold them. German rationalism, which in its later forms is a far more subtle pantheism than that of oriental emanationism, is, so far as we are informed, met and refuted by no official philosophy, or philosophy suffered to be taught in our schools, as it is conceived and held by the German rationalists themselves. No doubt our professors prove clearly enough, that it contains many errors and even absurdities; but we refute no doctrine for its adherents, till we distinguish its truth from the error they mix up with it, and show them that truth freed from its accompanying error, and integrated in our own doctrine. Men embrace an erroneous system, and adhere to it, not for the sake of the error, but for the sake of the truth it contains; and they hold the error, either because they do not distinguish it from the truth, or because it seems to them impossible to hold the truth without holding it. We should all remember that the intellect can never be false, and, therefore, that in every doctrine which the intellect may embrace, there is and must be an element of truth. That truth the Catholic, if he understands his own religion, accepts, and shows to exist, in its unity and integrity, in the doctrine of his church. This is the fact which he must make evident to every non-Catholic in order really to refute him. Now, how can you tell me, on your scholasticism, what is the truth the German rationalist holds, and which, to his mind, consecrates the error of that rationalism; or how will you show him that in your own doctrine you avoid his error, and accept and integrate his truth?

We repeat here what we have often said in our *Review*, that we do not refute false doctrines simply by pointing out their falsehood; we must do it by distinguishing between the true and the false, and showing that we accept the true, and integrate it in a higher unity. This is an important consideration for all who seek the conversion of non-Catholics. In the ear-

lier volumes of our *Review* we wrote not a few articles against Protestants and unbelievers in favor of Catholicity, which were perfectly satisfactory and conclusive to our Catholic friends, but which had little or no effect upon those who held the errors we labored to refute, except to puzzle and bewilder them. There was something not unjust in their reply: "Your arguments are logical; they are well put; they silence, but they do not convince." They did not convince any who needed to be convinced, for the simple reason, that we did not distinguish their truth from their error, and show them that we held the very truth they in their own minds saw, and held it in its unity and integrity free from their error.

This is the grand mistake of most controversialists with their opponents. They begin by denouncing their errors, and passing over, without recognition, the very important, the very essential truths which, notwithstanding those errors, they may hold, and then attributing their failure to be convinced to the perversity of their wills, the hardness of their hearts, or their love of error. No man hates truth or loves error, and no man is ever unwilling to give up error for truth, when he is convinced that it is only error that he gives up, and only truth that he is required to accept. Why is it the Protestant adheres to his Protestantism? Because his Protestantism is a pure, unmixed falsehood? No. But because he has in it certain elements of truth which he loves and prizes, and which he erroneously supposes he would be required to give up, were he to become a Catholic. To induce him to become a Catholic it is not necessary, nor is it profitable to insist, in season and out of season, on his error, but to show him that his truth is ours, is held by us as firmly as by him, in a higher unity than he has, in its true place and relation in the whole body of truth.

The hardest thing for us Catholics to conceive of, is, that they who are not Catholics may have, and in fact do have much truth, and that we do no harm to the Catholic cause, and in no sense deny the catholicity of our religion by recognizing and frankly accepting the truth they have. In fact, we hardly believe practically, that our religion can be regarded as catholic if we admit those outside are yet not destitute of some portions of truth. We are apt to think that whatever truth we concede to them is so much subtracted from our stock. Yet the concession implies no deficiency on our part, or that the truth which we concede them to hold is sufficient

for their intellectual and moral life and fecundity. The Catholic Church embraces the whole truth and nothing but truth; in her alone is truth to be found in its unity and universality as a complete and living whole. Out of the church truth is indeed held, but held in fragments, isolated from its proper relations, without unity or integrity, and therefore without life, vigor, or fruitfulness. No people in any age has been so degraded, so completely dishumanized, so absolutely severed from God as to have no truth; for to be absolutely destitute of truth, to be reduced to pure falsehood would be absolute intellectual death and annihilation. It is because those outside of the church are not destitute of all truth, because they have some elements of truth that we are able to hope for their conversion, for it is only on the truth which they have that we can base our arguments or our reasoning designed to bring them to the truth which they have not. Bearing this in mind, our labors would be much more successful, because we should proceed in our controversies with non-Catholics with more respect for their understanding, and more readily win their sympathy and affection.

Perhaps, after all, the suspicion that we have changed, which some of our Catholic friends seem to entertain, grows out of the fact that we really have changed our method of dealing with those outside of the church, and, instead of laboring primarily and chiefly to prove that they are wrong and on the road to destruction, we have labored to make them understand that we recognize what they have that is true and by no means wish them to abandon any truth they have. We have sought latterly to defend Catholic interests and to win the ears and the hearts of those separated from us, by showing them, on the one hand, that Catholicity repels nothing which they hold affirmatively, or most value in their own doctrines, and, on the other hand, that what they really object to in the Catholic Church and is practically effective in keeping them out of her communion, has no real foundation in Catholic doctrine, in the constitution, discipline, teachings, or practices of the church, although some of it may be true of the notions and practices of many Catholics. Here, we apprehend, is the cause of much of that distrust of us which some have latterly entertained. It has led us necessarily into a style of remark and to the adoption of a line of argument not usual with Catholic controversialists—or, as to that matter, with any class of controversialists, Catholic or non-Catholic. It has led us to ac-

knowledge and accept much that is true in our opponents, and to acknowledge and rebuke not a few notions and practices we find among our own Catholic brethren. It has had the effect not of diminishing our intolerance of error, but of making us less intolerant to those separated from the Catholic communion. It has also led us to seek to present Catholic truth, under those relations and in those forms which would render it intelligible to the non-Catholic American mind, and prevented us from adopting as the rule of our action: "See no faults in a friend, and no good in an enemy." But whether right or wrong in this, we have believed that we were proceeding upon a truly Catholic principle, and laboring in the most effectual manner in our power for the advancement of Catholic interests. It is for the authorities of the church to decide whether we have adopted an un-catholic principle, an un-catholic method, or whether, supposing our principle and method be true, we have erred in our development and application of them or not. If they say we are wrong under either head, we are ready to make the correction or the modification that shall be exacted of us.

A due consideration of what we have just said will explain, if it does not justify, what appears to our reverend friend as objectionable in our article on *Catholic Polemics*, and which he says is the cause of his letter to us. "Assuredly," he says, "we must present truth in such a way as to be understood by those whom we address; and who ever denied it? But if we must proceed, as you do yourself when speaking on hell, this is another thing." This concedes the principle we contend for; but the reverend author, we trust, will permit us to say that to present truth in such a way to be understood by those whom we address, is to present it in such a way that it shall be seen to be consistent with, and to include the truth they already hold. This is all we have aimed at in any thing we have written, or insisted upon as necessary to be done. Whether in attempting to do it we have ourselves fallen into error or not, we leave to others to decide.

Our reverend friend says he "has been horrified" at what we say when speaking of hell. We very frankly admit and we shall by and by explain wherein, that some expressions escaped us which are inexact and may lead to the inference that we hold in regard to the punishment of the wicked in hell, a doctrine which we do not hold and had no intention of suggesting. But our friend should bear in mind that we

were in fact laying down and defending no doctrine on the subject; we were simply stating certain problems of very great importance in the present state of religious controversy in our own country, in regard to which further definitions of the church seem to us to be needed. We did not attempt to dictate what those definitions should be, nor did we give anybody the slightest reason to suppose that we were unprepared to accept them, let them be what they might. We thought and we still think, that there are questions which are asked in relation to the future condition of the reprobate that have not been answered by any formal and express definitions of the church, and on which therefore opinion is as yet free.

Our friend cites against us some passages of Scripture and refers us to all the catechisms; the writer in the *Catholic Mirror* refers to us the fifth general council for a solemn definition of the church against us; *The Catholic* refers us to the words of the Athanasian creed, *qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam æternam; qui vero mala, in ignem æternum. Hæc est fides Catholica*, to the definition of the Council of Florence, which declares a difference of punishment between those who die guilty of actual sin and those who die in only original sin, and to the *Decretals* which assert that the punishment of actual sin is *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*. Conceding these authorities to be definitions, they do not touch the problem we proposed to be defined, for we have never questioned, or thought of questioning the fact that the reprobate are punished eternally in hell. Our questions, which, let it be understood, we did not answer—related not to the fact or duration of punishment, but to its nature and to the principles on which it is inflicted.

In regard to the reference of the writer in the *Catholic Mirror*, we can only say that we have been unable to find any thing of the sort in the acts of the fifth general council held at Constantinople in 553, or even in the acts of a synod held by the archbishop of the same city a short time previous at the request of the emperor, against the Origenists, and which are sometimes included with those of the council itself. There is in them not the slightest reference to the subject. It is true Denzinger in his *Enchiridion* refers us to the acts against the Origenists, but the acts as he gives them are wholly silent on the questions. A friend, quite competent to the task, whom, in consequence of our continued inability to make much use of our eyes, we requested to examine the acts of the council in question as given by Hefele in his *History of the Councils*, the

fullest and most recent authority on the subject, assures us that he can find no reference in them to the question of the punishment of the wicked. Hefele also maintains, and very conclusively, it has seemed to our friend and to us, that the name of *Origen* even, if not the whole of the 11th Canon inserted in the acts of the council as we now have them, is an interpolation. St. Gregory the Great tells us expressly that the only subject treated in the fifth general council was that of the *Tria Capitalia*. It would be well for our newspaper writers to consult the original authorities before citing them.

The definition of the Council of Florence adduced is not in point, for we did not question that it had been defined, that there would be a difference of punishment between those who die in only original sin and those who die in actual sin. The theologian in *The Catholic* reasons well as he understands our question, but not as we understand it ourselves. The passage from the *Decretals*, is referred by *The Catholic* to Innocent IV.; Denzinger refers it to Innocent III., and we find it in the *Decretals* of Gregory IX. referred to the same pope, which seems the more probable as Innocent IV. was not a pope until some time after the death of Gregory IX. The sentence quoted can hardly be regarded as a definition, because it was not the point in question before the pontiff. It appears in a letter from Pope Innocent to the archbishop of Arles against the Albigenses and other heretics, who contended that baptism is uselessly conferred on infants. The letter contains a condemnation of this heresy and argument against it, and the particular passage cited comes incidentally in the course of the pontiff's reasoning.

But let this be as it may, the *dictum* of the pontiff is given substantially in the language of Scripture, and leaves the sense of the text referred to undefined. The same may be said of the passage in the Athanasian creed. The texts adduced by our friend from the Scriptures are not definitions, for the questions we ask relate precisely to the sense in which these texts are to be understood. That the wicked "descend into hell," that they go *in ignem æternum*, that they dwell *cum ardoribus sempiternis*, are points which we did not, and, as a Catholic or a believer in the Holy Scriptures, could not question, or represent as undefined. In what sense are these expressions to be taken? The writer of the letter as well as the theologians of the *Mirror* and *The Catholic* seem not to have perceived the real character of the questions we raised, or the

points that we considered as in need of further definition. The main points we had in view were set forth in two questions which we asked, raised by the book we were reviewing.

1. Does the church teach that the punishment of the wicked in hell is vindictive or simply expiative? 2. Does she teach that the punishment is everlasting because the reprobate continue everlastingly to sin? In development of these questions, we say:—

“Certainly the church teaches that they who die unregenerate shall never see God in the beatific vision, that is, be united with God by the *ens supernaturale*. This loss or deprivation of heaven is a penalty of sin, and is undoubtedly everlasting. But has she defined that the wicked in hell are continually committing new sin, that they continue through eternity uttering new blasphemies against God, which call down upon them new showers of divine wrath? Are their hearts devoured by a literal worm that never dies? Are they subjected to a material fire that is never quenched? Are they doomed to those sensible tortures which the imaginations of our preachers so often attempt to depict? If they continue to commit sin, how can we say that Christ has triumphed over sin, that he has overcome Satan and destroyed his works? If their punishment is purely vindictive, not expiative, how can you reconcile it with the love, the mercy, or the goodness of God? Would the worst man that ever lived, animated by the most vindictive passion that ever raged in the human breast, not recoil from inflicting anything like so severe suffering upon his most bitter and most hated enemies? Is there not here a point in which popular belief needs to be modified? Can the everlasting existence of evil be by any means reconciled with the universal dominion of good? Has the church really defined, and does Catholic faith really require us to believe, that any thing is everlasting in the punishment of the wicked except the exclusion from the supernatural beatitude? May we not hope that the sins of this life may in some sense be expiated, and that the reprobate, though they can never receive any part or lot in the palingenesia, may yet find their suffering gradually diminishing and themselves attaining to that sort of imperfect good which is called natural beatitude? We know nothing in the definitions of the church opposed to this, and therefore though only the elect can be saved, we know no authority for denying that all men may attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature. If this view may be taken, or if this theological explanation of the Catholic doctrine of hell is admissible, many of the most serious objections urged by thinking men against the church would be removed. Are or are we not at liberty to take this view and offer this explanation? Can we hold and defend this view compatibly with our faith as a Catholic?”

Here it will be perceived that the questions we put had reference, not to the duration of punishment, but to the principle on which it is inflicted, and to its nature and intensity:—1. Are the wicked everlastingly punished because they are everlastingly sinning? 2. Is the punishment vindictive or simply expiative? 3. Does it necessarily include any thing more than is implied in the loss of heaven or supernatural good?

4. Does it necessarily, though none but the elect can receive any supernatural good, exclude the reprobate from all diminution of their sufferings under the expiation eternally going on, or from gradually attaining to that degree of imperfect good foreshadowed in what theologians call the state of pure nature? What we really say is, that we know nothing in the definitions of the church that forbids us to hold the milder view indicated in these questions. Our critics adduce no definitions of the church to the contrary; they seem to have fastened upon one or two expressions which are not exact, and which are only incidental, and to have passed over what was the real intent and meaning it is evident to the candid and careful reader we must have had.

No doubt we indicated, clearly enough, that we should like to concede, if we could do so compatibly with Catholic faith, that the punishment of the damned is not everlasting because they are everlastingly sinning, that is, committing new sin; and that it is expiative, and not, at least in the popular sense of the word, vindictive. Our critics have overlooked this point, which was the great point with us, and assumed that our intention was to maintain that the expiation would ultimately end, and the reprobate be finally restored to natural beatitude. The phraseology we used, perhaps, justifies this assumption, for we say, "May we not hope that the sins of this life, may, in some sense, be expiated, and that the reprobate may attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature, or to that sort of imperfect good which is called natural beatitude?" This phraseology is not sufficiently exact, and does not precisely express the meaning that was in our own mind when using it, and we thought we had sufficiently guarded ourselves against any erroneous interpretation, by the different phraseology which we used in connection with it, namely, that "though they can never receive any part or lot in the palingenesia, may yet find their sufferings gradually *diminishing* and themselves *attaining*," not *attain*, to the sort of imperfect good in question. We ought to have been more explicit, and to have stated more fully and more distinctly our meaning, or to have left that particular point untouched, as with us it was not of primary importance.

It was far from our intention to imply, or in any manner to indicate, that the punishment of the wicked could ever absolutely end, or that they could ever fully attain to natural beatitude, in the sense that term is taken by theologians. We

knew perfectly well that, as a Catholic, we were bound to maintain that the reprobate descend to hell, and that hell is eternal; that all the reprobate go *in ignem æternum*, and that the punishment of those who die guilty of actual sin, is termed *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, and we never thought of calling this in question, or of asking if we might lawfully concede any thing incompatible with it. There was no intention of intimating that the expiation could ever be completed, or that the natural beatitude could ever be perfectly realized. Consequently there was nothing in our meaning to militate against the eternal punishment of the wicked, or in favor of the notion of their ultimate redemption from hell, or even complete restoration to natural beatitude.

Our reverend friend tells us, that to assert that “the reprobate can be restored to the natural beatitude they might have enjoyed in *statu nature puræ*, is a heretical proposition.” We wish he had told us on what authority this rests, or when and where this proposition has been declared to be heretical. Yet we have said nothing that implies that it is or can be compatible with Catholic faith, for we did not assert any *restoration* to that beatitude. The most that can be made out of what we said is, that we thought it not contradictory to any definition of the church to concede that the sufferings of the damned may be eternally diminishing, without ever absolutely terminating, and that they may be eternally approaching that sort of imperfect good, foreshadowed in what theologians call the *status nature puræ*, without ever fully attaining to it. But it must be borne in mind, that we did not mean by the natural beatitude, to which we supposed them to be approaching, the beatitude implied in the state of pure nature, on the supposition that man had been originally created, and left in that state; but as implied in the present decree of Providence, according to which man was created for supernatural beatitude, and exists in a state of pure nature only as that nature has been despoiled by sin of its supernatural endowment and the original gift of integral nature; whence it follows that the natural beatitude possible in the present decree of Providence, is necessarily far below what theologians understand by that term, that is, the beatitude man might have enjoyed, had he been created in the state of pure nature, and always remained in it. We meant, and could mean only the natural beatitude that is foreshadowed in that state, taken as it exists, and must exist, in the present order of Providence.

There is and must be a great difference between what may be called pure nature, originally endowed with the gifts of integrity, and raised to the plane of a supernatural destiny, and violently despoiled by sin of these gifts and the supernatural elevation, and the same nature originally created without these gifts and this elevation, and for a purely natural destiny alone, because the latter would never be exposed to the pain or regret of the loss of a good which never existed for it, and for which it was never designed, while in the former case, it must suffer eternally not only the absence of supernatural beatitude, but, in the case of adults, the pains of feeling and knowing that it so suffers by its own fault. Created and endowed as we originally were, the reprobate not only do not attain to supernatural beatitude, but suffer eternally its loss; while, had we been created in a state of pure nature, there would have been no loss of that beatitude, and, consequently, no pain, mental or sensible, consequent upon such loss. Very different, then, must be the state of the reprobate, even supposing them to attain to the degree of natural good foreshadowed by pure nature, as that nature actually exists, from what it would have been had they been created in pure nature alone, for a purely natural destiny.

Our friend asks us: "If the reprobate undergo the loss of God, which you concede, and if this be a punishment, how can they feel any happiness, unless you count the loss of God a trifling affair, or unless you put them on the same level as children who have not been baptized,—neither of which can be held, consistently with the teaching of the Catholic Church?" We hold neither. The loss of God is no trifling affair, for it is the loss of our supreme good, and of the supreme good itself; and we do not place those who die in actual sin on the same level with infants dying unbaptized, for infants so dying are punished for no actual fault of their own, and the others suffer not only what these infants suffer, but also punishment for their actual sins. The infants suffer simply the penalty of original sin, which is *caerentia visionis Dei*, the absence or privation of the beatific vision, while the others suffer the torture of a perpetual hell, or loss, through their own fault, of that vision, or their supreme good. The difference between the two must be great, because, in the one case, there must necessarily be the eternal tortures of remorse and regret, while, in the other, there can be only the simple absence of a good which had not been lost, but never possessed or refused. The difference be-

tween not having and having lost, and that through our own fault, is not, and cannot be small, and is, perhaps, all the difference between *carentia visionis Dei* and *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*.

Happiness, in any full or adequate sense of that word, we do not suppose the damned enjoy, or even can enjoy; but between happiness, in its full and perfect sense, and the possession of some sort of imperfect natural good, there is, in our mind, a difference. Being and good are identical; and as all existence, by virtue of the fact that it is existence, participates of being, all existence must in some sense be good: and since all existence proceeds from Being, and by the very law of its nature tends to return to being as its final cause, there can be no existence absolutely without good, in either its first cause or its final cause. To be absolutely severed from good, either in the first cause or in the final cause, would not be its eternal misery, but its absolute annihilation. Evil is never positive, but always negative. The only evil there is for any existence, is in not returning or attaining to its final cause, or to God, as the end for which it was created. Evil, then, can never be any thing more or less than the incomplete or imperfect return of the existence to its final cause. As every existence does and must tend in some degree to its final cause, there must always be for it some degree of good. This good, however imperfect or incomplete, however far short of that for which man was created it may fall, since it relates to the end, participates of the nature of beatitude, and so far may be called a degree of happiness; but in the damned it never can be so called, in any full or adequate sense of that term, and is always more appropriately called misery than happiness.

We asked: "Has the church really defined, and does Catholic faith really require us to believe, that anything is everlasting in the punishment of the wicked, except their exclusion from supernatural beatitude?" None of our critics, in public or in private, have brought forward any such definition. Heaven, we had supposed, was understood by all Catholics to consist in the full and complete realization of our destiny, that is, the full and complete enjoyment of God in the beatific vision, or union with God in what theologians call the *ens supernaturale*, or *lumen glorie*. This is what we understand by supernatural beatitude; and it is only in the possession of this, that man attains to the end for which he was created, to his supreme good, which consists, and can consist, only in his

union, through the incarnate Word, with the supreme good itself. This is man's supreme good. Hell, therefore, as man's supreme evil, must, since all evil is negative, never positive, consist and can consist, only in the negation, absence, or loss of supernatural beatitude.

All that is positive is good, as all that is positive is true. Error is in not knowing, in the absence of intelligence; for to err with regard to any particular thing, is simply, so far as we do err, not to know. This follows, necessarily, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, that "the intellect is never false." This our critics know and concede. They know also, that the will refers to good only, and according to the same St. Thomas, we do and can will only good. Evil being negative, can no more be an object of will, than falsehood can be an object of intelligence.

If we suppose hell to be complete and absolute evil, we must suppose it to be pure and absolute negation, therefore a simple nullity, nothing at all, and the damned in hell not to suffer, but to be annihilated. There must be, then, something good even in hell, and good either of the natural or of the supernatural order. Hell, then, cannot be instituted for justice alone, or for simple condign punishment, for all good is God, or in attaining to God as final cause. Justice is not God, but only a divine attribute in a secondary sense, having relation simply to created existences, and it is itself exercised never for its own sake. It proceeds from, and must be exercised in subordination to good, the supreme good. Hence, St. Thomas says, hell is ordained for good and not for justice alone. How, then, can we regard hell as a condition in which all melioration of the damned is impossible? Or understand by its eternity any thing but the eternal impossibility under which the damned are placed of ever attaining to their true destiny, which is in the supernatural order alone? If this be so, is there any error in supposing that hell is simply the absence or the loss of the supernatural, or in further supposing that this absence or loss does not necessarily exclude the damned from all good or amelioration of their condition?

We have already seen that all existence is good in relation both to the first cause and the final cause, and that its complete severance from good in either would be not its complete misery, but its absolute annihilation. Hence, St. Augustine argues that simple existence is itself good, and says that it is better for the damned "to exist than not to exist," or that

no conceivable suffering can make it better not to be than to be. If hell were the negation of all good, it would be a simple nullity, and therefore inconceivable, for negations are conceivable only by virtue of the positive. Hell can be something real, actual, only in the respect that it participates of good, we might, perhaps, say, of heaven. Hence, some writers place hell itself in paradise, and the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus in the Gospel would seem to indicate that those in hell can converse with those in paradise. But be this as it may, hell cannot be the absolute contradictory of heaven. It can be its contradictory only as the finite is the contradictory of the infinite, and, therefore, must participate of heaven or beatitude, as the finite does of the infinite, or else it could not exist at all.

The good of which even those in hell participate, and in relation to which their condition can be eternally meliorating or growing better, must be either in the natural order or in the supernatural. If, with the Augustinians, we maintain that *status nature pure* was never an actual, or even a possible condition, and, therefore, that there is and can be no natural beatitude, we must maintain that this good pertains to the supernatural order, and is an initial palingenesia which can never be completed. But, if we maintain with the theologians of the Society of Jesus and those who follow them, that such state was possible, we may deny it all supernatural character, and maintain that it is good only in the natural order. Our critics take this latter view, and hold that natural beatitude, to a certain extent, is possible, and may be asserted for all who descend into hell with only original sin. This is the doctrine in accordance with which our questions were framed, and we are disposed to adhere to it, because we cannot understand how any one can even be initiated into the supernatural order without regeneration, or the new birth, which is a birth by the election of grace, and not by natural generation. But whether we are at liberty to hold the one or the other, is not the point in question, for we affirm neither. We have no doctrine of our own on the subject, and we are prepared to accept the real doctrine of the church, on this, as on all other points, the moment we know what it is.

The mistake of our critics has been in supposing that in what we said, we were dogmatizing, and under the form of questions, insinuating what we believed Catholic doctrine ought to be, not simply asking what, on the points indicated,

it really is, or what it permits us to concede to those whom we would convince of the truth of our religion. We were not advancing opinions to be held, but stating problems to be solved, and whose solution might lead to important modifications, not of Catholic faith, or Catholic doctrine, strictly so called, but of theological systems, and forms, or modes of expression, intended to harmonize revealed truth and the truths of reason. Suppose all the points which it has been assumed we asserted, or denied, as to the future punishment of the wicked, are untenable, and would be in fact heretical, as well as unreasonable, it would make nothing against our orthodoxy, for we did not, in point of fact, either assert or deny any of them; the most that could be said, would be that we confessed ourselves ignorant of some things which we ought to have known, and therefore did discredit to our understanding, not to our faith. We insist on this, because all our critics treat us as if we were dogmatizing, laying down Catholic doctrine, not merely proposing problems to be solved.

We have no difficulty with the doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked. We believe firmly that the wicked go into an eternal hell, in which they suffer eternally for the sins of this life. We see, not only in the special definitions of the church, but in the very philosophy of our religion itself, an invincible and necessary reason why it should be so. There is no injustice in excluding the finally impenitent from heaven; and their eternal exclusion from heaven is their eternal hell. There is no injustice, nothing at which our reason revolts, in excluding from an inheritance those who never had any title to it, or, having had a title, have voluntarily forfeited it. Heaven, presented as a reward, necessarily implies merit, and consequently where the merit is wanting, it cannot be bestowed. Nor is there any difficulty in believing that the wicked who have failed to merit heaven, and for their demerit descend to hell, are left to suffer the inevitable consequences of their demerit. Remaining as they must for ever below the line of their supreme good, they must for ever remain with their destiny unfulfilled, their supreme good unattained and unattainable. Being below their destiny, with their existence uncompleted, they remain inchoate existences, grovelling for ever in the darkness of the senses, and consequently suffer the *pœna sensus*, as well as the *pœna damni*.

Thus far there is no conflict with reason; and the common sense of mankind in all ages and nations justifies the Catho-

lic doctrine of hell. The difficulty is not here. The difficulty commences the moment you assert the vulgar doctrine of an eternal positive hell, in which the wicked are doomed to inconceivable tortures in addition to those which follow logically and necessarily from their non-conformity to the divine order, and their voluntary failure to attain to the end for which they were created. This hell revolts our natural sense of justice, and the supposition that the church teaches it, is perhaps, in our times and country, the gravest obstacle to the acceptance of the claims of our religion, that the Catholic polemist has to encounter. Now, the point we raised was, does the church any where assert such a hell, a hell which must be purely vindictive in its character, and exist from no necessity that we can see in the laws of divine Providence, and for no end beyond that of pure vindictive justice itself, which is not and never can be a supreme end either with God or man, since justice is ordained to good; Is there any definition of the church that requires us to believe this? We ask not what theologians may say on the point; but we ask what the church herself says, for it is precisely the agreement or non-agreement of popular theology, or we might better say, popular preaching, on the subject with the real teachings of the church, or strictly Catholic doctrine, that we wish to know. Must we on our faith as a Catholic assert this arbitrary, artificial, additional, and supernatural hell, or not? This is the question we want answered. Is the hell with which the church threatens the wicked any thing more or less than the loss of heaven? This is the question we want answered, and we want it answered so that we may know how to govern ourselves in meeting the objections of a large class of non-Catholics to the doctrine with regard to future punishment of the wicked, or the eternal penalties of sin.

We certainly accept the definition of the Council of Florence, that there is a difference between the punishment of simple original sin and the punishment of actual sin, and we accept fully the definitions, if definitions they are, of Innocent III., that the penalty of original sin is *carentia visionis Dei*, and that of actual sin is *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*. But this is not the question. What are we to understand by this *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*? 1. Are we to understand by it any other punishment than that which, according to the divine constitution of things, or the universal cosmic laws, sin unrepented of and unredeemed necessarily brings with itself, im-

plied in that very common saying with regard to the sinner, he has already "hell within him," or he already suffers the "misery of hell"? 2. Is this *cruciatu*s punishment by literal or material fire? With regard to the first question, we have already said all that seems to us proper or necessary; it remains for us to say a few words in regard to the second.

The Catholic says that "all theologians assert that it is rash (and some go further) to deny that the fire of hell is not metaphorical, but real, though no doubt different in many respects from the fire which we have on earth." But if it be conceded that the fire of hell is different, or even different in many respects from the fire which we have on earth, it is no longer fire in the literal sense of the word, but something else; if a fire of a different sort, it is no longer what we mean by fire, and the word fire can apply to it only in an analogical or a metaphorical sense. We cannot, then, say that the fire of hell is literal material fire. If we say it is literal material fire, how can it operate upon an immaterial and indissoluble spirit, save through the medium of a material body, since it operates only by disintegration? In such a case we should be obliged to deny, contrary to what the church has defined, that the wicked dying descend immediately into hell, and maintain that they do not receive the punishment of hell until after the resurrection and the reunion of soul and body. Furthermore, if the body raised from the dead and reunited to the soul be a material body and subject as now to the action of fire, it would be shortly consumed, and there would be an end of the punishment by fire. If we suppose the body to rise differently constituted so as to resist the action of fire, so that the fire could not disintegrate it, then the fire could cause no suffering, and there would and could be no punishment by fire. The punishment of the damned, then, by material fire, that is, by the element which we on earth call by that name, would be inexplicable without the constant miraculous interposition of the Creator. Are we required to believe in such interposition? After all, do not these expressions of the Holy Scriptures and the theologians, relating to the corporal sufferings of the damned and their punishment by material fire, pertain, like those which represent God as being angry, as repenting, and as having hands, arms, feet, sides, and nostrils, to the mimesis of religion, true as addressed to the senses and to the imagination, but not to be taken literally when addressed to the intellect. or the noetic faculty?

All language is mimetic or symbolic and is borrowed from the imagination and senses, and its true sense for the intellect is that which in it is copied or symbolized. Every word, we might almost say is an an allegory, at least a metaphor, and has a meaning deeper than what appears. We act always on this principle in interpreting those passages of Holy Scripture, which represent God with human passions and feelings, and acting under human forms; why are we not to observe it equally when interpreting those passages which speak of the punishment, the sufferings, the tortures of the damned? The holy pontiff uses the word, in speaking of the punishment of hell, *cruciatu*s, derived from *crux*, a cross, but he does not, we presume, and cannot take the word in its literal sense, for we cannot suppose that he means to teach us that the damned are literally crucified in hell. He uses the word in a figurative sense, and borrows an image from the sufferings on the cross to represent in a vivid and striking manner the extreme suffering of hell. May it not be that the inspired writers have borrowed an image from the action of material fire on bodies and the extreme pain which follows such action to express the great or extreme pain of those doomed to a perpetual *gehenna*? The word *gehenna* itself is taken figuratively, for literally it means the valley of Hinnom, which was just outside of Jerusalem, where were cast the offal of the city, and the dead bodies of malefactors. Nothing is more common than to use the word *fire* in a figurative sense. We speak of the "*fires* of passion," the "*fires* of wrath," the "*fires* or flames of desire," and surely we can conceive of no greater suffering than a soul consumed by an eternal desire which can never be satisfied, devoured by a burning thirst which can never be quenched, an everlasting craving for something which it has not and cannot have, and without which its destiny is not and cannot be fulfilled.

Consider what must be the condition of those who have lost heaven, who have lost for ever their supreme good, the complement of their being, the fulfilment of their nature, who must always remain, as it were, dishumanized, incomplete, unfinished, inchoate existences, devoured by a sense of their own incompleteness, by a want of what they have not, a hungering and thirsting after that which they cannot get, after that which they can never hope to obtain, all increased and intensified by the knowledge that it has been through their own fault, their own folly, their own perverseness, that they have been reduced

to their deplorable condition. Will the addition of any image drawn from the effects of literal fire heighten their sufferings, or represent their tortures in a clearer, more striking, or more appalling light? Suppose a soul to have lost heaven, what greater wretchedness or greater evil can you suppose it possible to befall it? What greater evil can you suppose, after all, it possible for the wicked to endure than the loss of the supernatural, which is the true end, the true good of man?

If the theologians asserted that it is *de fide* that the *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, or what they call the *pœna sensus* is punishment by literal or material fire, and that the *ignis æternus* or *inextinguibilis* must, according to the teachings of the church, be taken in a literal sense, we, of course, should not dare to controvert them. Their unanimous or general assertion as to what is of faith, is conclusive in all cases, for it is through them, through her doctors, that the church herself teaches. But they nowhere assert, as we have been able to discover, that it is *de fide*. They indeed defend the literal interpretation as the more probable or the most probable, and argue strenuously in its defence; still, that this interpretation must be adopted is only a theological opinion, and, if it be rash without very strong reasons to differ from them, we can never be bound to insist on that opinion as Catholic faith, when setting forth or defending our religion in our controversies with non-Catholics. In these controversies we have the right to adopt the principles of probabilism and no right to insist on their accepting as Catholic doctrine any thing not strictly *de fide*. The question here is not what is the more probable opinion, or what is the safer opinion for a man to adopt for himself, but what he is absolutely bound to accept and insist on as Catholic faith. Nor are we in these controversies debarred from offering to our opponents interpretations which appear to them and to us more reasonable or less objectionable than the commonly-received theological opinion, in case we can do so without contradicting the definitions of the church, or running athwart the principles or analogies of faith. We do not say the opinion of the theologians is false or erroneous, but we think we have a right to maintain that no definition of the church requires us to accept it, or forbids us to adopt a different opinion, providing we have strong and urgent reasons for so doing; we think we have a right to examine the arguments or reasons the theologians adduce in defence of their interpretation, and to exercise our own judgment in accepting or reject-

ing them. Do we here misunderstand or mistake the liberty allowed by the church to the Catholic polemist? If we do, we wish to be set right.

It is generally agreed, we believe, that the *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, which is the special punishment of those who die in actual sin, is identical with the punishment by fire, and also the punishment in which the body participates, if indeed it be not purely a corporal punishment. But if it be so understood, it is a punishment which the wicked cannot suffer until the resurrection of the body and its reunion with the soul. But is this reconcilble with the constitution *Benedictus Deus* of Benedict XII., which defines; “Quod secundum Dei ordinationem communem animæ decedentium in actuali peccato mortali, *mox* post mortem suam ad inferna descendunt, ubi pœnis infernalibus *crueiantur*,” or with the definition of the Council of Florence already cited: “Illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato, vel solo originali decedunt *mox* in infernum descendere, pœnis tamen *disparibus* puniendas”? These authorities seem to us to define that those dying in actual sin descend immediately to hell, and immediately suffer the infernal pains, from which those who die only in original sin are exempt, and which Innocent III. terms *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*. If the tortures of hell understood by the *pœna sensus* be by literal fire or corporal, how can we say that the wicked begin to undergo them immediately after death? As between death and the resurrection the damned must be regarded as disembodied spirits, how can they during that period suffer corporal pains? This difficulty we have not seen cleared up, and, till it is, we see not how we can understand by the *pœna sensus* and the *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus* either corporal pains or a punishment by literal fire, which can affect the soul only through the medium of the body.

We are told on very high authority that infants dying unbaptized, go not only *in infernum*, but *in ignem æternum, ad tormenta*, and actually suffer the pains of hell. The *Ite in ignem æternum* of the Gospel is said to all who are found on the left or not found on the right. As none are found on the right except those who enter the kingdom of heaven, and as those who die in infancy unbaptized do not enter into the kingdom of heaven, they must be on the left, and therefore sent away into everlasting fire.

This St. Augustine appears to us to teach; for he says: “Venturus Dominus, et iudicaturus de vivis et mortuis, sicut

Evangelium loquitur, duas partes facturus est, dextram, et sinistram. Sinistris dicturus, *Ite in ignem æternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus*; dextris dicturus, *Venite, benedicti Patris mei, percipite regnum quod vobis paratum est ab origine mundi*. Hac regnum nominat, hac cum diabolo damnationem. Nullus relictus est medius locus, ubi ponere queas infantes. De vivis et mortuis judicabitur; alii erunt ad dextram, alii ad sinistram: non novi aliud. Qui inducis medium, recede de medio: non te offendat qui dextram quærit. Et te ipsum admoneo: recede de medio, sed noli in sinistram. Si ergo dextra erit et sinistra, et nullum medium locum in Evangelio novimus: ecce in dextra regnum cælorum est, *Percipite, inquit, regnum*. Qui ibi non est, in sinistra est. Quid erit in sinistra? *Ite in ignem æternum*. In dextra ad regnum, utique æternum; in sinistra: in ignem æternum. Qui non in dextra, procul dubio, in sinistra: ergo qui non in regno, procul dubio, in igne æterno.”*

St. Fulgentius, *apud Billuart*, says: “Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites, non solum homines jam ratione utentes, verum etiam parvulos qui . . . sine sacramentis, baptismatis . . . de hoc sæculo transeunt, ignis æterni sempiterno supplicio puniendos; quia etsi propriæ actionis peccatum nullum habuerunt, originalis tamen peccati damnationem carnali conceptione et nativitate traxerunt.”† St. Gregory the Great, speaking of the same, says, “Ad tormenta perveniunt,” and also, “Perpetuæ tormenta percipiunt et qui nihil ex propria voluntate peccaverunt.”‡ Bellarmine || says: “Fide Catholica tenendum est parvulos sine baptismo decedentes absolute esse damnatos; et non sola cælesti, sed etiam naturali beatitudine perpetuo carituros, semperque erunt aversi habitualiter a Deo,” and also, “in quo (loco) parvuli degunt, et semper degent, siquidem locus eorum est carcer inferni, locus horridus ac tenebricosus.”

These passages would seem very clearly to indicate that infants dying without baptism suffer the *pœna sensus* as well as the *pœna damni*, are punished not merely with the loss of the beatific vision, but with the fires of hell, yet Innocent III. says expressly that the penalty of original sin is simply *carentia visionis Dei*, and all, or nearly all our theologians agree in

*Sermo CCXCIV. c., 3. De Baptism. Parvul. Ed. Gaume, Tom. v. 1741.

†De Fide ad Petrum. c. 27. ‡Morialum, lib. XI. CXXI., Ed., Migne.

||De Amissione gratiæ, Lib. vi. C. III.

maintaining that, though such infants can never see God in the beatific vision, they yet do not suffer the tortures of the damned or punishment by literal fire, and they explain away the force of such passages as we have cited, with St. Thomas, by saying: "*Quod nomen tormenti, supplicii, gehennæ, et cruciatus, vel si quid simile in dictis sanctorum inveniatur, est large accipiendum pro pœna, ut ponatur species pro genere.*"* But if they have a right to understand these strong expressions in a figurative or metaphorical sense, so as to exclude the *pœna sensus* and the literal fire of hell when applied to infants, taking them simply as implying punishment in general, why may not we, in like manner, understand them in a figurative or metaphorical sense when applied to those who die in actual sin? If, notwithstanding the assertion that unbaptized infants are said to go into "eternal fire," to "torments," and to suffer the "tortures of hell," we may still maintain that their punishment is simply *carentia visionis Dei*, and that they enjoy a certain degree of natural good, why must we maintain that those guilty of actual sin, because they are said to go *in ignem æternum*, and their punishment is described as *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, suffer material fire and are excluded from every degree of the same good? Even supposing this, there would still be, as we have already seen, the disparity between the punishment of those in original sin alone and those guilty of actual sin, asserted by the Council of Florence and Innocent III., for, in the former, there would be only the simple absence of the supernatural good, while, in the latter, there would be not only the absence, *carentia*, but the loss accompanied by the eternal regret, the eternal remorse, the eternal consciousness of having lost it by their own sin and folly, which would add to want eternally unsatisfied the gnawing of a worm that never dies.

It is very evident from all the authorities on the subject that those who die with original sin alone and those who die with actual sin in addition, are alike excluded "from the face of God," alike under "his wrath," alike are "damned" alike "go to hell," alike "go into eternal fire" alike "dwell with the devils in the prison of hell and the regions of eternal darkness." The difference, then, between them would seem to be confined to the difference in their internal state, not to their external condition. Their punishment may differ and must

*De Malo, q. 5, a, 2, ad. 1.

differ in degree: but degrees are said only in reference to the same order; between different orders there is no relation of degrees, for no comparison can be made between them; the one class may suffer more or less, but the sufferings of all must be of the same kind. If, then, it is maintained that the one class may be said to go to hell, into eternal fire, and to be tortured, and yet to suffer no corporal pain, but to enjoy natural beatitude, or at least a very high degree of natural good, it would seem to be necessary to maintain that the other class are not doomed to any positive corporal punishments, but may yet have some degree, though a far less degree, of that same good.

When we speak of hell as a place, *locus*, a region, we speak mimetically not methexically, to the senses and imagination, not to the reason and understanding. Hell is a state or condition to which they are doomed who have not attained, and never can attain, to the end for which they were created, which is in the supernatural order, the palingenesia whose completion is glorification. All who enter not into the kingdom of heaven, *regnum cœlorum*, are doomed to this state or condition, as is implied in the authorities which speak of all classes of sinners as alike going to hell. All classes of sinners are doomed to this state or placed in this condition, the generic character of which is the want or loss of the supernatural, in which, and in which alone, is the complete fulfilment or realization of the end for which we exist. We see, then, no reason why we may not say, as we said in our last *Review*, that the only thing eternal in the punishment of the wicked is the loss of the supernatural. Our error, as we understand it, was not in assuming that the damned might be gradually attaining, under the continual expiation of their sins, to some degree of natural good, but in using language which seems to imply that they might ultimately attain to the full and complete enjoyment of what our theologians understand by natural beatitude, something far higher than any good which we suppose ever to have been foreshadowed by pure nature as it exists, or can exist, in the present decree of Providence. But we have dwelt too long on this subject; we pass to another.

Our reverend friend asks: "How can you say with justice, that 'we must be content to repeat the arguments stereotyped for our use, although those arguments may rest on historical blunders, metaphysical errors, &c.,' and a few lines before, that 'it is the duty of Catholic publicists never to take

any deeper, broader, or loftier views, than are taken by the most ignorant and uncultivated of Catholic believers, &c.?" If our highly esteemed and reverend friend will have the goodness to recur to our *Review* and mark what we actually say, he will find that we do not assert that we are so required by our Catholic faith, by our church, or her authorities, but "by those who affect to give tone and direction to Catholic thought and action," by whom we, of course, mean not the bishops, or those who have the right by divine appointment to direct Catholic thought and action. We speak of those who *affect* to give tone and direction, by whom it needs no extraordinary sagacity to discover we meant simply our so-called Catholic newspapers. We spoke also of a very general understanding in the Catholic community, whose understanding we are very seldom in the habit of confounding with the understanding of the church. What we complained of was not any thing Catholic, or authorized by Catholic authority, but of an opinion very widely adopted at the present moment by Catholics, and sustained and defended by our Catholic journals. The church herself allows us all the liberty of thought and discussion we ask; but we maintain in our article, and very justly, we think, that there is in the Catholic community, at the present time, a fear of free thought and bold utterance, which tends to cramp, and hamper, and discourage those who really would and who really could do something to win back the intelligence now alienated from the church within the bosom of her communion; a fear which is fostered by our press into an unjust intolerance, to the great detriment of the Catholic cause.

Our friend also asks, "And you, yourself, were you shackled and fettered when formerly you wrote so beautifully and vigorously in behalf of the church?" Of course not. We asserted, and always assert, all the liberty we find necessary to defend the cause of Catholic truth, and are and will be "in bonds of no man." But, then, does our reverend friend forget at what expense we have done and still do it? Does he forget the clamor that was raised against those very articles to which he refers, both in private conversation, and in the so-called Catholic press? Does he forget that, from first to last, we have had a much more difficult task to maintain ourselves against the mistrust, the complaints, the fault-finding, not to say the calumnies and vituperations, of some of our Catholic friends, than against the objections and arguments of our non-

Catholic opponents? We are sorry that the reverend author of the letter should appeal to our own experience, for that affords but too strong a confirmation of the assertions we made. There have been many Catholics, both cleric and laic, true-hearted Catholics, who have stood by us from the first, and nobly sustained us; but there have been, from the first to the last, not a few, both cleric and laic, who, like our friend, have been horrified at what we have said, and like him could say, "My dear Doctor, I tell you again, I feel a great deal of pain on account of it," if not a great deal of indignation and absolute hostility.

The writer of the letter says again: "I object also to the beginning of the *alinea*: 'In our historical reading,' p. 360. It contains a real offence to the bishops."

But in the passage referred to it will be perceived that there is at least no direct reference to the bishops and prelates of the church: we speak not of the directors of the Catholic Church, but of the directors of the Catholic world, who are laymen, princes and nobles, as well as ecclesiastics. We should be sorry to be found wanting in reverence to the bishops or prelates of the church, yet, we presume, it is no irreverence to say that they are infallible only in teaching faith and morals. No man who has read the history of the church can say, that large numbers of them, in particular countries and particular epochs, have not often been mistaken in their human policy, and failed in their vigilance and in the performance of their pastoral duties. No man can honestly deny it, and to attempt to enforce silence by the *argumentum ad verecundiam* is neither wise nor honorable. The Catholic Church has and can have no dread of facts, and, St. Gregory the Great says, the scandal of hushing up iniquity is greater than that of publishing it.

The only question that should be asked with regard to the statements in the passages we have quoted, is, are they true? are they correct statements of facts? If they are not, then let it be shown that they are false, and us be condemned for publishing falsehood. If they are true, if they are facts, it is idle to war against us for telling them, for facts they are and will be, whether we tell them or not. If we simply state what is true, and state it for a good and lawful purpose, in a Catholic spirit, you have no right to complain of us or to censure us for stating it. The most you could do would be to show that we had stated it unnecessarily, and might have gained the good we seek without doing it. In reply to this last supposi-

tion, however, we would say that it often becomes necessary to say things which we might and ought otherwise to pass over in silence, in consequence of what is said bearing on them by others. Let non-Catholics keep silent with regard to the matters touched upon in these passages, and let the so-called Catholic press also keep silent with regard to them, and we, we readily grant, should have no occasion to introduce them, and might, with some justice, be required to keep silence also; but, so long as non-Catholics do not keep silence in regard to them, and so long as your so-called Catholic journals are permitted to discuss them, and in a false and injurious sense, misleading both Catholics and non-Catholics, we think it unfair to insist on our keeping silence, and unjust to blame us for stating the case as it actually is.

The writer says, he objects "also especially to the five last pages, except the last lines, which breathe a noble spirit, a truly Catholic heart," and he adds: "Ah, Doctor, if your excellent qualities could be cleared from some little defects which impair them, and lessen the fruits they can produce, you would be an accomplished man." Our friend should remember, as says the Lion in the fable, "it is a universal remark that we great beasts have generally certain little defects and therefore be not too severe upon us." We have never set up to be a perfect man, and nobody is more aware of our defects than we are ourselves; we labor constantly to supply them, but, we fear, not with much success, and it is no doubt idle to expect us ever to be an "accomplished man,"—by which we suppose our friend means *un homme complet*.

We have no room to enter further into the explanation or defence of the contents of the pages last referred to, and in fact no disposition to add any thing to what we have already said. The article on *Catholic Polemics* was forced from us by a deep sense of the defects of our more generally adopted method of Catholic controversy, and by our earnest desire to place that controversy on higher ground, to give it more earnestness, depth, and comprehensiveness, and to adapt it more directly to the wants of the higher intelligence of our age and country. That we have been in some respects unjust to our Catholic contemporaries, that we have not been sufficiently careful to specify their good intentions and their good deeds, or sufficiently attentive to their susceptibilities, *amour propre*, is very possible, and, so far as such may be the case, we regret it. That, in our earnestness to elevate the Catholic community,

to quicken intelligence in our Catholic people at home and abroad, and to gain for the Catholic population of our own country that moral weight to which they are entitled by their numbers, and that intellectual and scientific superiority to which they are entitled by the truth and sublimity of their faith, we have used in some instances too strong expressions and gone too far, is also possible; but, if we have really done so, it has been unconsciously and unintentionally.

We know that many very worthy people, let it be permitted us to say in conclusion, are strongly opposed to the discussion or agitation of such questions as several which we have treated or touched upon in our pages. The design of the article on *Catholic Polemics*, was to meet and answer their objections, by showing that these are great and practical questions, not raised indeed, by us, but by modern intelligence itself, or that they are forced upon the Catholic polemist by the present state of theological and philosophical controversy. The great objection to discussing them that has been urged against us, is the danger of unsettling the minds, if not the faith, of the unlearned and the simple, who are incapable of comprehending the questions themselves, or of even understanding the solutions that may be offered. This objection, certainly, has some weight, and no one should wantonly or unnecessarily raise or provoke discussions which might tend to unsettle the simple, or to scandalize the weak, but it is no less necessary to avoid scandalizing the intelligent and the strong, and it will never do to let the question raised by the learned and intelligent, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, go unanswered, for fear of injury to the weak and the illiterate. The church looks to the welfare of the former, no less than to the peace and quiet of the latter.

It is no doubt true that, since controversies in our day must be carried on before the public at large, and all classes take more or less part in them, there is a serious difficulty in entering into those profounder discussions, in solving those more abstruse questions, and in meeting those intellectual difficulties demanded by the educated and cultivated classes, whether in or out of the church, without more or less disturbing a very large class of simple believers, who have been instructed only in the nakedest elements of their faith. But this only proves, what we have always insisted upon, that in our age and country the faithful must be educated, must be instructed, and that our only reliance, under God, for the preservation and prog-

ress of religion, is in elevating and enlarging the intelligence, not merely of a few, but of the mass of the people. You cannot, if you would, carry back the discussion of the graver and more difficult questions to the cloister, or confine it within the walls of a seminary; our enemies have brought it before the public, and it is before the public, not in our cloisters and schools alone, we must accept and meet it. Of the very last importance, then, is it, that, instead of being gratified or pleased with the ignorance of a large portion of the people, and studying to keep them unacquainted with every thing not strictly necessary, *necessitate medii ad salutem*, we should labor to overcome that ignorance, to enlighten the people to the greatest degree possible, and thus prepare them for the new position in which the changes in modern society have placed them. Instead of studying to keep the people ignorant of the objections raised either to Catholic doctrine or to Catholic practice, we must labor to prepare them to meet those objections, or, at least, to appreciate the answers which our learned theologians and philosophers may give. If we fail to do this, and seek to suppress all discussion, or to prevent the agitation of any question in public which is above the knowledge or comprehension of the illiterate and simple, we shall fail to win back intelligence to the Catholic cause, and confine our church only to the ignorant and the weak, who will be constantly leaving her communion, in proportion as they acquire a taste for intelligence, and find a little mental activity quickened within them. It is this fact, or supposed fact, that we have wished to bring out, and force upon the attention of the Catholic public.

We confess, it has seemed to us, that the leading public opinion of Catholics neglects this fact, and proceeds on the assumption, that the more ignorant we can keep our people, the more effectually we can restrain curiosity and suppress inquiry in regard to the great living and practical questions of the day, the more effectually we shall serve the interests of religion. We do not believe this is true. We believe ignorance is a vice, and the most fruitful mother of vice; and that the ignorance of a very large mass of our Catholic population in this, and all other countries, is the greatest obstacle to their own virtue, and to the diffusion and conquests of the Catholic faith that we have to overcome. It is with this conviction that we have written. It is with this conviction that we have said those things which have so grievously offended not a

few worthy Catholics. It was no wish of ours to offend them, and we assure them we have never caused them pain without causing ourselves still greater pain. But the Catholic Church does not constitute a mutual admiration society, and it is no part of the duty of a Catholic publicist to follow the public opinion of even Catholics, unless he is satisfied that that public opinion is sound, and in accordance with the best interests of Catholicity.

We may be told, as we have been told more than once, that to correct this public opinion, to look after what is the true interests of religion, and to determine what will best promote them, here or elsewhere, is not the business of the Catholic publicist, but solely of those to whom the Holy Ghost has committed the authority to teach and to govern the church. It certainly is not the business of the publicist to decide, as one *having authority*, what is or is not best fitted to promote the interests of religion, nor has he any right to go or to protest against the decision the legitimate authority comes to and officially proclaims on the subject; but where there is no decision of authority—where authority has not pronounced, or within the limits of its decision, he has the full and unquestionable right to express his convictions, and to give plainly and strongly the facts and reasonings on which those convictions are founded, not, indeed, as acts of authority which must not be questioned, but as arguments addressed to reason, and, if you choose, to the reason of ecclesiastics as well as to the reason of laymen; for we are not to suppose that men, in becoming ecclesiastics, abandon reason, or are placed beyond its reach. No men have, or ought to have, reason in a higher degree than ecclesiastics, or to be more within or under its influence. If the publicist undertakes to dictate to them on his own authority, or to bring the pressure of an unreasoning public opinion to bear on them, they have a right to be offended, and to exert, not only all their reason, but all their ecclesiastical authority against him. But if he seeks merely to influence them by reason, by his facts and arguments,—to convince them by an appeal to their reason, that *this* course is better than *that*, and that *this* policy is safer than *that*, we see not wherein he offends their dignity, fails in his reverence to them, or transcends his own legitimate sphere. We yield to no man in our reverence for the ecclesiastical character, in our respect for authority, or in our readiness to submit to its decisions; but we know something of our own age, and we know

very well that people in our age do not, will not, and cannot be made to submit to authority on the principle of simple, blind obedience. The clergy must not merely insist that it is all over with religion when reverence for the clergy is gone, but they must command that reverence by their own personal worth and character; they must magnify their office, as well as depend on their office to magnify them; they must show a real, as well as an official superiority, and lead us by showing their intrinsic, as well as their extrinsic authority to be our chiefs and guides.

In saying this, what say we that can offend any ecclesiastic, or in what respect do we encroach on his office, or take his business out of his hands? Do you say it implies that ecclesiastics have not always understood and adopted the best possible course for the advancement of religion? Suppose it does; what then? Does not the church operate *more humano*, and does not our friend say, *Errare aut errasse humanum est*? The clergy in what is human may, because generally better instructed, be less liable to err than laymen, but they are not, nor do they claim to be personally inerrable. The most that what we say implies is, that the clergy, or a portion of the clergy, continue a policy, once good and proper no doubt, after the various social and intellectual changes that have been going on have rendered it advisable to adopt a new and different policy. This may happen to the best of men without implying any reproach; nay, it may happen in consequence of what in them is really laudable, that is, the dread of change and innovation.

Confining our remarks to our own country, we think that a very considerable number of our clergy, we by no means say all, for it is not true of all, have not duly considered the changed position of Catholics in the United States from what it was when the good Dr. Carroll was consecrated the first bishop of Baltimore. Then little could be contemplated by the bishop or his clergy but the simple preservation of the faith, and ministration to the spiritual wants of the few Catholics then in the country; then the chief duty evidently was to keep Catholics Catholic, and to give them the sacraments, and wait for time to soften prejudice and conciliate opposition; no great impulse could be given, or be expected to be given, to the work of conversion, and very little thought was necessary to be given to the social position and action of Catholics, save so far as necessary to prevent them from committing the

church to one political party or another, or exciting the hostility of non-Catholics against them.

But since then great changes have taken place. Catholics by natural increase, by immigration, and by conversion, have increased from thousands to millions, and we are now numerically a very considerable portion of the American population, for we number more communicants than any one Protestant denomination amongst us. Our position has changed; our wants have changed; and, in some respects, our duties have changed. Our duty is not now merely to keep our people quiet in the faith, and protect them from the attacks of non-Catholics, but to endeavor to extend our faith, to convert unbelievers and misbelievers, and to catholicize the country. Our clergy are not now merely chaplains to a foreign immigration or an isolated colony, but belong to a hierarchy which embraces the nation, and hold the position, have the duties, and, we say it with all reverence, should have the aspirations of a national clergy, in the good, not the exclusive sense of that term. They have now imposed upon them the great work of bringing this whole country into the bosom of the Catholic Church, so that our bishops shall be recognized as bishops, and submitted to as such, by the whole population of their respective sees. The work, then, which the clergy have to do for religion at the present time in this country, seems to us two-fold: first, to administer to the spiritual wants of those already within the fold, and, second, to labor to prevent the loss of educated, intelligent, and aspiring sons of Catholic parents, and to recover to the faith those who are now in heresy or infidelity.

It is only in this latter work that a Catholic publicist, as such, can perform any important part, or be an auxiliary of the clergy. If he is to render any essential service in the performance of this work, the clergy, we have maintained, and still maintain, must allow him to deal frankly and freely with the great practical questions which are uppermost in the minds of these two classes of our countrymen, and to meet the various objections in their minds alike to Catholic doctrine and practice, and to the opinions and practices of Catholics, whether these objections are theological or philosophical, political or moral. To understand and answer these objections does not necessarily demand the sacrament of Orders; and so long as the publicist keeps within the limits of faith and sound doctrine, there should be, in our judgment, no interference

with his freedom, though he should treat many questions which, if we looked only to the peace and quiet of the simple and illiterate among Catholics, it would be far better not to agitate at all.

Such are the views which we have entertained of our rights and duties as a Catholic publicist, and we have supposed we could entertain and act on such views without going beyond our province as a layman, or showing any want of reverence for the sacerdotal character and office. That we have done our part in the work well, or with any degree of success, we do not pretend; nobody is, or can be, more aware of our short-comings and of our failure to realize in execution our own ideal, than we are. To have done our part in this work as we conceive it should be done, would require qualities, an ability, and philosophical and theological attainments to which we lay no claim. We have done, however, what we could, and being what we are and are likely to remain as long as we live, in the best way we could. We have never felt ourselves competent to solve all the questions raised by the age; but we have felt the importance of the questions themselves and the necessity of meeting them. The most that we have done, for it is the most we were able to do, has been to call attention to them, to fix the mind of intelligent Catholics on them, and to make some suggestions, perhaps not useless, in the attempt to solve them. No doubt there are hundreds and thousands amongst us able to do the work far better than we have done it; and, if we have had the presumption to engage ourselves in it, it has not been through any overweening confidence in our learning and ability, of which we think very lightly, but because we saw here in our own country no others engaged in it, who seemed likely to do it any better than we could. Here are our answers to the various objections brought by our theological friend and other critics against our course as a Catholic reviewer. It is for others to judge whether these answers are satisfactory or not, and to acquit or condemn us as they see proper.

READING AND STUDY OF THE SCRIPTURES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1861.]

WE are not able to review these two goodly volumes, and to speak of their contents according to their merits, because, owing to the continued inability to use our eyes, we are unable to read them, and because, though we know French very well by sight, we know it but imperfectly by hearing. The well-known character of the works translated, as well as of the translator, is a sufficient pledge of their great merit, and of their being up with the literature of their subject. Germany has been, for the last sixty years, the classic land of Biblical literature; and nowhere has that literature called forth more serious or profound study, attracted a higher order of intelligence, or been more successfully prosecuted; and nowhere is it so advanced as in the more distinguished German writers. We were tolerably familiar with the results obtained in Biblical literature some twenty-five years ago, but of the results obtained since then, which, we are assured, are of vast importance, we are comparatively ignorant. These results a competent French critic has assured the public may be found well summed up and clearly set forth in these two volumes, much enriched by the valuable notes of the translator. The German authors translated may not be the most brilliant or daring, but they are among the most solid and really erudite of German authors who have devoted themselves to Biblical literature; and Père Valroger himself is one of the most learned Biblical scholars in France. We have no hesitation then, in recommending the work as the best Historical and Critical Introduction to the new Testament that has as yet been published.

We welcome the appearance of these volumes, because they indicate a return of Catholic scholars to a field which is properly their own and which was so successfully cultivated by their predecessors, especially the learned Benedictines, but which they have, except in Germany, apparently, to some extent neglected since Dom Calmet, as they have so many other fields

**Introduction Historique et Critique aux Livres du Nouveau Testament.* PAR REITHMAYR, HUG, THOLUCK, &c. Traduite et Annotée par H. DE VALROGER, Prêtre de l'Oratoire de l'Immaculée Conception. Paris: 1861.

of literature and science. Since the close of the seventeenth century till quite recently, Catholics have suffered themselves, in almost every branch of learning, of science, and literature, to be surpassed by the non-Catholic or anti-Catholic world. We are indebted, in the main, to non-Catholic, and, in some instances, to anti-Catholic authors, for the illustration and vindication of our own Catholic antiquity. The best history of the life and times of St. Gregory VII., before that not yet completed by Gfrörrer, a convert from Protestantism, we owe to Voigt, a Protestant minister, as we do the best history of the life and times of Innocent III. to Hurter, another Protestant minister, though since become a Catholic. We know no Catholic historian who has treated the history of the middle ages with so much learning, so much impartiality, and in so true a historical spirit, as Professor Leo; and, with all its faults, Ranke's *History of the Popes* is superior to any thing we have of the sort from Catholic sources. If we have returned to the study of history, and have ceased to apologize for our own mediæval antiquity, we are indebted to the labors, the researches, and the truthfulness of those not of our communion. We have caught the stimulus from them, have been spurred on by their example, when we ought to have taken the lead and been first in the field. Protestants have also preceded us in the application to Biblical history and criticism of the new facts discovered by profounder historical researches, and disclosed by modern travellers and the more familiar acquaintance with the language, the manners, the customs, the geography, and the natural history of the East. It is with no pride, but with a sort of humiliation, that a Catholic reviewer is obliged to make these confessions; and, therefore, it is with no little gratification we perceive our own scholars disposed to regain the pre-eminence they once held, and the possession of which they should never have suffered themselves to lose.

It is not precisely that our scholars, during the last century and half, have ceased to study, or have not kept themselves up with all new facts and discoveries, but that they have seemed to want the tact, the capacity, or the ability to use effectively the materials they amassed, and to adapt themselves to the new modes of thought and expression which had come into vogue. The world, which they had cast in their own image, they found crumbling away around them, and seemed to imagine that the most that remained for them was to prevent

themselves from being buried in its ruins. The new world springing up around them, emerging from the general chaos, and only half-formed, has filled them with fear, as a strange and unnatural monster, which could neither be driven back, nor moulded into any shape of beauty or loveliness; they have been paralyzed by the strangeness of their position, and lost their creative faculties. The crisis of the eighteenth century was to them inexplicable, and they knew not how to meet it; they saw not how the old that was passing away, and the new that was emerging, could have any principle in common, nor how their life could flow on in unbroken stream from the foot of the cross to the final consummation of the world, unless they could drive back the new and recall the old. Thus they suffered the leadership in science and literature, in history and criticism, to pass from their hands into the hands of those who were animated by the new spirit, and moved by the genius of the new world springing into existence. Though professing a faith which is always young, ardent, and vigorous, which never grows old, but has always the future before it; though belonging to a church which recognizes in man the principle of progress, and is the medium of his progress to the infinite, which takes the infant at his birth, and carries him onward and upward, until he becomes one with the infinite and eternal God, they lost their hope, became retrograde in their movements, and wasted their energies in bewailing a past that can never return, while they suffered the spirit of progress to pass into the non-Catholic world, which had no right to it, except through their fault, which could not guide it, and could at best only break it or materialize it.

The fault has been, not in the defect of study, not in the defect of learning, not in the defect of special science or special knowledge, but in the defect of appreciation of the new state of things in which our scholars found themselves placed; in not understanding that nothing good ever passes away, that no order ever falls into the past till its work is done, and it has no longer any power to serve the cause of God or man;— in not understanding that the new order springing from the destruction of the old, is not the destruction of what was good in the old, but its rejuvenation under new forms better adapted to the future progress of religion and civilization. The new is always the continuation of the old, a new birth from the past, in which the past lives a new and more vigorous life. The man of true genius and of true life is he who sees the moment

when the change has become inevitable, accepts what it has that is good, and conforms to it. He is not one who hurries it on, never one who seeks it, but he is always one who sees it, and accepts it the moment it has become inevitable, and can no longer be successfully resisted. Our Catholic scholars, frightened by the convulsions, the upheavings, the *bouleversements* of the eighteenth century, failed to perceive that even then the Spirit of God brooded over the chaos, commanding light to spring out of darkness, and order out of confusion; they saw not that the world, which they felt slipping from their grasp, which was so lovely in their eyes and so dear to their affections, had itself sprung from a chaos no less wild and weltering. But happily a change has come over the spirit of their dream; they are beginning to recover from their fright; they are beginning to feel that there is a future before them, and great and glorious deeds for them to perform. They are, therefore, fast resuming their ancient leadership, and uniting in those labors which were interrupted for a season, and which will once more invigorate, harmonize, and embellish the moral and intellectual universe.

We are especially gratified to see our scholars returning to Scriptural studies. In the estimation of Catholics, still more than in the estimation of Protestants, the Bible is the "Book of books;" and we could better afford to spare all other books ancient or modern, than the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments. The church has always encouraged their reverential study and pious meditation. Taken as the original medium of the revelation of God to man, as Protestants take them, they lose much of their value, for they are then, to a great extent, especially as to matters of doctrine, unintelligible. Even a superficial perusal of them should suffice to convince the impartial, unprejudiced, and passably-intelligent reader, that they could never have been designed to teach originally and explicitly the doctrines contained in divine revelation, because they nowhere contain those doctrines drawn out in systematic form, and clearly and dogmatically stated. The Old Testament contains the earliest traditions of the human race, the laws, the ritual, the history, the moral and devotional literature of a peculiar people living for two thousand years or more under the special providence of God. The New Testament contains brief synopses of the life, the sayings, the doings, and the sufferings of our Lord while tabernacling in the flesh,—the acts of the apostles, or at least of several of them

together with doctrinal, moral, and monitory letters addressed by St. Paul to several particular churches and to the Hebrews, of St. Peter, St. James, St. John, and St. Jude to the Christians at large, two letters to private individuals, and the remarkable book, which to most minds is a sealed book, the Apocalypse. All the writings of the Old Testament proceed from God through believers, and are addressed to believers, and presuppose the Jewish faith as already known. The writings of the New Testament, again, are addressed to believers in the Christian faith by Christian apostles and evangelists, and, though inspired writings, they presuppose the faith to have been already revealed and received. Nowhere do they present themselves as the original medium of the Christian revelation. They speak of it as something already communicated, already believed; allude to it as something known; and simply seek to explain it more fully, to confirm it, and to induce its recipients to practise in accordance with its requirements. Surely such writings were never designed to be the immediate and direct source whence those who were absolutely ignorant of revealed truth were to derive their knowledge of Christian faith or of Christian duty.

The unintelligibility of the Scriptures is not entirely owing to the obscurity of their language, the nature of the subjects they treat, the fact that they are inspired, and treat of the highest and sublimest themes which can engage the attention of the human mind; but to the fact that we come to them without the necessary preparation, without the preliminary knowledge which they presuppose in the reader, and without which their various allusions, hints, and illustrations cannot be understood. Look at them in what light we will, they are incomplete in themselves, and can be understood only when read in the light of the Christian faith as first orally taught, and as it has been preserved in the tradition of the church. Read as they who reject that tradition must read them, they are, to a great extent, unintelligible, and there is scarcely any error conceivable that they may not be made to teach, or, at least, to favor.

Take, as an illustration, the question we find put to the apostle in the Acts by one who felt it necessary to secure his salvation, "What shall I do to be saved?" The apostle answers: "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and be baptized: and thou shalt be saved." Here is a very plain question, put in the simplest manner possible; the answer seems equally

plain and simple. Two things only are required; "to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ," and "to be baptized." But what are we to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ? "Simply to believe," says the Unitarian, "that Jesus Christ was the Messiah promised to the fathers and foretold by the Jewish prophets; and therefore to have the true Christian faith," he concludes, "it is simply necessary to believe that Jesus was the promised Messiah." We may accept the interpretation, without accepting the conclusion. Suppose the inquirer, as was probably the case, to have been a Jew or a Jewish proselyte, and therefore already instructed in divine revelation, the answer would be sufficient and exact, because the two things named were all that he needed in addition to what he already had. But suppose the question to have been asked by a gentile or one absolutely ignorant of the faith of the synagogue, the answer would have been neither exact nor sufficient; for such a one would require something more than simply to believe that Jesus was the Messiah promised to the Jews, and to be baptized in his name. So simple a faith accompanied by the more external act of baptism, any man's reason tells him, could have in itself no necessary connection with eternal salvation. The answer of the apostle becomes true, full, and adequate for all men only when we have the traditional teachings of what it is to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and to be baptized. If we have not the true doctrine in our minds, we cannot find it in the Scriptures; but when we have been taught it, when we know what it is, we can then go to them and not only find it there, but find it set forth in the clearest, the fullest, the most attractive, and the most impressive form. The Scriptures are, therefore, for believers, not for unbelievers, for those who, up to a certain point at least, have already been instructed in the doctrines and precepts of the Gospel.

We have many instances of persons brought up in heretical communions, but honest and candid, sincere and earnest, who have come to the true faith by simply reading and meditating the Scriptures. But this is because they had, not only Christian dispositions, but also the elements of the Christian faith already in their minds, and those seminal principles of the truth which the reading of the Scriptures and meditation thereon are sufficient to cause to germinate, grow up, and fructify. But we have no well authenticated instances of individuals having no previous instruction in Christian doctrine

or in Christian modes of thought, who have, by simply reading the Scriptures, been brought to the knowledge of the Christian faith, or who have been able to construct from them any clear, consistent, and definite system of doctrine whatever. The Bible Society circulates innumerable copies of the Holy Scriptures among the heathen but we have never heard that the reading of them has brought any of the heathen to a belief, even a human belief, in Christianity. In some instances, no doubt, the reading of them has shaken their belief in the religion which they had received from their fathers; but instead of making them believers in Christianity, it has made them disbelievers in all religion. These considerations alone are sufficient to prove that the Protestant doctrine with regard to the sufficiency of the Scriptures is untenable. Even Protestants themselves do not rely on their own doctrine, and, whenever they can, they send with the Bible their missionary or doctrinal tract. But taking the Scriptures as the church takes them, and reading them in the light of her teaching or the catechism, after we have been instructed in the principles of our faith and in our duty, we shall find them the best of all possible helps to the full understanding of Christian doctrine, the best of all possible helps to the understanding of Christian morals, and the most instructive, inspiring, and edifying of all spiritual reading; we shall find them an inexhaustible fountain of truth and wisdom, of moral principle, as of true and sublime devotion.

The doctrine of the church with regard to the Holy Scriptures has been much misunderstood and grossly misrepresented. She has never objected to or discouraged the reading of the Scriptures, nor has she ever regarded their reading as undesirable or unprofitable. She approves, and always has approved, the use of the Bible, and objects, and has objected, only to its misuse. She holds it to be written by inspiration, and profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in righteousness, to perfect the man of God, and prepare him for every good work. But she does not recognize it as the original medium of divine revelation, or as sufficient to teach the true faith to one who has received no preliminary instruction and no prior notice of that faith. To put it into the hands of one who through the living teacher, or through traditional instruction, had received no preparation for reading and understanding it, would be as absurd as to put into the hands of the student a book on algebra before he had learned the first

four operations of simple arithmetic. The principle on which she proceeds is adopted and acted on by the various Christian sects, as well as by her, and to as great an extent, else why do they have their Sunday-schools, their catechisms, their commentaries, their theological seminaries, their professors of theology, their preachers and teachers? The Presbyterian reads the Bible in the light of Presbyterian tradition; the Anglican, in the light of Anglican tradition; the Unitarian, in the light of Unitarian tradition; the Methodist, in the light of Methodist tradition; and hence we find that the children of Presbyterians tend naturally to grow up Presbyterians, of Methodists to grow up Methodists, of Anglicans to grow up Anglicans, of Unitarians to grow up Unitarians. The only difference there is between the church and the sects on this point is, that their traditions, in so far as they are peculiar, date back only to the time of the reformers, whereas her tradition dates back from the time of the apostles, and is apostolic and therefore authentic.

The Evangelical sects, even while asserting the sufficiency of the Scriptures, do really recognize their insufficiency. They all recognize the necessity of a guide and interpreter to the understanding of Scripture not to be found in the Scriptures themselves; for they maintain that they are sufficient only when interpreted to the understanding of the reader by the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost. No man goes further in asserting the weakness of the human understanding, or its insufficiency by its own light to understand the Holy Scriptures, and deduce therefrom the true Christian faith, than your stern, rigid, arrogant, and inflexible Presbyterian minister. No man is further than he from accepting the doctrine of private judgment as held by Unitarians and rationalists, and as ordinarily combated by our Catholic controversialists. No man feels more deeply, or maintains more rigidly or explicitly, the necessity of an infallible guide and interpreter for whoever would read the Scriptures with understanding and profit. "Thinkest thou that thou understandest what thou redest?"—"How can I unless some one show me?" These questions are as significant for him as they are for a Catholic, and he concedes that he cannot understand what he reads, unless some one shows him or unfolds to him the interior sense, the real meaning of the words he reads. This *some one* he holds is the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, who inspired the Scriptures themselves. The only controversy there can be

between him and us, is on a question of fact, not a question of law or principle. No doubt, if, as he supposes, he has the Holy Ghost for his illuminator and instructor in reading the Scriptures, his understanding of them is correct and worthy of all confidence. Let him prove the fact, and there is no longer any dispute between us. But he must excuse us, if we refuse to accept it as a fact on his bare word, especially since we find others, as much entitled to credit as he is, who claim to be illuminated and taught by the Holy Ghost, and whose understanding of the Scriptures is almost the very contradictory of his.

The principle insisted on by the church is a very plain and a very reasonable principle, one that accords with the historical facts in the case. The original revelation, she says, was not made to mankind by writing, or through the medium of a book. It was made in the beginning immediately by God himself to certain chosen individuals, who communicated it to others. Mankind knew and believed the truth, knew and believed the one true religion, at least in its substance, long before any book was written, or letters had been invented. The primitive believers under the Christian dispensation were taught the faith orally by those who had been orally instructed by our Lord himself. The faith thus orally taught and transmitted by the apostles to their successors, becomes the internal light by which the language of Scripture is interpreted and understood. Something of this sort is obviously necessary in the case of all language, whether written or unwritten. Written language is unintelligible to those who are ignorant of the characters in which it is written, or who have not learned to read. It is equally unintelligible to those who, though they know the characters and are able to read, yet do not understand the meaning of the words written. All words, whether written or unwritten, are signs or symbols; but they are signs or symbols only to intelligence; they signify, they symbolize nothing to one absolutely void of understanding. The interpretation of the sign or symbol comes from within, not from without; and if the sense be not, in some respect, already in the intelligence, there is and can be no real or true interpretation of the sign or symbol. Why, then, find fault with the church for adopting a rule which is universal, and which must be followed, or no instruction can be given through the medium of language, either written or unwritten? She has received the sense of the Holy Script-

ures from the Holy Ghost, and by putting the faithful in possession of this, as she does, by means of analogies borrowed from nature, and accessible to the reason common to all men, she supplies the light and guidance necessary to enable them to read the Holy Scriptures with profit, and without perverting or wresting them to their own destruction.

The church undoubtedly requires her children to read the Scriptures with a reverential spirit, since they contain the revealed word of God, and it is God himself that is speaking through them. She also requires them to read the Holy Scriptures under her guidance, her direction, and not to interpret them in opposition to her teaching; because, as her teaching is from the Holy Ghost, by his assistance, and under his protection, any interpretation of Scripture contradicting that teaching would necessarily be a false interpretation, since the Scriptures are also from the Holy Ghost. But this does not mean that no one can read the Scriptures unless a priest stands at his back with a ferula in his hand, or that we have not the free use of our own reason and understanding in reading them, and developing and applying their sense. It does not mean that the errors of transcribers and of translators may not be corrected, or that we may not use all the helps to be derived from history and criticism, from science or erudition in correcting them. It does not mean that we may not use profane science and literature, the researches of geographers, the facts brought to light by travellers and the students of natural history, in illustrating and settling the literal meaning of the sacred text. It does not mean, any more, that we must understand and apply every text or passage, word or phrase, in the precise sense in which we find it understood or applied by the fathers and doctors of the church, or even by popes and councils. It means simply that we are not at liberty so to interpret Scripture as to derive from it any other doctrine than that which the church teaches, or to deduce from it any sense incompatible with faith and morals as she defines them. It is so we understand the doctrine of the church on the subject, and, so understood, her doctrine by no means cramps the intelligence, or restricts in any narrow or unreasonable degree the free and full exercise of our highest and best reason in understanding and applying the sublime truths they contain.

The abuse of the Holy Scriptures by the sects, and their exaggerated notions about Bible-reading, have no doubt had

an influence on many Catholics, and tended, by way of reaction, to prevent them from reading and studying them as much as they otherwise would. The exaggerations of error tend always to discredit truth. The fear of being Bible-readers in the Protestant sense has, not unlikely, kept many from being Bible-readers in the Catholic sense. The necessity of repelling and refuting the exaggerations of Protestants has, in many instances, prevented us from insisting with due emphasis on the great advantage to be derived by the faithful from the daily reading and study of the written word of God, and substituted for them a whole host of devotional and ascetic works, many of which are of doubtful merit and doubtful utility. If faith has not suffered, piety, at least, has suffered therefrom; and we attribute no little of the weak and watery character of modern piety to the comparative neglect of the study of the Scriptures, and to the multiplication of works of sentimental piety. The piety these works nourish is just fit to accompany the meticulous orthodoxy now in vogue, and is a natural growth of the nursing and safe-guard system now so generally insisted on. Faith, in our days, is weak and sickly, and piety dissolves into a watery sentimentality, rarely able to rise above "novenas and processions" in honor of some saint. It has become a sensitive plant; it lacks robustness and vigor, and is unable to meet the rough and tumble of the world.

The fathers studied and expounded the Scriptures, and they were strong men, the great men, the heroes of their times; the great mediæval doctors studied, systematized, and epitomized the fathers, and, though still great, fell below those who were formed by the study of the Scriptures themselves; the theologians followed, gave compendiums of the doctors, and fell still lower; modern professors content themselves with giving compendiums of the compendiums given by the theologians, and have fallen as low as possible without falling into nothing and disappearing in the inane. In devotional and ascetic literature there has been the same process, the same downward tendency.

The remedy for the evil, in our judgment, is in returning anew to the study of the Scriptures themselves, and in drawing new life and vigor from their inspired pages. The words of man, however true or however noble, can never be made to equal the words of God; and the words of Scripture diluted down through twenty generations of men, each leaving out something of their divine significance, and adding something

of human pettiness and weakness, can never be so effective in quickening and strengthening as they are as given us originally in the Scriptures by God himself. Orsini's or Gentilucci's *Life of the Madonna* is, no doubt, very beautiful; but it falls infinitely below in moral grandeur, in its inspiring effect, the few simple words touching our Lady given in any one of the Gospels themselves. There is much that is beautiful in our *Loves* and *Months of Mary*, but far less than in the *Magnificat*, the *Canticles*, or the *Psalms*; and all that is in them that has the slightest value for the soul is borrowed, and, we may say, diluted from these sources. Let us, then, go back to the Scriptures, study them as did the fathers, at least as did the great mediæval doctors. Let us take in the sublime instruction as it was dictated by the Holy Ghost, and in language more beautiful and more sublime than ever did, or ever could, originate with uninspired men. Our faith will profit by it; it will become broader, purer, sublimer, and more comprehensive; it will become stronger, more robust, more energetic, and more able to withstand the seductions of error, or the temptations of vice. Our devotion will become more ardent, more solid, more enduring, flowing from a fixed and unalterable principle or conviction, not from mere temporary feeling or animal excitement; and our morals will conform to a higher standard, and we become capable of greater sacrifices and more heroic deeds.

What we in the English-speaking world most want is a good, faithful, and elegant translation of the Scriptures. To no mere English reader will the latinized language of our Douay version ever be attractive, especially if he has been early accustomed to read the Scriptures in the version made by order of James I. of England. Archbishop Kenrick has done much to correct and improve this version, but still it falls, even in his amended edition, far short of what an English translation of the Holy Scriptures should be. His critical and explanatory notes are of great value, of greater value than their brevity and modest character would lead the majority of readers to suspect. But his language is not free, pure, idiomatic English. He has adopted many felicitous renderings from the Protestant version; he has, in some instances, substituted English for Latin words, and has gone as far as his plan permitted, and, perhaps, as far as he could go without too rudely disturbing the associations of those readers who know the Scriptures only in our Douay version; but it is

to be regretted that he adopted so narrow a plan, and did not allow himself greater liberties in the same direction. We have heard much talk of a new translation to be undertaken and completed under the direction of Dr. Newman; but, as far as we can learn, this new translation has not as yet been commenced. In fact, we do not believe that it is possible in the present state of our language to make a new and original translation, which would be acceptable to those familiar with the Scriptures in their original tongues, or even the Latin Vulgate.

We have heretofore expressed our opinion, that in any attempt at a re-translation of the Scriptures into English for Catholics, King James's version should be taken as the basis, correcting it according to the readings of the Vulgate, and avoiding its mistranslations and its few grammatical and literary errors. Never was our language in so good a state for the translation of the Scriptures, as it was at the time when that translation was made. It had then a majestic simplicity, a naturalness, an ease, grace, and vigor which it has been gradually losing since, and which, if not wholly lost, we owe to the influence of that translation together with the Book of Common Prayer.

No translation of the Scriptures into the English of our best writers at the present day, could be endured by any reader of taste and judgment. Every day does our language depart more and more from the grandeur, strength, and simplicity which marked it in the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth; and proves very clearly, that the reading of the Scriptures, at least in the English version, is growing less and less common, or that scholars who have never familiarized themselves with that version, and formed their taste by its study, have gained the mastery in our modern literary world. Say what we will, since the time of Burke, the Celtic genius, aided by French influence, has been triumphing over the old Anglo-Saxon; and pompousness of diction, and diffuseness of style, have taken the place of terseness and simplicity. These facts render it impracticable for even our best scholars to produce a new translation of the Scriptures that could ever equal, in literary merit, the Protestant version.

It is true, the version called the "Douay Bible" was made and published before that of the translators designated by King James,—the New Testament, at Rheims, in 1582, and the Old Testament, at Douay, in 1609; but it was made under

great disadvantages, by Englishmen exiled from their own country, living, and, in part, educated abroad, and habitually speaking a foreign language. They were learned men, but they had, to a great extent, lost the genius and idioms of their own language, and evidently were more familiar with Latin and French than with their mother tongue. We give all honor to their memory, and we laud from our hearts their earnest and well-meant efforts; but we are unwilling to accept their translation even as they left it, as that in which the English-speaking world should study the Scriptures, far less as remodelled and emasculated by the excellent but tasteless Bishop Challoner, in which English and American Catholics now generally study them. In literary merit it can in no respect compare with the Protestant version; compared with that, it is weak, tasteless, and inharmonious. We might prove this by illustrations taken anywhere; but take, as it first occurs to us, the first verse of the first Psalm. In the Douay version it reads: "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the chair of pestilence." In the Protestant version it reads: "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful." In this last version the parallelism of the Hebrew is better preserved, and the moral idea is carried out without change or interruption. But, in the first, the moral continuity is broken, and there is a sudden transition from the moral to the physical order, by substituting "the chair of pestilence" for "the seat of the scornful," which is not only better English, but a more faithful rendering of the original. Take another illustration, from the prayer of Habakkuk. In the Douay version it reads: "O Lord, I have heard thy hearing, and was afraid. O Lord, thy work, in the midst of the years, bring it to life. In the midst of the years thou shalt make it known: when thou art angry, thou wilt remember mercy. God will come from the South, and the Holy One from mount Pharan. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth is full of his praise. His brightness shall be as the light: horns are in his hands. There is his strength hid: death shall go before his face. And the devil shall go forth before his feet." The Protestant translation reads: "O Lord, I have heard thy speech, and was afraid: O Lord, revive thy work in the midst of the years, in the midst of the years make it known: in wrath remember mercy. God came from Te-

man, and the Holy One from mount Paran. Selah. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth was full of his praise. And his brightness was as the light; he had horns coming out of his hand: and there was the hiding of his power. Before him went the pestilence, and burning coals went forth at his feet."

Perhaps neither version can here be accepted as faultless; but certainly "I have heard thy *speech*" is better English than "I have heard thy *hearing*." "God will come from the South and the Holy One from mount Pharan." Why translate the word *Teman*, a proper name in Hebrew, and not the corresponding word *Paran*? Why interpret the symbol used by the prophet in one instance, and leave it uninterpreted in the other? There is no question as to which of these two translations is the most elegant and genuinely English; but a better translation than either is, perhaps, the following, from Dr. Noyes, excepting that we prefer the word "Lord" to the word "Jehovah."

"O Jehovah, I have heard thy words, and tremble.
O Jehovah, revive thy work in the midst of the years
In the midst of the years make it known,
In wrath remember mercy!

God cometh from Teman,
And the Holy One from mount Paran;
His glory covereth the heavens,
And the earth is full of his praise.
His brightness is as the light;
Rays stream forth from his hand,
And there is the hiding-place of his power.
Before him goeth the pestilence,
And the plague followeth his steps."

"Rays stream forth from his hand" is better either than "*horns* are in his hands," or "he had *horns* coming out of his hand;" yet the word *stream* is, perhaps, too modern, and we should, perhaps, prefer the rendering suggested in a note to the Douay Bible, "beams of light came forth from his hand." The great fault of Dr. Noyes' translation is in his too wide departure from the phraseology of the Protestant version, and the too modern cast which he gives to his language. We speak, of course, from the purely literary point of view, offering no opinion as to the fidelity, or want of fidelity, to the or-

iginal of the author's rendering. It may seem remarkable, however, to the English reader that, of the three translations cited, the first renders the original in the past tense, the second in the future, and the third in the present.

The Protestant version almost always uses the words *righteous* and *righteousness*, and the Douay uses the words *just* and *justice*. These terms are not synonymous in our language, and should never be used indiscriminately. When we speak of a man who is rendered righteous by the merits of Christ, we should use the term *just*, as implying, not only that the man is righteous, but that he is so through justification. But when we speak generally of the quality, or the state in which a man is placed by its possession, it is better English to say *righteous* and *righteousness*, than it is to say *just* and *justice*. We are glad to find that Archbishop Kenrick translates the *agite poenitentiam* of the Vulgate by the English word *repent*, which, though it does not fully express the force of the original Greek term, better expresses the sense of the Latin, than the *do penance* adopted by the English translators. The archbishop well remarks, that "*do penance* is by usage determined to signify the practice of penitential works, rather than the exercise of the virtue itself." *Repent* is a consecrated English word, and is far more agreeable to our ears than the awkward phrase *do penance*, unless where direct reference is had to the performance of penitential works. We wish, therefore, in any future edition of a translation to be used by Catholics, whether done on the basis of the Protestant version or not, the revisers will allow themselves a discreet liberty in following the real genius of the English language, and make such changes in regard to terms heretofore used, as that genius demands. In the technical language of our religion, there must necessarily be great differences between us and Protestants; but we think it desirable that the differences should be no greater than is absolutely necessary to express the differences of our faith and worship, our practices and usages. We ought, as far as possible, to speak a common language, which, to a great extent, we may do; because, however far Protestants may have strayed from the unity and integrity of the faith, they still retain much in common with us.

We have no intention, in any thing we have said, to derogate from the authority of the Latin Vulgate. That text, corrected or amended according to the most authentic copies, is authoritative for all Catholics, and is, according to the judg-

ment of the most eminent critics, upon the whole, the nearest approach to the exact reading of the original Scriptures which is now possible. It is, and must be, for Catholics, authority in all doctrinal discussions. We have not been speaking of it, but of an English translation, which may be read by English readers with pleasure and profit; but not of a translation that is ever to supersede for the theologian the Vulgate, or to be clothed with authority in controversies. Our simple suggestion is, that such translation should be made on the basis of the Protestant version, but conforming to the readings of the Vulgate where they differ from those of the received Greek and Hebrew texts. Such a translation, we think, would gradually come into general use, and ultimately supplant, in the English-speaking world, the Protestant version now in use. It would quietly settle the dispute between Catholics and Protestants as to the use of the Scriptures in the public schools, remove a great objection which Catholics now have to those schools, and go far to relieve us from the necessity we are now under of establishing separate schools for ourselves. But, however this may be, we cannot close these desultory remarks, without urging upon all Catholics the most attentive and assiduous study of the Holy Scriptures, as the best means of enlightening and confirming their faith, of elevating their devotion, of purifying and strengthening their piety, and giving robustness and vigor to their religious life.

THE PUNISHMENT OF THE REPROBATE.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1862.]

WE had no intention in the few questions we asked last July concerning the doctrine of the church on the future condition of the reprobate, to open a discussion on that subject. We recurred to it, last October, indeed, but solely for the purpose of correcting the inaccuracy of some expressions which, owing to the condition of our eyes, had escaped us, and of stating clearly and distinctly the meaning which we ourselves gave to our questions. No good, in our judgment, can result from continuing a discussion, which, certainly, it was never our wish to provoke. But the following letter from a most

pious and worthy clergyman is so well meant, so sincere and earnest, and written with so much kind feeling toward ourselves, that we are sure we shall be pardoned for laying it with a few comments before our readers.

“DEAR DOCTOR:—Though a stranger to you, I find myself compelled to write you a few lines in humble but sincere language, in order to express to you the Catholic belief on the punishment of the reprobate, for it seems to me that you did not pay attention enough to the common and universal belief of the Catholic people, when you wrote on that subject. But this is no little fault in a Catholic Reviewer, because Christ came into the world to preach to the poor, *Evangelizare pauperibus misit me* and commanded his Apostles to do the same. The preaching of Christ and of his Apostles formed the universal belief,—the Catholic faith among the nations of the world, the perpetual tradition of the Church. The learned man, the philosopher, cannot be a Catholic philosopher, if he does not take his principles from the Gospel as preached to and understood by the faithful Catholic people, because Jesus Christ himself preached it, and commanded it to be preached to the poor and illiterate class.

“The doctrine of the holy Church is identical with the common belief of the faithful, and this common belief finds its experience in the lives of the Saints, who are given at the same time as models of life to the people. Such an experience is, for instance, given by St. Teresa of Jesus, whose manly spirit is admired even in our days, and whose writings are recommended by the Church of Christ in the following words: *Multa cœlestis sapientiæ documenta conscripsit quibus fidelium mentes ad supernæ patriæ desiderium maxime excitantur. Brev. Rom.*

“The Saint relates the following fact which happened to herself.—See her autobiography, chapter xxxii.

“Being one day in prayer, I suddenly found myself in hell, without knowing in what manner I had been carried there. I only perceived that God wished me to see the place which the devil had prepared for me, and which my sins had deserved [had she continued in the lukewarm direction, in which she was gradually declining]. It lasted for a very little time; but should I live many years, I do not believe it would be possible for me to lose the remembrance of it. The entrance appeared to be like a small street, long and narrow, and closed at one end, and such as would be the door of an extremely low, close, and dark oven. The floor seemed to me to be of dirt, very filthy, emitting an insupportable stench, and full of a very great number of venomous reptiles. At the end of this little street there was a hole made in a wall in the form of a narrow niche, into which I was thrust; and although what I have just related was much more frightful than as I described it, it could pass for agreeable in comparison with what I suffered in that niche. This torture was so terrible, that all that I can say would not be able to represent the least part of it. I felt my soul burning in such a horrible fire, that it would be the greatest difficulty to describe it as it was, since I would not even know words wherewith to express it.

“Physicians have assured me that I have endured as dreadful pains as can be suffered in this life, as well by the contraction of the nerves and in many other ways, as well as by the evils which the devils have caused me; but all the sufferings are nothing in comparison with what I then suffered, besides the horror which I had at seeing that these were eternal; and that is yet little if we consider the agony in which the soul

then finds herself. It seems as if she were strangled, as if she were smothered, and her affliction and her despair attained such an excess that I would in vain attempt to describe it. It is little to say that it appears to her that she is unceasingly torn in pieces, because this would be making it appear as if an external force was endeavoring to deprive her of life, where it is she herself who tears herself into pieces. (How fearful must be that second death, that continual agony! how far from any amelioration and natural beatitude!) As to that fire and that despair, which are the summit of so many awful sufferings, I avow myself to be still less able to describe them. ("For each one will be salted by fire." Mark ix. 46.) I did not know who caused me to endure them, but I felt myself burning, and as it were chopped into a thousand pieces, and this seemed to me to be the most frightful of all these pains. In a place so fearful there does *not* remain the *least hope of receiving any consolation*, and there was not room enough even to sit or to lie down. I was in a hole made in the wall, and those horrible walls, against the order of nature, press and squeeze what they enclose. In that place every thing stifles, nothing but dense clouds (And the smoke of their torments shall ascend up for ever and ever." Apocal. xiv. 11), without any mixture of light, and I do not understand how it could be, that although there was no light, all that is most frightful and painful to the sight could be seen.

"Although six years have passed since what I just relate took place, I am even now so frightened in writing this, that it seems to me, that fear freezes the blood in my veins. So that, whatever evils and whatever pains I experience, I cannot call to remembrance what I then endured without causing all possible sufferings to appear contemptible."

"This narration of St. Teresa, and similar ones of different other saints, as for instance of St. Frances of Rome, and the common belief, are identical, and form a true commentary on what the Scripture tells us with regard to this subject. Touchingly they explain the state of the reprobate and of hell, that there is no life, no natural amelioration, no natural beatitude; but that there is the kingdom of death, an everlasting agony, no hope of change, but the stagnation of the evil. Reading St. Teresa's experience, we at once see the fire, and perceive what is meant by the 'worm that dieth not,'—an expression which our Saviour so emphatically repeats three times, Mark ix. 43, 45, and 47. Yes, we see the sting which is within the reprobate soul, as it 'is she herself who tears herself into pieces.' This is the one and the only description of hell, and this one and only description is just as Scriptural as it is popular, for it is given by our Saviour himself—given to the faithful in his time, given to the faithful at all times, given by the Apostles, given by the Catholic Church.

"How did our Saviour convey the idea of either life or death in the next world to the people? First, by parables; as for instance; Luke xvi. 19-31, in the parable of Dives he conveyed the full and true idea of reprobation to the minds of his hearers by stating: 1. That the unfortunate man was 'buried in hell.' 2. 'Tormented in this flame;' and, 3, that there is a separation that cannot be crossed; 'between us and you there is fixed a great chasm.' (*χάσμα*, chasm.) In our present order of things if one is buried, he is cut off from a society, so, in the second order, if a man dies the 'second death,' and is buried in hell, for in heaven there is no burial ground,—being the land of the living,—he is among the dead, and in this manner, so long as the second order of things lasts, he is cut off from the society of the living, and even the yawning chasm would not permit any escape, and consequently, as there is no escape from hell, there is no escape from the flames, no escape from the

torments. The resting-place, where Abraham was with Lazarus, may not have been far from the place of torments, for it is also called *inferi*, or 'hell,' or, limbo,—and our Saviour *descended* there—whilst it is said that he *ascended* into heaven. But, nevertheless there was no reunion imaginable, far less with the lofty place above, with the mansions of heaven.

"Is there any substantial difference between what our Saviour preaches and what St. Teresa relates? At least the illiterate, poor people, to whom it was given by our Saviour, took it just as it was given, took just the idea which was intended by Christ. Dear Doctor, let us ask the illiterate, 'the little ones,' to whom it was explained by the Saviour of mankind, and let us not confide too much in our own wisdom, for it may be confounded. Yes, my Dear Doctor, stay a moment, and listen to the unchangeable sentence, which our divine Redeemer once expressed: 'I give thanks to thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father; because so it hath pleased thee. Luke x. 21. So it had pleased the Father to ordain, so the Son has confirmed it; so it is. The Catholic philosopher, in order not to mount too high, must in all essential points ask and consult the poor Catholic faithful people. '*Non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem.*' Rom. xi. 3. And as the apostle advises a few verses after: '*Idipsum invicem sentientes; non alta sapientes, sed humilibus consentientes; nolite esse prudentes apud vosmetipsos.*' Rom. xii. 16.

"But let us proceed to another parable given by the Redeemer; St. Math. xiii. 30-43, 'Wheat and Cockle'—the one to be preserved, the other to be burnt up, *ad comburendum, κατὰ καῦσαι. Zum verbrennen*; that is to say, to burn it as long as there is any substance capable of being burnt. But as the immortal soul cannot be consumed, but in union with the body is confined to that awful place, which is separated from all communication—from which there is no escape—it follows that the burning is without any intermission, and forever. But what is meant by the cockle? Our Saviour explains it himself: 'And the cockle are the children of the wicked one!' The cockle on the field—the wicked as *vicator*—as long as on the field it would be possible in the moral order of things for the cockle to change into wheat, and therefore permission is given, 'to let them grow both together'—as the servants might take and pluck out what afterwards is no more cockle but wheat;—but as soon as it is cut off—it remains either the one or the other. Therefore the cockle, the wicked, taken from the field is to be cast into the furnace of fire! Does St. Teresa not speak of a furnace, or oven, or something like to it? Is this not the common belief of the Catholic people in all the countries of the world? Let us wait for no decision of a Council, when the simple believer is able to instruct us!

"St. Math. xiii. 47-52, follows with the parable of the net, which is filled with fishes, and after being drawn to the shore, the separation begins, and they cast forth the bad, (*σαπρά*, which signifies *putrid*) which are of no use any more: real outcasts! !

"In St. Math. xxv. 1. and following verses, in the parable of the Ten Virgins, we meet the expression: *Nescio vos*; 'I do not know you.' The reprobate are ignored by the Redeemer as they have failed to become what they should have become, according to the idea of God. In the free creature co-operation is necessary. If therefore by the abuse of the free-will this end, which God had intended, is not obtained, the creature is abandoned and cast out of the creation, into the outer darkness. And when, therefore, our Lord addressed the foolish virgins with: *Nescio vos*, it is just as if he would have said: 'You have thrown yourself out of the

sphere of my ideal world, out of my kingdom, out of my life! And St. Chrysostom remarks, that this expression, *nescio vos*, is worse than hell itself, and is identical with the sentence: *Discedite a me; ite in ignem æternum!* It is the sentence of reprobation.

"So far the parables show the division either for life or for death; no medium, no recovery, no amelioration in man, as he is, as he historically is, in his present state. No natural beatitude can be expected when the supernatural is lost.

"But we have particular expressions, used by our Saviour and the apostles, to signify the unchangeable and miserable state of the reprobate; expressions, which absolutely do not admit a mild explanation, or any natural life or happiness whatsoever. Therefore, in the second place, let us examine some of these weighty expressions.

"1. *Perdere in gehenna.* St. Math. x. 28. 'Fear not those that kill the body and cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him that can *destroy* both body and soul in hell.' The natural death is nothing—for there is a resurrection, but the second is similar to destruction; no life whatsoever follows it.

"2. *Perire*; 'For God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, *may not perish*, but may have life everlasting.' St. John iii. 16. And the same Apostle in the same chapter explains the *perire*, *perish*, in the last verse: 'He that believeth in the Son hath life everlasting, but he that believeth not in the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth (*μενεί* is the future, *manebit*) on him. St. John iii. 36. Life and death are thus undeniably and most clearly expressed; and every other state excluded.

"3. *Hæc est mors secunda.* This is the 'second death.' Apoc. xx. 14. It is endured in the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the Beast (the luxurious, sensual and proud world) and the False Prophet (Antichrist and all his forerunners) shall be tormented day and night (without any intermission) for ever and ever (throughout eternity).' Apoc. xx. 9, 10.

"There is in that pool: 1. The Beast (wicked world). 2. The False Prophet; but 3. There is, moreover, every one else, who is not written in the Book of Life. 'And whosoever was not found written in the Book of Life, was cast into the pool of fire,' and, consequently, 'tormented day and night' without any intermission, 'for ever and ever,' throughout eternity.

"By these expressions, of which many more are in the Scriptures, I intend to prove only, that there are but two states after this mortal life—either life, restoration and glory, in heaven; or death, misery and eternal reprobation; for any one who is not written in the Book of Life—is with the Beast and the False Prophet. There is no alternative—either life, or death; either with the False Prophet or with the Apostles; either with the Beast or with the Church; either in torments or in happiness; either in outer darkness or in the unalterable light; either with the devil in the pool of fire or with the children of the Kingdom in the glory of the Father; either in hell or in heaven! The state of the reprobate is a complete ruin, a complete death, prefigured only by our natural death, which, though dreadful, is only a slight representation of what shall happen, when the agony is perpetuated, and death feeds, as it were, on the immortal spirit without being able to devour it. Yes, it is a complete death, and worse than annihilation, for in this case death would consume and destroy itself by once completing the work of destruction; but this cannot be, on account of the nature of the spirit, which, being simple, cannot be annihilated. Therefore was the fate of Judas lamented by our Saviour himself, of whom he spoke without

wounding charity, as he saw him as a real reprobate, in whom the last spark of that good-will, which is necessary to co-operate with divine grace, was extinguished. 'Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man shall be betrayed; *it were better for that man if he had not been born.*' St. Math. xxvi. 24. *Not to be, therefore, is infinitely better than to be a reprobate.*

"And this is the reason why St. Peter twice calls that state, '*destruction.*' In Second Pet. ii. 1, he speaks of false prophets '*bringing upon themselves swift destruction*'—'*whose destruction slumbereth not;*' and in verse 4, he explains what he means by this destruction: '*the place of torments,*' into which the reprobate angels were cast. In Second Pet. iii. 7, he calls it: '*The perdition of wicked men;*' and more palpably still in Second Pet. ii. 19, he calls the reprobate: '*Slaves of corruption.*' What a perfect harmony between St. Peter and the Evangelists, where we found them saying, '*perish,*' '*destroy,*' '*the wrath of God abideth*' on the '*slaves of corruption*' Is there a priest who could possibly find expressions as strong as these before us; and who blames him if he uses strong language in describing that '*pool of fire,*' that place of '*torments!*' Is that according to the spirit of Christ and of the Apostles, whom we so often hear repeating the punishment of the reprobate? No, my Dear Doctor, for the truth surpasses here every description, and it is the greatest charity to remind our sensual and indifferent century, that there are '*dreadful things in store*' for all who obey not the truth.' Rom. ii. 8. St. Paul '*fears and trembles*' and '*chastises his body, and brings it into subjection;*' lest, perhaps, when having preached to others, he himself should become reprobate.' First Cor. ix. 27.

'Dear Doctor, '*I beseech you to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the Saints,*' Jud. i. 3; and not to console those that walk according to their own desires and sensuality; for such men have not the slightest idea of a '*beatific vision,*' and do not wish it. '*Natural beatitude*' is all they desire. That is the great change which I have observed in you since some time ago; that you advocate the aspirations of poor, fallen nature; and that, if you continue thus, it is you who will be the *κορυφαίος* of our time, leading and consoling those that have no hope.

"But if you do not believe me, ask others, ask men of piety and learning, ask the Sons of St. Ignatius, whose particular vocation it is to crush every germ of whatever indicates the slightest beginning of heresy; ask the theologian, and, as you yourself have formerly advised, ask the mystic-theologian; and they all will tell you that there is but one beatitude, consisting in life everlasting, and one reprobation, consisting in death, that last forever. They all will tell you, that whosoever is not found '*written in the Book of Life,*' is to be cast into the pool of fire.'

"But *nulla regula sine exceptione.* True, and even here there may be an exception with the children that die without being baptized. But this is a pious opinion only, and not more, and may be received—for there are good reasons to sustain it, as many learned theologians have proved. Nevertheless it is but an opinion, an exception, which confirms the rule still more.

"Now, my Dear Doctor, accept my good-will, my pure intention which I had when writing these lines—all the rest is patchwork, and needs your benevolence, and begs for your excuse.

"Yours in Christ Jesus."

The highly esteemed writer, we hope, will take no offence

if we say, that he tells us little that is new to us, or that we had not previously considered. We had read, before asking our questions, the life of St. Teresa, and that of St. Frances of Rome: we had, also, read and carefully weighed the several texts he cites from the Bible, many years before we became a Catholic reviewer, and had even come to his conclusion, which we hold as fast as he does, that in the future life there are but two states: the one, heaven for the saints; the other, hell, for the wicked; that these states are each everlasting; that those in heaven cannot fall into hell, and those in hell cannot ascend into heaven; and, finally, that those who receive heaven, receive it as a reward of their merits, and those who suffer hell, suffer it as a punishment for their sins. This, as we understand it, is the substance of the belief of the church on this subject, even as he himself represents it, and therefore there was no necessity of his undertaking to prove it against us.

Our theological friend labors under a grave mistake, if he supposes we deny that the punishment of the wicked is everlasting, or that we cannot, as well as he, say: "There are but two states after this mortal life,—either life, restoration, and glory in heaven,—or death, misery, and eternal reprobation; for any one who is not written in the book of life is with the beast and the false prophet. There is no alternative: either life or death: either with the false prophets or with the apostles; either with the beast or with the church; either in torments or in happiness; either in the outer darkness or in the unalterable light; either with the devil in the pool of fire, or with the children of the kingdom in the glory of the Father; either in hell or in heaven." We know and believe all this. We stated expressly that the reprobate can never be saved, receive any lot or part in the palingenesia, can never see God in the beatific vision, or attain to any supernatural good, and therefore must be for ever excluded from heaven, and remain for ever in hell. There was little fairness or candor in arguing as if we held the contrary. We acquit the excellent writer of all intentional or conscious unfairness, but, upon reflection, we doubt not, he will admit that it is neither fair nor just to endeavor to prove against a man, as contrary to his opinions, what he undeniably and expressly maintains.

Our pious and learned friend says, that there is no such thing as natural beatitude, and that there is no alternative—it is either heaven or hell; for there are but two states after this mortal life; and labors very unnecessarily to prove it against

us, for we assert natural beatitude in no sense in which he denies it. Yet he tells us we may hold that there is "natural beatitude," for children that die without being baptized. "But," he says, "*nulla regula sine exceptione*. True; and even here there *may be* an exception with the children that die without being baptized. But this is a pious opinion only, and not more; and *may be received*—for there are good reasons to sustain it, as many learned theologians have proved. Nevertheless, it is but an opinion, an exception which confirms the rule still more." If there be no "rule without exception," it is also true that there is no dogma with exception. All dogmas of faith express real truth, or truth of the ideal order, and therefore must be taken universally, and the admission of an exception to any one of them is simply the denial that it is a Catholic dogma. If, then, it be permitted to hold that infants are excepted from the second death, and are neither admitted into heaven nor placed in hell with the beast and the false prophet, who are tormented day and night in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, then it is not a Catholic dogma that there are only two states after this life, and that there is no natural beatitude. The exception, if admissible at all, instead of confirming the dogma, simply denies it. The writer, then, must either deny that what he calls "a pious opinion" may be held, or he must modify his assertion that there are only two states after this mortal life. If any thing is certain, it is that infants dying unbaptized, and adults dying in actual sin alike descend to hell, and to the same hell, are in the same state of reprobation, only they are not all punished with the same degree of pain or suffering. Such is the doctrine of the church as we have learned it. If our pious friend, then, concedes that it may be held that infants dying without baptism are not excluded from a certain natural good or beatitude, he must concede that every degree of that good or beatitude is not necessarily excluded from "hell," the "second death," the "lake" or "pool that burneth with fire and brimstone." The author's assertion, then, "no rule without exception," however true it may be in practical matters, is fatal to himself. His concession of an exception with regard to infants dying without baptism, concedes all that he is endeavoring to refute, all, indeed, that we ever thought of asserting.

Our worthy and pious friend writes, no doubt, under the impression that we hold there is for man in the world to come

a natural beatitude, to which even the reprobate may finally attain, or be restored; but if he had paid attention to the corrections and explanations we offered last October, he would have perceived that we hold no such thing, and that the melioration or diminution of their sufferings we spoke of, in no sense implies that they will ever attain either to the supernatural beatitude of heaven, or to what theologians understand by natural beatitude. This misapprehension grew out, we are willing to admit, of our use in July of the word *beatitude*, and which was understood by our theological friends in their sense instead of ours. We used the word not as implying that there is a natural destiny for man to which we supposed the reprobate might ultimately attain or be attaining, for we do not admit that man has or can have any natural destiny at all. His only destiny is supernatural. We used the term as the synonyme of good, some degree of which must always be supposed for man, if we suppose his existence at all as the creature of God. The complete severance of the creature, either from his first cause or his last cause, is not, as we said, his complete misery, but his total annihilation, since to the existence of any creature the final cause and the first cause are alike essential. Man by his creation participates of good in the first or cosmic cycle, and hence is said to be physically good; but, as he could not exist without a final cause, he must have an initial or inchoate good in the second cycle, and therefore is not and cannot be totally depraved. Hence St. Augustine may say with truth that existence is itself good, and that for the damned even it is better to be than not to be. The words of our Lord with regard to Judas cannot be understood according to the strict letter, and may simply be a strong way of expressing the deep and terrible misery to which Judas had doomed himself for ever by his betrayal of the Son of man.

If this reasoning be correct, it is not necessary to believe in the case even of actual sinners, that the damned are absolutely severed from all good, that is, from every degree of good; but simply to believe that they are eternally reprobated from heaven, and therefore, as the fulfilment or completion of man's destiny is heaven, for ever remain initial or inchoate existences for ever below their destiny, deprived of all means and of all hopes of ever attaining to beatitude, or the end of their existence. We never asserted that they would attain, or asked if we might not hope they would ultimately attain to natural be-

atitude or a natural destiny; but simply, if we might not hope that they would ultimately attain to that degree of imperfect good called by our theologians natural beatitude. The term, we grant, was ill-chosen, because we do not believe in natural beatitude at all; for beatitude is in fulfilling our destiny, which is in the palingenesia or supernatural order alone. But it was not beatitude in any order, but simply an imperfect degree of natural good that we really spoke of.

It may be that in excluding from our conception of hell every degree of natural initial or inchoate good, we grievously erred; but still the doom of the reprobate, as we represented it, since it includes the loss of heaven, the loss of God, the supreme good, the loss of glorification, and all the joys of the kingdom, and since it includes, in the case of all who die in actual sin, the internal torture of feeling that the loss has been voluntarily and maliciously incurred, and in the case of all the necessity of remaining for ever mere initial or inchoate existences, for ever below their proper destiny, without any hope or possibility of ever being able to attain to it, seems to us sufficiently deplorable, sufficiently wretched, sufficiently miserable to satisfy even those who luxuriate with the greatest fondness on the tortures of the damned, and are the most ready to improve on the maxim of the Holy Scriptures; "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," by making it read: "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of hell." At least, we could wish no greater suffering to our most bitter enemy, and we can conceive it possible for the damned to suffer no greater misery, unless we suppose that God by a continuous miracle sustains them in existence for the sole purpose of enabling them to bear a punishment above their nature. Our view of the case supposes as much misery for the damned as they are naturally capable of enduring, and hence, as we cannot conceive them to be supernaturalized, that is, raised above their nature, we hesitate to believe that the church teaches and requires us to believe that they will suffer any greater misery.

The melioration of the sufferings of the damned we incidentally referred to, as our friend might have gathered from our remarks in October, was not a point we very strenuously insisted upon. We inferred it from the expiatory view of punishment, which we were disposed to take, if permitted to do so by Catholic faith. Expiation is in itself good, and, as far as it goes, tends to good. We cannot, therefore, conceive the wicked to be for ever expiating their sins, without inferring

the gradual diminution of the punishment they have incurred; but, as their expiation can never be completed, their punishment can never completely end, and consequently is and must be everlasting. The diminution, therefore, is evidently only a logical inference drawn from the expiatory character of the punishment. The point, then, to make good against us, is that the punishment is not expiatory, but purely and simply vindictive. Hence the question we asked; Are we obliged to believe the punishment of the wicked is simply vindictive, that is, vindictive in the popular sense of the term; or are we permitted to believe that it is expiatory? If our reverend friend had told us what is the real doctrine of the church on this point, he would have settled an important question for us, and answered the precise doubt we raised. We find in some theological writers deserving of great respect, the opinion advanced that the punishment is expiatory. If so, all that we concluded with regard to the gradual diminution of the sufferings of the reprobate must be conceded. If this view of their punishment cannot be taken, then we know no reason or ground on which we can assert it, or in any sense hope for it. Why has not our friend, who undertook to teach us the belief of the church, instructed us on this point?

He sends us for an answer to "the people" to "the poor and the illiterate," and says: "Dear Doctor, let us ask the illiterate 'the little ones,' to whom it was explained by the Saviour of mankind, and let us not confide too much in our own wisdom, for it may be confounded. Yes, my dear Doctor, stop a moment, and listen to the unchangeable sentence which our divine Redeemer once expressed: 'I give thanks to thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father, because so it hath pleased Thee.' So it has pleased the Father to ordain, so the Son has confirmed it; so it is; the Catholic philosopher, in order not to mount too high, must in all essential points ask and consult the poor Catholic faithful people." But to refer us on a difficult point of theology to the illiterate, though very humble and edifying in one who writes English, and quotes Latin, Greek, and German, is not, we must be permitted to say, altogether satisfactory; for it does not seem to us that the illiterate and simple are those best fitted to give us the true Catholic explanation. Our Lord, in the words cited, was not, as we understand it, contrasting illiterate, docile, and childlike

Catholics with learned, scientific, and philosophical Catholics, and sending us to the former, instead of to the latter, to learn the mysteries of divine revelation; but docile and childlike Catholics, whether learned, or unlearned, with the proud gentile philosophers and the wise and prudent of this world, who neither know nor accept the true Catholic faith. That is to say, he contrasts Christians with non-Christians; those who are instructed by divine revelation, with those who either have received no such revelation, or through their pride and self-sufficiency have rejected it. The poor, no doubt, have the Gospel preached to them, and it is a proof that the promised Messiah has come, that it is preached to the poor and illiterate; but it does not follow from this, that they who preach it are the poor and illiterate, or that science and learning are not very useful qualifications in those who are appointed to preach it.

If what appears to be the doctrine of our friend's letter, that we are to learn our faith from the poor and illiterate, be the doctrine of the church, why does she demand a learned and highly-educated ministry, and why do we found colleges, seminaries, universities, and make liberal expenditures to educate not only the clergy, but the great body of our people? and why does our friend himself consult the Scriptures, the fathers, and the writings and experiences of the saints, and not content himself with simply consulting his housekeeper or his stable-boy? Why not shut up all our schools, burn all our libraries, and henceforth learn only what the unlearned are capable of teaching? We must believe that the writer, in his humility, has forgotten to inquire what would be the consequences of such a doctrine as this. It would tend to repress all thoughts and inquiry, render useless all literary or scientific culture; would condemn as useless, if not worse than useless, all the theological literature of the church; declare worthless all the labors of the great fathers, doctors, and philosophers of the Catholic world; would endorse with a vengeance De Rancé's plea for ignorance; and, if received as the doctrine and sentiment of the church, would justify the charge brought by her enemies against her, that she crushes thought and forbids all inquiries and all discussions which rise above the reach of the illiterate and the simple.

The writer mistakes entirely the question at issue between him and us, if any question there be. It was not what the illiterate or the poor faithful Catholic people receive as the

faith of the church, we wished to ascertain; for of that belief we could hardly be ignorant. Moreover, we had and have some doubts whether the faith of the church can always be concluded with infallible certainty from popular belief. We have great respect for the poor faithful Catholic people: we honor them for their fidelity, and we have great confidence in their Catholic instincts; but it would be idle, it seems to us, to pretend that all that is popularly believed, that all the notions circulating among the ignorant and illiterate and held by them to be true, are to be received as Catholic dogmas, or the true and full expression of the belief of the church. They have many opinions which no well-instructed Catholic entertains, and many practices which every enlightened Catholic regards as childish and even superstitious. It is possible, then, we may know the belief of the poor, ignorant, and illiterate people, without being quite sure that we have the belief of the church. The question does not turn on what is the belief of the illiterate, but how far is their belief itself true Catholic faith? Even supposing them to hold in words the dogma, it may still be asked, if they understand the dogma in its true sense. Our questions did not relate to the terms in which the dogma is expressed, either in the language of Scripture, or of popular belief, but to the sense in which that language or those terms are to be taken. It is evident from the very nature of the case, that on this point the poor faithful people, the illiterate and uncultivated, however humble or docile they may be, can give us no information.

One is almost tempted to think that the pious writer of the letter has never felt the need, either for himself or for others, of understanding the Catholic dogma, and ascertaining its scientific significance. This may be a merit in him, and he may, perhaps, not unwisely thank God that he is quite willing to accept the infallible speech of the church without asking what it means, or whether it means any thing or not; but we can assure him, all men have not, as yet, attained to his degree of perfection,—or indifference, and that, in our times at least, there are a great many respectable persons who have a strong desire to understand what they read or hear spoken, and who really wish to penetrate beyond the mere letter, seize the intellectual sense, and give it a scientific expression, both for themselves and others. There are men, and, we confess, we are among them, who would understand what they believe, and be able to render a reasonable service to God—*ratio-*

nabile obsequium. These persons may be very wrong, and regarded by our friend as proud and haughty philosophers, against whom all honest men should be on their guard. But still there are such persons, and we cannot, for ourselves, agree in the wisdom or justice of rejecting their demands, much less of excluding them from the pale of our charity, and consigning them over to Satan, as incorrigible. It would be doing Satan quite too much honor. It is far better to allow them to use their reason, and to do our best to enable them to understand according to the best of human ability the word of God.

We really know and understand nothing till we see and understand it in its principle, in its relation to the whole, of which, if it be not a mere chimera or *ens rationis*, it is an integral part. Take the popular belief on this subject of future punishment,—we must still ask, What is the principle or reason of this belief? What is its relation to the whole system of Catholic faith? Do you tell me that the church teaches it, and therefore I must ask none of these questions? Let me tell you, if I am a thinking man, really a live and not a dead man, my mind does and will ask these questions, and others like them; and the only way that I can prevent it from asking them, is by a violent effort of my will absolutely refusing to think of the subject at all. The mind has its own laws, and, if it acts at all, it does and will act in accordance with them. When once it has been quickened into activity, it is in vain that you come forward with wise and prudent, or even pious admonitions, and tell it that it must not ask this or that question, and that, if it does, it will only wander from the truth, be involved in the inextricable mazes of error, and find its place at last with the beast and the false prophet, in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone. Either you must prevent the quickening of the mind, the bursting into life of its activity, or you must suffer it to think, think freely, think earnestly, think deeply, and aid and direct it to think truly, wisely, and justly.

The suppression of thought, of all mental activity, may be attempted, but it can never be more than partially successful; for it is at war with the very nature of the intellect, and the manifest intention of divine Providence. Why were we made intellectual beings, why were we endowed with reason, if we are to live and die as if we were unintellectual and unreasoning animals? Why did God give us understanding, if under-

standing is not to be exercised? And if understanding is to be exercised at all, where will you fix its limits, set up your stakes, and say: "Hitherto, but no further"? To suppress our mental activity is to suppress our manhood; is not to make us pious, devout, faithful, and docile Catholics, but mere brute-beasts. The great men, the fathers and doctors of the church, your Basils and your Chrysostoms, your Jeromes and your Augustines, your Gregories, Hilarys, Ambroses, Anselms, Thomases, Bonaventuras, and even Bossuets and Fénelons, were thinking and living men, men of the highest, the most cultivated, and the most advanced reason of their respective ages, and they labored not to suppress thought, to suppress inquiry, to suppress reason, and keep the multitude ignorant and brutish, but to quicken thought, to instruct intellect, to enlighten the ignorant, and to answer fully and scientifically all the legitimate questions the human mind asks or is disposed to ask. If we are men, living men, who love the truth, and seek the glory of God in the redemption, intelligence, and love of mankind, we too shall labor not to suppress, but to quicken, guide, and assist the activity of the mind, the characteristic of our nature.

We wish our friend would understand, what we are sure he is not disposed to deny, that belief is an intellectual act, and that no man believes a proposition itself, any further than he understands it, and sees and assents to its reasonableness. You may tell me the church teaches an unintelligible proposition, and as I believe her, because I have reason to believe her God's church, and that she has authority to teach, I must believe it. Very true, I believe her, but I believe it, and can believe it no further than I understand it, and I understand it no further than I see its relation or its analogy to the system of truth which has been committed to her keeping, or as a part of the whole doctrine of which she is the teacher. Beyond this I may accept the words, but they are to me empty words, with no distinct meaning.

I have no difficulty in believing that they who die unregenerate are eternally excluded from heaven, and suffer for ever in hell, for that follows necessarily from the fact that heaven is the crown of the regeneration, and, to attain it, one must be regenerated, and live the regenerated life in this world. This eternal reprobation and the misery of the reprobate, as the consequence of the abuse of free-will, harmonize with the whole system of rational and revealed truth the church teach-

es, explains, evolves, and implies in her life through the ages. So far as this is the popular belief, so far the popular belief is reasonable and Catholic. But if you go further, and tell me the wicked are excluded from heaven not because they exclude themselves, but by an arbitrary act of God, by way of wreaking his vengeance on those who have obstinately, during this life, refused the good he proffers them, I naturally ask: What do you mean by this vengeance, and on what principle of natural or revealed truth do you assert it? Do you mean that this punishment is **any thing more or less than the natural consequence of the reprobate state or condition in which the sinner dies and enters the world to come, and from which there is and can be for him no redemption?** Is this your meaning? Then I understand you, and have no difficulty with the popular belief. If it is not, and you say that the church requires me to believe more than this, I ask you to tell in plain and unequivocal language, what it is that you really mean, and what in addition Catholic faith requires me to believe? I ask you also, to show that what, in addition, is required of me, harmonizes with the known attributes of God, and with the general principles of revealed truth.

Now, what is the teaching of the church on this subject, in relation to the precise difficulty we have stated, we do not pretend to know; but we must know it, we must understand it, and we must see its consistency with whatever else we are required to believe, or else there will be in spite of ourselves a doubt in our mind, a doubt which cannot be mechanically removed, or in any way removed without some intelligible reason addressed to our understanding. You may tell us that such a doubt is sinful, and that, if we entertain it, we are no true believers. But that will not remove the doubt. The motives you adduce are addressed to the will, not to the intellect, and may make us wish to get rid of the doubt, but they cannot convince the understanding. To will or not to will is always in our power, but not to believe or to disbelieve. There is no use in finding fault with us for this, for thus far we are not and cannot be blameworthy. Doubt is sinful only when it arises from some malice in the will, some indifference to truth, some neglect to seek for it, or for the evidence that it is truth; that is, it may be sinful in its cause, but not in itself as a purely intellectual act. Indeed, doubt is the first act of the reflex understanding, and he who has never doubted has never learned any thing. The merit of faith is in the

fact that it is an act of love as well as of understanding.

But we have no disposition to prolong this discussion, and whatever opinions we may have, directly or indirectly, advanced on the future punishment of the wicked, we, in intention at least, hold the Catholic doctrine, and wish to have on this, as on all other subjects, no doctrine not in accordance with it. The only two opinions we have advanced, which are supposed not to be in harmony with the teachings of the theologians and the belief of the people, are: 1. That the punishment of the wicked is not a positive infliction, but a necessary consequence of the state or condition in which the sinner dies, and vindictive only in the sense that it vindicates the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the creative act; and 2. That the future punishment of the wicked, which in the case of all actual sinners is a *perpetua q̄ leuice cruciatus*, involving what theologians call the *pœna sensus*, though, in our judgment, the pain of internal rather than of external sense,—but nevertheless is not punishment by material fire, as that term is ordinarily understood, in a literal lake or pool that burneth with literal fire and brimstone. With regard to the first point, St. Teresa's experience testifies to nothing against us, for her experience does not represent God as inflicting pain, or the pain itself as produced by any external fire, but declares it to be "the soul herself who tears herself into pieces," which shows that the sufferings of the soul grow out of her internal state, not that God positively inflicts them. On both points, however, we are content with the doctrine of the following passage, which we find in Archbishop Kenrick's Theology: "Attamen necesse non est eum concipere pœnas irrogantem; nam ex ipsa peccatorum conditione, quum procul sint a regno cœlorum, vehemens oritur dolor, qui, omnibus fatentibus theologis, est maximus damnatorum cruciatus, *pœna damni* dictus. Quæ autem supplicia ignis nomine in Scripturis designantur, non satis feliciter quis explicauerit; nec enim igni quo foveamur est similis. Cæterum carceris ipsius, ut ita loquamur, adjuncta haberi possunt quæcumque sint externa damnatorum supplicia, quin Deus ea inferens concipiatur."*

This, if we understand it, teaches that it is not necessary in order to hold the Catholic faith to believe that the punishment is a positive infliction, and therefore a supernatural punish-

**Theologia Dogmatica. De Impiorum Supplic. Resp. Obj. 10.* As we are referred to the illiterate to collect our faith, it would be quite unnecessary to translate the Latin into English for their benefit.

ment ; but it suffices to believe that it grows out of the state or condition in which the sinner has placed himself, or in which he is found on entering the future world. As that state is the natural consequence of the abuse of his freedom, which constitutes the dignity and glory of his nature, we see no injustice, nothing contrary to the essential attributes of our Creator, who is good and goodness itself, in leaving the reprobate to suffer it, and we see not how God himself could, without reversing the whole order of his providence, do otherwise. But as we regard all suffering, even in this life, as expiatory in its nature and character, we regard this future punishment as an everlasting expiation for sin. Whether we have a right to hold this latter view or not, is a point on which we have asked for instruction from those who have the authority to teach, and are capable of setting us right, if we are wrong. The expiatory character of future punishment is, in our mind, connected with a general principle which runs through all the Creator's works, and without which we could never discover or establish the dialectic character of pain of any sort. All the Creator's works are dialectic, and every thing in them when rightly understood, has a dialectic sense. Several highly esteemed and learned theologians, to whom the very name of Gioberti is an abomination, have objected even to our criticism on that philosopher's assertion that sin has its dialectic side, and assure us that we are wrong in saying that it is on no side and under no aspect dialectic, that is, reconcilable with good.

With regard to the second point, as to the *pena sensus* asserted by our theologians, we are not disposed to say any thing more than is said by Archbishop Kenrick in the passage we have quoted. We by no means deny what theologians call the *pena sensus*, but we consider it rather a pain of internal than of external sense, and look upon it as growing necessarily out of the loss of heaven, or the supernatural destiny of man, which leaves the sinner and compels him for ever to remain an initial or inchoate existence, and therefore in the world of the senses, infinitely below that world of mentality in which the blest are. That the reprobate will suffer from creatures in hell, on the principles and in the way they suffer from them here, is possible and not improbable; but that they will be crowded into "ovens," thrown into "pits," or plunged into a "lake," literally burning with "fire and brimstone," and actually punished by material fire, as the

term is ordinarily understood, we by no means deny ; we only say that we do not believe that it is necessary to believe it. These and various other images used by the Scriptures and by our preachers, and taken literally by the illiterate or the vulgar, we content ourselves with regarding as used to express the greatness and intensity of the sufferings of the damned. So much it is evident the Archbishop in his *Theology* would concede us, and nothing more can really be collected from the experience of St. Teresa quoted in our friend's letter. There may be great doubt whether the highly figurative or symbolic language of the *Apocalypse* has any reference at all to the condition of men after this mortal life, and, at any rate, there is no more reason why the beast should be taken figuratively to represent, as our friend says, "wicked world," than the lake of fire and brimstone should be taken figuratively. St. Teresa nowhere says that the damned are subjected to a literal burning, or that their agonies proceed from literal fire. Her language is highly figurative, and she uses the strongest expressions in her power to express the intensity of the sufferings of hell. But, after all, we place no great reliance on the saint's experience. She was a great saint, a noble woman, and a classical writer, yet it is not necessary to believe that she was inspired to reveal truth, or that she ever actually in her own person experienced the tortures of the damned. We have great respect for the experiences and visions of saints, but we are not disposed to take them as infallible commentaries on the Holy Scriptures, or as of any special value in determining what is or is not the Catholic dogma. We believe in the perennial inspiration of the church, that is, in the sense of a never-failing assistance of the Holy Ghost, but only to the end of preserving inviolate in its unity and integrity the idea, or truth itself, which she in her whole life is engaged in evolving, explaining, and applying, to the glory of God and the salvation of souls. But we regard this inspiration or assistance as given to the church as the new or regenerated human race, not to individuals, however learned, or saintly, or worthy to be venerated on our altars.

Still, if our friend insists upon the literal interpretation of the language of Scripture and of the popular belief, we shall not quarrel with him ; we shall only tell him that we think he has no right to accuse us of denying hell because we do not agree with him that it is literal fire. He may hold his opinion, but not impose it upon us as Catholic dogma. We

would, however, say to him and to others who have accused us of denying the everlasting punishment of the wicked, that they seem to us to take a very low view, not of hell indeed, but of heaven. They seem to consider the loss of heaven, of the supernatural, that is to say, of their proper destiny, therefore of their supreme good, as a very trifling affair, and to imply no hell at all. Perhaps if they had a little more of that spiritual-mindedness and penetration into celestial things, which they are so ready to deny to us, they would perceive that we might more justly accuse them of denying heaven, than they us of denying hell. They seem to us to attach very little importance to the supernatural destiny of man, and therefore to the Incarnation, and to think somewhat more of escaping hell than of securing the joys of heaven. Will they permit us to suggest that, if they would more frequently prefer life to death as the subject of their meditations they would be none the worse theologians, and none the weaker Christians?

Since the foregoing was written, we have received another communication from a learned and able theologian, and which, as we wish to have done with the subject, we append with a few brief remarks:—

SIR: Excuse me, if I take the liberty of offering to your attention a few remarks relative to the two last numbers of your Review. I should perhaps, not have been under the necessity of doing so, if you had seen my short exposition on the eternity of punishment in a German newspaper, the *Wahrheitsfreund*. Though I am not a great theologian, nor, in comparison with you, in the world of science of any importance, still I feel in the present case a great confidence in being able to give such answers to your questions as will put an end to the whole controversy.

Your questions are founded on a false principle, on a false idea of eternity. If you had the right notion of eternity, you would never come to conclusions like yours. According to the Holy Scriptures, eternity is the natural opposite of time; or, better, time is the true opposite of eternity. In eternity, as far as it is eternity, there is no time—*quia tempus non erit amplius*, Apoc. x. 6. But if there be no time, then there is no succession: if there be no succession, then there is no mutation of will and of punishment. "The will is in eternity" is equivalent to this proposition, "the will is immutable;" as long as it is mutable, it is not yet in eternity, but in time. In eternity *vermis non moritur, et ignis non extinguitur*. Mark ix. 43; because there is no transition from existing to not existing, or from not existing to existing; no mutation, no annihilation, because there is no succession, no time, any more. Whilst time reflects itself in motion eternity finds its picture in repose; whilst time is succession of the state of potentiality to the state of act, eternity is a simple state of act. There is only this difference between the necessary Being and contingent beings, that the eternity of the former excludes all state of potentiality, be it anterior or posterior, whilst the eternity of the latter excludes only the state of posterior potentiality. But in any case eternity excludes all succession of the state

of act and potentiality, so that the definition of eternity is necessarily this: "*Eternity* is a state of act excluding all succession." It is a simple moment of existence enduring without change.*

I think it would not be so difficult to show to a rationalist the rationality of this idea. There is nothing extraordinary, nothing impossible in it; on the contrary, it concords with reason and experience. A man with a fixed idea offers us a partial picture of the state of the wicked in eternity. His reason is directed to one point, from which even with the greatest labor it cannot be removed. It is in the state of immutability, of fixity, and in so far no more subjected to the laws of time. Suppose now, that his intellect and his will, all his conceptions and acts of will were in this state of fixity, then we should have a perfect image of the state of man in eternity. A man with a fixed idea through exterior influences can certainly come again to the full use of reason, because he is not yet quite free of the law of time; but if he were in the state of fixity with all acts of intellect and will, he never could be saved from such a state.

After this, it will not be very difficult, Sir, to answer your questions. But first, I might make some few other remarks. Your doctrine, Sir, is, when not quite destructive, at least very dangerous to Christian morality. Human nature is so inclined to evil, that, if we should offer to the impious, hopes of natural beatitude, crime, which nevertheless predominates, would reign to a far greater extent. Then your doctrine destroys the free-will of men. You say: "If they (the wicked) continue to commit sin, how can we say, that Christ has triumphed over sin, that he has overcome Satan and destroyed his works?" Now, I ask you if a man should be obstinately determined to commit sin, throughout eternity, how could you suppose him not committing sin without doing violence to his free-will? But is this not the grossest contradiction,—free-will and violence? He who is compelled, is not free, and he who is free cannot be compelled. So the triumph of Christ over sin cannot involve the consequence you draw from it, that men cannot continue to commit sin. But you ask perhaps: "Should the wicked in eternity continue to sin, would they remain eternally bad?" This question is a contradiction of terms as you easily will understand, when you remember, that their will, being in eternity, is necessarily immutable.

Come now to your fundamental questions. You ask, 1st: "Are the wicked everlastingly punished because they are everlastingly sinning?" Answer: Yes. They enter with their sin in eternity and so this sin, though they do not commit new sins, is everlasting; they enter, as Dr. Klee says, into the state of Satanity.† In Luke, viii. 18; the debt remains the same, consequently the punishment remains the same. You ask, 2dly: "Is their punishment vindictive, or simply expiative?" Answer: There is no difference, whether the punishment be vindictive or expiative, since it is eternal. Call it as you like, it is always the same pun-

*Vide *Tourauski et sa Doctrine jugés par l'Enseignement de l'Eglise*; par Pierre Semenenko, Docteur en Théologie. Paris: Jaques Lecoffre et Cie. This same notion of eternity, as the Holy Scriptures give it us you will find, also, in the Scholastics. As I have no other books at hand, I beg you to read St. Thomas *Summa*, P. 1, Q. 10, A. 4, and elsewhere.

†(Katholische Dogmatik von Dr. H. Klee, T. II., p. 462). And does not Jesus Christ speak himself of an eternal sin? *Qui autem blasphemaverit in Spiritum Sanctum non habebit remissionem sed reus erit eterni delicti?* Marc. iii. 29. In the same view St. Ambrose says: *Post mortem nequeunt merita mutari.*

ishment. But it is really both; it is vindictive and expiative, but remember well, *eternally* vindictive for an eternal sin, and *eternally* expiative of an eternal sin. Does not Jesus Christ say himself of the wicked: *Non videbit ritam, sed ira Dei manet super eum?* John, iii. 36.* In hell, Sir, there is no grace any more; but expiation in your sense, that is, satisfaction, involves and supposes grace. I beg to consider also the following oracles of the Holy Scripture: "Vae genti insurgenti super genus meum; Dominus enim omnipotens vindicabit in eis. . . . Dabit enim ignem et vermes in carnes eorum, ut urantur et sentiant usque in sempiternum." Judith xvi. "In flamma ignis dantis vindictam iis, qui non noverunt Deum, et qui non obediunt Evangelio Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui penas dabunt in interitu æternas." Sec. Thessal. i. In the same sense St. Cyprian says: "Quos inexcipiabili malo sæviens ignis æterna scelerum ultione torquet." Laud. martyr. 618. Bal. You ask, 3dly: "Does it necessarily include any thing more than is implied in the loss of heaven or supernatural good?" Answer: Though the loss of God is, according to the Holy Fathers, the hell in hell, still the Scriptures and the Fathers and the Church in her definitions speak always of positive, not only of negative or privative sufferings. But even supposing, that the eternal punishment does not necessarily include any thing more than is implied in the loss of heaven or supernatural good, we still must protest against a consequence such as this, that with eternal punishment natural beatitude can coëxist. For it is self-evident, that to be out of God, consequently to be out of all good and within all bad and evil, is to be in hell, and likewise that the highest *pæna damni* is also the highest *pæna sensus* (vide Klee's Dogmatik, T. ii. p. 463). You ask, 4thly: "Because none but the elect can receive any supernatural good, is it therefore necessary to exclude the reprobate from all diminution of their sufferings under the expiation eternally going on, or from gradually attaining to that degree of imperfect good foreshadowed in what theologians call the state of pure nature?" Answer: Certainly it is; as in eternity there is no time any more, so there can be no succession, no mutation, no gradual diminution of suffering, no transition to any degree of perfect or imperfect good. Does not also the Holy Gospel indicate the impossibility of this alleged mitigation in the parable of the rich man, to whom a drop of water, *i. e.*, the smallest mitigation is denied?† You see, Sir, that all my answers are founded in the true Biblical idea of eternity, whilst your questions suppose eternity to be a time without limits, which is, you will agree with me, a chimera. Do you still require definitions of the church? I am here living, Sir, in the country, far from all communication with large cities; I have not all the books I should have to write on theological matters, I have not the Decreta Pontificum, nor the Concilia Ecumenica nor the Holy Fathers; I have nothing else than some books of theology, and some remarks written during the time of my studies; I am a poor missionary in Upper-Canada, and so I cannot furnish you with a great apparatus of science; but I hope you will not ask too much from me. I have said nothing but what a candid spirit must admit, and the whole of what I have said can convince you that your theory is not in harmony with the doctrine of the church. So this is not a point in which popular belief needs to be modified. Yea, the popular belief itself is a real ar-

* *Proprie* loquendo pæna æterna non est vindicativa neque expiativa, sed *retributiva*.

† Cf. Marc. xiv. 21. "Vae autem homini illi, per quem Filius hominis traditur. *Bonus erat ei, si non esset natus homo ille.*" Ergo existentia damni non est melior conditio quam non-existentia.

gument against you. What is popular belief else, than the belief of all ages, all countries, and all the people of God, of the whole mystic body of Christ, of the church herself?

“Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est, non est erratum, sed traditum.” When Nestorius in the fifth century asserted that the blessed Virgin was only the mother of a man, it was not yet defined by the church, but it was popular belief, that she was the mother of God, and is not this popular belief considered till now as the strongest proof against the heresiarch? Before the last Decennium the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was not yet decreed, but it was popular belief, and this popular belief was the strongest argument for our theologians. On this popular belief Father Passaglia founded his large work, *De Immaculato Conceptu*, and Father Ballerini’s *Sylloge Monumentorum ad Mysterium Conceptionis Immaculatæ illustrandum*, is nothing else than a proof of the popular belief in this dogma.

Another remark we have to make before closing this already too long letter. We believe in your good will, in your orthodoxy; we believe that you have not the slightest intention to assert any thing against the church; we are happy, to see in your last Review such a firm declaration of your readiness to subject your opinions to the decision of the church; but, Sir, you must concede, that you were in an earlier number of your Review a little too incautious in speaking of the Index. In your article, *Gioberti’s Philosophy of Revelation* you say: “We know also, that modern orthodoxy is timid, and its defenders are more ready to denounce, to place up on the Index, or to pillory a man’s writings, than to refute them, to silence by authority than to convince by reason.” Are such expressions not incautious? Can you conscientiously speak so about a congregation of the greatest dignitaries of the church and the most learned theologians of the world, who never place a work on the Index without having examined it on all sides, to whose decisions the greatest men of the Catholic world, such as a Ventura, Rosmini, Hirscher, Gunther, &c., &c., willingly and humbly subjected themselves? But “errare aut errasse humanum est.”

Excuse me again, Sir, and, believe that I would not have said any thing against you, if not compelled by my conscience and my love of the truth and of our holy church, to whose service I offer my little faculties, my little labors, and my whole life.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant.

We were not ignorant of the definition of eternity given us by the writer, but the word *eternal* is frequently used in the sense of *everlasting*, in which sense it does not exclude the conception of time, or potentiality. When applied to punishment, it must be so used, and can only mean that the punishment is endless, or never comes to a conclusion. Taken in the sense in which it excludes all conception of time and potentiality, it applies and can apply only to God. Defined as our critic defines it, eternity, since it excludes all potentiality, is pure act, and only God is or can be pure act, for he only is or can be absolutely infinite. Eternity, in his sense, is God, who alone is eternal, or the Eternal One. To be in eternity is to be in God, and the blest are eternal, possess eternal life, only

in him. To be "in eternity," in the sense that it excludes all time, is to be in God, is to be God, for what is in God is God. The saints in glory participate in his eternity, because they have returned to him in the palingenesia,—and through union with the Word made flesh, are united to him as their final cause, and are thus, as St. Peter says, made "partakers of the divine nature," *divinæ consortes naturæ*.

But this cannot be said of the reprobate. They are not in eternity, for they are not in God,—are not united to him in the palingenesia, for they are reprobate precisely because they are not and never can be so united. In them the potentiality of their nature is not reduced to act, and their misery is that it never can be; or, in other words, they have not attained, and never can attain to their final cause,—have not reached and cannot reach the term of their existence; that is, have not fulfilled and cannot fulfil their destiny. Hence they remain for ever initial, inchoate, unfulfilled, or incompleted existences. Hence they are and must remain for ever subject to time and its mutations, never reaching eternity. Possibly it did not occur to our critic, that, if the wicked are in eternity, they have reached the term of their existence, have reduced their potentiality to act, have fulfilled their destiny, and therefore are neither wicked nor miserable, but deified and blest, are in fact saints in glory, which, he will permit us to say, is a "contradiction in terms."

Time and eternity are not contradictories, but simply opposites, reconciled and brought into dialectic harmony in the palingenesia. Time and space are related to eternity and immensity precisely as the creature is related to the Creator; and as Creator and creature are not contradictories, so neither are time or space and eternity or immensity. Time is initial eternity, and space is initial immensity, and each is complete or completed only in God, who is eternity and immensity in his own real and actual being. The blest have fulfilled their destiny, have returned to God as their final cause, and in them the final chronotope has not been destroyed, for they remain creatures still, are not absorbed in God, as the Buddhists teach, but are brought into dialectic union and harmony with the infinite chronotope, that is to say, the eternity and immensity of God, indistinguishable from the divine essence itself. The difficulty with the reprobate is, then, that this union and harmony are not and cannot be attained to. They remain eternally in finite time and space, out of their dialectic union and harmony,

out of the Logos, and are therefore sophistical. Had our critic duly considered this, he would have had less confidence in his demonstration of the impossibility of the sort of melioration under the expiation, for ever going on, we spoke of. This demonstration is founded not on a false notion of eternity, but on the false notion of the relation of time and eternity, in supposing them to be contradictories, when they are only simple contraries, susceptible of reconciliation. Time has its origin and its being in eternity, as the creature has its origin and being in the Creator.

We cannot conceive of time being no more without conceiving of the total annihilation of all creatures. The time for This or That may come to an end, but not all time. The time of probation ends at death, and the unregenerate are from that moment fixed in their state of reprobation for ever. There is no time for them to enter the palingenesia, and they must remain for ever in their state of reprobation. On this point there is no disagreement between the critic and ourselves. But that their condition within the limits of this reprobation is immutable, may be true, but is not, we maintain, a necessary logical conclusion.

This disposes of the philosophic argument adduced against us. In answer to one of our questions, the critic concedes that the reprobate do not commit *new* sin, and simply contends that they remain for ever in the same sinful state in which they enter the world to come. Substitute the *same reprobate state*, and we accept his answer. That the wicked, as he maintains after Dr. Klee, "enter into the state of satanicy," is a proposition that we do not fully understand, or which, if we understand, we do not accept; for we do not recognize two eternal principles, one good, one evil,—or the Manichean dualism. He says, furthermore, that it makes no difference whether we call the punishment vindictive or expiative, since it is eternal. With his permission, we think it does make some difference, if the word *vindictive* is taken in its popular sense and it was only in its popular sense that we objected to it. Popularly, the word *vindictive* means *revengeful, given to revenge*, and in this sense we doubt the propriety of calling the punishment of the wicked *vindictive*. In the other sense of the word the sense in which we use it when we say we *vindicate* a proposition against an opponent, or a truth against him that denies it, we are willing to admit that all punishment is vindictive. In the punishment of the wicked, God does not *avenge* or *re-*

venge himself, in the vulgar sense of those terms, but vindicates the logical or dialectic character of his own providence, proving it in harmony with the eternal Logos, which he himself is. He does universally and effectually what our critic is attempting, on a small scale, to do to us, that is, to vindicate the truth against our sophistry. The pain and mortification we should feel by being convicted would be our expiation of having been illogical, and vented sophisms. All sin is a sophism, is an error of logic, or an error against the dialectic truth of things, and really consists in the sophism of assuming on the part of the creature that he is not creature, but God. The expiation is the just reward of the error or sin, and is therefore *retributive*.

But when our critic talks of an "eternal sin," he talks again of something we do not understand. An eternal sin can be the act only of an eternal sinner, and therefore again only of an infinite sinner; an infinite sinner must be an infinite being; but an infinite being is *actus purissimus*, and therefore incapable of sinning. He only can commit an eternal sin who is in eternity; but eternity is God, and God cannot sin, nor he who is in God. Man may commit a sin that will never be forgiven, therefore a sin whose punishment or expiation will never end; but that is something very different from an eternal sin.

The writer concedes our proposition that "hell does not necessarily imply any thing more than the loss of heaven or supernatural good," but protests "against a consequence such as this, that with eternal punishment natural beatitude can co-exist. For it is self-evident, that to be out of God, consequently to be out of all good and within all bad and evil, is to be in hell, and likewise that the highest *pœna damni* is also the highest *pœna sensus*." If he had paid attention to what we said in October, he would have omitted what he here says of "natural beatitude." In the proper sense of the term, we believe in no natural beatitude; for beatitude is in the palingenesia, not in the cosmos. Yet the cosmos is initial palingenesia. The reprobate have no palingenesiac existence; yet, since they exist, they have a cosmic existence, and therefore an initial good. To deny this would be to deny that the reprobate have any existence, and if no existence, they can be the subjects neither of happiness nor of misery. But we have sufficiently explained this point elsewhere. We only add here, that, in our October number, we frankly admitted the

inaccuracy of our language, and explained what we meant. There is neither fairness nor candor in our critics continuing to assert that we maintain that the reprobate attain or even may be attaining to natural beatitude. All the good pertaining to what theologians call the "state of pure nature," which they, not we, call natural beatitude, is simply an initial or inchoate good, as the cosmos is initial or inchoate palingenesia, or as man in the order of genesis is an initial or inchoate Christian. The reprobate never get beyond this initial or inchoate state, never attain to the stature of full-grown men, never actualize the potentialities of their nature or race, and therefore remain for ever dishumanized and below their destiny, and hence are said to be in hell, *infernus, the below*.

Our critic says that "to be out of God, consequently to be out of all good and within all bad and evil, is to be in hell." Will he tell us what he means by being *within all bad and evil*? Are *bad* and *evil* something positive? Are they positive entities? If so, they must either be eternal or created. If you say eternal, you are a Manichean; if you say they are created, you deny that all the Creator's works are good, and maintain that God can do evil, therefore be bad and wicked. He says, "the Scriptures, the fathers, and the church in her definitions, speak always of positive, not only of negative or privative sufferings." No doubt of it. But do they ever speak of evil as a positive principle, or a positive existence? Nobody denies that suffering is positive, that is to say, actual suffering; but it is not by virtue of the presence of a positive existence called evil, but by virtue of the absence of a positive good. It is not necessary, Archbishop Kenrick tells us, to believe that the punishment of the wicked is a positive infliction,—and he, we must believe, is as good a theologian, as learned and philosophic as even our critic. We have no doubt that the suffering of the reprobate is very real and very intense, but we are disposed to regard it not as a positive infliction, but as the natural and necessary consequence of the loss of God, the privation of heaven, which compels the reprobate to remain for ever mere initial, inchoate, unfinished existences, intensified in the case of actual sinners by the consciousness that it is through their own fault they must for ever so remain.

With regard to popular belief as a criterion of Catholic truth, we have already spoken. Popular belief is orthodox, so far as it conforms to the external and internal tradition of

the church, and no further. The external tradition is the infallible speech of the church maintained by her definitions and decrees; the internal is the idea or Word whose divine-human life she is evolving in her own life, as we have elsewhere explained. As to the words of theologians and even of Scripture, we wish it to be understood that the question is not what they are, but what do they mean. This question it requires a higher authority than either his or ours to answer. As to the moral effect of our alleged doctrine, we reply, first, that we have nothing to do with it, because we do not hold the doctrine objected to; and, second, that the fear of hell is a restraint only to those who believe it, and, if we present hell in such a light that nobody will or can believe it, the fear of it will restrain nobody. We thank the critic for the confidence he expresses in our personal orthodoxy and good intentions, but we are not aware that any one can justly suspect them, or that they need any special endorsement. As to the complaint he makes of an incautious expression of ours when speaking of Gioberti, we assure him that we have very little sympathy with the meticulousness of modern theologians. We complain not that bad books are placed on the *Index*; that is all right and necessary as a guide to the faithful; but we mean to say that that is not enough. The discipline of the *Index* can be enforced in the case of very few who would be injured by reading the works censured. To place a book, in our times, on the *Index*, only creates a greater eagerness to read it. It is necessary in addition to refute bad books. This is all we meant to say, and this, we think, no one can censure.

There are two or three other points in the letter which we intended to notice, but we think we have said enough; and if, after the explanations we have given, our critics persist in accusing us of maintaining that there is natural beatitude to which the reprobate attain or can be attaining, or of denying the everlasting punishment in hell of the wicked, they must be a little dull of understanding, or deficient in fairness and candor. Our views on this, as on all other theological subjects, are submitted in humble deference to the Holy See, with the promise to abide by her decision. We seek to ascertain, to accept, and to obey the Catholic faith as committed by Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life to the church, not to make a Catholic religion, a Catholic faith, or a Catholic Church to suit ourselves, or after our own image.

With these remarks the discussion of the subject in our pages is closed.

THE CHURCH NOT A DESPOTISM.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1862.]

AT the end of our last number, we made the following announcement:

“ Heretofore on theological questions our articles have, for the most part, been submitted to theological revision and censorship before publication; hereafter they will not be so submitted. We shall write according to our own honest convictions, and publish our articles as we write them, simply holding ourselves responsible, after publication, to the proper authorities for any abuse we may make of the freedom of the press guarantied to us by the constitution and laws of our country. Each number as it appears will be sent to Rome, and any corrections of any sort the Holy See may require or suggest will be most cheerfully made, and at the earliest opportunity, for we recognize her full right to teach and to govern the church. Objections to our views from other quarters will be listened to with respect, will be carefully weighed and acknowledged whenever in our judgment they seem valid, or conclusive against us. We trust we shall prefer the truth to our own opinions, and be grateful to every man, in whatever spirit he may do it, who helps us to correct our errors.”

Singularly enough, this which we intended as a pledge to the Catholic public of our submission to the proper authorities of the church, and as an assurance in advance that though we might sometimes err, we would never become a heretic, has been construed, even in quarters where we expected better things, into a bold defiance of episcopal authority, and the proud declaration that the editor of this *Review* will recognize no court, but the court of last resort. It has seemed to many Catholics, and to some non-Catholics, to be a step backwards towards independence of all ecclesiastical authority, and has disturbed not a few who would gladly be our friends. The interpretation given to our language, and the suspicions it has excited or strengthened, would not a little surprise us, if we had not lived too long in this world to be surprised at any thing uncharitable, unjust, unreasonable, or absurd. We need not say, the interpretation is not ours.

The freedom of the press guarantied us by the laws of our country, to which we alluded, ought to have given our readers

the key to the sense of the first part of the announcement. Our laws leave the press free, but punish, or profess to punish, the abuse of its freedom. What we disclaimed was the censorship, previous to publication, to which we had in theological matters hitherto, for the most part, submitted our articles. This previous censorship had never been exacted of us, and had been sought by us for our own instruction and protection. Neither Rome nor any local authority had ever required us to submit any article to theological revision before its publication, and not a few of our bishops had requested us not to do it, for they had, they were pleased to say, more confidence in our judgment than in that of any theological censor we were likely to select. In the announcement we made, we were, we supposed, simply complying with their wishes, and assuming for ourselves the sole responsibility for whatever might appear in our pages. We had no thought of declaring or insinuating our independence after publication of the bishops or courts, in the first instance, for we said expressly that we should hold ourselves "responsible to the *proper authorities* for any abuse we might make of the freedom of the press guaranteed to us by the laws of our country." The simple sum of what we announced is, we shall publish what we think proper without censorship before publication, but shall submit to the censure, after publication, which the proper authorities may judge us deserving. We had never understood that in a country like ours, where freedom of the press is guaranteed by the civil constitution and laws, any thing more is required of any Catholic publicist. You may punish one after he has sinned, not before.

Members of religious orders are free to write and publish only *permissu superiorum*, but that is by virtue of the special constitution of those orders, and the special vow of obedience taken by religious. Presbyters, in strictness, especially in the anomalous state of the church in this country, where there is no canon law, may not be free to publish any thing without the permission of the bishop; at least it may not be prudent for them to do so, for he is their absolute master, and may remove them, or withdraw their faculties, at his pleasure. But a layman and secular is under no obligation to ask permission to write or to publish. I, as a Catholic layman, am under only the universal discipline of the church, and may write and publish what I please, only holding myself responsible to the proper authorities for any thing I may write or pub-

lish contrary to faith or morals. There is no power in heaven or on earth that can lawfully prohibit me from publishing and defending Catholic truth, or prevent me from doing any good, through the press, in my power. I am obliged to ask no one's permission to do either. It is my right, given me by Almighty God in the charter of my manhood, or of myself as a free moral agent. Undoubtedly, I am bound to do either in an orderly, not a disorderly manner. But only because neither can be done in any other manner. I can do neither against the hierarchy, but I can do either without the formal permission of the hierarchy. But if I attempt to do either without such permission, it is at my own proper peril and I must take the penalty of failure, if I fail. Of that penalty, the ecclesiastical authority, the local authority in the first instance, the Holy See in the last, is the proper judge, and I cease to be a good Catholic if I refuse to submit to it.

It is said, though we have not seen it, that there is an old canon of the sixteenth or some earlier century which forbids laymen and seculars to publish any thing on religion without ecclesiastical permission. If there is such a canon, we know not the circumstances in which it originated, or the special purpose for which it was promulgated. But be its intent what it may, it is not of force in this country, for the canon law has never been promulgated in the United States, and even if the canon law were in force here, it would not affect us personally, for we have received the permission of the bishops and archbishops of the country, nay, their request to publish our *Review*, and that request or that permission up to this moment has in no instance been withdrawn. We say furthermore, and the venerable hierarchy will bear witness to the truth of what we say, that the request or permission was given without any express or implied understanding that our articles were to be submitted, before publication, to theological supervision or correction. Nothing of the sort was exacted of us and when we removed to New York, its most reverend archbishop refused to supervise our articles, and assured us that he wished them to emanate from our own mind, and that we should be perfectly free, in conducting our *Review*, to follow our own judgment and convictions. In either case, we are safe from all charge of rebellion or disorderly conduct, and we wish both Catholics and non-Catholics to take notice that, if we formerly submitted our articles to theological revision before publication, it was because we chose to do it, not because any

ecclesiastical authority required it, nor because we supposed we were obliged to do it by the discipline of the church. The church gives us far more freedom than some Catholics imagine, and altogether more than is generally believed by non-Catholics.

As for defying the bishops or local authorities, and announcing that we would submit only to Rome, the supreme authority, we have done no such thing. We have said nothing to warrant any charge of this sort. We say expressly that we hold ourselves "responsible to the proper authorities," not, indeed, before publishing, but "for the abuse we may make of the freedom of the press." Who are "the proper authorities?" Of course, the bishops; for if we had meant only the Holy See, we most likely should have written "proper *authority*," not "the proper *authorities*,"—in the singular, not in the plural. We say, also in the article on *Catholic Schools and Education*. p. 82. "The Catholic cause can never be promoted by any anti-hierarchical action. Much good may be done that is not done by or under the direction of the hierarchy, but no good end can be obtained in opposition to it;"* and we assign as a sufficient reason why we should not oppose, and why we should support, Catholic schools, the simple fact that our bishops and clergy have manifestly decided in their favor. Does this indicate a spirit that would defy the bishops, or reject their local authority? We defy not the bishops, but we defy the bitterest enemy we have to adduce a single instance since we became a Catholic, in which we have refused obedience to the order of any local authority, bishop or simple priest, within whose jurisdiction we resided. No bishop or archbishop, in his own name, or in his official character, has ever yet brought the slightest charge against us, or breathed the slightest reprimand, for either our public or private conduct. One or two bishops have made private suggestions to us, and one in a private letter berates us most unmercifully for the course we have taken in regard to the present civil war in which our country is unhappily involved, charging us with holding Robespierrean principles, because we demand the liberation of the slaves, and as being able "to see things only through New England spectacles;" but we considered him as writing, not in his official character as bishop, but in his unepiscopal character of secessionist, or sympathizer with south-

*Brownson's Works, Vol. XIII. p. 512.

ern slave-holders. Bishops and archbishops may have criticised us in anonymous articles or unsigned editorials in their "Official Organs," some of them perhaps have denounced us to Rome; but no one has officially complained to us personally of any thing we have published, said, or done. Consequently, however rebelliously inclined we might be by nature, we had and could have no occasion to defy the bishops, or declare ourselves independent of the local authorities. Whether in any case we should do so, it will be time enough to inquire when the case is presented. Whatever else may be said of us, it cannot be said of us that we have ever yet refused to demean ourselves before authority, in the first or last instance, as a humble and docile Catholic.

Suppose our critics would read our announcement without any foregone conclusion against us, might they not find in that announcement evidence of something else than an uncatholic spirit? It was whispered all round or openly talked in influential Catholic circles, that the editor of this *Review* was growing "shaky" in his faith, and he found himself treated, where he had been a welcome guest, with the coldness and reserve hardly to be expected by an apostate. The non-Catholic press were almost on the point of welcoming him back to the ranks of Protestantism, and the so-called Catholic papers were nearly unanimous in denouncing him, or, at least, were laboring, and, having the prestige of "Official Organs," were laboring not without success, to excite distrust of him in the minds of Catholics generally. Now, why could it not occur to his critics that in the announcement he made he meant to reassure the few friends he might still have in the Catholic ranks, and furnish them with an answer to his enemies. Be it that he says, while he submits to the requirements or suggestions of the Holy See, the objections to his views from other quarters will be treated according to their merits; it must still be borne in mind that his submission to the Holy See is declared to be full and unqualified. "Any correction of *any sort* the Holy See may require or *suggest* will be most cheerfully made and at the earliest opportunity; for we recognize her *full* right to teach and to *govern* the church." What Catholic could say more, or what more could be required of or promised by the most humble and docile Catholic? We promise here all that our faith and duty as a Catholic can ask of us and our promise must be held good till it is broken, or symptoms of breaking it are shown. Here, then, is the most

positive assurance of full and unqualified submission to the Holy See, mother and mistress of all the churches. In the next place, we promise to listen respectfully to the objections to our views from other quarters, in whatever spirit they may be urged, to weigh them carefully, and to acknowledge them, that is, yield to them, whenever they seem in our judgment valid, or conclusive against us. What more does Catholic faith or Catholic duty require of any one? Here is no defiance of the local authorities, or refusal to recognize them, for we speak of "objections to our views," not of charges of un-catholic conduct, or breach of Catholic discipline. In regard to these we had already acknowledged ourselves responsible to the proper or local authorities.

We may be asked why we referred to the Holy See at all, in distinction from the local authorities? We did it, first, because it is our duty to submit to the Holy See, and second, because we wished to assure our readers that we knew and were prepared to perform our duty. We distinguished the corrections required or suggested by the Holy See from objections proposed against our views from other quarters, first, because such distinction is proper in itself; second, because we wished to remind those who in the newspapers were cavilling at us, and misrepresenting us, that we should treat their objections with the respect due to their intrinsic merit, but should not take them as the voice of authority, to which on our allegiance as a Catholic, we were bound to submit; and thirdly, because we did not wish to confirm non-Catholics in their false notions of Catholic authority. We also did it, because our enemies had themselves, without summoning us before the local tribunals, or giving us personally any notice of charges against us, lodged their complaints against us directly at Rome. We only recognized and accepted the tribunal before which they had summoned us to plead, and before which they were seeking our condemnation. We did nothing more than they made it necessary and proper for us to do. Moreover, we had received assurances from Rome that the Propaganda were satisfied with the promise we had previously given, to submit all our publications to the Holy See. As the pledge privately given had satisfied the Propaganda, we innocently supposed, if given publicly, it would satisfy the Catholic community, even our accusers themselves. The public statement was made with the knowledge and advice of the theologian trusted by the Propaganda with the matter. We hope this

explanation will prove satisfactory to all who are willing to be satisfied, and convince those who secretly try to get condemned at Rome a man who is wearing his life out in the cause they profess to have at heart, that Rome only acts with deliberation, and with a sense of justice.

We know Rome was displeased with some remarks we made on the temporal sovereignty of the supreme pontiff, but before learning her displeasure, we had announced that the discussion of the subject would not be continued in our pages. With the assurance that we would not reopen the discussion, and that we would make any explanations, modifications, or retractions the Holy See might exact, the Propaganda expressed themselves satisfied. Subsequently a list of charges was lodged at the Propaganda against us, not one of which, as stated to us, was true, but on the reception of a letter from us previously written, the Propaganda threw them out, and wrote our archbishop to tranquilize his mind as to our Catholic dispositions. These things we should not have publicly referred to, if our promise of submission to the Holy See had not publicly been made a charge against us, and tortured into a proof of our uncatholic and rebellious disposition. We refer to them in our own defence, and if they are displeasing to our enemies, we know they will not be so to our friends. We refer to them also that we may bear publicly our testimony to the fair dealing and honorable course of the Propaganda, and express our full confidence, that the humblest Christian, when his case is fairly represented at Rome, may be sure of having substantial justice done him. Rome is less hidebound than some of our meticulous Catholics.

But why are we bringing any of these questions before the public at all? We are too obscure an individual for the public to take any interest in what affects only our personal interest or reputation, and it imports little to the Catholic or non-Catholic community, whether we can or cannot defend ourselves. We know all this, and if we had no purpose beyond our personal vindication, we should be silent. But we have undertaken to prove to our non-Catholic countrymen, both by our word and our example, that they wrong our church when they pronounce her a despotism, and her communion the grave of thought and freedom. Because we have expressed ourselves with more freedom and independence than they suppose she allows, they are inferring that we are shaking in our Catholic faith, and some of their journals are representing us

as dissatisfied with the church, and not unlikely to follow the example of our friend Dr. Forbes. Now, we wish to disabuse them. We wish them to regard us as a staunch, uncompromising Catholic, for we should be ashamed to be any thing else; and we wish to convince them, that the freedom and independence we manifest, and which they approve, are not anti-Catholic, are not uncatholic, but really and truly Catholic, and in strict accordance with the free and large spirit of our holy religion. We thank their journals for the kind manner in which they have latterly spoken of us, and especially the *Illinois Teacher*, for correcting a very common mistake about us, which the Catholic journals, taking their cue from the *New York Herald* and kindred prints, treat as no mistake at all, and when friendly to us, excuse on the ground of our former Protestantism, and when hostile, reiterate as a fixed and condemnatory fact; but we cannot accept any personal compliments at the expense of our Catholic character. It is not that we are uncatholic in the things they approve, but that they in those things see something of real Catholicity. They suppose us uncatholic, because they have a false idea of what Catholicity is, and do not recognize the church when we present to their understanding her real character. It is not we who are departing from Catholicity, but they who, through us, are approaching and venerating her. A non-Catholic said to us the other day, "If all Catholics wrote as you do, there would be no Protestants." We verily believe that if Protestants really perceived the church in her true character, not as represented by ignorant, narrow-minded, and unworthy Catholics, they would readily abandon their Protestantism, and return to her as their spiritual mother. The greatest obstacle in our judgment to the conversion of the world to Catholicity, is not the bad disposition of those outside of our communion, but the ignorance and narrow-mindedness, above all, in modern times, the meticulousness of a large portion of Catholics themselves. We need a reform in the church, not *out of* the church, nor *of* the church, but *in* the church, so that the church in her idea, and in her children, may be presented as truly catholic, before we can make much progress in the work of converting those outside.

A reform *in* the church, and *by* the church, was needed in the sixteenth century, and was effected by the Council of Trent. A reform, not of the same sort indeed, but a reform more especially touching the relations between religion and

civilization, understanding by *civilization* all that can be included under the terms of human organization and human culture is needed by the church, and in the church now. For such a reform, on and by Catholic principles, we confess, we look and labor as the means of bringing back the world to Catholic unity, and advancing the cause both of religion and civilization, the church and society. Here is in the main, no doubt, the cause of the hostility to us of a portion of the Catholic, and the friendship of the non-Catholic press, of the fears we excite in Catholics, and the hopes we excite in non-Catholics. In our judgment the fears and the hopes are alike fallacious. Brought up in Protestantism, and acquainted with most of its forms, before coming into the Catholic Church, we know all it has to offer, and it has and can have for us no seductions. Having freely, and with our eyes open, chosen Catholicity, and devoted eighteen of the best years of our life to its study, not wholly forgetting its practice, we can hardly be supposed to be ignorant of its principles, or of the length we can go without falling into heterodoxy. Err we may, inaccurate in our expression we sometimes may be, but we hope we know enough not to follow our errors so far as to get out of the orthodox communion, and have humility enough—though, we confess, we have no humility to boast of—to correct our errors when we see them, and to recoil from the abyss when we behold it yawning before us. The fears of our Catholic brethren are idle, for, if in a life now not short, we have given proof of any thing, it is that of not being obstinate in error, or in adhering to our own opinions. We are, we would fain hope, too old, and have devoted too much time, not wholly without success, to the study of philosophy, to suffer our passions, which, though quick, were never strong, to blind our judgment, or precipitate us into heresy, and we are, and always shall be too unpopular to precipitate others there. There is no danger of our ceasing to be unpopular as long as we assert our honest independence, and there remain so-called Catholic newspapers in the country.

Equally unfounded are the hopes of non-Catholics. We renew no quarrel with them. A quarrel with them could serve no good purpose to them or to us, and we have got out of the mood of it. But, because we recognize their good dispositions and worth, and acknowledge they have much truth and valuable truth, they must not conclude that we are disposed to pass over to their side. They hold much truth, and could not live

a moment without it, but they do not hold the truth which they have in its unity and Catholicity, as we find it held in the church. We may find fault with much that obtains amongst Catholics; we may think very little of the philosophy taught in our schools, and still less of the literary ability, the Catholic spirit, and the foreign aspect and policy of our Catholic journals, even though professing to be the "Official Organs" of the bishops; but both Catholics and non-Catholics will always find us, when it comes to the test, stanch and uncompromising Catholics, liberal indeed, not in the sense of giving away half or all of our faith, but in the sense of Catholic truth and Catholic love, neither of which is narrow or exclusive.

The aims we have avowed, and which have excited fear on the one hand, and hopes on the other, are, we maintain, really and truly Catholic. The Catholic Church is not an arbitrary creation, but has her reason and her law in the reason and constitution of things. She is not a despotism, she is not subject to mere will and caprice, nor does she govern by mere will or caprice. She is herself under law, and in her action acts by law, and a law which has its origin and ground in the eternal reason and will of God. The pope is not above law, but is as much bound by law as the humblest member of the church, and though, as the supreme governing power, he may enact both with and without the council canons of administration, he cannot create any new faith, or make any thing a moral duty not made so by the law of God. The bishops have each in his diocese no arbitrary power. The bishop does not make the law; he is appointed to administer in his diocese, the law of God already known and promulgated. If either the pope or the bishop assumes arbitrary power, or to be as Cæsar claims to be, the living law, he assumes to be what he is not, and usurps a power to which he has no right, and offends against the very law he is divinely appointed to administer. The pope is a pastor, not a dominator; the bishops are pastors, not dominators; the servants, not the lords of God's people. "The son of man came to serve, not to be served." "Let him that would be greatest amongst you be your servant." Hence the pope, the chief pastor calls himself "the servant of servants," *servus servorum*.

The church defines, but does not make the faith. The faith is given her by divine revelation, and her office as teacher is to keep intact the *depositum*; to bear witness to it, and to guard it against error. Even in defining the faith, the definition is and must be the work, not of any one individual member or min-

ister of the church, but of the whole church. The pope is infallible speaking *ex cathedra*, but the pope *loquens ex cathedra* is the pope with his auditory, and his auditory is the whole church. The single bishop has no authority to define an article or dogma of faith. He can teach nothing as faith which the church does not teach, and in censuring our doctrine, he can no more censure it on his own authority, than we can his doctrine. His assertion never suffices to convict us of error or heterodoxy; and he must sustain it by the authoritative declarations of the church, just as we should be obliged to sustain ours. If he requires us to believe any thing the church does not teach, we are not bound to believe it. Hence, speaking of objections to our views from any other quarter than the Holy See we recognize our obligation to listen to them respectfully, and to weigh them carefully; but we acknowledge no obligation to yield to them, even if urged by a bishop, unless the reason he assigns and the authorities he cites prove that he is right and we wrong. The reason we expressed, even if extended to bishops, and to our own bishop, although, as a matter of fact, we had, in expressing it, no reference to the bishops, would be strictly correct. No single bishop can define the faith, or condemn an opinion as heretical, on his own authority; nor can all the bishops of a province, nor all the bishops of a nation, assembled in plenary council, nor all the bishops of the world, without the pope, the successor of Peter. There are many simple presbyters, who are entitled to far more weight in theological questions than the bishops; for it by no means follows that the bishop is a great theologian or the best theologian in his diocese. Even the theological judgment of a layman is entitled to more weight than that of a priest or bishop, if he be a man more richly endowed by nature, and has superior theological learning and science. The grace of orders confers the power of performing sacerdotal functions, which the layman cannot perform, but it is no part of Catholic faith or doctrine, that it increases the quantity or quality of a man's brain, or the sum of his science and learning. Some bishops are great theologians, some can hardly be called theologians at all. The same may be said of some priests.

We speak thus far of doctrine. The bishop has authority to govern his diocese, but according to law, and not by his own arbitrary will. This authority he receives from God through the Holy See; but it is restricted by the constitution and canons of the church. He is not in his own diocese even,

a despot; he is not even here to be obeyed as a general of Jesuits but only as the shepherd of the flock, feeding and governing them as an officer of the law. If he teaches heresy, nobody is obliged to accept his teaching, but every one who knows it to be heresy, is bound to reject it. Even the laity may cry out against him, if they know he is teaching heresy, as the laity of Constantinople cried out against Nestorius, when he denied the Incarnation, and the whole palingenesiac order, by denying that Mary was the mother of God, *Deipara*. In all matters of discipline, within the scope of his jurisdiction, he is to be obeyed and respected as the court in the first instance. But there lies an appeal from his decision and from his court, if we are rightly informed, according to the present discipline of the church, before as well as after his judgment is pronounced, to the supreme court at Rome. The bishop has, no doubt, some discretionary powers. He may, by dispensation, regulate the use of flesh-meat during the Lenten fast, and his publication binds every good Catholic in his diocese, whether he carries the dispensation to the full extent of his dispensing power or not. He can, no doubt, if he judges proper, assigning his reasons therefore, prohibit or interdict the circulation, among the faithful in his diocese, of any periodical or newspaper, and good Catholics would be bound to refrain from taking it until the interdict was removed, providing he does it on the ground of danger to Catholic faith and morals,—not for political, or simply secular reasons, for his authority is spiritual, not temporal. He is a spiritual pastor, not, in this country, a temporal lord. In the exercise of his spiritual jurisdiction, our own bishop may interdict us as editor and publisher of this *Review*, but only so far as relates to the discussion of questions which he judges dangerous to faith and morals. He could not oblige us to suspend its publication, because we are a layman, and its publication is our lawful business. He could only interdict the publication in its pages of the matters which he judges dangerous to the spiritual welfare of his flock, and we should be obliged to obey him so far, till he himself should raise the interdict, or we, by an appeal to the supreme court, should succeed in getting it raised. This is essential to order, and must be conceded, or the bishop could not discharge his duty to the flock committed to his pastoral care. But even he must be governed by the law of the church, and has no right to interdict us from slight and insufficient reasons, from mere will, caprice, or personal dislike. He

must do it on legal grounds, for legal reasons, or otherwise his interdict is of no force and does not bind us.

The bishop may excommunicate us, and so, *a fortiori*, may the supreme pontiff. That would be bad; but the great horror manifested by non-Catholics at the exercise of the terrible power of excommunication, proceeds from their mistaking the real character and effect of excommunication. Excommunication is a severe chastisement, the severest the church can resort to, but it is not a curse, intended to consign its subjects to hell. "Curse not," applies to ecclesiastics as much as to laymen. Excommunication is not a curse, nor is it intended to cut the excommunicated off from communion with God, and doom them to eternal perdition. If such were its design, nothing could excuse it. Its real meaning is separation from the *external* communion of the faithful, "delivering the communicated over to the buffetings of Satan *for the destruction of the flesh.*" If the person excommunicated belongs to the internal communion, or the soul of the church, the excommunication is, no doubt, an act of injustice, but does not sever him from that communion, for from that nothing but his own voluntary act can ever sever him. Nothing but my own deliberate act can separate me from the love of God. It simply cuts him off from the external communion of the faithful, and debars him, till absolved, from approaching the sacraments, a great damage certainly, but not absolutely irreparable. It was a much severer chastisement formerly than it is now, for it formerly shut out the excommunicated from all social intercourse, and was tantamount to the prohibition of fire and water by the old Roman republic. Now it only debars from the sacraments. It is still a severe chastisement, but it was and is intended only as a parental chastisement, for the benefit of the chastised. In itself, however, it is simply separation, and the anathema, in principle, is no more than some sects express by "withdrawing fellowship." The notion that many people have that the priest, if offended, can curse the offender, and that God will ratify the curse, or consign the cursed to hell, is a notion that finds no countenance in Catholic theology or Catholic discipline. The notion belongs to paganism, not to Christianity. The church devotes no one to the infernal gods, for she remembers the Son of man came to save souls, not to destroy them; and all her chastisements, from the slightest to the severest, are parental, and amendatory in their design, although, owing to the offend-

er's free will and strong passions, they may sometimes fail of their effect.

Another notion is entertained by non-Catholics, that in our church the laity count for nothing. But the church, as the body of Christ, is the congregation of the faithful, and includes in one indissoluble whole, both clergy and laity. In the church our Lord has appointed some to be apostles, some to be bishops, and some to be presbyters, for the sacerdoty and prelacy inherent in Christ himself, in his twofold character of priest and king, are essential, and must be expressed in the church. The clergy are not the church, but are functionaries in the church. The church is not for them, but they are for the church; and they, if such there are, who suppose the clergy are the whole church, by no means understand the nature and constitution of the Catholic Church, and fall into as fatal an error as they do who make the king, or the functionaries of the civil government, the state. The clergy have an official character and position, and functions which no layman is capable of performing. The layman can perform no sacerdotal functions, but even laymen can perform prelatial functions. Cardinal Antonelli is a prelate, and has a powerful voice in the ecclesiastical government of the Catholic world, and yet, if we are rightly informed, he is not even a simple priest. Nevertheless, he receives his authority from the pope, who is a priest, and possesses the sacerdoty in its plenitude. The laity have, and, as simple laymen, can have no sacerdotal or apostolical authority, and are usurpers when they assume to themselves sacerdotal or prelatial functions. The clergy, the hierarchy, including the several orders of the priesthood, have their rights and duties defined, and no Catholic can lawfully usurp their rights, or place any impediment in the way of the discharge of their duties. But beyond this, in their simple character as men and Christians, all Catholics are equal. The pope, as a Catholic, is bound by the same law that binds me, is under the same obligation to confess his sins to a priest, and has the same need of ghostly absolution.

The laity had originally a voice in selecting their pastors, and for a long time the pope himself was chosen by the clergy and people of the city of Rome; and in most, if not in all, Catholic nations the laity as represented by the civil government, by the king or emperor, have even yet the right virtually of nominating bishops, though their confirmation is reserved, as it always was, to the Holy See. This power of

nominating, or presenting candidates for vacant sees, now exercised by sovereigns, was originally exercised by the faithful people themselves; but whether exercised by the temporal sovereign or by the people, it is a power exercised by the laity, and being exercised by the laity, shows that in the eyes of the church the laity do not count for nothing. The influence of the laity has always been great, and when supported by the civil government, has sometimes proved preponderant, to the great detriment of religion and civilization. The part assigned the people, however, varies with time and place, according to the position held by them in the social and civil order. It was far more important before the barbarian conquest of the Roman empire, than it was for many centuries after, owing to the ignorance and barbarism into which that conquest threw the greater part of the world; and it will always depend very much on the degree of their progress in civilization, intelligence, moral culture, and civil importance.

The part of the laity among savages and barbarians newly converted will always be comparatively insignificant. Thus the Jesuits in the reductions of Paraguay managed not only the spiritual matter of their neophytes, but all their temporal matters, even to their buying and selling, and for this purpose established, under a Jesuit father, an agency in Europe. The good father failing in his business operations, it is well known, brought no little reproach on the society itself. In barbarous times and countries, the clergy perform nearly all the civil functions of society because they are the only educated and capable class, at least the best educated and the most capable class. In those times and countries the clergy are apparently every thing and the laity nothing. In Ireland, for the last three centuries, we have seen the clergy every thing and the laity nothing, at least apparently, because confiscation and penal laws had deprived the Catholic people of wealth and education, and reduced them to poverty and ignorance,—a poverty and ignorance honorable to them indeed, because voluntarily incurred by adhesion to and defence of their old Catholic faith, nevertheless a poverty and ignorance which must be recognized as a fact. Their natural temporal chiefs either apostatized or were stripped of their estates by fines and confiscations, and reduced to the ranks of the peasantry; the clergy were the only capable class remaining, and the clergyman was for the poor but faithful people, not only the parish priest, but the chieftain of the clan. Hence the little appar-

ent importance of the laity in the Irish church, and the extraordinary power wielded by their clergy over them. It was natural, inevitable, and salutary at the time, but cannot survive, and it is not desirable it should survive, the growth of the intelligence and civil importance of the Irish laity.

We may as well say here as anywhere, that the chief source of the distrust of us in Catholic ranks, is found in the fact that we do not believe that it is necessary to transfer to this free and educated country, usages which have outlived their time and their reason. We have, as an American, never been trained to the state of things these usages presuppose, and we believe that whatever temporary benefit they may have in regard to those migrating hither from countries where that state of things has obtained, they can here be only an impediment to conversions, and tend to confirm the prejudices against our church already well-nigh invincible in the minds of our non-Catholic countrymen. We know our countrymen well. They yield to no people on earth in their reverence for the clerical character. Hardly will a priest, travelling in any part of the country, have reason to complain of insult, and we know from our experience that a man travelling as a minister will always, in any part of the United States, be treated with special respect on account of his supposed sacred calling. Even since we have ceased to be a minister, we have received much consideration and many attentions, solely in consequence of our once having been one. It is only Catholics, for whom we were always, as we are, only a layman, who pay us no consideration on that account. No people more cheerfully than the American, will render an enlightened and filial obedience to the clergy, but they will obey them only so far as in obeying them they are obeying the law. They will never regard the priest, the bishop, or the pope as the living law. They are not, and will not be, cæsarists in religion any more than in politics, and do and will, in regard to the clergy, as they do in regard to their civil rulers, distinguish between the man and his office. The man they will reverence and esteem according to his personal intelligence and worth, but in his official character they will yield him cheerfully what is due to his office. To insist on more will be, with individual exceptions, to get less. Blind obedience, or obedience to persons in their unofficial character, is not in their nature, nor compatible with their views of moral right and moral duty.

We are not aware that our bishops and clergy exact any

thing more than this, or that this is not precisely the sort of obedience that best pleases them. But, accustomed to a different sort of obedience from a portion of the faithful, some of them may, no doubt, fear that the Catholic who says that he will yield only this obedience, has in reality the seeds of disorder and rebellion in his heart. And this is the fear entertained of us. It is not that we are disobedient, it is not that we say any thing which as a Catholic we are not free to say, but they fear that the disposition which leads us to say some things we do say, may carry us further, and that even our saying them may have a bad effect on others who have been trained differently. With regard to the first, the fear is idle, for we speak from a clear, well-defined, and fixed principle, not from passion or prejudice, and if the principle is sound, we are not likely to go further than it legitimately carries us. With regard to the second, we will not pretend that there is no reason for it; but no transition from one state of things to another can ever be effected without more or less injury to some one. If we are to wait before correcting a usage that has outlived its time, till it can be corrected without disturbing any one, we can never correct it at all. A usage just, inevitable, useful in its origin, when it has outlived its time, because hurtful, and the more hurtful, the longer it is continued. The chief hostility to the Catholic church today grows out of the fact that her children insist on perpetuating usages which have no longer any reason, and are repugnant to the real, not the false, intelligence of the age. These usages will never be removed unless somebody calls attention to them, and demands their correction. Whoever does it will be sure to stir up a hornet's nest about his ears, and be regarded by many as a dangerous man, and even be dangerous to some, on the principle on which our Lord said, though his mission was one of peace to men of good will, "Think not I am come to send peace on earth, but a sword;" or as the Apostle said, "To some we are the odor of death unto death, but to others, the odor of life unto life."

Let us illustrate our meaning. Last October, there appeared in the *Metropolitan Record*, an article criticising in rather flippant terms several articles in our *Review*, and bringing out certain views in regard to slavery and the war, assumed to be in opposition to views we had ourselves set forth. The article was supposed, and we believe justly, to have been written, dictated, or inspired by the archbishop himself. We replied

to it, as we judged proper, though in terms courteous and respectful to the proposed writer, differing from him in some respects, and defending him where we could against charges that had been preferred in the public press against his doctrine. For doing this, we were accused in no gentle terms by a Catholic journal in this city, of differing from *authority*. It took the article in the *Record* as authoritative, one that it was not lawful to criticise. Why was it considered to be the voice of authority? Simply because it was believed to be written by an archbishop. Assuming it to be authority, then the aforesaid journal was able to turn all the reverence innate in the Catholic heart for authority against us, and to prevent all examination of our reasons, and to crush us, not by argument, but by the weight of authority, which it would be uncatholic to resist. Now it is this we complain of. The archbishop, if he wrote the article, would be the last man to approve of such an uncatholic course. In the first place, the article, if written by the archbishop, was not written in his official character, and we find it, reported from the Paris journals which criticised it with some severity, that he declares not that he did not write it, but that he does not hold himself responsible for it.

The simple fact is, that the article, if written, dictated, or inspired by the archbishop, was done so in his capacity of journalist, not in his capacity of archbishop of New York, and had just as much authority aside from its intrinsic merits, as if it had been written by the ostensible editor of the *Record* himself, and no more. But, even if it had been signed by the archbishop with his own name, it could not have been an authoritative document, nor even a privileged document, for its subject matter was not privileged, or one in regard to which an archbishop has any more authority than a layman. On every point touched upon, we had, as a Catholic layman, the same right to criticise him that he had to criticise us; and to bring in the weight of his episcopal character to give force to his criticisms, would be simply taking an under advantage of us. It is only the false notion with regard to the province of authority, as distinguished from intrinsic reason and argument, entertained by a portion of the Catholic public, that gave him this advantage, and it is this false notion that we say should, for the interests of religion and civilization, be corrected.

The main argument in our article and the article in the *Record* touched on matters in regard to which the archbishop

receives no authority by virtue of his archiepiscopal office. They were matters which we can discuss only as a citizen and a publicist, and as a citizen and a publicist he stands only on an equality with ourselves, and has no advantage over us, save in his superior knowledge and ability. What he writes, like what we wrote should be judged solely on its merits. Let the archbishop publish in due form an episcopal *mandement* with his name, and properly certified, and we will recognize it as authoritative, as far as an archbishop by the law of the church has authority. But when he writes anonymously, even if we know that it is he that is writing, we are under no obligation to treat what he writes as authority, and hold ourselves as free to criticise it, to point out its misstatements or its sophistries, in case it contains them, as though it were written by an ordinary layman, merely observing the *bienséances*, which by the way, should in no case be neglected. If an archbishop descends to write anonymously for a newspaper, and misrepresent me, shall I not have the right to tell him so, and correct his misrepresentation? If he uses wit against me, may I not, if I happen to have it, use wit against him? In a matter not privileged, in a matter where I have as much right to my judgment as he has to his, may I not do my best to refute him if I think him wrong?

Now, it is not, as a general thing, the clergy, especially the bishops, who are wrong in this question of authority. No doubt they are human, and may not always be quick to rebuke those who assume more power for them than their office gives them; but the error is on the side of the laity, who understand neither their rights nor their duties, who pretend that every thing said by a bishop or priest is authority which must not on any account be gainsaid. We have heard of a bishop and a very conscientious and devout bishop he was too, who sang in a private parlor "Jim Crow" and "Jim along Josey." Must these two negro songs be regarded, therefore, as approved by authority, and reckoned henceforth among the hymns of the church? Even the very questions is of doubtful propriety. But this is not the worst of it. These people who are so ready to allege authority against you when they fancy it makes for them, or chimes in with their convictions, passions, or prejudices, will be the first and loudest to resist it, or at least, to clamor against it, when it runs athwart their own favorite notions, schemes, or wishes. We remember well when we had to defend the legitimate authority of the bishops and clergy against

the very journals that now seek to adduce that authority against us. Let our bishops and priests attempt to persuade our Irish Catholics to distrust the Democratic party, notwithstanding we owe to it the terrible rebellion still threatening the life of the nation, to persuade them to support the Republican party, and to lay aside their hatred either of Old England or New England, and you will find their organs saying, as they did in 1848. "We respect the clergy as long as they keep within their own sphere, and will obey them; but when they step out of it, we shall treat them as we treat other men." The obedience of men yielded on a false or mistaken principle can never be counted on. They may flatter you, but you must court and flatter them in turn, or in the time of need they will desert you. When we found authority assailed we defended it, and went to the extreme limits in asserting its rights; when we find authority used to crush out legitimate liberty, we in turn defend liberty, and if necessary will go to the extreme limits in its defence; for we love both and will give up neither. In the one case as in the other we are alike Catholic, for we place obedience on the true Catholic principle, a principle which harmonizes authority and liberty,—obedience to law, not to persons, to reason, not to mere arbitrary will or caprice. It is as much our duty to resist the usurpation of power by persons in authority, for that encroaches on the legitimate rights of authority, as it is to defend authority against encroachments in the name of liberty.

In a highly civilized state of society, where intelligence is generally diffused among the people, the laity necessarily and rightfully rise in importance, and do themselves many things which in a less advanced civilization, and where intelligence is only sparingly diffused among the people, are necessarily done by the clergy. Catholicity embraces both religion and civilization, and civilization is, where they are capable, the province of the laity. The evolution and application of the great catholic principles of civilization, under the spiritual directions of the sacerdocy, is the proper work of laymen, as follows logically from the acknowledged separation of the two powers, and the distinction of church and state. Here is the sphere of the laity and in this sphere they owe to the clergy only that general subordination in which the temporal is always placed to the spiritual. Here they work, or should work, for the same end as the clergy, for civilization does not stand opposed to heaven, but is related to it as means to end.

How often must we repeat that the way to heaven lies through the earth, and that civilization is initial religion, or initial Christianity, as cosmos is initial palingenesia? The mistake into which non-Catholics fall as to the true Catholic doctrine on this subject arises from supposing that the practice of barbarous and ignorant ages, in which the people are nobody as to intelligence or political position, is necessarily the practice approved by the church in civilized ages and nations. The principles of the church are as immutable as the God whose word they are, and are the same in all times and in all places, but the discipline of the church is variable according to the character and wants of different ages and nations. Many things were necessary and just in the middle ages that would be wholly out of time and out of place now. Then almost every bishop was a temporal baron, or a temporal prince, and joined a certain secular jurisdiction to his spiritual jurisdiction. Such an arrangement, however consonant to the spirit of the times, and however necessary and useful it was then, would now be manifestly absurd, especially in a republican country like ours, where no civil princes or barons are allowed. Other changes have been effected, and many others may be effected as social changes go on, and go on they will and must while the world lasts. In a country like ours, where—bating the negro slaves at the South—every man is a freeman, and the civil and political equality of all men is recognized as the basis of our civilization, and where means are adopted or in progress to give every child born into the republic a good education, the middle ages, based on inequality and privilege, must in time wholly disappear, and the church find herself so to speak, in a new world. To be at home in that new world she must divest herself of all mediæval accidents, and accept the *régime* of equality and republicanism.

In this new state of things the laity will and must acquire new importance, because they will have new capabilities, and as the people, they must take the place of kings, princes, and nobles in other times and other nations. With the advance of civilization and diffusion of education the clergy cease to be the only educated class, or to possess any marked superiority over the laity, save in their sacerdotal character and functions. Their superiority will become less and less personal, and more and more exclusively official. They will always be officially superior, because the spiritual is in its own essence superior to the secular, and its representatives must always in the very

nature of the case, be superior to the representatives of the secular order. The laity in other respects will attain to equality, and have their equality recognized. Perhaps they will at times forget their proper sphere, and attempt to subordinate the spiritual. That, no doubt, is a danger to be guarded against. Still we apprehend that it will be found necessary to leave to laymen all that may be done by men not in orders. There will be nothing uncatholic in this elevation of the laity, but, as we view it, a real advance in religious and social interests. Such a state of things would seem to us to be a fuller, a more perfect realization of the Catholic idea, than has ever yet been realized. We look for the scene of this realization in our country, when the Catholic faith and the American order of civilization have been united, and each has the aid of the other.

That some Catholics, cleric as well as laic, do not see or believe this, and regard every change from what their fathers loved, and what they themselves have been accustomed to from their youth up, as a departure from perfection, and to be deprecated, we do not deny, and that this fact operates to confirm non-Catholics in their persuasion that our church is wedded to a past order of things, and can neither accommodate herself to such new order of things nor give it her blessing, we are far from calling in question; but this does not disturb our conviction, or dampen our hopes. Men are prone to regard the old times as better than the present, especially after, like us, they have passed the meridian of life. The old man who brought us up constantly repeated in our ears the proverb, "Each generation grows wiser and wickeder than its predecessor." We understand well the feeling that resists all change, and up to a certain point we respect it. We by no means pretend that all change is progress. But the objection against Catholics of clinging to the usage of their fathers, of not discerning the signs of the times, foreseeing the storm and providing against it, lies not specially against them. You find in every sect the same tendency, and in the oriental sects the tendency far stronger than in modern Protestant sects, and in modern Protestant sects far stronger than among Catholics. Who does not know that in every sect, even among Unitarians, there is a conservative party which acts as a drag on the zeal of the younger and more ardent members? Go where you will, you will find a reform party and a conservative party, often at open war, for the two parties have their root in Catholic truth.

Catholic truth, however, rightly understood, reconciles them by making the reform not a new creation, but an evolution of the past, the future the development of germs already in the past, so that a man may be at one and the same time a reformer and a conservative. The conservative Catholics, aside from opposition to us on sentimental grounds, distrust us and our friends, because they think that we are disposed to cut loose from the past, and break the continuity of Catholic life. But in time they will understand us better. They will see that what we seek has its root in the past, and is only its necessary evolution. They will see that we are seeking only to fulfil the past, not to cut ourselves loose from it, to carry out according to the demands of time and place, in submission to law and order, the thought, the idea, the intent of those who preceded us, and will gradually cease their opposition, become our friends, and cheerfully and effectually coöperate with us.

Catholics are human, and fall like other men into errors common to the race. The mass of mankind see not why things need to change, why things may not remain as they are, be to-day what they were yesterday, and to-morrow what they are to-day. They consider the men who labor to introduce changes in the political and social order, in general or particular civilization, as disturbers of the peace, disorderly persons, moved by an evil spirit, and deserving to be repressed by the strong hand of authority. They understand not that all life is in evolution, and the evolution of the germ in the seed is the destruction of the body sown, and the life in the evolution passes from the old seed to the new plant. The life of individuals and of nations is the continuous evolution of the divine and infinite idea, of which the cosmos is the expression in what we call the natural order, and the church in what we call the palingenetic order, and the cessation of this evolution is simply death. Man, as Gioberti has well said, is crescent and progressive to the Infinite, in which alone he finds, or can find his complement, his fulfilment, his rest. We can rest, find repose, only when we arrive at home, and our home is in the Infinite. Hence in this life we are on the way, we are travellers, *viatores*, seeking our true country, *patria*, *Vaterland*, which is heaven. Hence, all the individuals and nations that assume that the evolution or progress is or may be complete in this world, that the end is here below, and count themselves to have attained to this end, cease to live. Where there is no future there is no progress, and where there is no progress there

is no life. All history proves it. All nations in proportion as they cease to evolve the idea and assimilate it, stagnate and die. Witness India, China, Japan, Turkey, and all the barbarous and savage tribes and hordes of all ages. The principle is insisted on by all the masters of spiritual life, who tell us that not to advance in our interior Christian life is to fall back, in other words, to die.

This great law of life is obeyed by Catholics far more generally than it is understood, for they have, when true to the ideal of the church, the principle of life dwelling and operating in them, and they are carried forward, so to speak, *ex opere operato*. But not all Catholics discern the signs of the times, and recognize the successive moments of the evolution, each when it comes. The Jewish commonwealth was organized on the promise of a Messiah to come, and the Jewish people believed in and hoped for his coming, but when he came they failed to discern him. "He came to his own, and his own received him not." It is just so in every age of the church. All Catholics believe in progress, and in reality hope for it; but when it comes they see "no form or comeliness" in it that they should desire it, turn away from it, as the carnal Jews neglected the promised Messiah when he came, and crucified him between two thieves. There are always carnal Jews in the church, always Scribes and Pharisees, who can discern the sky, but not the signs of the times. This, no doubt, is a damage, but we must hear them, do as they say but not as they do. The idea of the church is divine and catholic; and by virtue of the divinity and catholicity of the Word she is a living church, and though often impeded in her work by the ignorance, obstinacy, or selfishness of individuals, she never ceases her labor, and subdues not only one generation after another of barbarians, but, what is more difficult still, one generation after another of Scribes and Pharisees; and it is only Catholic nations, and those nearest to them and living to a greater or less extent in Catholic truth and Catholic principles, that are even in the secular order living and progressive nations.

What leads some Catholics and most non-Catholics into error on this subject, leading the former to oppose progress in civilization, and the latter to oppose the church, is a mistaken notion of the Catholic doctrine of infallibility. The church certainly has infallible science and infallible speech, but her infallible science pertains not to Catholics as individuals

whether they be cleric or laic. Infallibility is the privilege of no individual, not even of the pope. It is a privilege of the whole church, not of any particular part of the church, and the church is infallible only in her idea, in the Word whose life is her life, only in regard to the law, or principles. Her judgments in defining principles or in declaring the law are infallible, but in practical matters, in matters in which her judgments depend on human wisdom and human testimony, her judgments are venerable, and in the order of discipline obligatory, but not infallible. She judges from the facts before her, but she cannot say that the facts before her are always the facts, and all the facts, in the case. Some Catholics would claim infallible authority for every bishop and priest, and that, too, in every thing, even in matters of business, such as buying, selling, and swapping horses and to feel that they have the right to denounce you as resisting authority, in case you prefer to follow in such matters your own judgment. No bishop or priest claims such authority, or countenances such a mischievous exaggeration,—an exaggeration which, however useful it may seem for the moment, or for a special purpose, dangerous, and in the long run more or less hurtful, and not the least injury it does is the necessity it imposes on the sincere Catholic of contradicting it. The correction of an exaggeration often appears like denying the truth exaggerated, as the correction of superstition, which is an exaggeration, often weakens the hold of true religion. If the infallible authority of the church had not been exaggerated, and made to cover particulars which must vary with time and place, no prejudice would ever have been excited against it, and the church would never have been opposed by non-Catholics on the ground of her being a despotism, hostile to progress, and the grave of free and manly thought. None of the earlier sects objected to her on any such grounds. They all objected on very different grounds, on the ground of her not being sufficiently conservative, and suffering an unwarrantable evolution to proceed in the explication and application of the principles contained in the creed. So objected the Arians, the Nestorians, and at a later period, the Greeks. The reformers in the sixteenth century objected to her on the ground that she favored liberty at the expense of royal and imperial authority, that she had departed from the faith, created new dogmas, new rites, and new canons, &c.—all objections to her on the ground of not being sufficiently conserv-

ative and stationary. It is only recently, only since the Catholic world has been to a great extent recast in the mould of a society whose constitution was copied from the absolute monarchy of Spain, that the principal objections the Catholic has now to meet have been seriously and extensively urged.

There is nothing that strikes the student of ecclesiastical history more forcibly, than the contrast between the liberty of thought and expression, practically asserted by Catholics in the early and middle ages of the church, and that which has been allowed for the last two centuries. In these latter centuries orthodoxy has grown meticulous and the repression of error is far more studied than the evolution and application of truth. The political absolutism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seems to have passed into ecclesiastical discipline. The consequence is that the church during these centuries has hardly made any progress except in centralization, and in the transfer of obedience from obedience to law, to submission to persons. The mission of genius in the church has been rejected, or discouraged, and has been carried on, as far as carried on it has been, outside of the church, without the conservative and sanctifying influence it would have had in the church. Here is the reason of the new kind of objections that are brought against our religion. But for this change in discipline which may or may not have been wise and necessary, we should never have heard of these objections.

We have spoken of the church according to the idea she is realizing in her life, her essential constitution, her universal law, and her discipline where she is in her normal state. In this country she is at present in an abnormal state. Our country is included in the number of missionary countries, not in the number of those denominated Catholic nations. Our correspondence is with the Propaganda, not with the cardinal secretary of state. The canon law has not been generally introduced amongst us, and the power of the bishops is not restricted by its provisions. Each bishop is well-nigh absolute in his own diocese, and the freedom of the second order of the clergy has no security but in the will and conscience of the bishop. Their position, legally considered, is one of absolute dependence, and that dependence, instead of being mitigated, would seem to be, if possible, rendered more absolute by the canons and decrees of our own councils. The bishop can order a priest to any post he pleases, remove him when he pleases, and withdraw his faculties when he chooses, without being

responsible to any one but God, for he can do it without being obliged to assign any reason therefor, or convicted of violating any canon recognized as in force. A slight step in protection of the second order, we confess, has been taken in some provinces, but it is only a slight one, and we believe is by no means recognized in all our provinces. We are far from saying or from insinuating that any bishop has ever abused his power, or ever will abuse it, but as long as he has despotic power, its influence will affect more or less unfavorably those subject to it, and we believe the spirit and tone of our clergy would be much elevated, their zeal increased, and their duties more cheerfully and energetically performed, if they had the protection they have in other countries where the canon law is in force. That the church approves the present order of things, we know is not true, because the very existence of canon law proves the contrary, and she evidently submits to it only as a present necessity, and as a provisional and temporary state of things. Of the necessity and advantage of it in the present state of things, we are not competent judges, and if we refer to the fact, it is solely to show our non-Catholic friends, that they have no right to conclude from it any thing against our assertion that the government of the church is a government of law, not a government of persons, or of arbitrary will.

The church here is in an abnormal state in another respect. In all countries where the church is established, if we except Judea, she has been introduced by foreign missionaries, and necessarily so. But in our country the church has not been introduced by foreign missionaries converting the natives. As yet there have been properly no missionaries sent hither for the conversion of the American people, and the mission here has been to a Catholic population as foreign as the missionaries themselves. A small band of Catholics settled one of the original colonies, but only the smaller part of their descendants have remained Catholic, and their missions were not missions for the conversion of the country. Aside from these, and the remnants of some French and Spanish colonists subsequently incorporated into the body of the American people, the Catholic population is composed of a comparatively recent migration hither of Catholics from old Catholic countries, together with their children born since their arrival. The missions have not been sent to a non-Catholic people, but to a population already Catholic. This presents an almost entirely dif-

ferent state of things from what has ever been in any other country. The Catholicity in this non-Catholic country is not the effect of conversion, but of the migration hither of a Catholic population, consisting of both clergy and laity. Our bishops and priests are bishops and priests to an old Catholic people, not to a non-Catholic, or newly converted people.

The consequence of this is that the church has here a foreign aspect, and has no root in the life of the nation. The church brings here foreign manners, tastes, habits, a foreign civilization, and a foreign faith and worship, with foreign believers and worshippers, and whatever we may say, or whatever may be the case hereafter, the Catholic people in the country are as distinct from the American people, in all except their political and social rights, as the people of France, Italy, Spain, England, Germany, or Ireland. And yet it is idle to pretend that both are one people, living one common national life. It is no such thing. When the priest refers his people to their ancestors, he refers not to our American ancestors, but to an ancestry of some foreign nationality, and Catholics themselves distinguished non-Catholics as *Americans*, as in Ireland they call themselves *Irish*, and Protestant, *Sassenagh*, or Saxons. They intrinsically feel that they are not Americans in the sense non-Catholics are. The fact, disguise it as we will, is that, though for the most part American citizens, Catholics in this country, speaking in general terms, are a foreign people, think, feel, speak, act as a foreign population. An old American, like ourselves, feels, in the first and last moment of his intercourse with them, that, though he and they are of the same faith and worship, he belongs to a different order of civilization from theirs, has ideas on most subjects different from theirs,—in a word, that they are not his countrymen.

We do not present this as their fault or as ours. It is nobody's fault, but it is nevertheless, a fact and a fact not without important consequences, and which cannot be regarded as having no influence on the conversion of the country, and none on the American civilization itself. In the first place, it enlists against the church, in addition to the prejudices of non-Catholics against Catholicity, all the prejudices of natives against foreigners. Especially is this the case when it is seen that the majority of those who enter as converts the church, enter and also become naturalized in the foreign colony, and virtually forsake their own countrymen, without going out of their own country. In the second place, the bishops and cler-

gy being educated and consecrated to the service of a people already Catholic, are not missionaries to our non-Catholic population, and do not feel themselves called upon to labor especially for the conversion of the American people and do little or nothing to that end. We often boast of the progress of our religion in this country, but we deceive ourselves. As yet the church has made little or no progress in converting the American people, and what we call her progress is only the augmentation of the foreign colony. Catholic missions to the American people have not yet been opened. The missions in the country are to the foreign colony of Catholics settled here. No doubt a few converts are made, but they number, all told, we should judge, not a tithe of the perversions of Catholics that take place. Besides, as we have just intimated, the majority of these converts join the foreign colony, become far more assimilated to the foreign colony, than Catholic foreigners settled here do to the American people proper. So that, in reality, our Catholic progress consists not in catholicizing, but in foreignizing the country.

Now, here is the source of much difficulty. The American who becomes a Catholic, but cannot consent to denationalize himself in all respects save his political and civil rights, and who is determined to live, think, feel, and act as an American, do his share of the work in developing and advancing American civilization, finds himself in a most awkward predicament. He is separated by the civilization which he defends from his Catholic brethren, and by his religion, regarded as foreign, from his non-Catholic countrymen. Believing the civilization of the foreign colony inferior to the American, he is obliged in conscience to resist its extension, and believing his own countrymen heterodox, he is obliged to make war on their heterodoxy. This is the position in which we find ourselves placed, and the fire from the Catholic ranks is much more destructive than that from the Protestant ranks. As long as this state of things remains, the church here is certainly in an anomalous and false position. Her own children are accidentally an impediment to her progress, and the more they multiply and the more influential they become, the more opposed to them become the American people proper, and the greater the danger to the American nationality and civilization. The mass of the Catholic people see nothing, dream nothing of this, and rather wish to destroy American civilization, thinking their own much superior to it. The bishops

and clergy, mingling chiefly with their own people, and sharing their feelings, passions, prejudices, either do not see it, or see no way of remedying it. Only non-Catholics and converted Americans, or such Catholics as have imbibed real American sentiments, see it clearly, and attach importance to it. But the matter really is one of grave consequence, and graver than is commonly thought, under the point of view both of religion and civilization.

We lay it down as certain that the foreign colony will not absorb the country, and though it may weaken, and to some extent corrupt, will not displace its civilization. If they who manage our church affairs insist on keeping Catholics as a foreign body, our numbers will decrease instead of increasing, when emigration from Europe ceases. Our children, especially the brightest, most energetic, and the most ambitious, will, as they grow up, americanize, and if the church remains foreign, they will virtually, if not formally, abandon her communion, and when the old folks from the old country die off, Catholicity with us will die out. Here is the sad prospect before us. Yet few but foreigners or foreignized Americans can be bishops or priests. The real American not being understood, and being, though obedient, not obsequious, is distrusted and set aside, and a foreigner or the son of a foreigner, sympathizing heart and soul with the peculiarities of the foreign colony, is preferred. He is more flexible than the American, and therefore regarded as more manageable. We, for ourselves, weep over this. We cannot but raise our feeble voice in the name of the Catholic religion and American civilization against it. Are our own countrymen to remain for ever debarred of the faith, the hopes, and the consolations of our holy religion?

Yet, however discouraging to the American who feels a deep interest in the progress both of the church and of American civilization, this state of things may be, we must remember that it is only accidental, that it is abnormal and cannot last. It is no objection either to the church herself, or to the full evolution and realization of the American idea. We are not blind to the faults of our countrymen, whether North or South, East or West, and no man has lashed them more severely than we have. When we speak of American civilization, we speak of the type, the order of civilization the American people have it in charge to realize. We have never pretended, and should be sorry to be thought capable of pretending, that we have as yet fully realized it. In its continuous

evolution and realization in law, institutions, manners, customs, habits, &c., consists the life in this world of the American people. We have not yet attained to the end of that life; we have not yet fulfilled our mission, done our work, and harmonized practically religion and civilization. We cannot do this without orthodoxy. We cannot do it without the Catholic faith and worship, without the Catholic Church and Catholic discipline. But hitherto the church has been presented to us not as the Catholic Church, but as a foreign colony. We need the Catholicity but not the foreignism, for that foreignism which Catholics bring with them and perpetuate in their foreign colony, is uncatholic and antagonistical to the American idea, and has done far more injury to our American order of civilization, than the Catholicity they also bring, has yet done to aid it. The spread of Catholicity associated with the foreign civilization, throughout the country, would destroy the American order of civilization, and reproduce in our new world that of the old world, on which ours is in our judgment, a decided advance. The American people see this, and hence the little or no progress of the Catholic religion among them.

But we do not despair either of American civilization or of the Catholic religion, for they have a natural affinity for each other. The divorce between them is abnormal and injurious to both. The American order of civilization is the best expression the world has yet seen of Catholic truth on its human side, and as in the Catholic idea the human and divine are inseparably united, there is and must ever be a strong tendency for them to unite in their practical realization. This tendency will gradually eliminate from the Catholic body their foreignism, and render them more American, in rendering them more Catholic. The tendencies of Catholicity and Americanism are in the same direction, and necessarily strengthen each other. Besides, as time goes on, American converts will less readily abandon their Americanism, and feel more deeply that, in becoming Catholics, they are bound, for the sake of their religion and of their non-Catholic countrymen, not to denationalize themselves, or to make themselves foreigners. Before long, too, missions will be open to the American people, and the missionaries, even if not of American birth and breeding, if they are missionaries not to foreigners in America, but to Americans, will present their religion in its catholicity, without coupling with it a civilization inferior or antagonistical to our own. There is no necessity that the

missionaries should be native Americans; for it would be ridiculous to pretend that only natives can convert natives. What is more necessary is, that there should be a really American clergy for the foreign Catholics colonized in the country. The evil is greatly exaggerated both for clergy and congregations composed of foreign Catholics. American clergy for the foreign congregations, for the Catholics now in the country, and foreign missionaries to the American people, would not be objectionable, but in many respects, would be a very good arrangement. Foreign-born and foreign-educated priests, do not foreignize a country, or injure its civilization, but introduce much that is advantageous to it; they are objectionable only when their congregations are foreigners, for it is only then that they render their religion foreign. Then they are forced by the influence of their congregations, by the necessity of managing them and advancing their spiritual welfare, to conform to, or to suffer to go unchanged, the foreign notions, usages, and habits they bring with them. We ask as far as practicable an American clergy for the Catholics already in the country, for the sake of thoroughly americanizing them at the earliest practicable moment, but we do not ask that missionaries to non-Catholic Americans should be either American born or American bred, as in some respects non-American missionaries would be preferable.

But be this as it may, the American missions must soon open, and when they do, large numbers of Americans will become Catholics, for large numbers of them are ready to become Catholics when they see they can become so without abjuring their country or American civilization. These converts will remain Americans, and be the nucleus of the Catholic-American population. Around them will gradually gather, and to them will be gradually assimilated the whole Catholic population of the country, and the distinction between foreign-born and native-born Catholics, will be obliterated, as will also the distinction of foreigners and Americans as a distinction between Catholic and non-Catholic Americans. Both will be alike Americans and differ only in matters of faith and worship. There will remain for a time, at least, the distinction of orthodox and heterodox, a very important distinction indeed, but there will be no distinction under the point of view of civilization. Catholics and Protestants will not as now constitute two distinct peoples.

To this end, also, we believe our present civil strife will

greatly contribute. Up to the actual levying of war against the government, the great body of our Catholic population undoubtedly sympathized with the South. They were attached to the Democratic party, whose strength had always been in the slave-holding states; they were, many of them, like ourselves, strongly attached to the doctrine of state rights, which was made the basis of the right of secession and the metropolis of the Catholic colony was in Baltimore, a city of strong southern sympathies. They had been taught to regard the abolitionists as Puritan fanatics, and dangerous to the peace and safety of the Union; and the Democratic journals had assured them that the Republicans were only disguised, or undisguised, abolitionists. But when the rebellion broke out, and its real character and purposes became manifest, Catholics very generally in the loyal states, especially Catholics of foreign birth, and their children born here, refused to support it. To their shame be it said, the old American Catholics in the struggle of the nation for life, have proved themselves far less American, far less loyal than the foreign-born Catholics settled amongst us. Boston Catholics, nearly all belonging to a recent migration, have been far more American than Baltimore Catholics claiming to be descendants of the Maryland pilgrims. The Boston *Pilot* has been far less un-American than the Baltimore *Catholic Mirror* and the Pittsburgh *Catholic*, edited by both foreign-born and foreign-educated Catholics has shown a far more truly patriotic spirit than *The Telegraph and Advocate*, whose senior editor is an American and a convert. A large portion of Catholics of the old American stock have been, and we presume still are disloyal, while the mass of foreign-born Catholics in the free states have sided with the Union. It is a singular phenomenon, which, however, we have no space now to explain. But the fact that our adopted citizens have so generally sided with the Union, and volunteered to fight its battles, has already greatly softened the American prejudices against them both as foreigners and as Catholics, and before the war is over will soften them still more. We, ourselves, who are an American of Americans, are proud of them, while we are ashamed of our disloyal and peace-prating Catholic countrymen.

But what is still more to the purpose, the Catholics who have sided with the Union, these Catholic officers and men who with hearty good will are fighting her battles, rendering so much service to the country, and suffering so much for it,

learn to feel that it is their country, and that they have part and lot in her history. Their sympathies become enlisted in behalf of American civilization, for which they are fighting, and they will return with their laurels from the battle-field, with American hearts, an American people. This war has been sent to us in mercy. It has come as a chastisement on both the North and the South, and will arrest us in the false directions we were taking, recall us to the real American principles from which we had departed far and were departing further. It will have a salutary effect both on old Americans and on Neo-Americans, and mould both into one truly American people. It will, unless we Catholics foolishly throw away the opportunity it gives us, open a fair field for Catholic activity and enterprise, and enable us to bring our religion to bear, not in destroying, but in evolving, advancing, and perfecting American civilization, and giving to the world a practical example of the *régime* of liberty it may well attempt to imitate. Then our church will be here in her normal position, and she will no longer be confounded with her accidents, or embraced or rejected for what she is not.

But we have extended our remarks to an unreasonable length. Yet we had many things we wished to say, and we have, after all, said only a few of them. The reader will see that our aim has been something more than our personal defence, and that our wish has been to explain the anomalies presented by our religion in this country, and without concealing or palliating in the least what we regard as anomalous, and to non-Catholics is inexplicable, in the Catholic body, to prove to our non-Catholic countrymen that we can be a good Catholic, and love liberty as firmly as they do, and join heart and hand with them in defending, sustaining, evolving, and perfecting American civilization. What is foreign or un-American in our Catholic population, or in the position of our church, is only accidental, and must as things go on disappear. Many Catholics will fail to understand and appreciate our motives, and imagine that we are only venting our ill-humor with them. But that is their affair, not ours. We have no ill-humor towards them or anybody else, unless it be towards imbecile statesmen, and dilatory or luke-warm military commanders. But we think more of American civilization than they do, and are more anxious to reunite it and our religion for the benefit of both. We wish to see our countrymen Catholics, and we wish to see Catholics heartily sustaining the American order of civilization.

LACORDAIRE AND CATHOLIC PROGRESS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1862.]

M. DE MONTALEMBERT, in this small volume, has paid a most graceful, elegant, and well-deserved tribute to his lately deceased friend, the world-renowned Père Lacordaire, the reviver of the Order of Preachers in France. The volume is written with the grace and fervor which characterize all the works of its distinguished author, and with all the tenderness and pathos of the most true, confiding, and beautiful friendship. It was in early life, while yet a youth, fired with the generosity and enthusiasm of a noble soul, before any of its illusions have been dispelled, or its ardor damped by experience of the selfishness, the calculating prudence, the cold-hearted indifference, or the falsity of the world, that the author was brought into intimate relations with the Abbé Lacordaire a few years his senior, and formed with him those ties of friendship, of sympathy, and a disinterested devotion to the same great and noble cause, which only death has been able to sever, and which not even death has severed, for they were ties formed in the Lord, binding them to each other, because binding them alike to Him who dies not, is immortal and eternal. No man knew, no man could know Père Lacordaire better, for no man did or could hold a more intimate communion with his soul, since no one did or could more closely sympathize with him, or better interpret him by his own love and aspirations. The volume is written from the heart, and is the author's own heart revealing the heart and soul of his friend. It is tender, affectionate, but appreciative and manly. The friendship between these two gifted souls was strong, robust, and a friendship in which mind united with mind as well as heart with heart. The volume is instructive; it is inspiring, and in the present state of the Catholic mind, one of the best books that can be read and meditated, especially by our generous and noble-hearted young men, who wish for a great cause, and are not repelled by the prospect of labor and sacrifice.

We have seldom in these pages referred to Père Lacordaire,

**Le Père Lacordaire.* PAR LE COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT, l'un des Quarante de l'Académie Française. Paris: 1862.

and we confess to having never been among his warm admirers. We heard him spoken lightly of by men whom we highly esteemed, and whose judgment on any subject we did not at the time permit ourselves to question, and not finding his published works fully sustaining the reputation he evidently had as an orator, we were led to regard him as much overrated by his friends, and never took the pains to make ourselves acquainted with his real worth. When we came into the church the great danger to religion and society seemed to us to come from the side of revolutionism, or liberalism; and the democratic tendencies so apparent in Père Lacordaire made us distrust him, and look upon him as a man whose influence could not fail to be hurtful.

Our readers are well aware that we started our public career as a radical, an extreme liberal, with great faith in man, but with little faith in God. We accepted as they were given us, the democratic and humanitarian premises, furnished us by our age and country, and sought to carry them out theoretically and practically to their last logical consequences. Our first acceptance of Christianity, after our dark period of religious doubt and unbelief, was on its social or humanitarian side, and our effort after that acceptance was to combine religion and liberalism, and to find a principle on which we could reconcile stability and progress, conservatism and reform. For years, our great theme was the democracy of Christianity and the progress of man on earth as the means of arriving at heaven, or of attaining to his final destiny. Gradually, as our view of Christianity became larger and more firm, we discovered that we were attempting to make "bricks without straw," that the system we had adopted was sheer humanism and the interpretation we had given to the purpose and end of the Gospel was that given by the old carnal Jews to the promises and prophecies of the Messiah. We recoiled from the abyss we saw yawning before us, reëxamined our premises in the light of a profounder philosophy and a higher theology, and found as we thought, both the necessity and the truth of the Catholic Church, and also the medium of reconciliation between her and our modern world. We consequently became a Catholic, and were received into the bosom of the Catholic Church.

When once in the church, having accepted her as our teacher, and her pastors as our guides and directors, we thought it necessary to break with our whole past, and to think, speak,

and write only as we should learn of her. We held in abeyance all our former thoughts and reasonings, and repressed all our previous aspirations and tendencies; we tried to make our mind as far as possible a *tabula rasa*, and to begin as a new-born babe to learn our Catholic faith and theology, accepting nothing not taught us, and accepting every thing that was taught us in her name, or that logically followed from what was taught us. Having experienced the need of authority, having suffered more than we care to repeat for the lack of some infallible teacher, we thought, and could think, only of asserting authority in season and out of season. We had had enough of speculation, enough of liberty without authority, enough of democracy and private judgment, and were deafened with the declamations which had been ringing in our ears from early childhood about "popular sovereignty," "the people," "the rights of the people," "the rights of man," "the nobility of reason," and the "deathless energies and god-like tendencies of human nature," and consequently when we found a man using any of these terms, speaking of "humanity," "the irrepressible instincts of the human race," the "greatness," "dignity," or "worth" of human nature, we at once suspected either his orthodoxy or his understanding. We had had an excess of liberty, and feared the evils that come from that side far more than those that come from the side of despotism. The former we knew by experience; the latter we had never so known.

We are now satisfied that, however natural our course, however much there was of edifying humility and docility in it, it was a mistake, the commission of which separated us much further than was necessary from our own age and country, and lost us a large number of non-Catholic friends, whom we prejudiced both against ourselves and our church, while we are losing a large number of Catholic friends by our efforts to correct it, and to resume the work we should never have abandoned. It was our misfortune to be under the necessity of assuming the position of a Catholic periodical writer while we were but imperfectly acquainted with Catholic theology, and before we had had time and opportunity to examine how far we could retain as a Catholic the philosophy of religion we had attained to before received into the church. We felt the inconvenience and awkwardness of such a position, and believed it—perhaps, were encouraged so to believe—the best and shortest way to throw overboard our whole past, and to

preserve the memory of it only as a warning, and take not only Catholic faith, but Catholic theology as we learned it from books and professors. Thus we wrote in 1845:

“Our life begins with our birth into the Catholic Church. We say this, because we wish no one to be led astray by any of our former writings, all of which, prior to last October, unless it be the criticisms on Kant, some political essays, and the articles in our present *Review on Social Reform* and the Anglican Church, we would gladly cancel if we could. We have written and published much during the last twenty years; but a small duodecimo volume would contain all that we would not blot, published prior to last October.”

There was in this an excess of self-abnegation, and an ungrateful denial of the value of the long discipline we had received from the merciful and paternal hand of divine Providence. But we felt our incompetency to discuss from our own knowledge and personal convictions the great questions proper to discuss in a Catholic review, and we relied almost solely on others. We used our own logic and language, but we ventured to utter no thought of our own. We wrote the best we could from the premises given us, and as a matter of course adopted the views of the theological school in which we happened to be placed, and labored to give them their full and complete logical expression. It was our study even to obliterate ourselves, to suppress our own personality, and to let Catholicity as we received it speak through us, and establish its own conclusions. This very fact explains the air and tone of dogmatism the *Review* was charged with assuming on becoming Catholic; and what was set down to pride, to an overweening confidence in our own judgment, was due to an excess of self-abnegation, and to an undue distrust of what may be called our own thoughts and personal convictions.

But as time went on, as our acquaintance with Catholic theology extended, and as we found it necessary to meet objections which we could not find met in any of the theological works within our reach, and which we could not ourselves meet on theological or philosophical systems our Catholic teacher had given us, we began to look deeper into the received scholastic theology and philosophy, and, indeed, to think for ourselves, and to ask, if, after all, Catholicity might not be a personal conviction, and not merely a system of truth having no intrinsic relation to human reason, and resting solely on external authority. We soon discovered, or thought we discovered, that there was in reality no such disruption

between the true Catholic life and the *intellectual* life we had attained to prior to our conversion, as we had too hastily assumed. Doubtless, there were many errors in what we had previously written, but we had always, even in the days of our greatest darkness, held great Catholic principles, and our errors were less errors of principle than errors of fact, and were the result in the main of defective knowledge, chiefly of historical information. Catholicity then rested for us, as it does yet, on external authority, but not on external authority alone. It became a personal conviction, and we attained to that intellectual freedom which we had from the first asserted the church allows, demands, and secures. We thus recovered the broken link of our life, reunited our present life with our life prior to our conversion, and resumed, so to speak, our personal identity.

The process of this resumption of our own identity, especially in the sphere of philosophy, has been going on slowly, timidly, hesitatingly since January, 1850, and with more rapidity, steadiness, and firmness since our removal from Boston to New York, and may now be regarded as complete. We accept all in our writings before we became a Catholic that we had arrived at by the free and independent action of our own mind. What were really our own personal convictions then are our personal convictions now. Errors we then had, as errors we may now have, and may have as long as we live, but we dare maintain that we had true catholic principles, true catholic thoughts, catholic aspirations and tendencies, long before we had the happiness of being received into the church, and permitted to feast on the body and blood of our Lord, though, no doubt, the reach of the principles was not always seen, and the thoughts were incomplete. We had not truth in all its clearness and explicitness, but we had embraced it in its synthesis, and seen the process by which that synthesis is reached and verified. We were *not* mistaken as to the principle which conducted us to the church of God, as we were afterward led to believe,—an error which has caused us so much trouble, and lost us so much time; and if we had known better how to interpret the analytic language of scholastic theology, we should never have been induced to lay aside, or hold in abeyance, our original conviction.

In point of fact, the disruption we speak of was never so complete as it appeared, or as we ourselves supposed. We troubled ourselves little about the matter, because we early a-

adopted the maxim that no man should be a slave to his own past. But no honest man can wholly unmake himself, or, if true to himself, ever become wholly another man. In our most ultra-liberal days, in our wildest radicalism, we always retained a conservative element, and recognized and asserted the necessity of authority; and in our most conservative epoch, when opposing with all our might revolutionists and revolutionism, and defending the legitimate authority in the state, we never defended autoeracy, or absolutism of any sort. From 1843 to 1850, we opposed the ultra-democracy rapidly gaining a foothold in our own country, and the revolutionary and socialistic tendencies of European liberalism, because we believed, then, and believe now, that the dangers to religion and society were then on that side, and our rule of conduct is always to attack the danger where it is, not where it is not. But in January, 1850, we assured our friends that we had carried the work of combating liberalism far enough and that we should soon have to combat the reaction against it to prevent it from crushing out liberty, and establishing despotism. A writer in these pages, not the Editor, indeed exulted over the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, and defended it, but not with our approbation, and for seven long years we stood alone in this country, almost in the world, among Catholic publicists, in warning Catholics against any entangling alliance with the new-fangled cæsarism of Napoleon III. From the first we assured our bishops and clergy that, though the new emperor of the French might seek to use the church he would never consent to be her servant, or to allow her full freedom as a corporation in his dominions. They believed us not, and we were represented as sharing the spite and tendencies of a "disappointed tribune," as the illustrious champion of Catholicity, Count de Montalembert was sneeringly called, against Louis Veillot and Louis Napoleon. Unhappily time and events have vindicated the noble French champion of Catholicity and liberty, and justified our warnings. They who, without reason, threw the church at the feet of the "new Charlemagne," or the "new St. Louis," as the new emperor was called, are now in danger of going to the opposite extreme, and offering him an opposition equally without reason. France is not ripe for a republic, and better the Bonapartes than the restored Bourbons, of either the elder or the younger branch. In all this there is evidence of the love of authority on the one hand, and of liberty on the other, and of a conviction of the necessity of

reconciling with each other both liberty and authority. We waged no war for despotism, and none against liberty as such. If we opposed the alliance of the church with democracy, we opposed with equal firmness her alliance with despotism. In 1838, before our conversion, we wrote and can repeat now, with only slight modifications:

“But if the church, both here and in Europe, does not desert the cause of absolutism, and make common cause with the people, its doom is sealed. Its union with the cause of liberty is the only thing which can save it. The party of the people, the democracy throughout the civilized world, is every day increasing in numbers and in power. It is already too strong to be defeated. Popes may issue their bulls against it; bishops may denounce it; priests may slander its apostles, as they did and do Jefferson, and appeal to the superstition of the multitude; kings and nobilities may collect their forces and bribe or dragoon; but in vain; IT IS TOO LATE. Democracy has become a power, and sweeps on resistless as one of the great agents of nature. Absolute monarchs must be swept away before it. They will fail in their mad attempt to arrest the progress of the people, and to roll back the tide of civilization. They will be prostrated in the dust, and rise no more for ever. Whoever or whatever leagues with them must take their fate. If the altar be supported on the throne, and the church joined to the palace, both must fall together. Would the church could see this in time to avert the sad catastrophe. It is a melancholy thing to reflect on the ruin of that majestic temple which has stood so long, over which so many ages have passed, on which so many storms have beaten, and in which so many human hearts have found shelter, solitude, and heaven. It is melancholy to reflect on the condition of the people deprived of all forms of worship, and with no altar on which to offer the heart's incense to God the Father. Yet assuredly churchless, altarless, with no form or shadow of worship will the people be, if the church continues its league with absolutism. The people have sworn deep in their hearts, that they will be free. They pursue freedom as a divinity, and freedom they will have,—with the church if it may be, without the church if it must be. God grant that they who profess to be his especial servants may be cured of their madness in season to save the altar!”

The church is indefectible, and cannot fail save with individuals and nations, and so far as the contrary is implied in expressions here used, the extract needs correction; but in all other respects it may be indorsed by the most rigidly orthodox Catholic. The church, indeed, always remains, for the idea she is realizing in time and space, the Word incarnate whose life she lives, cannot fail, but she may yet fail with individuals and nations, as she often has failed. We have in reality been always the same man we were when we wrote these words, and we cannot, if we would, make ourselves over into another man. The true Catholic life can be lived only in an element of freedom. The innumerable martyrs in all ages prove it; for martyrdom is the strongest assertion of liberty,

and protest against despotism and tyranny it is possible for man to make. It was the desire to be free, to live in free and open communion with God that in the primitive ages peopled the deserts of Thebais and Palestine with hermits and anchorets, and in later ages the monasteries and convents with monks and nuns. The church herself can fulfil her mission only in an element of freedom, and wherever her interests become complicated with those of despotism, the love of liberty common to all men breaks away from her, and makes war against her as the accomplice of the despotism they would annihilate. The church must not only be free herself, but she must, in order to flourish in the modern world, support liberty without, and allow it within. It is not that authority should be withdrawn, denied, resisted, or made little account of, but that it should not be asserted as alone sufficient, or the liberty and the necessity in cultivated minds of personal conviction cast aside as a matter of no consequence. Men in our day demand personal conviction,—to appropriate, to assimilate to themselves the truth which authority teaches, so that they may have in themselves as Catholics unity of thought and life, and speak from their own thoughts, convictions, and experience as living men, and not merely repeat a lesson learned by rote, and to which they attach no more meaning than the parrot does to her scream of “pretty pol.” It is not, in speaking thus, that we value less the external authority of the church than we did formerly, or that we are less indisposed to resist it, but that we value personal conviction more, and feel more deeply the necessity of incorporating the truth the church teaches, into the life, the intellect, the soul, the very being of the believer,—of making it our own, an integral part of ourselves, so that when we speak freely, spontaneously, we shall give it expression. We would think, and speak what we think, without being obliged to stop and ask, whether or not some father or doctor has thought or said the same before us. We would have Catholic truth as a part of ourselves, have it our reason, our conscience, our common sense, not merely something put on, and held on by a foreign hand.

In coming to this conclusion, in resuming the continuity of our own intellectual life, and thus becoming a Catholic from personal conviction as well as from submission to simple external authority, we cannot believe that we have become less Catholic; we think we have become more Catholic, and now for the first time really and understandingly a Catholic.

Catholicity has now become a part of ourselves, and we no longer regard it as something taken up or put on, or separate it, or distinguish it in thought from the rest of our intellectual and moral life. In resuming the connecting link between our present and past life, we are only bringing up a phase of thought that at first we did not dare trust, or feared might turn out to be uncatholic, and are only divesting our Catholicity of all sectarian incrustations and mediæval accumulations not in harmony with what is true and good in our age. Dogmatically considered, the Catholicity that was taught us was orthodox, but the philosophy and the political and social ideas, in a word, the *civilization* given us along with it belonged to an age that has passed away, and is impossible to be recalled. *Impossibile defunctos revocare.* We are in our labors, so strangely misunderstood and so cruelly denounced, only asserting ourselves a man of the nineteenth century, and doing our best to show the ground of the real harmony between the Catholic Church and modern civilization. We had discovered this ground before we came into the church, but for some time after we came in we did not dare confide in it. We were afraid to rely on our own convictions, and unnecessarily broke with our age and our country. It was a blunder, innocent in its motives, and the result not of pride, but its opposite. Still it was a blunder, and has prevented us from serving the cause of Catholicity as effectually as we might have done, caused us to waste much strength, and to lose much time. But what has been has been, and cannot be helped, and there is no use in whining or whimpering over it. He who has sinned should confess his sin, and forsake it, and hasten to practise the virtue still within his reach. He who has blundered need not paralyze himself in useless regrets, but should, as soon as he discovers his blunder, correct it, and seek to avoid similar blunders in future. No man, not a downright fool, ever claims exemption from error, or pretends to be infallible. He who thinks will sometimes err, but it is better to err, than never to think, and better is it now and then to fail than never to attempt. It is of far more importance what we are to day than what we were yesterday. We make no moan over our past. We simply explain it, and dismiss it. We are none the worse, but the wiser for it.

But with our present views and from our present position, we are able to appreciate, to some extent, the character, and to recognize the services of such a man as Père Lacordaire.

We have been his contemporary, really engaged, though in a different sphere, and under circumstances widely different from his, in the same great work to which he devoted his life, and can honor ourselves by claiming to have been in many respects his disciple, and to have pertained to his school. No man in this country watched with more interest the beginning of the great movement in France, commenced in 1831, and of which he was the master-spirit, or has been more affected by it in his whole intellectual life and destiny, than we. It was that movement that more than any thing else brought us back to Christianity, inspired us with belief in the possibility of reconciling religion and modern society, and finally prepared us for the recognition and acceptance of the church. We had, in appreciating that movement, overlooked the claims of Père Lacordaire, for we took him to be simply a disciple of the once distinguished and eminent Abbé de La Mennais. We learn now for the first time that Père Lacordaire was never his disciple, that he never shared his peculiar views either in philosophy or theology, but was really himself the master-mind of the movement in what was sober, reasonable, just, and Catholic in it. The movement, resulting in what M. Montalembert calls the Catholic *Renaissance*, as La Mennais understood it, was based on a false and mischievous system of philosophy, and if it could have prevailed, it would have subverted the very foundations of our Catholic faith. On the one hand, it would have confounded regeneration with generation, or, on the other, resolved humanity into divinity, and proclaimed not only people-prophet, and people-priest, but with Mazzini, people-king, and people-god, as any one may collect from his *Paroles d'un Croyant*, the legitimate development of his system.

Lacordaire during his college days, like so many of his generation, was without faith in Christianity, a deist, as they said then; but after having finished the study of his profession as a lawyer, while still young, he recovered his faith in the Gospel, and immediately entered the Seminary of St. Sulpice, and was ordained priest in 1827. From his conversion to Christianity he never for a moment up to the hour of his death wavered in his faith, or relaxed his labors in the cause of religion and civilization. His faith was sincere, firm, and orthodox, his zeal pure, enlightened, and disinterested, and his submission to the proper authorities of the church was prompt and unreserved, though never blind or servile. He was bold,

at times to the verge of imprudence, if not of rashness, a man of strong personal convictions, we may also say, of an intense individuality, who, having taken his ground, adhered to it with firmness and constancy, and shrunk from no obstacles, from no misapprehension or misrepresentation, no obloquy or reproach, in maintaining it. He had unbounded and unshakable confidence in truth, or, more strictly speaking, in God whose word is truth, and he never doubted that the truth would sustain him, and in the end crown his works with success. He was inherently a brave man, what we call a manly man, the hero of the pulpit, and the champion of free speech, free education, free thought, and free discussion. In him was no guile, no cunning, no trickery, no artifice, no seeking to compass his ends by intrigue, by craft, by indirect means, or by crooked or zigzag paths. His soul was as open as the day, and his means were as straightforward and just as his ends were pure, lofty, and noble. He was simple, tender, affectionate, but one of the most intrepid of men in defence of truth, justice, liberty. He was a bold, energetic, and vigorous writer, of remarkable facility, and in modern times at least, unrivalled as a pulpit orator, and the echoes of his voice which rang out so clear, so strong, so sympathetic, and so winning, in the old cathedral of *Notre-Dame de Paris*, and throughout all France, have not yet died away, and will not for many generations to come.

In 1831, Père, then the Abbé, Lacordaire became associated with La Mennais and Count Montalembert not yet of age, in conducting that remarkable journal, the *Avenir*. In that journal he soon eclipsed, the illustrious count tells us, the elder and more distinguished Abbé de La Mennais. With his associates he set on foot a movement which has not been without its influence on the subsequent history of the world, and to which he remained true to the hour of his death. To understand that movement, and to appreciate the service it rendered for over twenty years to Catholicity in France, as well as in a large portion of the Catholic world, we must recur to what at the time was the state of Catholic minds, of the general opinion of Catholics in France and elsewhere. The violence of the old French revolution, the infidelity of its chiefs, the persecution it inaugurated against Catholics, its legal suppression of the Catholic worship, and its murder, imprisonment, or deportation of Catholic priests, had not, unnaturally, turned the whole Catholic mind against republicanism, and linked the

cause of the church with that of monarchy; and the military despotism of Napoleon, his imprisonment of the Holy Father, and his efforts to subject the church to his will and to use her in forwarding his ambitious projects of conquest and universal dominion, had wedded the Catholic cause to that of the Bourbons, and the party of legitimacy throughout Europe represented by the so-called Holy Alliance. Catholics were almost universally in 1830 united with the party of repression, the party of absolutism, the *oscurantisti*, and opposed to all movements in favor of popular liberty. The word *liberty* itself was *suspect*, and he who spoke in its favor was looked upon as a bad Christian and a worse subject.

The revolution of 1830 came and proved that the *oscurantisti* were not invincible, and that the Catholic cause, if not separated from the sovereigns, would fail. That revolution proved to all men who had eyes in their heads that the people were mightier than their sovereigns, at least too powerful and too imbued with a sentiment of their strength, too earnest in their love of liberty, ever to become again the quiet, peaceable, and orderly subjects of a despotic rule. It was clear that the repressive policy of the sovereigns must fail, and the Catholic cause, if linked to that policy, must itself fail with it. The church everywhere shared the prejudices and resentments of the people against their temporal sovereigns, and the more she preached to them submission, and the more she labored to reconcile them to the old *régime*, and to make them quiet, docile, and obedient subjects, the more embittered they became against her as the enemy of progress, as the accomplice of despotism and tyranny. In point of fact, the liberal party, the party of progress, the believers in modern civilization were estranged from her communion, were unbelieving, and were making war on her as the chief supporter of a political and social order they wished to make an end of once for all. In this state of feeling the church could not discharge her mission of winning souls to Christ, or of rearing up the modern world in the Christian faith. She had become odious to the modern world, and impotent to govern or direct it.

Under the existing circumstances, what has to be done? Why had the thinking, active, energetic portion of the people in modern times become the enemies of the church, and disbelievers in her dogmas? Evidently because they found, or thought they found, the church on the side of the sovereigns against the people, and sustaining an order of things which

they held to be hostile to intelligence, to progress, and the political and social interests of mankind, not because they had outgrown the Catholic faith, or had any grave objections to her dogmas or her worship in themselves considered. Their quarrel with the church was political and social, not dogmatical, and what they opposed in her was not her assertion of the divine, but her real or apparent suppression of the human. To them she seemed to have forgotten that the Saviour was "perfect Man," as well as "perfect God." The true course was, then, for the church to cease to make common cause with the people's masters, to sever her cause from that of the Holy Alliance, to accept liberty and bless it, to take up the cause of the people, hallow the irrepressible instincts of humanity, place herself at the head of the modern world, and aid and direct it in the great work of scientific, social, and political evolution. This was the thought of the *Avenir*, and of the men grouped with Lacordaire and Montalembert around the Abbé de La Mennais. It required the complete separation of church and state, the church to give up all pecuniary support from the state, and to throw herself on the voluntary contributions of the faithful. Her liberty was no longer to be secured by concordats with the state, but by securing the liberty of the people, and obtaining a safeguard for her liberty in the general liberty of the citizen, whether Catholic or non-Catholic.

The change recommended would have deprived the church as a spiritual commonwealth of all political power, of all power derived from the state, all political right of censorship, and of all *civil* power to enforce her sentences against heresy, error, or schism, and consequently would have abolished the whole of that system of mixed civil and ecclesiastical government which had grown up in the middle ages, and was continued to some extent in all Catholic Europe, and have placed the church on precisely the footing on which she stands in the United States, where she is free in the freedom of the citizen, and powerful by her intellectual and moral influence. It would have placed the church on the side of liberty, and made it the interest as well as the duty of all churchmen to resist absolutism, and to sustain the freedom and equal rights of the citizen. It would have enabled the church to resume her civilizing work, baptized modern civilization, and healed the schism between her and the modern world. The thought was grand and noble, and, what is more, was eminently Catholic. We well remember the enthusiasm and joyous hope

with which we heard its enunciation, all Unitarian as we were, and Christian in a mystic sentiment and vague longing rather than in any well-defined thought or intellectual conviction. It was the first thing that attracted our regards towards the old church, and gave us a glimpse of her grandeur, as a social institution. Unhappily we knew the movement only as the work of La Mennais, and when we learned his condemnation and excommunication, we hastily, rashly concluded that the old church was dead, and her resuscitation no longer possible. We wept as a child over the death of his mother, made honorable mention of her memory, and followed away the Saint-Simonian dreamer, the fallen priest, and wasted a dozen years of our life in the endeavor to lay the foundation of a new church.

We read with intense interest the description M. Montalembert gives of the enthusiasm of the noble youth, the true chivalry of France, that were grouped around the great thought, and threw the whole force of their souls, their pure zeal and disinterestedness into the Catholic movement. We read with a new confidence in divine grace and the dignity of human nature, his account of their labors, their sacrifices, their trials, and the obstacles they overcame, or could not at the time overcome; and we can in our own heart sympathize with that sorrow which must have oppressed them when their chief was condemned, when he fulfilled to the letter the predictions of his enemies, and their noble cause seemed to have failed, and failed for ever. Men never feel but once in life what they must have then felt. But the brave Count Montalembert, and the equally brave and heroic Lacordaire never for a moment faltered, never for a moment "lost heart or hope," or deserted the cause so dear to them, or despaired of the divine mercy for the church and the world. To the hour of his death Lacordaire remained faithful to his first love, and amid a life of vicissitudes the noble Montalembert seems to have abated nothing of his youthful passion, and amidst the wreck of society, obloquy, reproach, the desertion of friends, the treachery of associates, the cowardice of those who should have stood by him, and bodily infirmity, has maintained his fidelity and his honor. His heart, if touched with sadness, if it has something of the unction of sorrow, is as young, as ardent, as enthusiastic as it was thirty years ago. All in all, the history of the movement is to us the brightest, the purest, the noblest, the most inspiring and consoling chapter in the history of Catholic France.

There were, as M. Montalembert admits, some imprudences, and some things premature to be noted. The logic of the individual leaps more rapidly the distance from the premises to the conclusion than that of the community. None of the Catholic nations of Europe were in 1831 prepared to accept at once so great changes as La Mennais and his friends proposed. The merit of all great changes is in their opportuneness, and the most desirable reforms are injurious rather than beneficial, if attempted out of season, or so as to cause too violent a shock to old prejudices, habits, and usages. To be useful, they must not be new creations, nor violent changes, but should grow out of the past, and be its natural evolution. Unhappily, this rule, so true, and so just, is oftener abused by the conservative party, than forgotten or disregarded by the reform party. It is made the excuse for doing nothing, for opposing all reform, all progress, and is translated into the maxim, *quieta non movere*, make no disturbance, keep quiet, and leave things as they are. This abuse on the one side provokes a corresponding abuse on the other, and pushes the reform party into a violence that it would never otherwise have dreamed of; yet, better motion than stagnation, better even the storm than the long calm, in which not a ship can move, nor a sail flap, under which even the ocean rots. Better life than death. It was only when troubled that the waters of the pool of Bethsaida possessed a healing virtue. If no shock is ever given to men's prejudices, they can never be removed; if no strong hand be laid upon old habits and usages, and if no one is suddenly started from his sleep of the "Seven Sleepers," no progress can ever be made, and no old abuses ever be corrected. Somebody must take the lead, and for the moment be in advance of the multitude, whether learned or unlearned, and he who takes the lead will to the many seem imprudent, rash, violent, and a disturber of the peace and quiet of society or of the church. For our part, separating what pertained to La Mennais personally, and taking the movement as represented by Lacordaire, we see nothing in it not true and good, and nothing really rash or premature as a subject of public discussion.

No doubt the great body of the French prelates and clergy were unprepared for the sweeping changes proposed, but the changes were desirable, and of the greatest importance to the interests of religion and society. The error on the part of the friends was not in proposing them, but in demanding that

they should at once be practically adopted ; in being too impatient ; and in not allowing the well-disposed men, cleric or laic trained in the old system, attached to the old *régime*, and not much disturbed by its defects, which had not disturbed their predecessors, sufficient time to examine the questions involved, and to form an enlightened judgment respecting them. Our young friends did not make sufficient allowance for the slowness with which the majority of minds act, and the difficulty the majority of men have in changing their point of view, or of letting any new ideas get into their heads. They did not consider the bulk of mankind, and especially of those who have the direction of affairs, are, for the most part, made up of prejudices and habits, creatures of routine, who believe and act as they do only because so believed and acted their fathers and predecessors ; and therefore they were too unmeasured, too violent in their attacks upon the French prelacy, and could expect only denunciation in return. They, too, erred by seeking a decision at the time from Rome. Under the circumstances, in the actual state of public opinion, and with the relations of the church with the state such as they still were, Rome, even if not opposed to the views of the *Avenir* party in themselves considered, if compelled to decide the question, must decide against them. But this forcing Rome to a decision was the work of La Mennais himself, against the advice and judgment of his friends, and proves, we fear, that he was more intent on gaining a victory over his enemies, than on securing the triumph of the cause in which he had enlisted so many of the noble youth of France.

We have been told the movement was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI., in his famous *Encyclical*, dated at Rome, August 15th, 1832, but we cannot find that its principle was condemned, or that the movement itself was censured as un-catholic. It was censured as one the church could not officially sanction at the time, one which demanded changes at the time impracticable, and incompatible with the existing relations and interests of the church, and likely to favor the false notions of liberty, of the freedom of conscience and opinion, as well as the religious indifference, then so rife in the revolutionary European world. This did not necessarily touch the great principle for which Lacordaire contended, that, if we may so speak, of associating liberty with religion, and effecting a reconciliation between the church and modern civilization. We know he held fast to that principle during his whole life, and did so

with the full knowledge of Rome, and without the least censure. He held fast to it as a secular priest, as a monk, and as the reviver of the Dominican order in France. Our present Holy Father appears to have approved it, and to have acted on it in the beginning of his pontificate. It will not, therefore, do to say it has been condemned, and that the church has bound herself for all time to come to her old political alliances, interdicted modern civilization, and thus denied her own catholicity in time. The church has not stultified herself.

La Mennais, we think, might have been saved, had the French prelates treated him somewhat differently, and not enlisted his pride and his vindictive temper on the side of his errors; and he certainly would not, as it was, have been lost, if he had had a less proud and arrogant disposition, a less intense personality, and had engaged with more disinterestedness in his movement. We have heard much of the wisdom, tact, adroitness of the clergy, of their patience, forbearance, and tenderness, and not more than is true, when they deal individually with one who comes to them avowing himself a sinner. But we have not found them always all that is pretended, when they have to deal publicly with a man whom they suspect of erroneous tendencies. Such a man they seldom spare. They seem to suppose that they have a perfect right to denounce him, and to enlist public opinion against him. It is enough for them to say he errs, and to persuade others that he errs, without taking any pains in a liberal spirit, to convince him, without unnecessarily wounding his self-love. No doubt they are moved by zeal for the purity and integrity of faith, and a just horror of heresy; but there may be an indiscreet zeal, a zeal that overshoots itself. The opinions which we judge unsound we are free to combat, and ought, if important, to combat; but we should spare the man till we have good evidence that he is determined to persist in error.

In combating a man's opinion, it is never wise or kind to do it by alleging public opinion, or even external authority, against him. To enlist public opinion against my opinions, is not to prove me in the wrong, it is only to prove or to make me unpopular; and external authority should not be alleged till all the resources of reason are exhausted, for authority sometimes silences without convincing, and it is possible, too, that the man may have a way satisfactory to himself of reconciling his opinions with the decisions of authority. As far

as we have read the controversy, very little to the purpose was alleged against La Mennais. His obvious meaning was often misapprehended; his own defences treated with wrath or superciliousness. We read the publications of the bishop of Toulouse against him with great pain. The best things and least objectionable were said by Father Rozaven; but the good father begins by assuming that he is right, and that his opponent has not a word to say, and does not permit him to say a word, in his own defence. This is not the best way of proceeding, for it gives a man no chance but to prostrate himself at your feet, and give you a personal triumph over him, or doggedly to close his mind and heart against even the truth. By such proceeding, if the man is not a heretic when you find him he is very likely to be one when you leave him. You adopt it successfully against the multitude, not against an individual. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that La Mennais lacked true humility and the forgiving disposition of the Gospel.

But though La Mennais failed, the movement did not fail. Lacordaire, Montalembert, and their friends remained true to it. Its powerful and excellent influence was seen in the revolutions of 1848. These revolutions nowhere, out of the papal states, assumed an anti-Catholic character, and they gave to the church in France and Germany a degree of freedom that she had never before enjoyed since the memory of man. Never since France became Catholic did French Catholics conduct themselves more like freemen; show more the qualities that best befit the patriot, the citizen, and never did the church in France assume a nobler attitude, occupy a more independent position, speak with a freer, a more energetic, a more inspiring, or a more consoling voice, than under the republic of 1848. She saved the country from anarchy, and French society from dissolution, by the prompt and frank acceptance of the republic by the majority of her prelates and clergy, with the archbishop of Paris at their head, and their ready and hearty espousal of the cause of liberty. Then we saw that Père Lacordaire and his noble band of *liberal* Catholics, as they were called, had not labored in vain. They had infused a confidence in political and civil liberty into the Catholic body, and had disarmed the honest and intelligent liberals of their former hostility to the church and made Catholics themselves feel that the liberty of the church would receive its strongest guaranty in the freedom of the citizen.

We need not say that a lamentable change has since come over the Gallican church. An exaggerated fear of socialism, defeated on the 13th of June, 1848, a pusillanimous dread of seeing reënacted the horrors of the republic of 1792, of which there was really no serious danger, and a secret longing for the support and favors of the prince, the result of old habits, or of the reminiscences of old times, led her prelates with the majority of the parish priests to sacrifice her independence, to deliver her over bound hand and foot to Cæsar, in the fallacious hope of deriving greater advantages to religion from power than from liberty. They thought it better for the church to be a courtier, than a free citizen, and in consequence compelled her to serve as a slave, or to make herself a *frondeur*. We will not suffer ourselves to speak of their uncalled for surrender to power in the terms that best besit it. If, on the morrow of the revolution of February, the noble attitude they assumed attracted the admiration and kindled the hopes of the world, their weakness, to use no harsher term, after the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, and before the proclamation of the empire in December, 1852, was fitted only to grieve the hearts of sincere Catholics who understood the position of things, and to excite the contempt and disgust of the liberally minded non-Catholics who had begun to turn with respect and affection towards the old church. It was lamentable, and tended only to confirm the objections that had been so long and so confidently urged against us; it proved but too evidently that goodness is not always accompanied by wisdom, and that the simplicity of the dove may be possessed without the prudence of the serpent. The clergy, especially of the first order, throughout the world, taking their cue from the clergy of France, at least from those who by favoring power could speak, supposing very naturally that they were the best judges in the case, hailed the reëstablishment of the Napoleonic empire as the commencement of a golden age for the church.

Our readers will bear us witness that we warned them against committing themselves in favor of the new *régime*; but they will also bear witness that we did so only at our peril. It was regarded as gross impudence on our part to presume to differ from the French clergy and their trusted organ, sustained even at Rome, the Paris *Univers*. Were not the bishops and clergy of France better judges of what was for the interests of the church, than an American, or rather, a

Yankee layman? And could he pretend to be more devoted to those interests than they whom the Holy Ghost had intrusted with their management? Does he, a Yankee convert and a convert of recent date, presume not only to instruct old Catholics, those who have been Catholics from infancy, and have never followed Tom Paine, Fanny Wright, Saint-Simon, been infidels, socialists, Presbyterians, Universalists, Unitarians, or any thing of the sort, but even to teach our consecrated bishops what is or is not for the interests of religion, and to arraign them as not knowing or not performing their duty? Out upon his intolerable pride, his Yankee impudence! So, for seven long years we stood alone, in our own country, uttering our warnings in vain, and nothing we have said or done has had so much effect in impairing the confidence of Catholics in us as our opposition to the tendency among them to applaud the new-fangled cæsarism introduced by Louis Napoleon, defended by Louis Veuillot, and indorsed apparently by the French episcopacy. We feel no gratification in finding events justifying our warnings, and it was with real pain we heard a noble-hearted bishop say to us, a few weeks since, "You were right, and we were wrong." We could enjoy no personal triumph which had been gained only by events deeply injurious to the Catholic cause, dearer to us than our own reputation, far dearer to us than our own life.

Religion has been put back perhaps half a century or more by the abandonment of the cause of political liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of discussion, and publicity in France; but the glorious cause to which Lacordaire devoted his well-spent life is not lost. True he is gone, and his eloquent voice can no longer be heard in the French churches, by thousands of French youths with palpitating hearts; but it is not wholly silent. It has at least left an echo, and his whole life, his heroic example will speak for him. Ozanam, that prince among erudites, the true scholar, the really learned man, the devout Christian, the founder with Lacordaire of the great and glorious association of St. Vincent de Paul, and now spread through nearly all Christian lands, is gone, but he lives, speaks, and moves men's minds and hearts in his works. These are gone, yet not all are gone. Montalembert, De Falloux, the bishop of Orleans, the learned and eloquent Dupanloup, and hosts of others whose names deserve honorable mention, yet remain and are sure to leave a posterity. The army of Cath-

otic progress has suffered losses, has received a temporary check, a defeat, if you will, but not annihilation, nor a rout. It is weakened for a moment but not demoralized. New recruits will flock to fill its thinned ranks, and this New World will soon send her full contingent. Our own personal race is, no doubt, well-nigh run, and we shall probably be placed on the retired list, as past service, if not dishonorably dismissed; but our country lives, and will live, in spite of the formidable rebellion that threatens her life, and rise to a position in the world's estimation she has never yet held, and here Catholicity and political liberty will walk hand in hand together. Here sooner than elsewhere will the schism between the church and modern civilization be healed, and it be possible for a man to be a Catholic without warring against the progress of the age, or laboring to restore a dead past. Our civil war will correct many notions, remove many doubts, and confirm confidence in the principle of free government. Our bishops and our clergy will acquire it, and will break from the bonds which bind them to a political and social order which the triumph of the loyalists in the republic will for ever render obsolete. Our young and educated Catholics will drink in a love for liberty with the love for religion, will feel themselves freemen as they bow at the foot of the altar, assert in the same breath their manhood and their Christian docility, and with ever increasing numbers, courage, and discipline swell the Catholic army of progress. We have no fears or misgivings as to ultimate success.

But the great change we look for in the mutual relations of the church and society, demanded by the progress of events, is not to be expected in a day. The old mixed civil and ecclesiastical government of society is that under which most Catholics have been trained, that to which in old Catholic countries they are still habituated, and that which almost everywhere the regular official instruction they receive presents as the beau-ideal of Catholic organization. All see and know that that order has been violently shaken, that it has in many places been overthrown, and is menaced everywhere; but probably the majority regard this as a fact to be deplored, and still cherish the hope of one day restoring the relations which have been disturbed or broken. Many may suspect the change threatened cannot be successfully resisted, but, regarding it as an evil, think it their duty to resist it as long as they can,—to put off the evil day to the remotest future pos-

sible. They who think with us that the change is not only inevitable, but desirable, and that it will prove not only a change, but a progress, are only a minority, and those not at the head of ecclesiastical affairs. The laity are much better prepared for it, and much more favorable to it, than the clergy; but it is not fitting that the laity should array themselves against the clergy, and in matters of this sort there is little good that can be accomplished without the coöperation of the hierarchy. The great evil, and that which delays the change, is the attempts of the laity to accomplish it without this coöperation, and in spite of it. These attempts are impolitic, and even uncatholic. They are in their nature revolutionary, and therefore always to be deprecated. If the clergy are not the whole church, there is no church without them, any more than there are children without parents. Much of the backwardness, slowness, and hesitancy of the clergy grows out of the impatience of the people, their disorderly demands, their revolutionary tendencies, creating in their minds the suspicion that the moving cause in the people is doubt of religion, and unwillingness to submit to its restraints, and to practise its precepts. The complete separation of church and state, leaving the church to find protection for her liberty in the general liberty secured to the citizen, we hold to be the only practicable solution of the problems of our age with equal advantage to civil and religious society; we believe that this solution is the one to which the whole progress of the world is tending; but we are not ourselves prepared to adopt it against the church, or without the consent of the hierarchy.

What we claim for ourselves is the right to urge it, the right to discuss it, to show its utility, its desirableness, and its inevitableness; to convince if we can, even the hierarchy of its utility, and persuade them to consent to it. The right to do this much, we maintain, is the right of every Catholic, whether cleric or laic, simply holding himself bound in the sphere of action to obey the constituted authorities. I am bound to obey the pontificate, and to venerate the sacerdoey, both of which are from God, but I am not bound to take no thought for the interests of religion and society, or, in this country at least, to refrain from expressing my honest convictions, when they in no sense impugn Catholic dogma, or what is unchangeable in the constitution of the church. There is a mission of genius, of intelligence in the church, which is not necessarily

restricted to the clergy, and may be committed to laymen, or to clergymen in a sense outside of their sacerdotal character, for the church has a right to the service of the genius, the intelligence, the learning, the good-will, and the zeal of all her members, of laymen as well as of clergymen. We see nothing uncatholic in this non-hierarchical mission, any more than there was under the Old Law in the mission of the prophets, which was distinct from that of the ordinary priesthood, and, as we may say, extra-hierarchical. Indeed, in asserting it, we assert only what always has been and always will be. We claim no more for the laity than they have always done, except we claim publicity for what they do, or that what they do they do openly, before the whole world, not simply by private communication, by secret diplomacy, and sometimes by private intrigue. In discussion the layman, under responsibility, we hold, may take the initiative, and not await it from authority. He may open such questions as he deems important, and the business of authority is not to close his mouth, but to set him right, when and where he goes wrong. This is no more than princes and nobles have always been allowed, or assumed unrebuked the right to do, and princes and nobles are only laymen. What a crowned or a titled layman may do, a free American citizen, though uncrowned and untitled, may also do. I have as much right to make my suggestions, and offer my advice to the bishops or to the supreme pontiff as had Charlemagne and St. Louis, or as has Louis Napoleon or Francis Joseph to offer theirs. Before the church, if not before the state, all laymen are equal.

But this, though undeniably true, is so far removed from past usage, that to any but an inborn republican, it seems almost false, almost satanic, and it will need to be iterated and reiterated from many mouths and for a long time, before it will be generally accepted and practically conformed to. The memory of old systems and of the old relations between the temporal and the spiritual is too vivid for even Catholics who have not imbibed republican sentiments, and, as to that matter for many who have imbibed them, to see in the assertion that the people in relation to the ecclesiastical society, stand on a footing of perfect equality with princes and nobles, kings and kaisers, nothing uncatholic or disrespectful to the hierarchy. All the old relations of church and state presuppose the state to have for its basis not right and equality, but inequality and privilege. The greater part of our ascetic

literature or works designed especially for spiritual instruction and edification, presuppose monarchy tempered or not tempered with aristocracy, as the constitution of society, and are filled with allusions, illustrations and comparisons that are neither apt nor edifying to a republican mind. The general tone of our theological literature, whether scholastic or popular, speculative or polemical, produces an impression on the reader that the church is confined to the government, and really consists only of the clergy, hierarchically organized under their chief, the supreme pontiff. The people seem to count for nothing in the church, as formerly they counted for nothing in the state. He who ventures to assert that the clergy are only functionaries in the church and for the church, that the laity are an integral part of the church, and not mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to the hierarchy, with neither voice nor souls of their own, is at once suspected of wishing to democratize the church, of having Congregational predilections or reminiscences, if not of being animated by an unavowed hostility to the hierarchical constitution of the church herself. It is hard to protest against an extreme in one direction, without being suspected of wishing to run to an extreme in another. Hence it is that they who propose changes or ask for changes demanded by the progress or changes in civilization, are sure to be misunderstood, misrepresented, and suspected of disloyalty to Catholicity.

No man ever lived who could more effectually bear witness to the truth of what is here asserted than Père Lacordaire. He was sincere, earnest, and firm in his faith, simple and docile as a child, clear, distinct, and reverential in his expression, unbounded in his charity, full of tenderness of heart, gentle in his manners, eminent for his prudence, his sobriety, and for his earnestness, his singleness of purpose, and his disinterestedness, and yet he had his enemies, enemies who persevered in being his enemies during his life, who misunderstood him, misrepresented him, distrusted him as a Catholic, and did all in their power to lessen his influence, and defeat his purposes. How often have we heard him traduced, denounced as a radical, a Jacobin, a socialist, concealing the *bonnet rouge*, under the friar's hood. Yet he persevered, held fast to his integrity, held fast to his convictions, and continued on in the line of duty marked out for him, unshaken and unruffled, calm and serene, till he laid him down gently, and slept his sleep of sweet peace in the Lord who so tenderly

loved him, and whom he so tenderly loved and has so heroically served. His example is full of inspiration and consolation, and proves that God is as near us to-day as of old, and has not abandoned our age. Great souls may be born now as well as aforesaid, and great and heroic deeds remain for the Christian to-day, not inferior to the greatest and most glorious performed by our fathers. Not in vain did Père Lacordaire live, toil, suffer, and die, and nothing better proves it than the touching words in the Albigensian *patois* uttered by a poor woman in the immense multitude that flocked to his obsequies at Sorèze *Abion un rey, l'aben perdut*, "We had a king, we have lost him." No, my good woman, we have not lost him. He lives in the world; he lives in that free, manly spirit he quickened in the Catholic youth of France, in the souls he formed to take up his work, and carry it on to the glory of God, the honor of Jesus Christ, God made man, the redemption of souls and the revival of Catholic society.

We know the weakness and miseries of human nature; we know that principles, dogmas of faith are immutable; we know the government of the church is hierarchically constituted; and we recognize our duty to believe what God teaches us, and to obey those whom the Holy Ghost has commissioned to govern us; but we cannot persuade ourselves that he who for our sakes assumed our nature, made himself man that man might become God, requires us to suppress our nature, or that he ever intended to exclude from his religion all exercise of reason, all the living convictions of our own minds, all the warm affections and gushing tenderness of our own hearts. "Whom God has joined together let no man put asunder." In our Redeemer and Lord the divine nature and the human nature are joined together in one person for ever, to be separated nevermore; and he who would separate them, that is, dissolve Christ, is not of God, but is antichrist. In the Incarnation, human nature, that nature which is equally the nature of all men, is elevated to be the nature of God, is, in the language of Pope St. Leo, "deified" actually and completely so in the Son of man, and potentially so in all men. How long shall we be in learning that this mystery of mysteries, in which the wisdom, the love, the mercy, and the creative power of God are, so to speak, exhausted, is not a mere isolated dogma, with no intimate relation to our practical and every-day life? In our religion there is the divine, but the divine with the human, and the human, but not the human

without the divine; and we are as untrue to it when we take the divine without the human, as we are when we take the human without the divine. The religion that neglects civilization is in principle as uncatholic, as the civilization that neglects religion. He departs from the Gospel who asserts the divine authority to the exclusion of human freedom, as he who asserts human freedom to the exclusion of the authority of God. The Jesuits rendered the cause of orthodoxy a valuable service in their defence of nature and human liberty against the Jansenists. They might render it a still further service by reforming our ascetic literature, and placing modern spiritual direction in harmony with the principles they in their controversy with the Jansenists so vigorously, heroically, and successfully defended.

The cause of religion has suffered deeply from the schism between it and civilization, we may say, between it and humanity. The friends of religion seem to be more oppressed with a sense of the weakness and degeneracy of human nature, than encouraged by a sense of its innate greatness and dignity. Our spiritual directors are afraid to place a generous confidence in nature, and think it necessary to keep it always in leading-strings. They do not, indeed, maintain that all our instincts are corrupt, and that every spontaneous motion of the soul is satanic. They admit that in themselves they are good, but fear the consequences of giving them a free and open field. They thus begin at the earliest moment to restrain, prune, trim, and train them to the stiffness, and artificiality of a French parterre. They render the heart and soul constrained and artificial, and consequently weak and helpless when the moral storm or tempest comes to sweep over them. We know that even what is good in our nature, if left to itself, runs wild, and that everywhere the garden of nature needs the gardener to dress it. But in dressing it he should not destroy it. He should follow the principle of all true landscape gardening, that of preserving the plan or the *idea* of nature, and only prune away the excesses or excrescences, which only obscure that idea, and hinder its free and full development. We have too much direction, and not enough of self confidence and self-growth. We are too tenderly nursed, too carefully guarded, and, in a word, governed too much. We grow up in religion weak and timid, not strong and courageous. We are greenhouse plants, and fade and melt away, when removed from the conservatory to the open air and

light of heaven. We thrive only by artificial heat, and can bear the light only as it comes to us through glass cases. We yield ever so innocently to nature only with a feeling that we are doing wrong, or at least are falling into an imperfection. If we have looked with a high degree of pleasure on a lovely landscape, a gorgeous sunset, or a master-piece of art, we feel, if we are striving after Christian perfection, that we should go and ask our director, if the pleasure was not a sin or an imperfection. God forbid that we should in any respect undervalue, or lead others to undervalue spiritual direction, a thing which the wisest and best of our race need. It is not that we speak against direction, but against the want of self-reliance, of self-help, and the feeling that in nothing which belongs to religion can we think for ourselves, and follow our own honest convictions. We can confess only to the priest, we can have the holy sacrifice, and receive holy communion only from the hands of the priest; but we may have thought, good sense, understanding, knowledge of our religion by the exercise of our own faculties, and the assiduous study of the principles of our religion as taught in the catechism, without running every moment to trouble our ghostly father with questions which every moderately instructed mind is capable of deciding for itself.

There is no doubt that all or nearly all Catholics in this country believe and firmly hold that the Catholic religion and republicanism in the state can coexist in perfect harmony. We do not recollect to have ever heard a single Catholic express a serious opinion to the contrary. But, we apprehend, very few amongst us are able to give a clear and distinct statement of the principle which harmonizes them. To one who denies it, they point to San Marino, the oldest republic in the world, to the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, to the opinions of some Catholic doctors, and to the general devotion of Catholics here to our democratic institutions. This is all very well as far as it goes, but that is not far, and by no means reaches the heart of the question. It only proves that men who are Catholics do sometimes support republicanism, and are not condemned by the church for so doing. But it does not show on what principle the church and the republic are harmonized, and therefore gives no scientific solution of the problem. It is not seldom that Catholics act on one set of principles in their religion, and on a different, if not a contradictory, set of principles in their politics. It is not every

man who brings his whole intellectual life into dialectic harmony, and we apprehend that the majority even of Catholics in our own country feel that there is more or less discrepancy between the principles of their religion and their political convictions which they get over by saying to themselves, either that religion has nothing to do with politics, or that politics have nothing to do with religion. If they thought much of the matter, and analyzed their own intellectual state, they would perceive that there is a schism in their intellectual life, and that in point of fact their religion tends to detach them from their politics, and their politics tend to detach them from their religion. Pious, devout Catholics with tender consciences keep clear of the political arena, and Catholics who engage deeply in politics soon become of little worth in the church. This shows that they have not found or do not understand the principle which makes them both parts of one whole

Republicanism should be taken in a liberal sense, as the government of law, not of men. Under a republic the obedience is not rendered to the man, but to the law he represents. Carry this principle into religion, and the church and the republic are harmonized without a compromise on either side. Republicanism stands opposed not necessarily to monarchy, but to despotism, and the difference between the two is that in the despotism the man is obeyed as the living law, and in the republic as its minister or representative. Obedience to man is servility, is slavery, utterly subversive of all true manhood; obedience to law is, on the contrary, freedom, true liberty, and no more repugnant to true manliness than is obedience to God himself. The characteristic of republican freedom is not in the absence of obedience or even subjection, but in the absence of all obedience or subjection to men as such. This principle is as applicable in the church as in the state. Undoubtedly in the church obedience is and must be exacted, but not to men. The pontificate and the sacerdocy are divine, inherent in the Word made flesh, and men are only their ministers, so to speak, their representatives. The priest when ordained receives the priesthood, which we must reverence and obey as sacred and divine, but the man himself we reverence only for the sake of his office, as we reverence the fragile vase in which a precious treasure is deposited. No doubt great reverence and honor should be paid to the man for sake of the priest, and to avoid all disrespect to the sacred and divine treasure of which he is the depositary, even in case he is personally unworthy; but our

obedience is due only to the law of which he is the organ. Thus we show honor and respect in the state to the governor or president, for the sake of his office, or the high trusts with which he is invested; but we owe him and pay him obedience only in his official capacity, as the minister of the law. The principle, therefore, is the same in the church and in the state, and we are not obliged to leave our republican principles at the door, when we enter her temple.

Now what we want, and what we suspect Père Lacordaire wanted and labored to effect, is to bring the whole Catholic public up to this principle, and to harmonize in their conceptions, feelings, and habits, manliness and obedience, submission to authority with conscious freedom. He as well as we would wipe out the last vestiges of that old servility generated not by the obedience the church exacts, but by the submission insisted on by political despotism, and which was transferred from the world of politics to the sacred sphere of religion. As long as the state remains despotic in its constitution, and the prince is not the representative of the majesty of the state, but the state itself, the living law, the people will remain servile in their dispositions, and will want the manliness, the energy to assert and maintain the freedom and independence of the church. The church will in her turn be affected, impeded in her operations, and shorn of her civilizing power by the same despotism that weighs upon the people, and be forced to speak only in the tones of consolation, to preach patience and resignation, and bid the poor suffering millions to be contented with what they suffer here, in view of the joys and glory of heaven hereafter, to which they may, if faithful, hope finally to attain. The people thus become before the church what they are before the state. The remedy for the evil is only in crushing the despotism of the state, in instituting a free state, and creating free citizens. Hence it is that we maintain that the freedom of the church is secured only in the freedom of the state. It is only in freeing the state that you can free men, and it is only free men that can yield a free, enlightened, and voluntary obedience, or have the strength, the energy, the courage to assert the freedom of the church.

But till the faithful throw off their servile habits, and understand their freedom and its conditions, they cannot be either good republicans or good Catholics. As long as they retain them, the practical influence of the clergy will for the

most part be on the side of despotism, and unfavorable to the introduction of republicanism where it is not, or to its preservation and development where it is. What is now most necessary to be done is, in our republican country, not to republicanize the church, but to republicanize Catholics, and harmonize them in their religious character with their character as republicans in the state; and, in despotic states, to imbue them with a sincere love of liberty in the interest both of religion and civilization. This is the significance, as we understand it, of what Montalembert calls the Catholic *renaissance* in France. Our own country presents a fair and open field for this *renaissance*, for the union of religion with civilization, and that new Catholic development which will restore to the church the nations she has lost, give her back the leadership of human intelligence, and secure her the willing obedience and love of mankind.

It was to this end that the eloquent Dominican devoted his entire life, and set an example worthy of our imitation. Those who follow his example must expect to be misapprehended, misinterpreted, and opposed by men high in place, distinguished for their abilities, and worthy of respect for their many virtues. But let not this move them, or sadden their hearts. Above all, let them do justice to the motives and the real worth of those who opposed them, and never suppose because God has given them a special mission, or because under the operations of divine providence they have been led to see things not given to all to see, that they are necessarily intellectually or morally superior to their enemies. Let them do their work freely, faithfully, bravely, utter the truth they see, do the good they are called to do, but with love to all, without acrimony to any, and without attempting to forestall the judgments of Almighty God. They who differ from us may often deserve as much respect and affection as we, even though we are right and they wrong.

CATHOLICITY, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1862.]

We do not insert the name of the accomplished and gifted translator of this remarkable essay by the late Donoso Cortés, for we do not know whether it is her intention to publish it with her name, or not, the work being not yet out, and we having before us only 16 pages of the advanced sheets. We however, commend her for having sought consolations amidst the troubles of her country, and her own private griefs in translating for her countrymen so valuable a work and one so much needed at the present time to be read and studied, as the profound and eloquent essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism, certainly one of the very few truly excellent works our age has produced, and, in the original, one of the most eloquent books to be found in Spanish, or in any other language that we are acquainted with, while its theme is the loftiest, the profoundest, the most comprehensive that can engage the thoughts of the philosopher, the statesman, the citizen, the Christian, or the man.

Donoso Cortés was a great man, a man of true genius, and deserves to rank in the first class of the really eminent men of our time. Like nearly all the men who in our days have risen to eminence and been remarkable for the richness and firmness of their faith, and the sincerity and depth of their devotion, his youth, though he was born of Catholic parents and piously educated, was overcast with doubts and perplexities as to the Christian faith, and for a time marked, if not by unbelief, yet by a lamentable religious indifference. At length, domestic afflictions brought him to reflection, and reflection restored him to faith; he became understandingly as well as lovingly a Christian, and one of the most fervent and influential Catholic laymen of Europe. With him faith was not a mere sentiment, religion a mere feeling, but a deep and profound conviction in which his whole nature as a man sympathized and took part. He was a Catholic from conviction, not from inheritance only, and understood and could give a

* *Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism, considered in their fundamental principles.* By DONOSO CORTÉS, MARQUIS DE VALDEGAMAS. Translated from the Spanish. Philadelphia: 1862.

reason for the faith that was in him. His genius was synthetic, and no man in modern times, if we except his illustrious contemporary, the much decried and calumniated Vincenzo Gioberti, has more clearly seen, or more firmly grasped the Christian synthesis, which embraces in one living whole God and creation, nature and grace, religion, the church, society, family, and the state. His high position as a senator of Spain, and ambassador of the Spanish government to various foreign courts, as well as his personal character, so true, so gentle, so energetic, so disinterested and self-sacrificing, gave weight to his words, while his rare eloquence charmed and to a great extent captivated for a few brief years his age, and gave a new impulse to Catholic thought. Too brief was his career, too soon he died for us, but not too brief or too soon for himself, for he died in the Lord, and his works do follow him.

In early life, in the freshness of youth and opening of manhood, Donoso Cortés was a Spanish liberal, and though he subsequently despaired of liberty in the sense he had at first hoped to secure it, yet never did he cease to breathe a free spirit, or to labor for what he held to be true freedom. There are passages scattered through his works, which indicate his loss of confidence in constitutional guaranties, and so-called parliamentary governments, and that he was prepared to take refuge from the evils of his times in monarchy, unlimited save by moral and religious restraints; but no man ever lived who held despotism in greater detestation, or who was prepared to make greater sacrifices for genuine liberty. He saw or thought he saw, in the revolutions of 1848, in the prevailing social uneasiness and political convulsions of the times, a breaking up of social order, and a return towards barbarism, and he felt the need of authority, of power, of a strong concentrated government able to compress the dissolving tendencies, and to hold society back from absolute ruin, till reason, religion, and Catholic instruction could resume their legitimate empire over the rebellious and licentious populations of Christian Europe. Notwithstanding what we see at this moment in our own country, notwithstanding the demand, as yet only whispered, for a dictatorship to save us from the weakness and vacillation of the administration, which threaten the existence of the nation, and create at home and abroad the impression that our experiment in behalf of free government has failed, because under its influence intelligence and virtue have declined; we, for ourselves, hold fast our old con-

victions, and retain our confidence in constitutional government, and think the Spanish statesman too easily desponded, and allowed himself to go too far in his advocacy of a strong government, and the centralization of power. If we were forced to choose between them, we should prefer to come under the federative order, contended for by the so-called confederacy, to coming under the centralized despotism of Philip II., Louis XIV., or Napoleon III. Better Jefferson Davis than a dictator, whether that dictator be William H. Seward or George B. McClellan, or Abraham Lincoln; better state sovereignty with republican organization than the maintenance of national sovereignty by means of a military or any other despotism. Yet it was not despotism the Marquis de Valdegamas loved, but it was liberty through republican and parliamentary systems he despaired of; and if he approved the assumption of supreme power by the French president, he saw that under imperial centralism he had and could have no place; he withdrew from the public, sought occupation and consolation in his religious exercises, in visiting the sick, and in ministering to the poor and the afflicted, and soon died, clothed with the habit of a Jesuit; fitting end for a man who loves liberty and despairs of obtaining it for the world through political action or combinations

Donoso Cortés was a theologian formed by the study of the Holy Scriptures and the fathers, not by the exclusive study of the later scholastics, and the compendiums of modern professors. Hence he was most furiously attacked by French abbés, especially the Abbé Gaduel, a man of more learning than knowledge, who undertook to prove him heretical, or at least unsound in the faith. But these French abbés, though clever as all Frenchmen are, never understood, and could not understand the depth and the reach of the Spaniard's thought, and therefore very naturally concluded that it must be unorthodox. Moreover he had borrowed his terminology from the Scriptures and the fathers, not the schools in which they had been educated, and therefore could not fail to fall under their suspicion. This fact is, that there has grown up amongst us in later times, a very rigid, but narrow and shallow theology, which a great many amongst us confound with Catholic faith itself, and whoever departs from it, in any direction, or fails to adopt its dry and frigid terminology, is at once assumed to be unsound in doctrine, disloyal to the church, at least deserving to be censured as rash, bad sounding in his expres-

sions, or offensive to pious ears. Under the rod of *temerarium, male sonans*, offensive to pious ears, our pedantic abbés, our theological *petits maîtres*, attempt to lash almost every generous spirit, every really thinking student, who aspires to a free, living theology, into subjection to their hide-bound and cramping systems, which squeeze the very life out of them. Both faith and theology suffer from their pedantry and intolerance.

The system of theology, which is the most generally adopted at present in Catholic schools, is that taught or patronized by the fathers of the Society of Jesus, and there is a very wide feeling among honest and devout Catholics, that to depart from any thing approved by the fathers of the society, is to depart from what is approved by the church herself. Yet we should do well to bear in mind, that, while Catholic faith is always and everywhere one and the same, embraced alike by all, there are among us various systems of theology, which often differ very widely one from another. Every Catholic is free, according to his own convictions, to follow any one of these systems or schools, or to differ from them all, so long as he does not contravene the Catholic faith, or Catholic dogma. A man may be a Molinist, a Thomist, or an Augustinian, defend the *scientia media*, or assert the *premotio physica*, and yet be irreproachable as a Catholic believer. Theology is not faith, nor is any system of theology or philosophy a divine revelation. Every system of theology or philosophy is a human science, the production of the human faculties operating on divine things supernaturally revealed, or cognizable by the light of reason, and is subject to the fallibility common to all our faculties. No man, no number of men, no school, no religious order or congregation has any right to set up its peculiar system of theology or philosophy as a test of orthodoxy, or to require conformity to it on pain of being decried as a disloyal or suspected Catholic. The early fathers of the Society of Jesus were great men, and good men; they thought freely for themselves, and gave currency to a theology which, with various modifications, has since become that of the society itself. It is permissible for the society to hold and teach it, but it is not Catholic doctrine, to differ from which is heresy; it is only the society's views of Catholic doctrine; its systematic and logical explanations of it, and deductions from it. Through various causes this system is very widely accepted, and most of our seminarians are trained in it, whether they are Jesuits or not. We complain not of this; we only com-

plain of the attempt, unconsciously made perhaps, to impose this system upon us as authoritative, and to denounce as unsound in the faith those who do not see fit to accept it, or prefer to follow a different school.

For ourselves, we are not, in all things, a disciple of the Jesuits' school of theology. We regard their system as the weakest and least philosophical of all the systems of Catholic theology that have been emitted. We do not accept the *scientia media*, for we know no medium between God and man but the creative act of God, and unless man has proper creative power, God is and must be the determining cause of all that is good and positive in the action of creatures, and therefore must know all things in knowing his own determinations. We, therefore, prefer the doctrine of the *præmotio physica*, or that the determining cause of whatever is good and positive in creatures, is God himself; but a determining cause that in man determines him as a free second cause, not as bound by the law of fate or necessity. The Jesuit may differ from me, refute me by natural reason, or by what is called the *ratio theologica*, if he can, but he must not denounce me, or pretend that I am unsound in the faith, for my opinion is as free in the church as his; nor is it permitted me to denounce or defame him, for his opinion is as free as mine. In regard to the *status naturæ puræ*, original sin, natural beatitude, &c., we go with the Augustinians, rather than with the Jesuits. We hold their system of theology to be profounder, more philosophical, and more consonant with the attributes of God, and the unity and simplicity of the divine action in creation, redemption, regeneration, and glorification than are the teachings of Molina and other fathers of the society. Under the influence of the society, as we believe, theology has become a dead science, and the Catholic world has shrunk to very narrow dimensions, which are daily becoming narrower; while under the influence of the profounder and more comprehensive theologies of earlier times, the clergy conquered the world, and led the human race. In this fact we see the interpretation of that hostility which the society incurs even from Catholics. Yet the Jesuits individually are learned men, able men, excellent, pious, devoted, self-sacrificing men, whom to know is to love and to venerate; and the theology they teach is unquestionably permitted by the church, who neither approves nor condemns formally any system of theology, unless the rights of dogma are in question.

Donoso Cortés had grand theological conceptions, which he always expressed with a living and energetic eloquence, but not always with what, in our times, is regarded as strict verbal accuracy. In a few instances he is not fully master of his own thought, and fails to vindicate it to ordinary minds. He seeks the origin and type of creation, of family, of the state, of society, in God as the ever-blessed Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in which he is eminently philosophical, and eminently Catholic. God is the origin and type of all created existences, and in him are and must be the principles of all the relations which do or can subsist among them, since he is universal creator, origin, cause, exemplar, and end of all things. In the Trinity we must seek the principle of generation, production, reproduction, perfection, or consummation, and, consequently, not sex, as the heathen did, but the principle of sex, essential to production, or development in the natural order. In this principle is the origin and ground of natural human society, as in grace is the origin and ground of supernatural human society or the church, whose ministers are rightly and felicitously called *fathers*, spiritual fathers, fathers of the spiritual life. But not having penetrated into the divine mystery of the Trinity as far as reason operating on revealed *data* can go, he presents this grand doctrine in a confused and imperfect form, which, under some points of view, may seem objectionable. We extract what he says on this point, and which the Abbé Gaduel considered as a denial of the Trinity itself.

“The same God, who is the author and governor of civil society, has also created and regulated domestic society. Placed in the most hidden, the highest, the purest, and the brightest of the celestial regions, is a tabernacle, which is inaccessible even to the choirs of the angels. In this unapproachable tabernacle is perpetually enacted the prodigy of prodigies, and the mystery of mysteries. There dwells the Catholic God, one and triune: one in essence, three in person. The Son is coeternal with and engendered by the Father; and the Holy Ghost is coeternal with and proceeds from the Father and the Son; and the Holy Ghost is God, and the Son is God, and the Father is God; and God has no plural, because there is only one God, three in person and one in substance. The Holy Ghost is God even as the Father is God, but He is not the Father; He is God even as the Son is God, but He is not the Son. The Son is God even as the Holy Ghost is God, but He is not the Holy Ghost; He is God even as the Father is God, but He is not the Father. The Father is God even as the Son is God, but He is not the Son; He is God even as the Holy Ghost is God, but He is not the Holy Ghost. The Father is omnipotence; the Son is wisdom; the Holy Ghost is love; and the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are infinite love, supreme power, and perfect wisdom. Their unity, expanding perpetually,

begets variety, and variety in self-condensation is perpetually resolved into unity. God is thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; and He is the supreme thesis, the perfect antithesis, the infinite synthesis. Because He is one, He is God; because He is God, He is perfect; because He is perfect, He is most fruitful; because He is most fruitful, He is diversity; because He is diversity, He is the family. In his essence exist, in an inexpressible and incomprehensible manner, the laws of creation, and the exemplars of all things. Every thing has been made in his image, and, therefore creation is one and many. He is the universal word, which implies unity and variety combined in one. Man was made by God, and in his image, and not only in his image, but also in his likeness; and for this reason man is one in essence, and represents a sort of trinity of persons. Eve proceeds from Adam, Abel is begotten by Adam and Eve, and Adam and Eve are the same thing; they are man, they are human nature. Adam is man the father, Eve is man the woman, Abel is man the son. Eve is man as Adam, but she is not the father; she is man as Abel, but she is not the son. Adam is man as Abel without being the son, and as Eve without being the woman. Abel is man as Eve without being the woman, and as Adam, without being the father.

"All these names are divine, even as the functions which they signify are divine. The idea of paternity, the foundation of the family, could not have had its origin in the human mind. No fundamental differences exist, in the relation between father and son, of sufficient importance to constitute in themselves a right. Priority is simply a fact, and nothing more; and the same thing may be said of power; and both united cannot of themselves make the right of paternity, although they may originate another fact, that of servitude. This fact supposed, the proper name of father is *master*, as that of son is *slave*. This truth, which reason suggests to us, is confirmed by history. Among those nations who have forgotten the biblical traditions, the title of paternity has ever been but the synonym for domestic tyranny. If there could have existed a nation forgetful, on the one hand, of those great traditions, and on the other, neglecting the worship of material power, among this people the fathers and sons would have been, and would have called themselves, brothers. Paternity comes from God, and can alone exist through him, either in name or in reality. Had God permitted an entire oblivion of all paradisiacal traditions, mankind would have lost even the name of this institution.

"The family relation is divine in its institution and in its nature, and has everywhere shared the vicissitudes of Catholic civilization; and it is very certain that the purity or the corruption of the first is invariably an infallible symptom of a corresponding condition of the second; as the history of the various vicissitudes and changes of the latter becomes equally the history of similar alternations in the former.

"In Catholic ages, the family relation tends to the highest degree of excellence; its human element is spiritualized, and the cloister takes the place of the domestic circle. While in the domestic life children reverently submit to their father and mother; the inmates of cloisters, with a still greater reverence and submission, bathe with their tears the sacred feet of a better Father, and the holy habit of a more tender mother. When Catholic civilization is no longer in the ascendant and begins to decline, the family relation immediately becomes impaired, its constitution vitiated, its elements disunited, and all its ties enfeebled. The father and mother whom God had united in the bonds of affection, substitute for this sacred tie a severe formality; while the children lose that filial reverence enjoined upon them by God, and a sacrilegious familiarity usurps its place. The ties which unite the family are loosened, de-

based, and profaned. Finally, they become obliterated, the family disperses, and is lost in the circles of the clubs and places of amusement.

"The history of the family may be traced in a few words. The divine family is the exemplar and model of the human family, and all its persons are eternal. The spiritual human family, which most closely approaches the divine in perfection, exists through all time. Between the father and mother in the natural human family the tie lasts during life; and between them and their children it is prolonged many years. But in the human anti-Catholic family the relation between the father and mother lasts only some years; between them and the children only some months; in the artificial family of clubs only a day; and in that place of amusement but for a moment.

"In this, as in many other things, duration is the measure of perfection. Between the divine family and the human family of the cloister, we find the same proportion as between time and eternity. When we compare the spiritual family of the cloister, which is the most perfect human type, and the sensual life of the clubs, which is the most imperfect, we again find the same proportion, as between the brevity of a moment, and the immensity of all time." pp. 36-40.

There are grave defects in this statement, and the human trinity presented as the copy of the divine lacks exactness, and indicates that the author has not sufficiently grasped the principle of the interior, essential, and eternal progression of the divine being, by virtue of which he is inherently active, living being, or as the schoolmen say, most pure act, *actus purissimus*; but the thought itself is profoundly philosophical and truly Catholic, and it was only the lack of a more perfect mastery of the *prima theologia*, almost wholly neglected in our days, that could have made the good Abbé Gaduel suspect it of heterodoxy. The human trinity as presented may not correspond to the divine in all its parts as the copy to the exemplar, but it is clear that the author accepts in good faith the doctrine of the Trinity, and founds every thing on it, as he should do. What has happened to Donoso Cortés has happened and will happen to others, to all who are borne by the order of their genius, the temperament of their minds, or the character of their studies, to leave the beaten track, and to labor to advance or elevate thought, or to gain a free and fuller comprehension of divine things, than that which generally obtains. God redeems the world by dying for it, and all who would serve humanity must imitate him. The world always crucifies its redeemers, and crucifies them between two thieves, not to indicate that it crucifies them as redeemers, but as criminals. Therefore, said our Lord, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." It is precisely in what we in these sentences have done that the misunderstanding begins. We have here given a general application to par-

ticular revealed facts, and the theological *petits maîtres* at once conclude, with their peculiar logic, that because we deduce general truths from the individual facts, we deny the facts themselves, or simply resolve them, after the manner of the rationalists, into general propositions or rational truths. Thus, if we speak of the Word as incarnated in the race, they at once conclude that we deny his incarnation in the individual, as if the race could subsist without the individual, or that Christ was an individual man hypostatically united to the divine person. So, if we deduce a universal truth from a miracle recorded in the Bible, they conclude that we deny the miracle as a fact, and are simply rationalists. They cannot understand that we are synthetists, not mere analysts.

Now, we accept the simple facts, the simple defined dogmas in all sincerity, and in precisely the literal, definite sense in which they are accepted by our pedantic and literalistic theologians and by the vulgar; but we take also, as they seem not to be able to do, the facts as symbols of ideas or universal truths, and the dogmas as universal principles. Because we believe more than they do, they suppose we believe less: because we see more in the facts and dogmas than they see, we are presumed to see in them nothing at all. Here is the source of the misunderstanding between them and us, and the reason why we find bishops and priests, as well as journalists denouncing us as uncatholic, or as evidently under the influence of an heretical tendency. Did not the high priest say it was better that our Lord should die than that the whole nation should perish? Is it not better that we should be denounced and defamed than that the faith of the least of those little ones should be endangered? Certainly. If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his household. But they are the wicked Jews, misbelieving heretics, or besotted pagans, never Catholics, who do these things! Yet what our Lord said, he said for all times, and the faults he rebuked in the synagogue are faults in the church, and are hardly less common in the new than they were in the old. The fact is, we take it, as did the fathers, the great facts recorded in the Bible are not only particular facts, individual facts, and to be accepted as such, but also facts symbolic of great ideas, and of the general laws of divine providence, and therefore, may and should teach us something beyond what the literalists see in them. The dogmas of the church are all Catholic, and if Catholic, universal

principles, and susceptible of a universal sense and application.

Here meet the men we call literalists, and the rationalists. The literalists see only the particular facts and isolated dogmas, and confine themselves as far as possible to the strict letter. So taken the facts and dogmas appear arbitrary, capricious, unmeaning, and remain unproductive. They are the dry bones, not the living body of truth. They have no soul, for their soul is in their union and relation with God, the living truth itself. Repelled by the literalists, the rationalists reject the letter altogether, and take only the general principles and truths which the facts and dogmas are supposed to symbolize. They thus render all religion subjective, abstract, without any concrete or objective reality or support. Either class is fatal to religion. What we aim at is the real and sincere acceptance of the letter with the literalists, but at the same time as significant of universal or Catholic truth. We wish to show that the individual facts are pregnant, that the dogmas of the church are not arbitrary, capricious, and isolated assertions, but great and living principles subsisting and operating in the system of things of which we are a part. This is what we have aimed to do, and what has led to so much misunderstanding of our views by well-meaning and fervent Catholics, but who never look beyond the mere letter. It is what was attempted with perhaps greater success than by any other man in modern times by Gioberti in Italy. It is what, under certain aspects, was attempted by Balmes in Spain, what, under other aspects, is attempted by Montalembert in France, by Kuhn and Froeschammer in Germany, by the editors of the *Home and Foreign Review* in England, and by every really living man, rising above routine, now in the church. This was the great work of the lamented Donoso Cortés, of which the essay before us is a splendid, a most valuable, though not an absolutely faultless monument.

The translator could not in the actual state of theological controversy among us, have selected a better or a more opportune work. It must be received by all thinking men with gratitude, and be read with avidity. The school of Alexandria triumphed over that of St. Irenæus, and will continue to do so whatever opposition the literalists may offer. Donoso Cortés will give a new impulse to theological thought in this country, and elevate controversy to a higher and serener region than that in which it is now carried on. For her part, the

translator has performed her task with taste and fidelity, and given us one of the very best translations to be found in our language. As far as we have compared the translation with the original, it is remarkably exact. It is also free, spirited, and elegant, and the author suffers very little from his English dress. The most eloquent book we ever read, it is hardly less eloquent in the translation than in the original. The most gifted and accomplished lady has evidently translated it as a labor of love, but we hope a discerning public will appreciate and reward her labor.

FROSCHAMMER ON THE FREEDOM OF SCIENCE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1862.]

THIS is the title of a philosophical and scientific Review that has recently made its appearance in Germany, under the editorship of Dr. J. Froschammer, professor of philosophy in the University of Munich. It first met our eye on a casual visit to Westermann & Co., well-known foreign booksellers of this city, and we were at once struck with the author's clear comprehension of the problem of the church in our age. How to restore science and genius to the position they once held in her bosom?—in other words, how to determine, on true and comprehensive principles, the relation of science to faith,—of philosophy to theology? Indeed this problem may be regarded as the *intellectual* phase of the great question of nature and grace, just as the *moral* phase of the same question has been determined by defining the relation of free-will to grace. The world has marvelled at the vast amount of learning and science that has been brought to bear on this latter question before a true mean was struck between Pelagius and his adherents on the one hand, and Baius and Jansenius on the other. And it would seem that, in our day, a contest no less laborious is in preparation, before the dualism between the natural and supernatural in the matter of faith and science is brought into harmony without compromising the legitimate sphere of either.

* *Athenæum*. DR. J. FROSCHAMMER. Munich: 1862.
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Professor Kuhn of Tübingen, in his *Katholische Dogmatik*, published some few years ago, one of the ablest writers in our day, was the first we met with in Catholic Germany to assert and maintain the independence of science, or its right to be governed by its own laws. He was attacked in an elaborate pamphlet by Dr. Clemens, professor of philosophy at Münster who in turn advocated the common traditional doctrine, that science is but the handmaid of theology, and as such, of course, should take its principles from faith, and be governed in its conclusions entirely by the dogmas of the church. We read Professor Kuhn's rejoinder at the time, now some two years since; and until the present publication of Professor Froschammer fell into our hands, we had met with nothing superior in our German reading.

Dr. Froschammer sees clearly enough that it is the dearth of such philosophical studies as are based on the free legitimate use of our mental faculties that has brought the church into antagonism with the science that is outside of her, and has hampered and emasculated whatever of science there is within her—and the task is, to labor to restore science to its independent position—to give back to it the vigor and legitimate sway it held in the apologetic age of the church, when Justin Martyr and his compeers came freighted with the spoils of Grecian philosophy to aid in defending, in unfolding, and in consolidating her doctrine.

Of Professor Froschammer himself we have no knowledge except what we derive from his works—of these, *die Freiheit der Wissenschaft*, Freedom of Science, *die Aufgabe der Naturphilosophie und ihr Verhältniss zur Naturwissenschaft*, the Problem of Natural Philosophy and its relation to Natural Science, and the one at the head of this article, are all that we have read. They, however, make it clear enough to us that he is one of the leading minds of Catholic Germany, and is destined by his extensive scientific and philosophical learning, by his logical strength and acuteness, and his bold, independent thought, to exercise no ordinary influence upon his country and his age. He has entered upon his work, fully aware of the number and power of the enemies he must encounter, and what is better still, fully armed for their assaults. Certainly if he can sustain himself against future opponents as ably as the *Athenäum* attests he has done with *The Catholic*, one of the first to make an onslaught upon him, he will prove in the end a true benefactor to the church and society,—such a one as

she would have been glad to hail for these many generations. No one can read his scathing replies to the old timeworn objections of *The Catholic*,—his complete riddling of the defences it relied upon as impregnable, without a feeling of joy that “a strong man, armed” has come to lift off the load of oppression that has kept science and reason manacled within the church for so long a period, and that this emancipation comes from the hand of a priest (such the remark of his opponent would lead us to conjecture) makes it none the less welcome by reason of our own poor efforts in the same cause.

His work entitled *Freiheit der Wissenschaft*, or Freedom of Science, goes to show, in the first place, that science, especially philosophy, must have freedom, that is, be free to follow its own laws; laws which are essential to its very existence; that these laws constitute therefore its *natural right*, without which science itself ceases, since only constraint and arbitrariness can rule in its place. Therefore even within the Catholic Church, this freedom of science must be granted so long as she admits and does not exclude and repudiate science itself. Without this freedom the church must fall into contradiction with herself, for while on the one hand she would admit science to exist, and even seek to foster it, on the other, by depriving it of its natural rights or the very conditions of existence, she would render it impossible. In the second place, science must be free, must follow the law of its nature (which only herself can find out and determine) because the perfection of science could not otherwise be seriously sought and attained. On this ground also must the Catholic Church allow freedom of science, otherwise that ideal of science could not be actualized on which she relies to show the accordance of science with faith; since this ideal is not attainable by mere obedience, submission, and belief, but is striven after and reached only by means purely scientific. Finally, in the third place, he shows that, apart from the pure standpoint of science and of its interests, it lies in the interest of Christian faith and of the church herself, to possess and perfect a science which brings the facts of revelation—faith, its contents and authority itself, to the test of a proof that is free and independent of faith, and resting upon natural principles, in order to bring home faith to the natural consciousness, to the reason of the unbeliever, to legitimate it, and to defend and vindicate it against the attacks of its enemies. He further goes on to show that such a science has at all times been assumed in the Christian Church, and it is

from these principles that Christian science has taken its rise, and which, adapting itself to all the changes and necessities of the times, gives birth to that natural and apologetic science always fostered by the fathers, and which has continually been perfecting itself, and which will and must become further perfected and remodelled, so long as it is deemed allowable, indeed, necessary, that natural power and activities should operate effectively in the preservation and advancement of Christianity.

REFORM AND REFORMERS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1863].

A RIGHT REVEREND Prelate, for whom we have a profound esteem, and who in all our difficulties has treated us with singular kindness and forbearance, writes us that he is displeased with the manner in which we spoke of Dr. Froshammer in our *Review* for last October, and assures us that we were quite mistaken in our estimate both of the author and of his works. We can only say in our vindication, that when we wrote the article referred to we knew of Dr. Froshammer, a priest, and a professor of philosophy in the University of Munich, only what we stated in our remarks; and that we had no intention of holding ourselves responsible for all the views he might have published, nor indeed for all the views contained even in the extract we made from his defence of himself against the attacks made on him by a German periodical called *The Catholic*. We recognized in him a bold, vigorous, and independent writer, apparently doing brave battle for the freedom of Catholic science against a policy which seems to us to repress Catholic genius and talent, and to give the lead in literature and the sciences to the enemies of our faith, to the serious injury of both religion and civilization; we also found *The Catholic* attacking him with arguments drawn not from reason and revelation, from a solid

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1. *Einleitung in die Philosophie und Grundriss der Metaphysik; Zur Reform der Philosophie.* Von Dr. J. FROSHAMMER. München: 1858.
 2. *Menschenseele und Physiologie. Eine Streitschrift gegen Professor Carl Vogt in Genf.* Von Dr. FROSHAMMER. München: 1855.

and comprehensive theology; but from egotism, passion, prejudice, or the popular opinion of the time or place, in the arrogant, criminative, and declamatory style too often adopted by our Catholic journals and periodicals; and we felt that, up to a certain point at least, he and we were engaged in the same great and necessary work, and that we could do no less than greet him as a fellow-laborer and proffer him our sympathy.

Moreover in judging an author we aim to distinguish between inaccuracies and errors which are simply incidental, and affect only some detail or illustration, and such as are fundamental in the author's doctrine, and enter into his systematic thought. The author may be orthodox notwithstanding the former, for his error may be due simply to inadvertence, and would be corrected the moment his attention should be turned to its direct consideration. Pope St. Clement, the companion and friend of St. Peter and St. Paul, in one of his epistles to the Corinthians, introduces the fable of the Phoenix, without any intimation or apparent consciousness that it is a fable; shall we therefore, pronounce his epistle unorthodox, and condemn it as teaching error? Not at all, although the fable contradicts the universal law of reproduction, because it was not the design of the epistle to teach the error it involves. He used the fable simply as an illustration. Fénelon wrote his *Maxims of the Saints* to guard the true doctrine of divine love against the errors of the quietists on the one hand, and those of their partially instructed opponents on the other. He erred simply in his language, which was for the most part borrowed from writers canonized by the church, and especially from St. Francis de Sales. Must we, therefore, censure St. Francis de Sales, and the other saints whose language Fénelon borrowed, as unorthodox, as quietists? Fénelon's own doctrine was never condemned, only some of his expressions were censured. The Roman theologians could do no less than censure them, as susceptible of a false and heretical sense, when brought by the mortified vanity and offended pride of the great Bossuet directly to the notice of the Holy See; but the Christian world has never approved the conduct of Bossuet, on whose reputation the whole affair remains and will for ever remain a blot, for his own errors on the subject were vastly greater than any of which he ventured to accuse the archbishop of Cambrai. Fénelon was by far the sounder theologian as well as the more amiable man of the two. We regard it as the mark of an ill-natured, a narrow-minded, or carping

critic to read a book simply to find in it something that he can pounce upon, and hold up to public execration as unsound in morals or incorrect in theology. Such a critic gains credit for a zeal for orthodoxy simply by gratifying his petty vanity, spite, or ill-nature. The great aim of the generous and noble-minded Catholic critic is to recognize what there is in his author that is true and good, worthy of commendation, and to pass lightly over small or incidental errors, for our great work is not so much to avoid error as to bring out and appropriate truth.

We marked in Dr. Froschammer expressions and even thoughts that we did not and could not approve; but we did not call attention to them at the time, because we were introducing and not criticising him; because at the time we intended to return to him soon, and attempt a fair and just appreciation of his works; and because we hoped we should find, on further examination, that what we disapproved was more in the expression than the thought, or, even if in the thought, incidental to his main purpose rather than entering into that purpose itself. Since then, we have made ourselves better acquainted with the author. He has himself been so obliging as to send us the two works named at the head of this article for which he will accept our thanks; and we have more critically examined those of his works previously in our possession, and have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the error is not with him simply incidental, but fundamental, and in his systematic thought itself. The alleged fact that his works have been placed on the index, and that his periodical has been prohibited, which we have just heard of, undoubtedly weighs and ought to weigh something with us, and would weigh much more were the index published in this country, and thus made a part of the disciplinary law that we are bound to obey; but his doctrine of the freedom of science goes further, if possible, than that of our friend Simpson, which we have combated in the present number;* and his general theological and philosophical system, as far as we understand it, is one which we see not how the Roman theologians could suffer to pass without censure. We go as far in the direction of free thought, free speech, and freedom of science, as any man can who remembers the real relations between rational truth and revealed truth; we are heartily opposed to the short-sighted policy that, for fear of giving utterance to some slight error, represses the free development of genius, and permits one to defend

*Brownson's Works. Vol. III. pp. 565 *et seq.*

only the commonplaces of theology: and so far we are in full sympathy with Professor Froeschhammer. We also agree with him in demanding a reform both in theology and philosophy, or at least in demanding something deeper, truer, more living and life-giving than the dry, superficial, jejune, fleshless systems which our moderns have substituted for the grand thoughts of the fathers and the great doctors of the middle ages. But there is a limit beyond which we cannot pass without failing in our loyalty to truth and in our obedience to the disciplinary authority of the church.

Every man who has read our *Review* for the last four or five years knows perfectly well, without any avowal on our part, that we think a reform in theology and philosophy, and in some respects even in the discipline of the church, is needed. It is the more or less clear perception or instinct of this fact that has led to many of the hostile criticisms to which we have been subjected. These criticisms, though seldom just or candid, have neither surprised nor angered us. But we have never dreamed of any reform that should in the slightest degree affect the unity of the church in space or time, or which could not be effected in the church without any resistance to her authority, whether her authority to teach or her authority to govern. We may err on collateral matters, and frequently express ourselves without due exactness, but we have always in our heart and before our eyes the unity and catholicity of the church. We believe in national unity and therefore we oppose secession. The destruction of national unity is the destruction of the nation itself; and we hold that whatever grievances may exist, and need redressing, they must be redressed in the nation and by the nation, not by breaking away from it, subverting its authority, and making war against it. We regard every secessionist, although he may believe himself a Catholic, as a genuine Protestant,—as guilty of the precise error in regard to the nation that the Protestant or schismatical reformers in the sixteenth century were guilty of in regard to the church. We can advocate no reforms that we cannot advocate as members of the church, as loyal and obedient Catholics in her communion, and propose none to be effected in defiance of her authority, or otherwise than by her authority itself. For the same general reason that we oppose secession we oppose Protestantism, and for the same general reason that we oppose Protestantism we oppose secession; the one because it breaks the unity of the nation and resists its

authority, and the other because it breaks the unity of the church and sets her authority at naught. A *Catholic Secessionist* sounds in our ears as incongruous as a *Catholic Protestant*. Every sound statesman holds first of all to the unity of the nation, without which there is and can be no national life; and every sound theologian, or sound philosopher even, holds to the unity of the church, the body of Christ, out of which no man can live the true divine-human life of our Lord. The doctrine of state sovereignty, favored by so many of our superficial statesmen, is a heresy in politics of precisely the same nature with the Anglican heresy in theology of the independence of diocesan or particular churches, and we can, as a Catholic, no more accept the one than the other.

We do not hold that the reformers of the sixteenth century erred in demanding, or in laboring for, reforms in the church, for reforms were then needed; but they erred in seeking to effect them at the expense of Catholic dogma, Catholic unity, and Catholic authority, and any man who would do the same to-day, would justly fall under the sentence pronounced against them. Reforms can never be necessary in the church, except in relation to that which is purely human. It were absurd and blasphemous to say that any thing divine, or existing immediately by divine institution, can need reforming. But in the church as she exists in space and time there are two elements, the divine and the human; and in that which originates in and depends on the human element, reforms from time to time may become necessary, because, on the one hand, of human infirmity, and, on the other, of the changes in human affairs with which the church stands in relation. These reforms can never touch dogma, the essential constitution of the church, nor the authority of the church to teach or to govern. But they may affect practical discipline or canon law, which is always reformable, and theological and philosophical systems, which are creations of the human understanding. In these respects reforms are lawful when necessary, and important reforms under each of these heads have from time to time been effected, and, in our judgment, are needed now, both in the interests of religion and civilization, and therefore may be lawfully called for.

But there is a legal method as well as an illegal method of effecting reforms. The constitution of the United States, or of any one of the particular states, can be amended or reformed, without any breach of loyalty or of law, in the way and man-

ner it itself prescribes; but to alter, amend, or reform it in any other way would be illegal, disorderly, and revolutionary. All secessionists are revolutionists, and the nation justly makes war on them, and labors to reduce them to their allegiance. Reforms in the church, by the authority of the church, are legal, and we may advocate them in good faith, without reproach to our loyalty or suspicion of our orthodoxy. But to demand reforms, and to persist in demanding them, even when not wrong in themselves, in defiance of the governing authority of the church, is to exhibit a schismatic, and, it may be, an heretical spirit, which is incompatible with Catholic faith and loyalty. We have been opposed, not because we have demanded, or labored to effect, reforms in the church in this illegal and schismatic way; but because some had a fear that we would do so, in case we failed to get them in a legal way. In many cases such fear would be just, for even men well disposed at first are exceedingly apt, when they meet on the part of the authorities what appears to them a blind and unjust opposition, or a dogged persistance in what they believe to be an unwise and hurtful policy, to go further than they had thought of going, so far as to resist the authority itself, and break away from the unity of the church; and we have just as little doubt that the neglect or refusal of the authorities to favor the reforms we seek to effect drives large numbers out of the church, and keeps out millions who otherwise might be drawn within her fold. But in our case the fear was groundless, because we knew, before coming into the church, the best that could be offered outside, and because our philosophy and theology harmonize perfectly with our Catholic faith and our Catholic duty. It would be for us the absurdest thing in the world to go out of the church because we could not have our own way in the church. We should be as foolish and as wicked as our secessionists, indeed, infinitely more so, who, because they could not have their own way in the Union, seceded from it, and then, Protestant-like, turned round and made war on it. Under no circumstances could we be a secessionist, either in the church or state, and least of all in the church.

In matters of faith and morals we hold the church to be authoritative and infallible, by virtue of the divine presence as well as by divine appointment; in discipline, administration, or external government, we hold the church to be authoritative by immediate divine constitution, but not infallible. As

ecclesia docens, she cannot err; as *ecclesia gubernans* she may err, as may any other legitimate government; yet as the legitimate authority she is to be obeyed in what she commands, in like manner as she is to be believed as the infallible teacher in what she teaches as dogma or as pertaining to dogma. Even in the state we hold ourselves bound in conscience to obey the civil government, and to observe the law as long as it is the law, although we may dislike it, and use the legal means in our power to get it repealed, altered, or amended. The same principle governs us in regard to the church, in her capacity as governor. We may not believe the policy pursued here and now in her human relations, in her dealings with external affairs, whether civil or ecclesiastical, absolutely the wisest and best possible, and we think we have a right, when we honestly do not so believe, to say so, and to do what we can in an orderly way to induce her to alter it; but as long as she insists on retaining it we must submit, and obey strictly her commands. We recognize neither the right nor the wisdom of disobedience. In the first place, we can oppose to her policy only our own convictions, and the reasons on which they rest, and it is not impossible that, all things considered, she is right and we wrong; and in the next place, the changes, unless effected by her authority, would have no value and do no good. Our disobedience would harm ourselves, but it could effect no salutary reform, and serve no good end.

The Protestant reformers, by their disobedience, prompted by their impatience and self-will, lost much and gained nothing. The whole world now sees their folly. Protestantism has ceased to be a religion, and the Protestant world, though it has yet some Catholic reminiscences, is involved in as great spiritual darkness, doubt, and uncertainty, as were the gentile nations before the coming of our Lord. Amongst Protestants are men whom we love and honor, but Protestantism is a pitiable affair, and attracts from Protestants themselves more derision than genuine respect. The reformers have lost for their followers the unity of the church; they have lost catholicity, all legitimate church authority, the priesthood, sacrifice, the perpetual presence of our Lord in the eucharist, dogma or doctrine, faith, hope, charity, and the very liberty of conscience they sought to secure. It is now seen, also, that if they had waited a little longer in the bosom of the church they could have had the substance of all they contended for, through the reformatory action of the church

herself. What inducement can any sensible man, who knows what Protestantism is, have to leave the church, or to compel her, by his disorderly demands for reform, to cast him out of her bosom into exterior darkness and death? It is better to wait, wait patiently and submissively, till the church gets ready to effect such reforms as are needed. In due time she will effect them, if permitted to count on the loyalty of her children.

Furthermore, the future can never be a new creation; it must be, not a reproduction indeed, but a development of the past, a normal growth from it, which supposes the unity and continuity of life. The unity and continuity of Christian life we break, just in proportion as we break from the church. It is by no arbitrary ordination that heresy and schism are made sins; they are sins in the very nature of the case. Heresy is a sin, in that it breaks the integrity of the idea, of truth itself, and would, were it possible, rend in pieces the eternal word of God, as the wicked Typhon and his associates in Egyptian mythology rend in pieces and scatter the body of the good Osiris. Schism is a sin, in that it breaks unity, the very bond of charity, and severs the soul from the fountain of life, and is like severing the branch from its living union with the trunk. It breaks the unity and the continuity of life, and renders all progress, all development, all reform in the severed branch or body impossible. You never see any progress among schismatic and heretical bodies. They may waste gradually away, but they never receive any accretion of life. They are petrifications. Look at the schismatic Greek church, at the oriental sects! Ages pass over them and bring no progress. They are like savage and barbarous nations, that, cut off from communion with the life of humanity, remain for ever stationary, and have in themselves no power to effect any amelioration in their condition. "The branch cannot live except it abide in the vine." Cut off from communication with the root, whence flows the sap of life through all the living branches, nothing remains for them but to wither and to die. Schismatical and heretical sects are to the church what savages and barbarians are to humanity. Even your Protestant sects are progressive only in destruction. They lose, but do not acquire; waste, but do not grow; and their best estate is always their first estate. Having no living principle within them, they have no recuperative energy, and no power to reform themselves. This lies in the nature of the case, and is

evident to every one who understands the principle and law of Christian life, and the nature and conditions of all real progress.

Knowing, at least believing all this, we have treated as idle, in our case, the fear that we could ever be induced or forced, by any resistance we might meet with from any quarter in our efforts at reform, to forget our Catholic duty and break from Catholic unity, and thus not only defeat our purpose but forfeit our salvation. We hope, if we are not too good a Christian, at least that we are too good a philosopher, to do any thing so illogical, or so ridiculously absurd. We are as much opposed to the repressive policy, now so widely insisted on, as is Dr. Froschammer or any other of our Catholic reformers, and we enter on every occasion our protest against it. We believe the church allows more liberty than is at present allowed by Catholic public sentiment, and we claim more liberty; not, however, for our own sake, because we have certain private ends to answer, or certain crotchets of our own to defend, but for the sake of Catholic interests, for the sake of both religion and civilization. We want no license, but we want that men should have true freedom, and be men, living men, thinking men, earnestly and perseveringly laboring to develop and appropriate to their moral, intellectual, and spiritual life, alike the truths of revelation and of natural science. But we understand that liberty can subsist only with order, as order can subsist only with liberty. Liberty without order is license; order without liberty is despotism. If the legitimate authority, bound to protect alike order and liberty, tells us that we abuse our liberty, and that we violate order in our attacks on this repressive policy, all we have to do is to bow submissively to what authority prescribes, and wait for a more fitting season to bring out the truth we hold to be important and necessary, or till the degree of liberty we demand can be safely exercised, not against, but with the sanction of authority.

Professor Froschammer seems to us to forget this duty of Christian obedience. One of his books was placed on the index, and he thereupon attacks the congregation of the Index and demands its abolition. We do not like this. No theologian pretends that the decisions of the Roman congregations are infallible, and we for ourselves very much doubt the utility, in the present state of the world, of the congregation of the Index. We think the Roman theologians would render us a

far greater service by refuting books unsound in morals and theology than they do by simply prohibiting them, for there are a great many people who are the more eager to read a book for its being prohibited. The Index belonged to a state of things which is now passing away, and was, in our judgment, far more appropriate when the civil government conceded to the church the civil censorship, and enforced its censures, than it is now. But the congregation of the Index is established by lawful authority; it has itself a disciplinary authority: and were it to censure a publication of ours, we should neither attack it nor publish the opinions or views censured. We should recognize in its decision, not necessarily the voice of the infallible church, but a judgment of the governing power of the church through one of its legally established courts, and would obey it as we obey any legally established civil court. We should not with our friend Froschammer, endeavor to evade the decision by pleading to the jurisdiction of the court. In our country we might deny the Index to be binding, because it is not published here but when the decision of the congregation is clearly and authentically brought home to us we should hold it to be binding, at least *inforo interiore*. Hence we read no books that we have tolerable reason for believing are on the Index except by dispensation from the competent authority, and should under no circumstances defend a proposition which we knew had been condemned by the Roman congregation.

Let no non-Catholic friend complain of this, or brand it as servility. In the first place, everybody knows that servility is the last charge to be brought against us; and in the second place, this is no more than we yield to the state,—no more than the obedience that is due from every loyal citizen to the legitimate civil authority. All power is from God, and we are obliged in conscience to obey the powers that be. The danger of the loose notions of obedience which have prevailed amongst us for the last half century, and which have permitted us to sympathize with every revolution, every rebellion, and every insurrection of the people, or a portion of the people, against authority, everywhere or anywhere, we now read in the formidable rebellion at this moment threatening the very existence of the republic, especially in the men who in the loyal states sympathize with it, and oppose the government because it is seeking by force of arms to suppress it. We oppose that rebellion, and execrate those northern sympathizers, and

sustain the government, because we recognize the principle of authority and the right of the nation not only to live, but to govern. The church is more to us than the nation. We would give our life to save the nation; what should we not then do for the church? The church is not only the hope of this nation; but of the world, —and of the whole world not only for time, but for eternity. Its authority to govern comes more directly from God than that of the state, and the interests with which it is intrusted are of infinitely greater moment, and shall we yield it less than we yield the state? Would you have us renounce our logic, our reason, and make ourselves a mere animal, in order to make ourselves a man and a freeman? There is no servility in obeying God, or in obeying those whom he authorizes to govern us. It is your loss of the true conception of liberty that makes you think so. It is your ignorance of the place and office of the church, in the plan of the Creator and of divine providence, that permits you to imagine the world can get on without her, or that even the temporal prosperity of nations can be secured without a strict observance of those great principles of law and order, of authority as well as liberty, which she inculcates, and which without her would soon be forgotten, or degenerate from great living principles into mere theorems and speculations. The first condition of all true freedom is obedience. In the child we exact even blind obedience. Parental love does it, because it is necessary to the child's well-being; and if when reason is developed we exact *enlightened* obedience, it is still obedience we exact, and that must be yielded or all goes to ruin. No doubt it is well when the obedience is rendered easy by love; but whether it accord with or be repugnant to our feelings and affections it must be yielded, or there is no such thing as society, or freedom in society. This is the law of God, and no one can disregard it without being soon or late compelled to pay the penalty.

What we will not yield is our own convictions, to the simply *human* opinions of others. We will stand by them unless condemned by divine authority. Our obedience must be given directly or indirectly to God, and not simply to man. Jefferson Davis has no divine authority; his government is a usurpation and has no legitimacy; and we would be drawn and quartered sooner than recognize its right to govern us, for in it there is at best only a purely human authority, and no man has, ever had, or ever can have, in his own right, dominion over man. We yield not to the orders of journalists, let who

will write them; we may be convinced by their reasons, but we submit not to them as authority, for authority they have none. We yield not to mere popular opinion for we have no belief in the saying, "the voice of the people"—which with us is usually the voice of demagogues and pot-house politicians—"is the voice of God." But when the church, through her official organs, in official form, clearly and distinctly commands us, we obey, and we do so for conscience' sake, and from conviction that is only by so doing that we can really aid human progress and be faithful to the interests of religion and civilization. If this be servility or abnegation of our manhood, be it so.

We have made these remarks *à propos*, indeed, of Dr. Froeschhammer, but more in reply to the thought of our right reverend friend than as called for by Dr. Froeschhammer's works. What we have to say in reference to his doctrine of the freedom of science, which we hold to be unsound, we have said in the article on "Faith and Reason, Revelation and Science."* We have wished in these remarks, somewhat desultory and disconnected in their character, to reassure our Catholic friends who have feared, from the occasional freedom of our strictures and the boldness of some of our assertions, that we either did not know, or, if we knew, we would not respect, the line beyond which no one passes without losing his Catholic character. We think we know that line, and we know that though we may at times find it necessary to come plump up to it, we have, and have had, no disposition to pass beyond it. Catholicity is not with us something to be put on or off, as it may suit the exigencies of the moment; nor is it something which is or can be stowed away in a dark corner of the mind, to be brought out only on certain festive occasions; it is our intellectual and moral life itself, and we can no more divest ourselves of it than we can divest ourselves of ourselves. It is the element in which we live, think, move, and have our moral and intellectual being; were it now so, we should never have dared speak as freely and as boldly as we have done. Our bold assertions and free strictures, which have made some timid souls fear we were on our way back to Protestantism, are the marks of a strong, not a weak faith, of a mind fully convinced, not of a mind hesitating and uncertain whether to believe or disbelieve.

*Brownson's Works. Vol. III. pp. 565 *et seq.*

We have owned that we aim to be a reformer; but the chief thing we want reformed is not discipline, theology, or philosophy, but Catholics themselves. The great evil, as it appears to us, is not in institutions of any sort, but in the low and frivolous character, in our age, of Catholics as well as of non-Catholics. There is amongst us a great want of earnest thought, and a still greater want of profound and far-reaching thought. Our popular journalists and authors pronounce glowing eulogiums on Catholicity, and exhaust their very copious vocabulary in praising the church, and yet our holy religion, as they present it, is no great thing; it is in fact a meagre sectarian affair, nothing to stir the soul, command the intellect, and captivate the heart. It is less than the mind itself, and takes up only a small part of it, and is rather an intellectual excrescence than the essential element of our intellectual life. We complain of the judgments formed by non-Catholics of our church, but we forget that non-Catholics form their judgments of the church from what they see and observe of Catholics, and the thought, tone, and conduct of Catholics go far to justify them. Their chief error is in mistaking the popular exhibition of Catholicity by Catholics for Catholicity itself.

Now the reform we want consists in bringing Catholics themselves back and up to the church, and making them understand that there is more in Catholicity than they see, and that their understanding of Catholic truth is not the measure of that truth itself. To a great extent, Catholics have lost the profound significance of their faith, and are to-day far below the grand conceptions of the fathers, and even the mediæval doctors. We do not penetrate to the marrow of the great truths we have learned from the catechism, and which, as far as words go, are hourly on our lips. We make frequently the sign of the cross, but we seldom reflect that the sign of the cross symbolizes the sum of all Christian faith, of all Christian virtue, and of all Christian prayer. It is not that we believe wrong, but that we do not meditate enough on what we believe, and get hold of it in its real relations, in its unity and universality, in its sublimity. The word *Catholic*, with many of us, has only a technical, and almost a sectarian, and usually a mere denominational sense; and few reflect that when applied to a dogma it is used in its proper and full sense, and expresses not simply that it is true, that it is a dogma of the church called *Catholic*, but that it is itself a uni-

versal principle, universally, always and everywhere true, always and everywhere believed by all the faithful. Catholic dogma is never a particular, an isolated or a detached truth, but is universal, and cannot be denied without denying in principle the whole body of truth, both revealed and natural. We repeat our belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation, but how many of us, supposing that we were not commanded to believe these mysteries, could see any damage to our moral and intellectual life in rejecting them? How many of us see or suspect the real relation of these great mysteries to the whole created order, and that their denial would lead logically to the denial of creation, to pantheism, and thence to nihilism? In fact, the Catholic system is the universal system,—is the system of the Universe itself,—and no man who thinks rationally can avoid thinking it. It is the divine plan according to which God creates and governs the universe, according to which all things in heaven and earth and under the earth are ordered. It is the whole truth—not simply all the truth we are required to believe, but all the truth there is, whether we speak of the Creator or of his works.

Now we are not so wild as to pretend that the human mind, even by the aid of revelation, can, in this life, grasp and comprehend Catholic truth in this Catholic sense; but we can grasp something of it—enough, at least, to see that every stream and streamlet, river and rivulet of truth, however small or however large, flow directly into this vast ocean of truth and lose themselves in its immensity. We can grasp more than we do, and penetrate further than we ordinarily deem possible. What we want, therefore, is that the popular Catholic mind, instead of resting on a few isolated, and, to it, unmeaning dogmas, or weaving for itself a wreath from the flowers of piety, which it often mistakes both for the root and the fruit of piety, should be elevated to the contemplation of Catholic truth in its unity, in its universality, and in its sublimity, so as to be able to trace in it the wisdom of God and the power of God, his infinite love, and his infinite condescension. It is not so much something different from what we have, but something more, that we need. We want Catholics to see more in their faith than they seem to us to see, understand more than they now understand—at least enough to know that any thing but Catholicity is miserable sophistry, and that we can be true men only so far as we are true Catholics. We do not want a different, but a profounder and a less inadequate theology.

In a word, we want the understanding and life of Catholics more thoroughly Catholic. We want Catholics able to understand what we mean, when we say we are Catholic not simply by dependence on external authority, but also from inward personal conviction. When we said this some months ago, a learned doctor of divinity understood us as meaning to discard external authority, as renouncing the church, and relying only on our own private convictions. How far had the learned doctor succeeded in harmonizing his Catholic faith and his own understanding? Had he found in his Catholic faith the very principle of his intellectual life, and thus destroyed the antagonism between faith and reason, he never could have given to our words so absurd an interpretation.

Dr. Froshammer makes deadly war on the scholastics of the middle ages; we, though we will not accept their *dicta* as conclusive in every philosophical dispute, do no such thing; we wish our age were back and up to the level of those great and earnest men. Most men in our days are, in philosophy, mere dwarfs by the side of a St. Anselm, a St. Thomas, a St. Bonaventura, a Duns Scotus, a Durandus, an Alesius, a Hugh of St. Victor. There is more in these old men than the best of us now are able to see. Let our philosophers understand them, master their thought, and we shall have little cause of complaint against them, for the defects in these old scholastics are easily supplied when once we fairly understand them. It is our defect of comprehensiveness, our neglect to seize and intellectually profit by the great truths of revelation, our superficiality, our ignorance, our arrogance, our conceit, and our narrow, dry, jejune, and unliving systems of theology and philosophy we complain of. The fault we find is in Catholics themselves, who are content to remain far below the dignity and glory of their faith, and who are too apt to claim for themselves the virtues which belong only to the church of God. It is this fault, which, to some extent we share with them, that we seek to correct.

These remarks will indicate to the serious and thoughtful reader in what sense we advocate reform, and furnish the key to what in our writings has seemed to some strange or unusual. There is nothing in them unecatholic, nothing indeed not positively Catholic. Our faith is not given us as a talent to be wrapped in a clean napkin and buried in the earth; but to be used, to be intellectually and morally a vivifying principle, a root which, nourished by our thought and love, shall spring within us and bear fruit to everlasting life. We ourselves do

not fructify, and our faith is often intellectually fruitless. We talk much of the heart and the affections, but we do not often enough reflect that the heart, in a religious sense, is included in the rational nature, and that the affections needed are rational affections, excited or moved by the contemplation and meditation of truth; and hence our piety and devotion too often degenerate into mere sentimentalism, weak and watery, without solidity or value. It is not that there are none among us who penetrate the marrow of the great truths unfolded by our religion, but that they who write for the people and are popular with the people do not, and only skim the surface, and instead of lifting the people to a higher plane of intellectual and moral life, stand in the way of doing it, and thus extend and perpetuate the evil which all who comprehend something of the length and breadth, the height and depth of Catholic faith bitterly deplore.

But it would be wrong to leave, or seek to leave, the impression that Catholics fall far below non-Catholics in intellectual activity. The fact is, the age itself is unspiritual, and therefore unintellectual. In the non-Catholic world, what of intellectual activity there is has been devoted to the material order, to the natural sciences, or to trade, commerce, manufactures, and the various mechanic arts. The age is active, bustling, but mechanical, material, unscientific. It has made some progress in the exploration of the phenomena of nature, but it is very doubtful if it has made the slightest progress in their scientific explication. The facts of history have been studied, and innumerable theories constructed, each vying with the other in lofty pretension and intrinsic weakness, and we may well doubt if the age has made much progress in the real scientific knowledge of history. In Biblical criticism great activity has been displayed; but aside from a better knowledge of the natural history, the fauna, &c., of oriental countries, it may well be doubted whether, since the Bible was written, there has been really less knowledge of it as a record of the divine revelation than in our age. Even in the science and art of war, tactics, strategy, military weapons, offensive and defensive, our boasted achievements, experience is daily demonstrating, are as unreal as the age itself. Our Enfield rifles, in actual service, are inferior to our old-fashioned muskets; and the new guns, with their complicated contrivances, are inferior to those with which our fathers won their independence.

The reason of all this is obvious enough. Our age has lost the conception of unity,—has ceased to be dialectic and has become sophistical. Every thing ascends from low to high, and loses itself in details, without being brought back, and up, to the great law of unity and universality. Now, as Catholicity alone, in its faith and its *prima theologia*, or higher philosophy, which is the science of sciences, furnishes that law, Catholics, instead of allowing themselves to be carried away by the shallow and sophistical character of their age, should labor to lift the age itself up to the level of the higher science rendered possible by divine revelation and Catholic faith. It is ours to supply to the age the dialectic character which it needs to enable it to bring all its particular sciences up to the unity and universality of the *Scientia Prima*. We owe more to the age than we are doing for it, and more to the country than we imagine. We keep our light under a bushel, and are ourselves content to grope in comparative darkness. Let us learn to appreciate and use the treasure committed to us.

CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1864.]

THESE admirable discourses on civil and religious liberty have appeared, we believe, in a separate publication, but we have seen them only in *Le Correspondant*, where they were first published. The *Correspondant*, by the way, published on the 25th of each month, is a periodical that we can conscientiously recommend to the general as well as to the Catholic public. It is able, learned, liberal, spirited, sincere, and earnest. It is the organ of the liberal Catholics of France, the only Catholics in Europe who sympathize with the loyal people of the Union in their war against the slavery rebellion; and the best account of the struggle in which we are now engaged, that we have seen in any European periodical, has appeared in its pages, written by M. Henri Moreau. Its writers are such men as the Bishop of Orleans, the late Père

**L'Église libre dans l'État libre.* Par M. CHARLES DE MONTALEMBERT. Paris: 1863.

Lacordaire, Count de Montalembert, Count de Falloux, Auguste Cochin, A. Pontmartin, Henri Moreau, M. de Meaux, Prince de Broglie, and others hardly less eminent, all fervent, orthodox, Catholics, devoted heart and soul to civil and religious liberty—men who combine the faith of the martyr ages with the civilization and progressive spirit of the nineteenth century.

These discourses pronounced in the Catholic congress at Mechlin, last August, are able and eloquent, as is every thing from the illustrious author, and exceedingly well timed. They are well matured, well reasoned, and contain views and advocate a policy which no friend of religion and civilization can prudently disregard. They are grave and earnest, bold and manly, noble and chivalric; and they have been read with surprise by non-Catholics, and with delight by all Catholics who do not happen to have their faces on the backside of their heads. They, however, have not given universal satisfaction, and several journals have entered their protest against them. They have incurred the decided hostility of *La Civiltà Cattolica*, a periodical printed at the Propaganda press, and published at Rome, under the eye of the general of the Jesuits. They have also incurred the wrath, we are told, of the new *Dublin Review*, said to be the organ of His Eminence Cardinal Wiseman, Archbishop of Westminster. They do not appear, however, to have been opposed by the Catholic organs of the United States, all devoted, as they are, to slavery, and hostile to liberty, whether civil or religious; but this is, probably, owing either to the incapacity of their conductors to understand their bearing, or to the fact that their author is a Frenchman, and a former peer of France. Had he been a plebeian, or had he been born a Yankee, and a Yankee who will not concede that to be a Catholic it is necessary to denationalize himself, and become a foreigner in his native land, they would doubtless have honored them by a more formidable opposition than they have as yet received from any of the Catholic organs of Europe. Becoming a Catholic in this country means becoming an Irishman, or at least a European; and if one becomes a good Irishman, a good European, or a decided anti-American, he is a good Catholic, let him defend what doctrines he may.

That M. Montalembert's discourses in favor of civil and religious liberty should incur opposition from *La Civiltà Cattolica* is in the natural course of things. That periodical is the organ of a society which has outlived its day and genera-

tion, and which is now not inaptly symbolized by the barren fig-tree of the Gospel. It was a noble and illustrious society in its origin, and successfully did it labor to check the progress of error, and to place the church in harmony with the civilization of the age. Its members were men of high character, often of noble birth, with the training and polish of men of the world, the literary tastes and culture of the most accomplished humanists, the erudition of cloistered monks, the freedom of motion of secular priests, and the ardent charity and burning zeal of apostles. God gave them a great work to do and they did it, and did it well. They deserved and won the admiration and gratitude of the Catholic world. But the society being only a human institution, subsidiary to the church, was not able to adapt itself to the wants of all ages and nations, and the time was sure to come when it would grow old and disappear, like all things human, or remain only to cumber the ground. When it had done the special work assigned it to do, its strength was exhausted, and it became necessarily unable to perform, or even to perceive, the new work demanded by the rapid social changes and new developments of civilization which the movement and progress of events are introducing. The world went on, and as it neither would or could go on with it, the world went on without it, and the once illustrious Society of Jesus stands now calling out for it to stop, for it is going too far, or seizing hold of its skirts and trying with all its might to hold it back.

The Jesuits understood the wants of the age from the middle of the sixteenth century to that of the seventeenth, especially on the continent, better than any of their contemporaries, and fulfilled with great success that extra-hierarchical mission which, under the new law, may be termed the mission of genius, and which corresponds in some measure to the mission of the prophets under the old law. But in their controversy with the Jansenists their glory culminated, and they ceased to lead the civilization of the world. They never understood the eighteenth century; and holding the chief places of influence, they suffered the world they themselves had educated, to lapse in philosophy into shallow sensism, and in religion into the crudest infidelity. Still less do they understand this nineteenth century. They are out of place in it. They themselves feel it, and, determined to be what they were or not to be at all, they seek to arrest and turn it back to what the world was when they were in their glory. They are good

men, learned men, excellent scholars earnest, devoted, and self-sacrificing priests, none more so in the church; but they understand not the work of this age. They see not that this age demands men who are to it what St. Ignatius Loyola and his companions were to theirs, men of large minds and a free spirit, who dare break from routine, to reject the dry technicalities of the schools, to take the world as they find it, to accept the new learning, the new social order, and to christianize the new civilization by baptizing, not anathematizing it. The Jesuits did their work by harmonizing, not dogma, which is immutable, but theology, the schools, and ecclesiastical administration, with the new developments of civilization in the sixteenth century; but they see not that this is precisely the work now needed in regard to the civilization of the nineteenth century. They wish to retain the world in the mould in which they had cast it. Hence, with all their virtues, with all their private worth, they do little for our age, and still less for our country, with which they have no sympathy. They can no longer restrain or lead the civilized world, and their successes are confined to uncivilized, savage, or barbarous tribes, or to people whose civilization is far below the European in the sixteenth century.

But this is not the worst. The Jesuits have formed the Catholic world, at least the ruling portion, after their own image. They have, directly or indirectly, the forming of our Catholic youth, and to a great extent the direction of our consciences; their theology, dogmatic and ascetic, is that generally taught in our ecclesiastical seminaries, and nearly all who pass for earnest, devoted, and devout Catholics are in some sense Jesuits. They have immense influence still in the church by means of their past, on which they live, if not by their present labors. Catholics who fail to recognize them as virtually the church, are looked upon by their devouter brethren as wanting, if not in faith, at least in pious fervor and holy obedience. Hence it is that the dominant influence of the church to-day is thrown in favor of an order of things that it is impossible to recall, and against a social order that it is equally impossible successfully to resist, even if it were desirable, as it is not, to resist it. There is in the church a party, and it is at present the dominant party, called in Italy, the *oscurantisti*, who make war *à outrance* on what is called modern civilization. It would be a mistake to suppose that they find their *beau idéal* in the middle ages; they find it rather

in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when were consolidated the great centralized monarchies of Europe, and when the ecclesiastical administration was centralized and placed in the Roman bureaucracy. The best, ablest, and most active representatives of this party are unquestionably the Jesuits. It is not strange, then, that Count de Montalembert finds their organ opposed to him, just in proportion as he departs from the traditional policy of the *oscurantisti*, and labors to place the church in harmony with modern civilization. The Jesuits belong to the past; he belongs to the present and the future. If he increases, they must decrease; and if he realizes his idea, they must abandon theirs.

M. de Montalembert loves his church, is earnestly devoted to his religion, and has from his youth devoted himself, his life and his fortune, liberally and heartily to the promotion of Catholic interests. He is, as all the world knows, a man of eminent ability, of brilliant genius, of varied and solid erudition—one of the most accomplished scholars, polished and vigorous writers, and eloquent and graceful orators of France. He is an ardent lover of liberty, a zealous champion of constitutional government, and holds that in the modern world the freedom of the church can be secured only in the freedom of the citizen. He defends civil freedom for its own sake, and also as the necessary condition of religious freedom. In the so-called middle ages, churchmen sought the freedom of religion by asserting for the church a supremacy in temporals as well as in spirituals—in establishing a real *clerocracy*, or government of the world by the clergy. But this had it succeeded, would have annihilated the state, reduced to naught the lay society, and prevented the development and growth of the people, and the real amelioration of their social condition by their own efforts. Civilization refused to submit to it. The wars between the two orders, which fill the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, ended finally in its defeat, and, unhappily, in the establishment of the great centralized European monarchies, and the subjection, in turn, of the church to the temporal order in both Catholic and non-Catholic states. The church had little more freedom in the Catholic states of Europe, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, than she had in non-Catholic states. She was held by the state in a sort of gilded slavery; she enjoyed large revenues, as does the English church now, but she dared not oppose the court. In exchange for her freedom, she had

the sad consolation of having the state exclude, at least so far as the law went, all heretical or dissentient communions. Externally the church appeared to be protected by the state, but she was in reality simply enslaved, as in a prior age the clergy had sought to enslave the state. The consequence was, that religion everywhere suffered.

M. de Montalembert perfectly well understands that the clerical dream of the middle ages cannot be realized. Men will not and cannot be made to submit to the government of churchmen in temporals. The experiment has been tried and failed. The subjection of the church to the state, of the spiritual to the temporal, is repugnant to the essential principles of religion, for in principle it is the subjection of God to man. He therefore maintains that the subjection of the state to the clergy, as well as the subjection of the clergy in spirituals to the state, must both be rejected, for both are equally hostile to religion and to civilization. Hence he demands a free church in a free state, or, as we express it, the freedom of the church in the freedom of the citizen. That is, the recognition by the church of the freedom of the state in temporals, or in its own order, and the recognition by the state of the freedom of conscience, and its own incompetence in spirituals. The state does not prescribe or tolerate, it protects the religion of the citizen, not as approving or disapproving it, but as, before it, a natural and inalienable right. As before the state all citizens are equal in their rights, so all religions, not *contra bonos mores*, or incompatible with the public peace, embraced by its citizens, are equal before it, and entitled to equal and full protection. Hence a free church in a free state implies the liberty of false religions no less than of the true, the freedom of error no less than the freedom of truth,—the precise order which obtains in the United States.

Now to this order, which is the order of liberty, our *obscurantists* are opposed, because they do not believe in liberty or desire it; because they hold it wrong to guaranty the liberty of error; and because they hold that to do it were to cast reproach on the past conduct of the church, who, wherever she has been strong enough to have her own way, has approved a contrary policy. The *Civiltà Cattolica* admits that there may be times and countries in which it is wise and even necessary to concede liberty to error, as, for instance, where error is so strong that it cannot be suppressed by civil pains and disabilities, and it is impossible to maintain the unity of faith

by the strong hand. It would concede it to France, to Belgium, to Austria, to Great Britain, and to the United States, but as a condescension on the part of the church, not as a natural right before the state, or as a principle applicable to all times and places. And this seems, in fact, to be all that Montalembert has judged it prudent formally to demand. He asserts his free church in a free state, not as a universal rule or principle, but as a practical necessity, in our times and in most countries, for the promotion of Catholic interests. He apparently shrinks from its assertion as a natural and indefeasible right. But the concession which the *Civiltà Cattolica* says the church makes is not all we demand, because in it the church reserves the right to revoke it when she deems herself strong enough, or judges it for her interest to do so. We venture to assert as a universal principle, that the state is incompetent in spirituals, and that wherever civilization is sufficiently advanced to admit the organization of the state, or what is the same thing, the civil organization of lay society, every citizen has the natural right to be protected in the free enjoyment of his religion, or the religion of his free choice.

We except from this rule only tribes or peoples in what may be called their infancy or minority, in which they correspond to the period of childhood in the individual. Here some precautions against error other than instruction may be necessary, and some degree of repression may be resorted to, on the ground that the mind is not yet developed so as to have the right to be remitted to its own judgment, or to be in fact held responsible for its own judgment, either before the human or the divine law. With regard to tribes or peoples in this state, which is not that of civilization, we will engage in no dispute. For a certain period I have the authority from God to govern as well as to teach my child, and even to require him to conform to my religion. But that period ends when the child has come to years of discretion, and I can then legitimately use only instruction and moral suasion. So, where a people is or has become civilized, the church must confine herself to her spiritual authority, and make no resort, directly or indirectly, to force to repress error or to maintain the truth. There is no civilized people on earth to which we would not apply, as an absolute rule, the doctrine asserted simply as a practical doctrine by M. de Montalembert. We accept it not as a concession or as a condescension; we demand it as a right, and we maintain not only that it is impolitic,

but that it is wrong, to withhold it. The minority past, the nation, as the individual, is free. "But then you condemn the past and even the present conduct of the church, which you are well aware that as a good Catholic you cannot do." Be not too fast, my good brother. The church, we concede, has in all ages and nations been governed by pure and holy motives and done what her authorities judged to be, under the circumstances, the wisest and best; but we have yet to learn that her authorities are incapable of error in their practical judgments, or that the church herself is, or claims to be, infallible in any thing except dogma. The practice of the church is not the rule of faith, though it may be cited as throwing light on it. The church has received the *depositum*, the faith once delivered to the saints, and in the preservation and definition of that, as every Catholic believes, and no one more firmly than we, she is, by the assistance of the indwelling Holy Ghost, infallible. Her dogmatic canons are infallible and irreformable; but we have never heard it pretended that she is infallible in her human legislation, in her administrative canons, or her practical conduct.

The church, in the sense we now speak of her, means the ecclesiastical authorities, and these have made and continue to make serious blunders, as it would be worse than folly in any one who has studied ecclesiastical history to pretend to deny. A pope has said that England was needlessly lost to the church by the mismanagement of his predecessor, Clement VII., and we have no doubt that, with a proper degree of prudence, even the East might have been saved, and Protestantism prevented. As to Germany, Scandinavia, and England, there were no dogmatic questions that could not have been adjusted without any serious difficulty. There were bishops in the Council of Trent who differed, before the decisions were arrived at, from the doctrine finally declared by the council, as widely as did Luther or Calvin. The real source of the defection was in matters of discipline and administration, the former of which was relaxed, and the latter grossly corrupt. There is not much edification in reading the lives of the popes from Calixtus III. to Leo X., inclusive. They live, act, and reign as temporal sovereigns, and apparently think more of strengthening their political influence, and enriching their families, than of feeding the spiritual flock committed to their care.

Nothing is more certain, except in matters of pure doctrine,

in what pertains immediately to dogma, than that the church, that is to say, the authorities of the church, from the pope down to the humblest parish priest, are more or less affected by the public opinion of their age or country. The church has a divine origin, and lives a divine life, but she has her human element and lives a human life often far removed from her divine life. Her divine life is like leaven hidden in three measures of meal, and not all at once, or instantaneously, does it leaven the whole lump. In her human element she is subject to the vicissitudes of time and space, and while she acts upon the world it reacts upon her, and its opinions influence her conduct. She found the doctrine of civil intolerance with the Jews, where it was in place, for the synagogue was recruited and continued by natural generation, not by the election of grace; she found it also in the Græco-Roman world, where it survived as a reminiscence of the patriarchal order, and when she became strong enough she adopted it, for it was already in the minds and habits of the great mass of her children. This is a fact that every one knows, who knows the history of the church, and in asserting it, we assert nothing even on the supposition that is an error, that is not consistent with our faith as a Catholic to assert. All forms of government have been developed from the patriarchal, and the doctrine that authority must suppress error, and protect the truth against it, is of patriarchal origin, and grew out of the fact that the patriarch or father of the family was at once priest and king, and never recognized the majority of any member of his family while he lived. The doctrine itself belongs not to dogma, but to civilization, and so far as regards the church, comes under the head of discipline, in respect to which no one pretends that the church is infallible, or that her rules are irreformable.

That the church has legislative authority, under the divine law, every Catholic maintains; but it is no part of Catholic faith that she is infallible in her legislation or in her disciplinary canons. Nothing forbids us to maintain, if such be our honest conviction, that any human law, borrowed from the Hebrew and Græco-Roman civilizations, and incorporated into the discipline of the church, or at least for long ages approved by churchmen and acted on by civil government, is unnecessary, improper, or prejudicial to the best interests both of religion and of civilization. We find no trace of the doctrine on which the practice is founded among Christian writers, prior to the

first Christian emperor. Many among the greatest doctors and fathers of the church have opposed it, and boldly asserted that the only lawful means of maintaining or reëstablishing unity of faith are moral, spiritual weapons drawn from the armory of reason and revelation, and addressed to the understanding, the heart, and the conscience. So at one time, at least, held St. Augustine; so held the great St. Dominic, the reputed founder of the inquisition, who used all his influence to prevent the employment of force against the Albigenses, among whom he was sent to labor as a missionary; so held the illustrious St. Francis de Sales, who, if for a moment he called in the troops of the duke of Savoy to expel the Calvinistic ministers who gave him so much annoyance, instantly repented of his act, and gave himself no rest till the exiles were recalled and reëstablished in their homes; and so, it is well known, held the equally illustrious Fénelon, archbishop of Cambray, who would not undertake the mission for the conversion of the Huguenots, till Louis XIV. consented to withdraw his dragoons. We feel, therefore, quite easy as to the past, and have no fear of compromising our orthodoxy by refusing to defend the doctrine, or by openly condemning it, as has been done by the late archbishop of Baltimore in his learned work on the *Primacy of the Apostolic See*, dedicated to the supreme pontiff himself.

That the doctrine we maintain, after M. de Montalembert, concedes the liberty of error, and places it and truth on the footing of equality before the civil authority, we grant, and we would have it so. We do not in this assert the indifference of truth and error, or that a man has the *moral* right to adhere to a false religion. Truth cannot tolerate even so much as the semblance of error, and in the theological order we are as intolerant as any Calvinist in the land, and hold firmly that out of the true church there is no salvation, any more than there is virtue without obedience to the moral law of God. Nor do we with Milton and Jefferson maintain that "error is harmless where truth is free to combat it." Error makes the circuit of the globe while Truth is pulling on her boots, and no error ever is or ever can be harmless. What we assert is, not what is called theological tolerance, but what is called civil tolerance. Error has no rights, but the man who errs has equal rights with him who errs not. The civil authority is incompetent to discriminate between truth and error, and the church is a spiritual kingdom without force, or

the mission to employ it for the one or against the other. The weapons of her warfare are spiritual not carnal; consequently, before the secular or human authority, whether of churchmen or statesmen, truth and error must stand on the same footing and be equally protected in the equal rights of the citizen. All sects should be equal before the civil law, and each citizen protected in the right to choose and profess his own religion, which we call his conscience, as his natural right, so long as he respects the equal right of others. This is the American order, and we dare maintain that it is the Christian order; for when the disciples proposed to call down fire from heaven to consume the adversaries of our Lord, he rebuked them, and told them that they "knew not what manner of spirit they were of."

All the doctors of the church agree that faith is not to be forced, that it must be voluntarily accepted, and that no one can be compelled to receive baptism against his own free will. So much is certain; and hence Charlemagne, who placed before the conquered Saxons the alternative of baptism or perpetual slavery, is never regarded as having conducted himself as a good Christian or as a good Catholic. Yet it is not to be denied that theologians have argued, from the analogy of secular governments, that since by baptism the recipient is born again, and born a subject of Christ's kingdom, he may be compelled by force, when once baptized and become one of the faithful, to keep the unity of the faith, and submit to the authority of the church, as the natural-born subjects of a state may, if rebellious, be reduced to their civil allegiance by the strong hand of power, and, if need be, punished even with death for their treason. But have they not abused this analogy? "My kingdom," says our Lord, "is not of this world,"—is not a secular kingdom, for the government of men in their secular relations, but is a spiritual kingdom, founded to introduce and maintain in human affairs the spiritual or moral law of God. The church, which is clothed with the authority of this kingdom, or in a mystical sense, is it, has undoubtedly over her subjects the authority which secular governments have over theirs, only it is an authority of the same kind with her own nature and mission. Since her kingdom is moral and spiritual, she has and can have only moral or spiritual power. She can resort neither directly nor indirectly to physical force, for that would make her a secular kingdom,—a kingdom of this world,—and belie her own spiritual nature.

The mission of the state is one that can be executed by physical force, for its mission is restricted to external acts in the social order. The magistrate bears the sword against evil-doers, and his mission is to watch over the safety of society, and to maintain justice between man and man, or to repress and redress external violence, either against individuals or against society itself. In this, physical force, when needed, may be employed, because there is a congruity between its employment and the end to be obtained. But it is not so with the church. Her mission being to introduce and maintain the law of God in the interior of man, she affects the exterior only through the interior, that is, the external act only through reason and conscience. This is wherefore she is called a spiritual, not a secular kingdom, or kingdom of this world. She teaches man the truth, tells him what he ought to believe, and what he must be and do in order to render himself acceptable to his Maker, his Redeemer, and his Saviour, or to gain the end for which he has been created. She administers to him the sacraments, through which he receives the new birth, is regenerated, restored, nourished, and strengthened in the life which ends in his supreme beatitude or supernatural union with God. But in all this she can address herself only to his moral or spiritual nature, to his reason or understanding, his free will, his heart, and his conscience. All physical force is here out of place, for physical force can affect only external acts, and all the acts she requires, to be of any value, must be internal, spring from the interior, from real conviction and love, and be the free, voluntary offering of the soul. Faith cannot be forced; she can by exterior force compel no one to receive the sacraments, for though they operate *ex opere operato*, they are inefficacious unless they are received with the proper interior dispositions. "My son, give me thy heart." Obedience in the moral or spiritual order cannot be forced, for it must be voluntary, from the heart; and a forced obedience, or an obedience that springs not from love, and is not yielded by free will, is simply, in her order, no obedience at all. In it the heart is not given. God demands a willing giver, is worshipped with the heart, in spirit and in truth, not with the lips only. External acts, genuflections, prostrations, singing of psalms and repetitions of the creed, the *Pater-noster*, and the *Ave-Maria*, are of no value if the heart be wanting, if love be absent, and there be not in them acts of free will,—all acts which by their own nature cannot be enforced,

or produced by simple external authority or pressure. The church, then, cannot do her work, cannot produce faith or love, or maintain interior unity, by force, nor could she reduce by force her rebellious subjects to their allegiance and obedience if she would. The obedience must be voluntary, in the baptized no less than in the unbaptized.

The church precluded by her own spiritual nature and mission from the employment of force, and the state being incompetent in spirituals, no course is practicable, or even lawful, but that of placing before civil society, before external authority, truth and error on the same footing, and using for the promotion of the former and the correction of the latter moral power alone. Let the state leave the church free to wield her moral power according to her own divine nature against error, false doctrines, spiritual disobedience, or spiritual defection or rebellion, and it is all that in the divine economy is required or admissible. The state can demand only the faithful discharge of one's civil duties, and it can punish only civil offences, and it has no right to make that a civil offence which is not so in its own nature. It has no right or competency to discriminate between the Catholic and the Calvinist, and, if each demeans himself as a good citizen, it is bound to maintain for each the same rights, and to place both in its own order, on the same footing. The responsibility of the religious error it must remit to the individual conscience, leaving each man to account, in the spiritual order, for himself to God, the only master of conscience. The spiritual offences being in their very nature such as cannot be redressed by physical force, the church can use only moral power against them, that is, arguments addressed to reason and conscience. If these fail, she can do no more, and must, as the state, leave those whom she cannot convert to answer to God for themselves. She may, undoubtedly, use moral discipline to correct her delinquent subjects, or to advance them in virtue, and go even so far as to excommunicate those she judges incorrigible, that is, so far as to exclude them from her external communion. She may thus deprive them of many spiritual advantages; but she cannot exclude any from her internal communion unless they first exclude themselves, and she must raise the ban of excommunication from her external communion whenever the excommunicated demand it, and give satisfactory evidence of interior submission. Here her coercive power stops; and even so far her coercive power is moral not physical, and the moment it becomes physical, it is not

in her mission. When the priest rides into a mob, and disperses it with the blows of his black-thorn stick or his horse-whip, he may do a very meritorious act, but he does it not in his priestly capacity, but as a peace officer, or as a chieftain of the clan.

The doctrine we contend for, and to which *La Civiltà Cattolica* objects, or which it permits to be held only as a concession or condescension of the church to the exceptional circumstances of particular localities, has its foundation in the very principle of the divine government itself. The spirit of Christ is the spirit of liberty. God governs the moral world by moral power, never by physical force. He made man free, endowed him with reason and free will, that he might have moral worth, be capable of virtue, and merit a reward; and he governs him according to the nature he has given him, as a free agent, and never forces his reason, or does violence to his free will. He governs him as a free man not as a slave, for he desires his love, and accepts from him only a rational, and voluntary service, *obsequium rationabile*, as says St. Paul. The church, whose mission it is to introduce and maintain the law of God in human affairs and the hearts of men, must imitate the divine government, and no more than God himself attempt to force reason, or by physical violence constrain free will. She is restricted by the very law of her existence to moral means, and can operate only through reason and conscience. God never suppresses error by the exertion of his omnipotence; he leaves the mind free, and corrects error only by the exhibition of his truth, and wins the heart by displaying his moral beauty. He lets the wheat and the tares grow in the same field; "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good and sendeth his rain upon the just and the unjust." This is the law for the church, and she must bear with error and disobedience as God himself bears with them.

This law, which we call the law of freedom, is universal, and law for both church and state. The state itself has no right to use force, except to repress or redress external violence, to maintain and vindicate the rights either of individuals or of society against aggressive external acts. Beyond this, all physical force, on the part of the state even is unlawful, unauthorized by the law of God, from whom all power is derived. Except in relation to external acts of violence, acts against individual rights, and the rights and peace of society, no government governs legitimately save

by the concurrence of the free will of the governed. Hence all despotisms, all arbitrary governments, or governments that do not exist and govern by the free will or free assent of the governed, are repugnant to the law of the divine government, and therefore are usurpations, without legal authority, and incapable of binding the conscience. Such governments have indeed existed, and been approved and defended even by churchmen, as well as by infidels; but they have done so by misapprehending the principle on which the patriarchal government rested for its justification. The authority of the patriarch is acknowledged as absolute indeed, but it is held to be that of the father over his child, and assumed to be tempered by parental affection and experience. It is wise, just, legitimate, while the governed are infants, incapable of speaking for themselves, but the reverse when the *infans* becomes able to speak, when the child has attained his majority and become a man. Within certain bounds it is just in the government of the family, but never in the government of a state composed of adults, of members who have arrived at manhood. Here all arbitrary government is unlawful, and only republican government in some form,—elective government, or the government of the people by the people themselves,—is legitimate, or in conformity with the principle of the divine government. Hence most justly does Count de Montalembert demand a free church in a *free state*, and maintain that only in a free state is a free church, or a church unfettered by the civil authority, practicable, as a free state itself is practicable only with a free church. There is no freedom for the state under a clerocracy, such as was attempted in the middle ages, and none even for the church; for spiritual interests are subordinated to secular interests, and the clergy sacrifice or subordinate the spirituals of the church in order to maintain her temporals, or their own temporal possessions and power, no less than politicians, as the history of what is strangely enough called the “Ages of Faith,” but too amply demonstrate. Under *cæsarism* neither state nor church is free, for in relation to both Cæsar’s will or caprice is the law. He can use the law to oppress the church, and the church to sustain his oppression of the people. The church in Russia had no more freedom than have the Russian people, and it has no more freedom in France under Louis XIV. or Napoleon I. than had the French people themselves. In Great Britain the

progress of religious freedom and that of civil freedom have advanced *pari passu*. So is it in Austria; as the church is emancipated from the shackles imposed by the state under Joseph II. the state becomes constitutional and free, the church becomes free to act as a moral or spiritual power, according to her own constitution. In this country both the church and the state are free, because here men are governed as freemen, not as slaves, or because here the manhood of the nation is fully recognized.

But the party represented by *La Civiltà Cattolica*, to some extent by the *Dublin Review*, and the first three volumes of our own *Review*, do not like this, for they, in fact, desire neither a free church nor a free state. They do not believe in republican government, and they desire a civil government which establishes the church as the law of the land, and uses its whole force, if needed, to protect her, and to suppress error or dissent. In the United States, they sympathize to a man with the southern rebels, not because they love negro slavery, but because they hate the republic, and wish to see it broken up and its influence destroyed. In France they to a man favored the re-establishment of the empire on the ruins of the republic because they flattered themselves that the new emperor would favor exclusively their church, suppress her enemies, and permit her pastors to bask once more in the sunshine of the court. In Italy they to a man reject the freedom offered to the church, because it is offered alike to the sects, and is coupled with constitutional liberty in the state; and if the state has to some extent treated them harshly, it is because they have demanded more than equal rights, and have insisted on special favors to themselves, or on having the government of the country exclusively in their hands. They regret the loss of their former privileges, and believe the Italian world is rushing to the devil because they have been deprived of them, as many people among ourselves fancy that our constitution will be destroyed, liberty lost, and the country ruined for ever and a day after, if negro slavery comes to be abolished. We doubt not the orthodoxy, the honesty, the sincerity, or even the benevolence of these people; but they are like those Jews whom our Lord rebuked for not being able to discern the signs of the times, and who crucified him between two thieves, because he came not precisely in the way they had made up their minds that he was to come, or because he came not in the form, and with the signs, they had expected. They see not

that there is more of Christ in what they oppose than there was in what they have lost, and so bitterly regret.

The theory adopted by this party, when reduced to its ultimate principle, is, that even Christian nations are still in the age of barbarism, and that lay society, or the people are still, and are always to remain, in their infancy, and to be guarded and tended in the nursery. They must be kept in leading-strings, and in no respect be trusted to their own reason and conscience. They are to be treated with all gentleness, with all a father's and all a mother's love; to have plenty of dolls, toys, hobby-horses, wooden swords and wooden guns, miniature drums and flags, plenty of play-things and amusements, pictures, statues, music, processions; but never to be treated as free agents, or to be allowed to speak for themselves. In church and state they are to be cherished and tenderly cared for, but held to be *injanctes*, or mutes, incapable of speech. They cannot think or speak for themselves, and are not to assume the responsibility of their own acts. Supposing the people to be, and always to remain, infants—to have no majority, never to become of age, or to arrive at man's estate—this opposition to civil and religious liberty is reasonable and just. The regimen demanded is the proper regimen for children who have not come to the years of discretion, and perhaps also for savage and barbarous tribes, or nations still in their infancy, not yet brought into the family of civilized nations. We will not say that it was not in some measure proper, even in the barbarous ages which succeeded the overthrow of the western Roman empire by the northern barbarians, and prolonged by new barbarian invasions from the East and the South till the eleventh century, though, perhaps, even in those ages it was at best only partially proper, because, in point of fact, the Græco-Roman civilization did not wholly perish with the Roman empire, and even the conquering barbarians brought with them many elements of civilization—and of a civilization superior to the Græco-Roman in its most palmy days. But be this as it may, nations as well as individuals have a majority; one day they become of age, and are no longer to be treated as minors. They pass from childhood to manhood, and when they have reached their majority, and are men, both church and state must recognize the fact, acknowledge their freedom, and seek to govern them as men—as free men, not as children or slaves. The doctrine is not new for us, and was amply set forth, though timidly, in our pages for July, 1849.*

*Brownson's Works, Vol. X. p. 207. *Civil and Religious Toleration.*

Modern Christian nations, whether orthodox or heterodox, have unquestionably attained to their majority, and all attempts to remand them to the nursery are only productive of evil. They cannot succeed. Lay society has attained to manhood, and can be governed only under the regimen of liberty, as free rational agents, who can speak, who have the rights of men, which authority must respect and recognize as inviolable. They must be governed through their own reason and conscience. It will not do to treat the nation that breaks away from external unity, and rushes into schism and heresy, as a truant child, to be scourged back, or given up as incorrigible. Force against it is out of the question, except to repress actual violence. Its natural and civil rights remain unaffected, for it derives the former from God through nature, and the latter from God through the people. This we want frankly acknowledged by both ecclesiastics and politicians. So of individuals, whether the majority or minority of the nation, who fall into what the church condemns as heresy or schism. Natural and civil rights, not being derived from God through the church, remain the same in both the orthodox and the heterodox, and among these rights is to be reckoned the right of conscience, or right of each one to choose and profess his own religion. All that is to be asked for the church is, that she be free, by appeals to the reason, intelligence, and conscience of her rebellious subjects, to convert them if she can, and that they be free, in the face of all external authority, to return to her communion if they see proper. This freedom we demand for the church, not on the ground that she is the church of God but on the ground that she is *our* church, *our* religion, *our* conscience, and we are men and citizens, and all men and citizens are equal before the law. This equality of all men and citizens demands equal liberty and protection for the church and the sects, and for truth and error. The error is always to be deplored, as is every abuse which man makes of his liberty; but its responsibility rests upon the individual, who is accountable for it to no human tribunal; for conscience is accountable to God alone. God gives to every man the means of salvation, and urges him, by all the force of divine wisdom and love, to use them, but leaves him, nevertheless, free to reject them and damn his own soul if he chooses; and what right has the church or state to be more strict than God? And why should either shrink from imitating the example of his government?

The great error of the *oseurantisti* is in persisting in governing men as children. Because the faithful are required to be docile and childlike, they conclude that they are to be retained in perpetual childhood, and never to be allowed the freedom of manhood. Liberty has its inconveniences, we admit, and it requires far less wisdom and virtue to govern men as slaves, than it does to govern them as free men. Men of very small minds, little knowledge, and less virtue, can be despots, and lord it over God's heritage, whether in church or state; but to govern not as lords, but as pastors, or to govern free men as free men, through their freedom, intelligence, and their moral convictions, requires men of character, of large minds, rare intelligence, rare wisdom, and rarer moral worth—something divine. Liberty is sure to be abused if recognized, but its abuses never exceed, never equal, the abuses of power. It was not the excesses of liberty, but the excesses of power, that constituted what is called the reign of terror in France. Frenchmen were freer under Napoleon than they were under the convention, or the committee of safety. We have ourselves, when shocked or disgusted at the misuse men make of their liberty in our republican country, allowed ourselves to use expressions in favor of a regimen less free, which we regret, and which must not be taken as our deliberate, settled convictions. If the reader comes across any such expressions in any thing we have written, let him blot them out. They are only the impatient utterances of a transient feeling, of a momentary indignation at the abuses of liberty which we saw daily and hourly before us. Men are permitted to declaim against the abuses of a good thing, without being held to reject the good thing itself. We demand government, and strong government, in both church and state, but in either a government that recognizes and protects the rights of manhood, that respects instead of crushing out the natural freedom God gives to every man,

There is no doubt that liberty, in whatever order we assert it, will be abused. Men left to their own reason and conscience, in spite of the teachings and admonitions of the church, in spite of the Holy Scriptures, in spite of divine revelation and the interior operations of divine grace, in spite of all the moral and spiritual influences that can be brought to bear on them, will abuse it, will fall into pernicious error, into deadly heresies, and even glory in disobedience. Let no one flatter himself that liberty will never be construed to mean license, or

that it will lead to or secure entire unity of doctrine, guard against all dissent, or result in offering to God the pure worship he requires. We know this well. But at all this risk it is better to have liberty than despotism, or else God would not have created man a free moral agent. It is better that men should sometimes err than that they should never think; that they should sometimes act wrong, than that they should never act at all. The great apostle to the gentiles tells the faithful to be men:—"Be ye no longer children, but be men, howbeit, in innocence be children, but in understanding be men." In the primitive ages there was none of this excessive government and over-direction of the faithful, which render them so weak and timid at the present day. More, far more reliance was then placed on the Christian's understanding and conscience. He was carefully instructed in his Christian faith and duty, strengthened by the sacraments, and then left to act as a free, intelligent, conscientious man, who had an interior light that in all ordinary cases could be safely trusted. Hence the faithful, though recruited in great part from the slave population and humbler classes of society, were men, thinking, reasoning, heroic men, capable of giving a reason for their faith, and, when need was, of dying for it. There was life, moral and intellectual activity of mind, deep energy of soul, which, with God's blessing, converted the world. Heresies and schisms there were, but there were also able and accomplished champions of orthodoxy and unity to meet and vanquish them; and we may say that no heresy or schism has ever been extirpated by the exertion of physical force. Protestantism survives in France, and Catholicity in Ireland. Force may make hypocrites, and by alienating men from the truth, drive them into infidelity; never can it make sincere and earnest believers. No; mind must be met and conquered by mind, not by brute force.

Even in the middle ages, the modern nursery system hardly obtained. In the bosom of the church, among the faithful, there was a freedom of thought and action, a reliance on reason and conscience, or self-direction, so to speak, which has been unknown or condemned for the last two hundred years. There was much barbarism, much violence, and there were terrible crimes in those days, but, as Montalembert has well remarked, in his *Moines d' Occident*, there was more manliness, more strength and elevation of character, than in our times, and if there were great crimes, there were great expiations. There

was very little of the weakness, the effeminacy, or the sentimental piety of our days. The party represented by *La Civiltà Cattolica* speak of those ages as "Ages of Faith," as Catholic ages, and regret them. But whatever advantages they had over subsequent ages, they owed them to their greater freedom, to their greater reliance on the individual reason and conscience. The Jesuits had not then invented or perfected that marvellous machinery now in use, which so effectually emasculates the soul, and keeps us at best mere children in the nursery, hardly daring to decide what slip or frock we shall wear for the day, till we have consulted our ghostly father or our spiritual director. We owe our weakness, our lack of self-reliance, of robust faith and manly piety, of strong and elevated character, to our lack of liberty, to our being kept always in leading-strings, and treated as children not to be trusted out of sight of the tutor or governess. What is the consequence? The strong and robust, those who feel themselves men, and have the right to be men, and to think and act as free men even in religion, grow cold in their affections for the religious society, and, confounding faith and piety with the human machinery in vogue for sustaining them, and the church with a party in the church that seems to lack all human sympathy and all respect for human rights and human progress, turn away with wrath or disgust, and seek refuge in infidelity or indifference, as men in despair sometimes kill themselves. Under your safeguard system you have no mental activity, or none that has the courage to show itself. Your great men are reduced to silence, or die of broken hearts, and only the voice of mediocrity can be heard. Any other voice is judged unsafe, heretical, revolutionary, or, at best, offensive to pious ears. You see this and deplore it, but, unhappily, labor to remedy it only by new and more vigorous applications of the machinery that has produced it.

Now, both reason and experience prove that we cannot if we would, keep the nations in perpetual childhood, or remand them to childhood when once they have attained to their majority. We urge, then, the frank abandonment, on the part of the rulers either in church or state, of the nursery system, and the equally frank adoption of the regimen of liberty. It seems to us worse than idle to resist the spirit of liberty which now moves and agitates nearly all civilized nations—which has created a constitutional Italy and a constitutional Spain; is creating a constitutional Austria; convulsing the Christian

populations of Turkey, emancipating the Catholics of Great Britain and Scandinavia, serfs in Russia, and the slaves in America, and in the name of which the United States have under arms and in the field more than half a million of men. We must accept modern civilization, and, notwithstanding all its infidel and materialistic tendencies, accept it in good faith. After all, if analyzed, this modern civilization will be found to be at bottom, not a revolt against Christianity, nor even against the church as a spiritual kingdom, as so many worthy people suppose. It is only a revolt against a human authority that seeks to govern men as slaves, not as freemen, and is really more Christian, more catholic than the system it seeks to supplant. It opposes all employment of physical force or secular authority in matters of faith and conscience, and demands for every man the recognition, by all human tribunals, of the liberty that God gives us—a liberty which neither the state, nor the church in her human legislation, can either grant or alienate,—or, in other words, the full and frank recognition of man's right, before all human authority, to civil and religious freedom. This it demands in all modern nations, Catholic and non-Catholic, for non-Catholic states have been, and still are, even less tolerant than Catholic states. The United States is the only nation in the world, where the majority of the people are non-Catholic that has not a religion established and supported by the state, or in which all religions are placed on an equal footing before the law. Great Britain tolerates dissent from the national church, but does not recognize the right of dissent; and barbarous law against recusancy still disgrace her statute-books, though rarely enforced. Civil liberty has made progress in most modern states, but in every country, not excepting our own, it has even yet to struggle to sustain itself. Yet the result is now doubtful, and victory will at last declare itself for the new order of civilization.

The civil and religious liberty, involving the complete separation of church and state, regarded as governments, which modern civilized society demands, does not, as some suppose, necessarily imply political atheism or a godless state. Religion is by no means, because the state does not establish it, excluded from civil society, and the church is united with the state through the faith and conscience of the citizen, if the state, as it should be, is republican in its constitution. It would be godless only in case it was an absolute monarchy, in

which Cæsar can say, *L'état, c'est moi*. But the state being republican, though it professes officially, or enacts no religion, has always in its laws and administration all the religion held and cherished by its citizens. The republican state, or government of the people by the people themselves, must express in its laws and administration, in the long run, the intelligence and will of the people, and, therefore, just so much of religion, of faith and piety, as enter into that intelligence and will; which is all the union of church and state that is compatible with liberty, or that is really practicable. So far the union is dialectic, living, and indissoluble. But as all citizens are equal, and each has an equal right to assert his own religion, it follows necessarily that the people can bring their religion into the laws and administration only so far as it is common to them all. What each has that is peculiar to himself remains as a part of his individuality, respected by the state, indeed, but incapable of expressing itself in the positive action of civil society. Hence religion only so far as it is catholic or common to all, can be expressed or recognized in the acts of the government, which is all that is necessary, and to which no one can object. All sects would be free, but the state would be really catholic.

Let no one take any alarm at this. The enemies of religion must understand, that if they require the state to use its power against religion, or to suppress it, they violate the first principle of civil and religious liberty. Religious liberty does not mean the liberty of infidelity to use the state or the civil power to suppress religion. The state, under the control of infidelity, and establishing atheism, is, to say the least, as hostile to religious liberty as the state under the control of the clergy, and establishing the Roman Catholic Church. The French convention, decreeing that "death is an eternal sleep," violated as flagrantly both civil and religious liberty as does a Catholic state when it deprives Protestants, or a Protestant state when it deprives Catholics, within its dominions, of the free exercise of their faith and worship. The man who denies Christianity has no more right to insist that the state shall give civil effect to his affirmation—nay, he has altogether less right, because civilized nations are Christian, and nations are really civilized only so far as they are Christian nations. All civilization has its origin and ground in Christian principles or ideas; and the infidel, whatever he may be practically, places himself doctrinally in opposition to civilization itself,

and, therefore, to all human development, and individual and social progress. Infidelity is really a return to barbarism, from which Christianity has rescued us. We ask no civil pains and penalties to be enacted against it; but we can consent to none in its favor. Humanity has the right to go on under the law of development, whatever the protests or efforts at resistance of the *oscurantisti*, whether they are churchmen or infidels, and the most thorough-going of all obscurantists are those who reject the Christian religion.

Those of our friends who fear that to accept modern civilization would be to favor schism, heresy, or infidelity, would do well to bear in mind that Christianity, in itself, is one and catholic, and that all Christian nations belong to one and the same family, have the same Christian idea, and are, each in its way, developing and laboring to perfect one and the same order of civilization. The real union of Christendom, if weakened and obscured, has not been wholly lost. The central life of Christendom, the idea in its purity and integrity, Catholics, of course, hold, is in the church in communion with the see of Rome, under the pastoral care of the pope; but they neither hold, nor are bound by the faith to hold, that all life which flows from the central fountain, or which emanates from Christ, who is the idea of Christendom, is arrested at the external or visible boundaries of the Roman communion, and that there is no Christian life outside of its pale. All civilization is, in some sense, catholic; but all civilization is not confined to so-called Catholic nations. The civilization of Great Britain is, in some important relations, more catholic than that of Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, or Spanish and Portuguese America. The church has lost many nations from her external communion, but the world is more catholic to-day than it was before the Protestant revolt or even the Greek schism. Neither faith nor charity has failed, or been diminished, and the progress of modern civilization is the real expression of both. No man who understands Christianity can exclude from Christendom the principal Protestant nations, or the nations that adhere, like Russia and modern Greece, to the schismatical Greek communion. We cannot look upon these as heathens, and treat them as aliens from the Christian family. We may often find in these not less catholic truth, save in words, the sense of which is little understood even by Catholics themselves, than we find in many Catholic nations. They are heterodox and

externally schismatics, but their civilization and ours is one and the same in principle, and doctrinal and sacramental unity will follow as soon as Catholic nations purge themselves of their sectarianism, understand more fully that Catholicity is catholic, and accept and adhere to the regimen of liberty.

It is necessary to distinguish, in modern civilization, what is central, real, living, from what is merely accidental, temporary, or only simply apparent; and when this is done it will be found that it is essentially Catholic and Christian. Our good souls who are frightened at it, who recoil with horror from it, or anathematize it with so much unction, as does Father Tapparelli, Father Curci, or even Father Felix, would do well to study it a little closer, and to ask themselves if they have not failed to give to the Christian dogma its catholic sense and application. They seem to us to seek their Lord among the dead, not the living, and to look for his body in the tomb wherein it was laid by Joseph of Arimathea. They should know that our Lord is risen, and is not to be sought among the tombs. All the words and deeds of our Lord, all the facts of his history, have, aside from their particular sense, a universal sense, applicable alike to all ages and nations. The apparent hostility of modern civilization to Christianity, or its apparent unchristian character, lies in the fact that even churchmen overlook this universal sense and application, and confine themselves too strictly to the particular sense. They accept the Christian dogma, but understand not that every dogma is a catholic or universal principle, and therefore fail to recognize it, when they find it under any other than the particular form in which it is stated in the teaching or definition of the church. They keep to the letter, forgetting that the letter killeth and that it is the spirit that quickeneth. The truth is not the sign, but what the sign signifies.

Modern civilization, with all its errors and defects, is, at bottom, the aspiration of the nations to Christ, and is the result of their serious and earnest efforts to realize the Word made flesh, or the Christian idea, in their social life. No similar civilization is to be found in nations that have received no Christian instruction. The modern demand for liberty is only the assertion of the free will taught by Christian theology applied to our social relations. The demand for the amelioration of the condition of the poorer and more numerous classes, or the effort to put the poor in the way of helping themselves, is only a catholic exposition of the precept to give

alms; and the movement to place them on a footing of political equality with the rich and prosperous, is only the attempt to fulfil the word of our Lord to the Precursor, "the poor have the Gospel preached unto them." Even democracy, to which the age so strongly tends, is but an earnest effort to realize in society the unity of the race, human brotherhood, and the natural equality of all men, asserted in the Incarnation and Redemption. Your unbeliever, your atheist, whatever his speculative errors, practically follows not seldom the law of Christ, and is a good Christian as a friend, a neighbor, and a citizen. Auguste Comte and his disciples, though they speculatively deny God and vent the grossest sophisms about religion, yet assert the divine existence under the form of the principles or laws of nature, and hold it man's duty to conform to them, to expiate by his sufferings the faults he commits, and to labor for the development and progress of his race. They reason badly, and have no philosophy, yet they are, intellectually considered, only carried away by a reaction against an exaggerated supernaturalism, and a false theology, which separates God from his works, as a clockmaker is separated from his clock. Unquestionably, in modern civilization there are unchristian and even antichristian tendencies, but these are accidental, and may be separated from it, and would soon disappear were churchmen to accept it, and instead of warring against it, to labor to supply its defects, and restore to it the equilibrium it now lacks. Certainly to do so were the surest and quickest way to put an end to unbelief, and to modern heresies and schisms.

We do not forget here the question of the salvation of the soul, which, after all, is the great thing since heaven is our end. We hold as firmly as any of our brethren the dogma, *Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*, but we by no means hold that we are to consign to perdition all who are not visibly in her visible communion. In every age and nation, he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted with him. Not every one who falls even into dogmatic error is damned. All error is the effect of ignorance, and ignorance, when not culpable in its cause, is excusable. I hope through God's mercy to be saved, but I have not the presumption to pretend that I am free from all error, even in relation to Christian dogma. If all error insures damnation, who can be saved? The greatest and best men that ever lived have erred, and a man may err without being a heretic. He only is a heretic who rejects the known truth, or voluntarily neglects to use due dil-

igence in seeking for the truth. There are, probably, fewer hereties and schismatics in Christendom than is commonly supposed. The direct labor to convert the individuals we believe in error, or to bring them into our visible communion, is, perhaps, not the best way either to advance orthodoxy or to save the soul. Most of the schisms and heresies, if not all, that the Christian deplures, originate not in pride or obstinacy, in hatred of the truth or impatience of the legitimate authority, as is too often pretended, but in the fact that the church is coupled with an obsolete phase of civilization, and that in the changes that have taken place, her authorities really do not give to the soul, to the understanding, to the human element its rights. The individual must now, to a great extent, be reached through civilization, and the labors most effective in developing civilization, and making it express the real Christian idea, will be in the end the most effective in saving the souls of those who are now out of the way. Christ must be formed in society as well as in the individual, and through society the individual must be united with him.

The Christian idea has, hitherto, received from the clergy, whether orthodox or heterodox, a one-sided development. The ascetic and mystic side of Christianity has been insisted upon to the detriment of the social. Heaven and earth, instead of being regarded as parts of one whole, related to each other as medium and end, have been treated as opposites and what is given to the one has been counted as so much taken from the other. The highest form of Christian life on earth has been assumed to be that which approaches nearest to the life of the saints in glory. Hence the Christian ideal, the ideal of Christian perfection on earth, has been confounded with the monastic life, and, in the monastic life, with the contemplative life. The saint tramples the world beneath his feet, counts this life nothing, suppresses his human instincts and affections, and strives to live, while a mere *viator* or pilgrim, as if he had arrived at home, and become a *comprehensor*—the grand error of both Brahminism and Buddhism. We do not, of course, pretend that this error has ever received the official sanction of the church, that it has ever been warranted by her authoritative teaching, or that the great masters of spiritual life have failed to warn us against it. The Holy See has never favored it, and has always labored to soften the ascetic rigorism adopted by the founders of relig-

ious orders. Yet there has always been a tendency among the devout in this direction; and as nearly all the spiritual reading of the faithful has been for ages furnished by monastic orders, who were, or professed to be, dead to the world, its virtues and affections, this tendency has been strengthened and become practically predominant in the minds of the faithful. Yet this whole system is one-sided, sophistical, and not seldom mischievous. It mutilates Christianity and tends to separate in Christ the divinity from the humanity. This world is not the end for which man was created, but the way to that end lies through it. It does not stand opposed to heaven, but is related to heaven as the means to the end, and the end is attainable only through the means.

This exclusively ascetic view, which has practically prevailed, has led to the neglect of civilization, and to its depreciation in its relation to the salvation of souls, or the elevation of the race to union with God. If I can only save my soul, what need I care for civilization? Men have supposed that nothing should weigh with them but their individual salvation. Yet St. Paul did not so think. He said he could wish himself separated from Christ for his brethren, his kinsmen according to the flesh, showing in the strongest manner possible, that disinterested love which places the good of others above even our own, and which is far removed from that cold-hearted egotism that says, "No matter what becomes of the world, of society, of human life and its affections, if I only save my own soul." The truth is, no man who so feels and so thinks is in the way of saving even his own soul. The commandments, without fulfilling which no man can inherit eternal life, place love to our neighbor on the same level with love to God. Hence the social element, which has love to our neighbor for its basis, and which expresses itself in what we call civilization, is as Christian and lies in as high a plane as the ascetic element. In barbarous ages, or where there is no free state, the development of this social element is, no doubt, obstructed, and hence the reason why such undue prominence has been given the ascetic, and why the labors of churchmen for civilization have been indirect rather than direct, or why they have labored to reach civilization through the individual, rather than the individual through civilization. Hence a reason why we demand a free church in a *free* state, where both elements may be developed *pari passu*, in dialectic harmony.

Now, if we study modern civilization, that is, civilization

struggling to establish itself, not that which is struggling to hold its old place, we shall find that, at bottom, it is nothing else on the one side, than a protest against this exclusive asceticism, and, on the other, the assertion of the rights and position of the lay society. It protests against the false mysticism to which exclusive asceticism always gives birth, and asserts that Christian life is a human-divine life, and that man is not pure spirit, or pure spirit inhabiting a body, but the union or complex of soul and body, as implied in the fact that our Lord, in assuming human nature, assumed a human body as well as a human soul, and in the last article but one of the creed, "I believe the resurrection of the body,"—*carnis resurrectionem*. No doubt modern civilization, like all reactions, has a tendency to run to the opposite extreme, and, in its turn, to undervalue the ascetic, the mystic, the personal culture hitherto predominant in the Christian world; no doubt it tends to be exclusive, and, therefore, sophistical, but this is a point to be guarded against, for all exclusiveness is opposed to truth, since all truth is catholic. Yet underlying this modern civilization, and pervading it as its informing and moving spirit, is the principle that this world has its place in the Christian order, and civilization its work in the economy of salvation, or that the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us.

Taking what is substantive in each element, and rejecting in each its exclusiveness, or rejecting what is sophistical and accidental in each, and bringing both into dialectic union, we have the truly catholic order, and a really catholic civilization, together with the principle and conditions of the unity and peace of Christendom. We, in this way, secure unity of faith, unity of charity, unity of the sacraments, unity of discipline, unity of communion, without requiring any one to give up any thing positive that he really holds and desires to retain, or to accept any thing to which he is or ever has been really opposed. There is no compromise of principle or surrender of any positive condition required. All parties are right in what they affirm, and none err except in what they deny. Their affirmations are catholic, for none other are possible; only their denials are exclusive, sectarian, sophistical. The word *catholic* asserts unity as well as universality, for nothing lacking unity can be universal. That which you assert to be universal must be one and the same, for no addition of one thing to another can ever give you universality, any more than the accumulation of finites can give you infinity. It is

not without a profound meaning, therefore, that the true religion, or the church of Christ, is called *catholic*. It is so called because it is catholic in itself, in its principles, and because what is not catholic is not true, is not of the church of God, and can be no part of true religion. What are called false religions, are religions only in so far as they are one and catholic, for there is and can be but one religion. All Christendom repeats daily, "I believe the holy catholic church—*sanc-tam ecclesiam catholicam*," and the word *catholic* is not technical, naming a particular church, sect, or congregation, but an adjective applied to express the quality, nature, and character of the church herself. Christianity itself is catholic, and hence St. Vincent of Lerins gives us as the criterion or mark of Christian faith, the fact that it has been believed always, everywhere, and by all. Men can all agree only in what is true.

The trouble now is, that the profound significance of the word *catholic* is unheeded,—that the word is taken in a technical sense, and made the rallying-cry of division instead of unity. This is because not all who are called Catholics are really Catholics; for many of them restrict catholicity to their own external communion, and recognize no catholic truth outside of it, and consider it their duty to condemn the world outside as all wrong, to convict it of error, instead of recognizing the truth it really has, and seeking to enlighten it and to supply its defects, by presenting it the truth in its unity and integrity, or the truth it has not in dialectic union with the truth it has. These people seem to think, because the Holy Ghost dwells in the church into which they have been incorporated, that his operations are confined to them. They fail to note that, though the Holy Ghost speaks to men in the written word, and in the external authority of the church, when teaching or defining the faith, he speaks also to them through reason and conscience, common to all men. Peter marvelled, no doubt, when he found the Holy Ghost was given to the gentiles as well as to the Jews; but when he saw his manifest operations, witnessed the effects of his presence, he recognized them for what they really were, and in the joy of his heart exclaimed, "Who can forbid water that these be baptized?" The Holy Ghost is God; God the Consummator; and his presence is therefore universal, as universal as that of God the Creator, or God the Mediator. He is in the new phase assumed by civilization, no less than he

was in the old, and, rightly understood, the new developments, which frighten so many of our friends, and make them think the world is about to end, are only a step forward in the great work of consummation. The feebleness of character so marked in our modern conservatives, whether in church or state, is owing to the fact that they do really, without knowing or intending it, resist the Holy Ghost, and force him to work against them, not with them. The living, beating, aspiring heart of Christendom is not with them, is against them, and on the side of the men who represent the progressive spirit of the age. Only the voice of these, the radicals, as they are called, fetch an echo; and, even when not free from many sad errors, their voices stir the souls of men, and kindle in them noble aspirations, and fire them with heroic daring. Had the president of the United States been one of these men, instead of being a feeble and timid conservative; had he been able to plant himself firmly on the principle of progress, without feeling that he must shuffle backwards and forwards between the party of the past and the party of the future, he would long ere this have suppressed the rebellion, and restored the republic to unity and peace. It has been a far more difficult task to conquer him than to conquer the rebels.

We have gone thus at length into this argument, in order to show that neither the friends nor the enemies of religion have any thing to fear from adopting the great principle of civil and religious liberty, and asserting a free church in a free state. We now add, that this regimen of liberty, however it may be resisted and delayed, is inevitable. The struggle may be protracted through long years; there may be still, for more than a generation, a state of war, in which alternate successes and defeats may await each party; but victory is sure at last to crown the party of liberty and progress, for on its side are humanity, and, what is more than humanity, humanity's God. Why, then, war against it? *La Civiltà Cattolica*, which might better be called *La Civiltà Acattolica*, apparently resists, only because it wishes to preserve the old system in Rome and Italy, where the introduction of the new would destroy much old machinery, and break up many old habits. But we are aware of no part of Christendom where the retention of the old régime does so much harm as in Rome and Italy. Leave the old there, and *La Civiltà Cattolica* and its party would permit us the regimen of liberty

everywhere else, as a concession to our weakness, our intractableness, or to a local and temporary necessity. But we cannot accept as a concession what we demand as a right. Say what we will, Rome is the centre and capital of Christendom, and while the ecclesiastical authorities there maintain the old order and resist the new, or even refuse indignantly to accept it as a deliverance, it is impossible to give the necessary assurance to the friends of civil and religious liberty elsewhere that the church is not herself really opposed to them, and that she will not, the moment she feels herself strong enough to do it, revoke her concessions, and insist on the reestablishment of the old system everywhere.

We belong to the Catholic Church; we love her as our mother, and we mean to conduct ourselves towards her as an obedient son. But we distinguish at Rome, as elsewhere, between what is divine and what is human; between what God has established and what men have invented. The pontificate is divine, and it speaks with divine authority. It, and all that immediately pertains to it, we accept as infallible, to be by us believed, obeyed, loved, and neither judged nor disputed. But the men at Rome are human, and the human at Rome is neither more nor less respectable than at Paris, London, Vienna, or Washington. If we have the right to defend civil and religious liberty, so far as asserted in the divine government of men, and as not forbidden by any dogma of faith or law promulgated by divine authority, at Washington, Baltimore, New York, London, Mecklin, Vienna, the Hague, St. Petersburg, or Paris, we have the right to defend it and insist on it at Rome, providing we do not do it, as we are not at liberty to do it anywhere, in a disorderly manner, or in a turbulent and seditious spirit. As long as Rome repels the regimen the world now demands, it can be looked upon as only provisional and temporary elsewhere. Here we differ from our friends the illustrious Count de Montalembert, and the learned, intrepid, and venerable bishop of Orleans, who are apparently satisfied with the practical concessions *La Civiltà Cattolica* says may be made. We know no reason why Rome and Italy should be excepted, unless they put in the plea of infancy, the only ground on which the old system, in our judgment, is defensible.

We enter into no discussion of the pope's temporal sovereignty, the last stronghold of the old system of prince-bishops; but we must be permitted to say, that it seems strange to us

that the wise heads at Rome do not see that the pope holds that sovereignty only on sufferance, or because at present it does not suit the plans of the emperor of the French to allow the new Italian kingdom to have Rome for its capital. The emperor wants an Italy strong enough to be a useful ally, but not strong enough to be a dangerous enemy. So he maintains the prince-bishop at Rome and the Austrians in Venice. But the sentiment of the great body of the people of Christendom is against his temporal sovereignty, whatever may be the pastorals of their bishops, issued in obedience to the mandates of Rome. When Pio Nono a few years since undertook to raise an army, and bid for volunteers from all parts of the Catholic world, to recover his revolted provinces, and to defend his sovereignty against the armed invasion of Sardinia, very few flocked to his standard, and those who did so, did not cover themselves with glory. The pontiff is strong; the prince is weak. We are all ready to die for our spiritual father; but we have not heard of a dozen soldiers who went from the United States to fight for the prince. The Italian kingdom, *aut fas, aut nefas*, is every day becoming consolidated and stronger, and, as far as men can foresee, if not prevented by France, will ere long, in spite of the tiara and the quadrilateral, embrace the whole peninsula, and be in reality, as well as in name, one of the great powers of the world. If the Roman sovereign relies on the address of the bishops assembled at Rome, on the occasion of the canonization of the Japanese martyrs, he will most likely be deceived, for these bishops have comparatively little power over their flocks save in spirituals, and we are sure that in their address they did not represent the sentiments of the great body of the Catholic people, especially of that people who must do the fighting, if fighting is to be done. Where, then, is he to look for human support? He can look only to diplomacy; only to the embroilment of the European nations in a fierce and general war, from which religion would be sure to lose more than it could possibly gain.

Indeed, it seems to us that Rome feels that her position is insecure. Her whole conduct indicates it. *Non possumus* is the cry of weakness, not of strength. We hear no longer from Rome the voice of Hildebrand, of Innocent III., nor of the stern old Sixtus Quintus. The excommunicatory bulls issued venture to excommunicate no one by name, and, seemingly at least, fall without effect. The scholars and *savants*

of Rome explore the catacombs and devote themselves to the study of antiquities, as if they had no promise of the future. If a living man appears he must be silent, or be silenced. No voice of generous inspiration comes to us from the Eternal City; no voice of encouragement to those of us who are toiling day and night, with our heart's richest devotion, to advance the interests of religion and civilization. It is much if we are tolerated,—if we escape an interdict. We have found nothing more disheartening than the letter of the Holy Father to the archbishop of Munich, in relation to the congress last September in Munich of a large number of the most distinguished Catholic scholars and authors of Catholic Germany. It is replete with the spirit of fear, and betrays a total lack of confidence in the human mind. The only determination we discover in it is to persist in the warfare against the irrepressible instincts of civilized humanity. Rome speaks only to repress; she has ceased to speak to encourage. We hear not from her, "Forward!" and we find her lauding only those who are foremost in the work of repression. All this indicates that she feels herself insecure, and lives in constant dread of some terrible convulsion.

Our readers know that we are not revolutionists in either church or state; that we respect vested rights, and that we hold that the pope has as valid a vested right to the sovereignty of the Roman states, as any prince has or can have to the sovereignty of his dominions. We are not aware that his sovereignty has escheated either to his people or to Victor Emanuel. But vested rights, not being natural rights, are not indefeasible. They may be forfeited, and if not forfeited, they may be alienated or ransomed. The pope can alienate his authority as prince by restoring it to the people, or for a just ransom, if he sees proper; and so the *non possumus* is really *non volumus*. The Roman sovereign can do as he pleases; but he knows little of a real movement party who flatters himself that when it finds vested rights in its way, and the owner refusing to put them to ransom, it will not, if strong enough, take them without ransom. The pope need not then be surprised to find his Italian countrymen, aided by his own subjects one day taking from him his Roman principality, without stopping to say, "By your leave." It seems to us, therefore, as there is no reasonable prospect of resisting permanently the movement and retaining the principality, at least without grave detriment to the highest religious and social in-

terests, it would be wise and prudent for the Holy Father to abandon it for a reasonable ransom and proper guaranties for civil and religious freedom—for a free church in a free state, as offered by Count Cavour. It is easy to denounce us for saying this. It will not be so easy to prove that what we say is not true, or that it is disloyally said, or with a heart not as devoted to the church as that of the sovereign of Rome himself.

But we simply add, in conclusion, that we have in what we have said only defended our own American order of civilization, and the rights conceded and claimed by our own nation, as is in our province, and in our duty as the conductor of a periodical that professes to be NATIONAL.* In the order we have defended, we have the fullest confidence, and we hold it to be not only national, but Catholic, because in accordance with the law of God, or the principles of the divine government.

LIBERALISM AND PROGRESS.†

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1864.]

THIS work, which has not yet found a publisher, and which exists only in the author's autograph, has come honestly into our possession, with permission to make such use of it as we see proper. The author seems to have been only a civilian general, as his name does not appear in the army Register, and we suspect that he has never served in any army, hardly in a band of filibusters. From his English, and his inability to see any thing in our habits or manners, in our civil or military service, to commend, we should judge him some disappointed foreigner, who at the breaking out of our civil war, had offered his services to the government and had them refused. He regards himself as qualified for any post from pathmaster to president, or from corporal to commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, which makes against the theory that he is a foreigner, and would in-

*[The *Review* for 1864 was called the *National Series*.—ED.]

†*Tendencies of Modern Society, with Remarks on the American People, Government, and Military Administration.* BY GENERAL CROAKER.
MS.

dicate that he is a native, and "to the manner born." He finds every thing amiss with us, and that things can come right only by his being placed at the head of our civil and military affairs.

The general (?) is very profuse in his military criticisms, and shows a very hostile spirit towards our military academy. He blames the government for intrusting important commands to men who have been educated at West Point, and insists that if it will appoint Americans to the command of its armies, it should appoint civilians, who have not been narrowed, belittled, and cramped by the pedantry of a military education. He prefers instinct to study, and the happy inspirations of ignorance to the calculations of science. He thinks our true course is to invite hither the military adventurers so numerous on the continent of Europe, and who can find, in consequence of their devotion to democracy, no employment at home, and give them the command of our armies. He does not seem to be aware that we have tried his theory pretty thoroughly in both respects, and have found it not to work well. We passed in the beginning over the army, and made nearly all our high military appointments from civil life. In our first batch of major-generals, not one was taken from the army, and only one was taken who had been educated at West Point. The government commenced with as great a distrust of West Point and a military education and military experience, and with as great a confidence in the military instincts and inspirations of civilians or political aspirants, as our author himself could desire, and with what wisdom the country knows, to its sorrow. Most of our civilian generals have proved sad failures; West Point is now at a premium, and would remain so, but for the wretched policy of making most new appointments in the army from the ranks, thereby spoiling good sergeants and making poor officers. Something besides bravery even is demanded of an officer. Gentlemanly tastes, habits, education, and manners, a knowledge of his profession, and an aptitude to command men, are necessary. Appointments from the ranks, as a reward of extraordinary merit, is well; but they should be sparingly and judiciously made. When we make appointments from the ranks the rule, they cease to be the reward of merit, and degrade the army and impair its efficiency.

In the beginning of the war, we had almost any number of foreign adventurers in our service, but we have been obliged

to get rid of the larger portion of them. Some among the foreign officers who have received commissions from our government are men of real merit, and have served with intelligence and success; but the majority of them have proved to be men "who left their country for their country's good." No national army can be worth any thing that is to any considerable extent officered by foreigners. If the nation cannot from itself officer its own army, it had better not go to war; for it is pretty sure to fail if it does. Then war as made here assumes a peculiar character. Carried on over our vast extent of country, much of it either a wilderness, or sparingly settled, in a manner so different from what the training and experience acquired in European armies and wars fit one for, that foreign officers can be of little use to us. Neither the strategy nor the tactics of a Napoleon would secure success here. The men who enter a foreign service are, besides, rarely the best officers in the army of their native country, and are usually such as their own government does not care to employ. We maintain, too, that though West Point is susceptible of improvement, nowhere are young men better trained for the profession of arms, and it is very little that the men from abroad, who seek commissions in our army, can teach our West Pointers. The great objection to our army officers at the opening of the war was their lack of experience in commanding, moving, and manœuvring large bodies of men; but the foreigners who seek to enter our armies equally lack that experience. They have had only a lieutenant's, a captain's, a major's, or at most a colonel's command in their own country, or in the foreign service to which they had been attached. At the opening of the war, there were some who were mad enough to wish the government to invite Garibaldi to come and take command of our army; but Garibaldi, however successful he might have been as the tool of Piedmont or Mazzini in stirring up insurrection, and as a partisan commander, never commanded nor proved himself capable of commanding an army of thirty thousand men. Besides, his proper place in this country would not have been in the federal army, but in that of the rebels. To fight against rebellion and revolution in defence of legal authority and established government would have been a novelty to him, and contrary to his native instincts.

Our author is a decided democrat, in the European sense of the word, and complains that the American people are not

truly and thoroughly democratic. He has no sympathy with our people, and thinks them false to their own democratic principles. What brought him here, if a foreigner, and induced him to offer us his valuable services, which appear to have been rejected, was his sympathy with democracy, and hostility to all other actual or possible forms of government. He wanted to sustain democracy here, not for our sake, but as a *point d'appui* for his operations against monarchy and aristocracy in Europe. All this may be very well in him, only he is on the wrong side, as would have been his friend Garibaldi. The struggle in which we are engaged, notwithstanding what some silly journalists write and publish, is not a struggle for the triumph of democracy. So to understand it is to misunderstand it; and we always regret to find friends of the Union urging the war as a war between the northern democracy and the southern aristocracy. Such many have tried and are still trying to make it; but such is not its real legitimate character. On our side it is a war in defence of government, of authority, and the supremacy of law. It is a war in vindication of national integrity, and in defence of American constitutionalism. The very thing our author would have us make the principle and end of the war, is that which the war is waged against. We wish to abolish slavery as far as it can be done without appealing to humanitarian or revolutionary principles: but we have neither the right nor the wish to seek to revolutionize southern society. Politically, southern society is no more aristocratic in its constitution than northern society: if socially it is more so, that is an advantage, not a disadvantage. In the present struggle, southern society has proved relatively stronger and more energetic than northern society, because in southern society the people are marshalled under their natural leaders, under men who are intrinsically superior to the mass, and felt to be so; while in the northern states they have been marshalled under no leaders or under artificial leaders, not superior, and often inferior, to those they are commissioned to lead. No society that has not a natural aristocracy, if we may borrow a phrase from Thomas Jefferson, has any really cohesive power, or any more strength than a rope of sand.

We have some madmen amongst us who talk of exterminating the southern leaders, and of new-Englandizing the South. We wish to see the free-labor system substituted for the slave-labor system, but beyond that we have no wish to ex-

change or modify southern society, and would rather approach northern society to it, than it to northern society. The New Englander has excellent points, but is restless in body and mind, always scheming, always in motion, never satisfied with what he has, and always seeking to make all the world like himself, or as uneasy as himself. He is smart, seldom great; educated, but seldom learned; active in mind, but rarely a profound thinker; religious, but thoroughly materialistic: his worship is rendered in a temple founded on Mammon, and he expects to be carried to heaven in a softly-cushioned railway car, with his sins carefully checked and deposited in the baggage crate with his other luggage, to be duly delivered when he has reached his destination. He is philanthropic, but makes his philanthropy his excuse for meddling with everybody's business as if it were his own, and under pretence of promoting religion and morality, he wars against every generous and natural instinct, and aggravates the very evils he seeks to cure. He has his use in the community; but a whole nation composed of such as he would be short-lived, and resemble the community of the lost rather than that of the blest. The Puritan is a reformer by nature, but he never understands the true law of progress, and never has the patience to wait till the reform he wishes for can be practically effected. He is too impatient for the end ever to wait the slow operations of the means, and defeats his own purpose by his inconsiderate haste. He needs the slower, the more deliberate, and the more patient and enduring man of the South to serve as his counterpoise.

The South has for its natural leaders, not simply men of property, but men of large landed estates, and who are engaged in agricultural pursuits: the North has for its natural leaders business men and their factors, who may or may not be men of wealth, or who, if rich to-day, may be poor to-morrow, and who necessarily seek to subordinate every thing to business interests. They of course are less fitted, in a country like ours, to lead than the landholders, because agriculture with us is a broader and more permanent interest of the nation than trade or manufactures.

We insist that it were a gross perversion of the war to make it a war against Southern society or the Southern people. The war is just and defensible only when it is conducted as a war of the nation for its own existence and rights against an armed rebellion. In the war the nation seeks to reduce the

rebels to their allegiance, not to destroy them, not to exile them, not to deprive them of their property or their franchises; it seeks to make them once more loyal citizens, and an integral portion of the American people, standing on a footing of perfect equality with the rest, not slaves or tributaries. Southern society must be respected, and any attempt to build up a new South out of the few Union men left there, northern speculators, sharpers, adventurers, and freed negroes, is not only impolitic, but unconstitutional and wrong. Such a South would be a curse to itself and to the whole nation; we want it not. With here and there an individual exception, the real people of the South are united in the rebellion, and under their natural leaders, and any scheme of settlement that does not contemplate their remaining with their natural leaders, the real, substantial, ruling people of the southern states, will not only fail, but ought not to be entertained. They must have the control of affairs in their respective states, and represent them in the councils of the nation. The nation cannot afford to lose them; if it could, it need not have gone to war against them. The bringing of the negro element, except in states where it is too feeble to amount to any thing, into American political society will never be submitted to by either the North or the South. We must suppress the rebellion; but with the distinct understanding that the southern states are to be restored, when they submit, to all the rights of self-government in the Union, and that no attempt in the mean time shall be made to revolutionize their society in favor of northern or European ideas. If in our haste, our wrath, or our zeal we have said any thing that can bear a different sense, it must be retracted.

Friends of constitutional government, and of liberty with law, may justly sympathize with our government in the present struggle; but not European radicals, democrats, and revolutionists, for the principle of the struggle is as hostile to them as it is to the southern rebels. In this war the nation is fighting northern democracy or Jacobinism as much as it is southern aristocracy, and the evidence of it is in the fact, that the people cease to support willingly the war just in proportion as it assumes a Jacobinical character, and loses its character of a war in defence of government and law. The administration may not see it; and the philosophers of the *New York Tribune* and *Evening Post*, well convinced as they may be that something is wrong, may deny it, and propose to cure the evil by doub-

ling the dose of radicalism; even the people, while they instinctively feel, may not be fully aware that it is that which holds them back; but so it is, and nothing for years has given us so much hope for our country as this very fact. It proves that, after all, the popular instincts are right, and that while the people are ready to carry on a war to preserve the constitution and government, they are not prepared to carry on a war for revolutionizing either. These foreign radicals and revolutionists who complain of our democracy, that it is not thorough-going and consistent, and does not press straight to its end, ought to understand that there is no legitimate sympathy between them and us, and that they cannot fight their battles in ours. We are not fighting their battles, and those of our countrymen who think we are, begin already to find themselves deserted by the nation. The American people, however ready they have been to sympathize with revolution, and encourage insurrection and rebellion in foreign nations, therein imitating the English Whigs, are yet very far from being revolutionists in the interior of their souls, and for their own country.

Our author, who professes to side with the Federalists, keeps an eye on the revolutionary movements in Europe, and a considerable part of his work is written with the express intention of forwarding them. He rejoices at the spread of democratic ideas in England, in Germany, and in Italy, and he expresses his hope that the democratic party will rise again in France, and hurl the emperor from his throne. We trust we love liberty and free government as much as does this disappointed foreigner, or American with foreign sympathies and notions: but, in our judgment, what Europe most wants at present is repose in the interior of her several nations, and freedom for their respective governments to devote themselves to the welfare and progress of the people, for which they can do nothing, so long as they have to use all their power and energy to maintain their own existence. Every enlightened well-wisher to European society would rejoice to see the whole race of European revolutionists exterminated, or converted into loyal and peaceful subjects. True liberty was never yet advanced by subverting the established government of a country. Europe has lost far more than it has gained by its century of insurrections, revolutions, and civil wars, and the new *régimes* introduced have left fewer effective guaranties of civil freedom and personal liberty than existed before them.

Providence may overrule evil for good, but good is never the natural product of evil.

We know, in censuring the revolutionary spirit of modern society, we are placing ourselves in opposition to the whole so-called liberal party of the civilized world; but that is not our fault. The liberal party so called has its good side and its bad side. Some things in it are to be commended, and other things in it, whoever would not stultify himself must condemn. Man is by nature a social being, and cannot live and thrive out of society; society is impracticable without strong and efficient government; and strong and efficient government is impracticable, where the people have no loyal sentiments, and hold themselves free to make war on their government and subvert it whenever they please. Men and governments, no doubt, are selfish, and prone to abuse power when they have it; but no government can stand that rests only on the selfishness of the human heart, or on what in the last century they called "enlightened self-interest," *l'intérêt bien entendu*, and not on the sense of duty, strengthened by loyal affection. People must feel not only that it is their interest to sustain government, but that it is their moral and religious duty to sustain it; and when they have no moral sense, no religion, and no loyal affection, they should know that they cannot sustain it, and society must cease to exist. A nation of atheists were a solecism in history. A few atheists may, perhaps, live in society, and even serve it for a time, where the mass of the people are believers and worshippers, but an entire nation of real atheists was never yet founded, and never could subsist any longer than it would take it to dissipate the moral wealth acquired while it was as yet a religious nation. It was well said by the Abbé de La Mennais, before his unhappy fall: "Religion is always found by the cradle of nations, philosophy only at their tombs"—meaning, as he did, philosophy in the sense of unbelief and irreligion; not philosophy in the sense of the rational exercise of the faculties of the human mind on divine and human things, aided by the light of revelation. The ancient lawgivers always sought for their laws not only a moral, but a religious sanction, and where the voice of God does not, in some form, speak to men's consciences, and bid them obey the higher power, government can subsist only as a craft or as sheer force, which nobody is bound to respect or obey.

The great misfortune of modern liberalism is, that it was

begotten of impatience and born of a reaction against the tyranny and oppression, the licentiousness and despotism of governments and the governing classes; and it is more disposed to hate than to love, and is abler to destroy than to build up. Wherever you find it, it bears traces of its origin, and confides more in human passion than in divine Providence. The great majority of its adherents, even if they retain a vague and impotent religious sentiment, and pay some slight outward respect to the religion of their country, yet place the state above the church, the officers of government above the ministers of religion, and maintain that priests have nothing to do with the affairs of this world. They forget that it is precisely to introduce the elements of truth, justice, right, duty, conscience into the government of individuals and nations in this world, as the means of securing the next, that institutions of religion exist, and priests are consecrated. Politicians may do as they please, so long as they violate no rule of right, no principle of justice, no law of God; but in no world, in no order, in no rank, or condition, have men the right to do wrong. Religion, if any thing is the *lex suprema*, and what it forbids, no man has the right to do. This is a lesson liberalism has forgotten, or never learned.

In our last *Review* we defended civil and religious freedom and pointed out to the *oscurantisti* in church and state, wherein and wherefore they mistake this age, are laboring for an impossibility, and fail to recall men to faith, and to reëstablish in its integrity the unity of Christendom; but whoever inferred from what we then said that we have any sympathy with political atheism, reasoned from premises of his own, not from any we ever laid down or entertained. Almost entire volumes of this *Review* are filled with refutations, such as they are, of political atheism, and the defence of the authority of religion for the human conscience in all the affairs of human life. There are elements in modern liberalism that it will not do to oppose, because, though liberalism misapplies them, they are borrowed from the Gospel, are taken from Christian civilization, and are, in themselves, true, noble, just, and holy. Nor can we recall modern society to that old order of things, that liberalism began by opposing, even if it were desirable, which it is not. Many things we may seek to save from being overthrown, which, when overthrown, it would be madness to attempt to reëstablish. But we have never denied that modern liberalism has an odor of infidelity

and irreligion, and assumes an independence of religion, that is, of conscience, of God, which is alike incompatible with the salvation of souls and the progress of society. Liberals, if they would study the question, would soon find that religion offers no obstacle to any thing true and good they wish to effect, and even offers them that very assistance without which they cannot effect or preserve it.

It is the mad attempt to separate the progress of society from religion that has rendered modern liberalism everywhere destructive, and everywhere a failure. It has sapped the foundation of society, and rendered government, save as a pure despotism, impracticable, by taking from law its sacredness, and authority its inviolability, in the understanding and consciences of men. The world, since the opening of modern history, in the fifteenth century, has displayed great activity, and in all directions; but its progress in the moral and intellectual orders has been in losing rather than in gaining. Its success in getting rid of old ideas, old beliefs, old doctrines, old sentiments, old practices, and in cutting itself loose from all its old moorings, has been marvellous, and well-nigh complete. Taste has, indeed, been refined, and manners, habits, and sentiments have been softened, and become more humane, but we have not learned that they have gained much in purity or morality. There has been a vast development of material resources, great progress in the application of science to the productive arts, and a marvellous augmentation of material goods; but it may well be doubted if there has been any increase even of material happiness. Happiness is not in proportion to what one is able to consume, as our political economists would lead one to suppose, but in proportion of the supply to one's actual wants. We, with our present wants and habits, would be perfectly miserable for a time, if thrown back into the condition of the people of the middle ages; and yet it is probable they were better able to satisfy even such material or animal wants as were developed in them than we are to satisfy those developed in us. Human happiness is not augmented by multiplying human wants, without diminishing the proportion between them and the means of satisfaction, and that proportion has not been diminished, and cannot be, because such is human nature, that men's wants multiply always in even a greater ratio than the means of meeting them, as affirmed by our political economists, in their maxims of trade and production, that demand creates a supply, and supply creates

a demand. Under the purely material relation, as a human animal, there is no doubt that the negro slave, well fed and well clothed, and not unkindly treated, is happier than the free laborer at wages. We suspect that it would be difficult to find in the world's history any age, in which the means of supply were less in proportion to the wants actually developed than in our own. There was more wisdom than our liberals are disposed to admit in the old maxim: If you would make a man happy, study not to augment his goods; but to diminish his wants. One of the greatest services Christianity has rendered the world has been its consecration of poverty, and its elevation of labor to the dignity of a moral duty. The tendency of modern society is in the opposite direction. England and the United States, the most modern of all modern nations, and the best exponents the world has of the tendencies of modern civilization, treat poverty as a crime, and hold honest labor should be endured by none who can escape it.

There is no question that education has been more generally diffused than it was in the middle ages, but it is doubtful if the number of thinkers has been increased, or real mental culture extended. Education loses in thoroughness and depth what it gains in surface. Modern investigators have explored nature to a greater extent than it appears to have ever been done by the ancients, and accumulated a mass of facts, or materials of science, at which many heads are turned; but little progress has been made in their really scientific classification and explanation. Theories and hypotheses in any number we have, each one of which is held by the simpletons of the age to be a real contribution to science when it is first put forth, but most of them are no better than soap-bubbles, and break and disappear as soon as touched. Christianity has taught the world to place a high estimate on the dignity of human nature, and has developed noble and humane sentiments, but under the progress of modern society in losing it, characters have been enfeebled and debased, and we find no longer the marked individuality, the personal energy, the manliness, the force, the nobility of thought and purpose, and the high sense of honor, so common in the mediæval world, and the better periods of antiquity. There is in our characters a littleness, a narrowness, a meanness, coupled with an astuteness and unscrupulousness to be matched only in the later stages of the Lower Empire. In military matters

we have introduced changes, but may still study with advantage the Grecian phalanx and the Roman legion. Ulpian and Papinian can still, save in what we have learned from Christianity, teach us law, and we improve modern legislation and jurisprudence only by borrowing from the civil law as digested by the lawyers of Justinian, in the *Institutes* and *Novelle*. In political science, properly so called, Aristotle, and any of the great mediæval doctors, are still competent to be our masters. He who has read Aristotle's *Politics* has read the history of American democracy, and the unanswerable refutation of all the democratic theories and tendencies of modern liberals. For the most part we are prone to regard what is new to us as new to the world, and, what is worse, what is new to us as a real scientific acquisition, and a real progress of the race.

We have never read or heard of any age that had so high an opinion of its own acquisitions, that believed so firmly in its own intelligence, and that so little questioned its own immense superiority over all preceding ages, as the eighteenth century. It believed itself enlightened, highly cultivated, profound, philosophic, humane, and yet the doctrines and theories that it placed in vogue, and over which the upper classes grew enthusiastic in their admiration, are so narrow, so shallow, so directly in the face and eyes of common sense, so manifestly false and absurd, that one finds it difficult to believe that anybody out of a madhouse ever entertained them. What think you of a philosopher who defines man—"A digesting tube, open at both ends"? and of another who ascribes all the difference between a man and a horse, for instance, to "the fact that man's fore limbs terminate in hands and flexible fingers, while those of a horse terminate in hoofs"? Yet these philosophers were highly esteemed in their day, and gave a tone to public opinion. We laugh at them as they did with the disciples of Epicurus, at the superstitions of past ages, the belief in sorcery, magic, necromancy, demons, witches, wizards, magicians, and yet all these things flourished in the eighteenth century, are believed in this nineteenth century in our own country, in England, France, and Germany, by men of all professions, and in all ranks of society. Wherein, then, consists the progress of our enlightenment?

But "we are more liberal, more tolerant in matters of opinion, and have ceased to persecute men for religious differences," says our author. Hardly; yet if so, it may as well be be-

cause we are more indifferent, and less in earnest than our predecessors, believe less in mind, and more in matter. We have read no public document more truly liberal and more tolerant in its spirit and provisions than the edict of Constantine the Great, giving liberty to Christians, and not taking it from pagans. Even Julian the Apostate professed as much liberality and tolerance as Voltaire, or Mazzini, and practised them as well as the liberals in Europe usually do, when in power. "But the age tends," replies our author, "to democracy, and, therefore, to the amelioration, and the social and political elevation of the people." Fine words; but, in fact, while demagogues spout democracy, and modern literature sneers at law, mocks at loyalty, and preaches insubordination, insurrection, revolution, governments have a fine pretext for tightening their bonds, and rendering their power despotic; nay, in some respects, are compelled to do so, as the only means left of preventing the total dissolution of society and the lapse of the race into complete barbarism. If the system of repression is carried too far and threatens its own defeat, the exaggerations of liberalism provoke, and in part justify it, for the liberalistic tendencies, if unchecked, could lead only to anarchy. Democracy, understood not as a form of government, but as the end government is to seek, to wit, the common good, the advance in civilization of the people, the poorer and more numerous, as well as the richer and less numerous classes, not of a privileged caste or class, is a good thing, and a tendency towards it is really an evidence of social progress. But this is only what the great doctors of the church have always taught, when they have defined the end of government to be the good of the community, the public good, or the common good of all,—not the special good of a few, nor yet the greatest good of the greatest number, as taught by that grave and elaborate humbug, Jeremy Bentham, but the common good of all, that good which is common to all the members of the community, whether great or small, rich or poor.

But that democracy as the form of the government is the best practicable means of securing this end, unless restrained by constitutions, the most earnest and enlightened faith, and by the most pure and rigid religious discipline, is, to say the least, a perfectly gratuitous assumption. We defend here and everywhere, now and always, the political order established in our own country, and our failure—for failed, substantially, we have—is owing solely to our lack of real Christian faith, of

the Christian conscience, and to our revolutionary attempts to interpret that order by the democratic theory. Our political order is republican, not democratic. But, in point of fact, the liberals have never advocated democracy for the end we have stated, from love of liberty, or for the sake of ameliorating the condition of the people, though they may have so pretended, and at times even so believed, but really as a means of elevating themselves to power. Their democracy is, practically,—I am as good as you, and you have no more right than I to be in power or place. We believe in the disinterestedness or the patriotism of no man who can conspire to overthrow the government of his country, and whenever we hear a man professing great love for the dear people, praising their wisdom and virtue, their intelligence and sagacity, and telling them that they are sovereign, and their will ought to prevail, we always regard him as a self-seeker, and as desirous of using the people simply to elevate himself to be one of their rulers. Democracy elevates to places of honor, profit, and trust, men who could not be so elevated under any other form of government; but that this operates to the advantage of the public we have yet to learn.

What our author praises as the tendency of democracy, is the tendency to reduce all things to a low average, and to substitute popular opinion for truth, justice, reason, as the rule of action, and the criterion even of moral judgment. Democracy, when social as well as political, elevates not the best men to office, but the most available men, usually the most cunning, crafty, or empty-headed demagogues. When, two years ago, the editor of this *Review* received the nomination in his district for member of congress, he was interiorly alarmed, and began a self-examination to ascertain what political folly or iniquity he had committed; and he became reconciled to himself, and his conscience was at ease, only when he found his election defeated by an overwhelming majority. His own defeat consoled him for his nomination, and restored his confidence in his own integrity, loyalty, and patriotism. The men democracy usually elevates are petty attorneys or small lawyers, men of large selfishness and small capacity, and less political knowledge. The southern states, whose democracy is less socially diffused than that of the northern states, has always as a rule elevated abler men than has the North, which has given them an ascendancy in the Union that has provoked northern jealousy. They have selected to represent them in con-

gress, in diplomacy, in the cabinet, in the presidential chair, their ablest men while we have selected our feeblest men; or, if abler men, we have, with rare exceptions, "rotated" them from their places before they could acquire experience enough to be useful. Democracy, in the sense we are considering it, has shown what men it selects, when left to itself, in the present administration, and in the last and present congresses. Were there no better men in the country? Then is democracy condemned, as tending to degrade intellect and abase character, for greater and better men we certainly had, who were formed while we were yet British colonies. If there were greater or better men, and democracy passed them over as unavailable, then it is incapable of employing the best talent and the highest character produced by the country in its service, and therefore should also be condemned. President Lincoln we need not speak of; we have elsewhere given his character. But we have not had a single statesman, worthy of the name, in his cabinet or in congress since the incoming of the present administration, and hardly one from the free states since the whigs, in 1840, descended into the forum, took the people by the hand, and, led on by the *Boston Atlas* and the *New York Tribune*, undertook to be more democratic than the Democratic party itself, and succeeded in out-heroding Herod. When they dropped the name *Whig*, and assumed that of *Republican*, which we had recommended in place of *Democratic*, we, in our simplicity, supposed that they really intended to abandon Jacobinism and to contend for constitutionalism, else had we never for a moment supported them. But they did, and intended to do nothing of the sort.

There is nothing in the American experiment thus far to justify the liberals in identifying the progress of liberty and social well-being with the progress of democracy. On this point our author is wholly at fault. Since Mr. Van Buren, more incompetent men in the presidential chair we could not have had, if we had depended on the hereditary principle, than popular election has given us. Prince John [Van Buren] would have been better than Harrison or Taylor, and Prince Bob [Lincoln] can hardly fall below his father. We want no hereditary executive, but probably the chances of getting a wise man for president, if the executive were hereditary, would be greater than they have been under the elective principle, as our elections have been, for a long time, conducted. Seldom

has our senate been equal to the English house of peers. Democracy opens a door to office to men who, under no other system, could ever attain to office; but their attainment to office is of no conceivable advantage to the public, and very little to themselves. It opens a door to every man's ambition, at least permits every man to indulge ambitious aspirations. When such a man as Abraham Lincoln can become president, who may not hope one day also to be president? It stimulates every one's ambition, every one's hope of office, perhaps of the highest in the gift of the people, but it does not stimulate any one to study or to labor to qualify himself for honorably discharging the duties of office. It is rare to find any man who does not think himself qualified for any office to which the people can be induced to elect him. The plurality of votes is a sovereign indorsement of his qualification. The people, in electing me, have judged me qualified, and would you, proud aristocrat, arraign the judgment of the people? Enough said.

The same tendency to democracy, lauded by our author, leads in nearly every thing, every one to struggle to be other than he is, to get what he has not, and to fill another place than the one he is in, and hence produces universal competition, and general uneasiness and discontent in society. No man is contented to live and die in the social position in which he was born, and pride and vanity, not love and humility, become the principle of all individual and social action. I am as good as Abraham Lincoln, and why should he be president and not I? He was a rail-splitter and I am a hod-carrier. Let me throw down the hod, as he did the beetle and swedge, become an attorney, and I may one day be president as well as he. John Jacob Astor was once a poor German boy, who landed alone and friendless in the streets of New York, and he died worth, some say, twenty-five millions, all made by himself in trade; and why not I do as much, and make as much money as he? So every boy is discontented to remain at home and follow the occupation of his father, that of a mechanic or small farmer, and becomes anxious to get a place in a counting-house, and to engage in trade and speculation. Where all are free to aim to be first no one is contented to be second, especially to be last. This is the effect of liberalism, and an effect which our author cites as an evidence of its merit. He dwells on it with enthusiasm, and contrasts the movement, the activity, the aspirations of the

common people at present with that of the lower classes under feudalism, and even the monarchical *régime* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

We, although a true-born Yankee, think very differently. Liberalism, taken in its practical workings in a society, with weak faith, a movable religion, and no loyalty, tends to develop wants which it is impossible to satisfy, because the wants it develops all demand their satisfaction from the material order. In the moral, intellectual, and spiritual world, the multiplication of wants is in itself not an evil, because the means of satisfaction are liberally supplied, and even the very craving for moral or spiritual good,—what the Gospel calls “a hungering and thirsting after righteousness,” is itself a good, and blessed are they that do so, for they shall be filled. But the multiplication of wants which can be satisfied only with material or sensible goods, is not a good, but an evil. Political equality and equality before the law is practicable, but social equality, equality of wealth and social condition, is impracticable, and even undesirable. Only one man, once in four years, out of many millions, can be president of the United States; and if all set their hearts on it, all but the one must be disappointed. The sufferings of disappointed office-seekers more than overbalance the pleasures of office-holders. All cannot be rich, for if all were rich, paradoxical as it may sound, all would be poor. Real wealth is not in the magnitude of one’s possessions, but in the amount of the labor of others one is able to command; and if all are rich, no one can command any labor of another at all, for there is no one to sell his labor, and the rich man is reduced precisely to the level of the poor man. Though his possessions are counted by millions, he must produce for himself, and actually have only what he can produce with the labor of his own hands. All your schemes of an equal division of property, and for keeping all the members of a community equal in their condition, are fallacious, and, if they could be carried out, would end only in establishing universal poverty, universal ignorance, and universal barbarism. The human race would soon sink everywhere below the condition of our North American savages and, indeed, liberalism is practically a tendency to the savage state, as any one may learn even from Jean Jacques Rousseau.

We want no privileged caste or class; we want no political aristocracy, recognized and sustained as such by law. Let all

be equal before the law. But we do want a social aristocracy, families elevated by their estates, their public services, their education, culture, manners, tastes, refinement, above the commonalty; and we do not believe a community can long even subsist where such an aristocracy is wanting, to furnish models and leaders for the people. It is the presence of such an aristocracy, that in the present fearful struggle gives to the southern states their unity and strength. It is the want of such a class, enjoying the confidence and respect of the people in the loyal states, that constitutes our national weakness, as we have elsewhere shown. The people, we have said, and we all know, must have leaders and leaders must be born, not made. The number in a nation who have the qualities to be leaders, whether in peace or war, are comparatively few. All cannot lead; the mass must follow, and those who are born to follow should be content to follow, and not aspire to lead. If you stir up in them the ambition to lead, make them discontented with their lot, and determined to pass from followers to leaders, you reverse the natural order of things, introduce confusion into society, disorder into all ranks, and do good to nobody. We ourselves, we know it well, were never born to lead, and should only be misplaced, and ruin ourselves and others, were we put in the position of a leader. Our author professes to be a philosopher, and to have mastered what just now is called the science of sociology,—a barbarous term, which we detest,—and therefore he ought to understand that he is calling things by wrong names; that practically he says, Evil be thou my good! and, if successful, would erect a pandæmonium, not a well ordered human society, or a temple of liberty and peace.

Yet our author swims with the current, and is sustained by all the force of what is regarded as the advanced opinion of the age, and for the moment is stronger than we, who are sustained only by certain moral instincts and traditions which are generally unheeded. He has, too, the ear of the public, if not for himself personally, yet for innumerable others who agree with him, and can speak with even far more force and eloquence than he; while we are repudiated by all parties, by all sects, and only a few will listen to or heed our voice, harsh and discordant as it is in most ears. We are neither an *obscurantist* nor a liberal, but agreeing in some things, and disagreeing in others, with both; precisely the sort of a man, no party likes, for we can support no party

through thick and thin,—a legitimate child of the nineteenth century, yet believing that all wisdom was neither born nor will die with it. We believe there were “brave men before Agamemnon,” and that there will be brave men even after we are dead and forgotten. We belong not to the party that would restore the past, but to that which would retain what was true and good, and for all ages, in the past; we are not of those who would destroy the past, and compel the human race to begin *de novo*, but of those, few in number they may be, who see something good even in liberalism, and would accept it without breaking the chain of tradition, or severing the continuity of the life of the race, separate it from the errors and falsehoods, and bitter and hateful passions with which it is mixed up, and carry it onward. We are too much of the present to please the men of the past, and too much of the past to please the men of the present: so we are not only doomed, Cassandra-like, to utter prophecies which nobody believes, but prophecies which nobody heeds either to believe or disbelieve. We know it well, and therefore we said, We were not born to be a leader, although we have been long since spoiled as a follower, like most of our contemporaries. Hence, though we know that we speak the words of truth and soberness, we expect not our words to be heeded. Popular opinion decides with us all questions of wisdom and folly, of truth and falsehood, and popular opinion we do not and cannot echo.

Our author is a liberal, an ultra-democrat, a revolutionist,—has been, and probably still is, a conspirator,—a man who sees no sacredness in law, no inviolability in authority, and no charm in loyalty. His political creed is short, and very precise. It is: “The people are sovereign; the people are divine; the people are infallible and impeccable; I and my fellow-conspirators and revolutionists are the people; and because you Americans will not permit us to assume the direction of your civil and military affairs, you are no true liberals, no consistent democrats, and are really hostile to the progressive tendencies of the modern world.” This is his creed, and the creed of all such as he, whether at home or abroad. We do not believe his creed, and have no wish to see it prevail. Many Americans profess it: few of them, however, really believe it, or, in fact, much else. They have been in the habit of hearing it, of reading it in newspapers and novels, and listening to it from the lips of impassioned orators on

the Fourth of July, and in political meetings, and they have repeated it, as a matter of course, without giving it one moment's serious thought; but their instincts are truer than the creed they now and then fancy they believe, and there still linger in their minds faint reminiscences of something better, which was once believed by most men, and approved by Christian faith and conscience.

If the American people could only once understand that the present war is not a war between democracy and aristocracy, but a war in defence of government and law, that is, in defence of authority in principle as well as in practice, against popular license and revolutionism, the war, however it might terminate, would prove the richest boon they have ever as a people received from the hand of Heaven. It would arrest that lawless and revolutionary tendency they have hitherto thoughtlessly followed, which they have fancied it belonged to them to encourage both at home and abroad, and which at times has threatened to make us the pest of the civilized world. We trust it will yet have this effect. We are radical, if you will, in our determination, at the earliest moment it can be legally done, to get rid of the system of slave-labor, but, thank God, a radical in nothing else, and sympathize in little else with those who are called radicals: and, after all, we suspect the mass of the American people agree more nearly with us than with our General Croaker, and that we are a truer exponent of their real interior convictions and social instincts than he, although they will never believe it because they will never read us; and the journals, if they notice us at all, will only misrepresent and pervert our words. Yet we rely greatly on military discipline and the effects of the war, to bring back the people to sounder political and social views.

EXPLANATIONS TO CATHOLICS

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1854.]

As it is possible that this number of our *Review* may be the last, we are unwilling not to avail ourselves of the opportunity of offering our Catholic readers, who have been and still are its principal supporters, some remarks which may tend to

satisfy them that we have not, at least knowingly and intentionally, betrayed the cause of our holy religion, whose support and consolations were never dearer to us, or more needed by us, alike in view of domestic affliction and the sad state of our country. Since we commenced writing this number, public affairs have not brightened, and we have lost by death two of our noble sons, if a father may so speak,—one an officer in the army—a boy-veteran, who fell mortally wounded on the battle-field, fighting manfully for his country, and died a hero's and a patriot's death; the other by an accident while on his way home for the purpose of joining the army, and giving his life, if it should be required, to the cause of the constitution and the Union. It is our consolation under our great personal loss that they were both Catholics, both true patriots, both ardent lovers of liberty, and neither desiring a more glorious death than that of dying in defence of the integrity and freedom of the land of their birth. We would not have our Catholic friends suppose for a moment that we are indifferent to the interests of that religion in which all our children have been carefully trained, and in which five sons out of seven have died, and without which we could have no sweet hope of meeting them again in the bosom of our God.

Much fault has been found with our article in our last *Review on Civil and Religious Freedom*, in which we are said to have made a wanton attack on the Jesuits, and to have even treated irreverently the Holy Father on the subject of his temporal sovereignty. With regard to the Jesuits, we did but give the views, almost verbally, expressed to us by one of the most saintly archbishops of the church in the United States, and which he gave us not only as his own, but also as those of a most learned, active, and devout Catholic gentleman in France, who had carefully studied the wants of the church in our day, who knew well the history of the society, and was on the most friendly personal relations with the Jesuits themselves. We made no wanton attack on the society, for we went not out of our way to attack it, since we were defending the discourses of M. de Montalembert and our own national order in relation to civil and religious freedom, precisely against the attacks of the Roman organ of the society, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, which, as the conductor of a national review, and as the defender of both civil and religious liberty, it was in our way to do. There was, then, nothing *wanton* in our attack, no seeking for an opportunity to attack the Jesuits.

Then, we did not attack the Jesuits personally, nor even their institute, as approved by the church. The pretense of a Philadelphia paper that we were moved to say what we did by private grievances, is unfounded and ridiculous. We have and we have had no private grievances in the case. Some of the best friends we have ever had, or expect to have, we have found in the society. We are under many and heavy personal obligations to more than one Jesuit house in this country, more than we can pay; and in our private feelings and personal friendships, we are strongly attached to the Jesuits, who are, as far as our experience extends, generally excellent men, learned men, able and devoted priests. That, as the same journal alleges, we were forbidden one of their houses, which we had entered to seek our confessor, is true; but he who did it was one of the warmest and truest of our personal friends, and whom, ever since we have known him, we have loved and venerated. We never blamed him; he only did what he felt was expected of him by his superiors. We had just given a lecture before the Emancipation League in Boston, and as the Jesuits held property in the seceded states, it was feared, if they entertained us at one of their houses, the rebel government might take offence and confiscate it. They wished to give Mr. Davis of the confederacy no occasion to charge them with misprision of treason or hostility to his government. The rector who excluded us, though personally sympathizing with us, felt that under the circumstances he was officially bound to exclude us, and he did so with tears in his eyes. That the incident affected us unpleasantly, we do not deny, but not in the way assumed, nor because we were the party excluded. As a personal matter we could never have given it a second thought, and the unpleasantness it occasioned was the regret that simple, worldly prudence or property considerations had more influence with the Jesuit body than we expected from a mendicant order, and that the education of the Catholic youth of the nation should be intrusted to a society so destitute of loyalty that it could look on with indifference and see the nation rent assunder and destroyed by a rebellion which every principle of our religion, as we have learned it, condemns. It was important only as one proof among many others, that the society is, if not disloyal, at least unloyal. The society boasts that it has no country, no nationality, is at home nowhere and everywhere, and under no civil obligations anywhere. Now we believe patriotism is a Christian virtue, and loyalty

a Christian duty, and men who make a boast of having neither, although made in the form of being superior to both, do not seem to us the proper men to have the forming of the youth of a nation, however excellent they may be as individuals. We know well that the mission of the priest is spiritual, and one of peace, and we would not have him untrue to it; but the clergy, both regular and secular, are men, and, in this country at least, have the rights and the duties of citizens; and in a national crisis, when the integrity and even the existence of the nation is threatened by either a foreign or a domestic enemy, have, as far as we can see, no more right to remain neutral or indifferent than any other class of citizens. The Jesuits have been sheltered by our nation; they have enjoyed the protection of our laws, and have all the rights and immunities of American citizens: and wherefore, then, owe they not to the nation, the love, the good-will, the duties of loyal citizens? Unquestionably, they ought not to be compelled to serve the country in any way incompatible with their clerical profession or with their state; but in every way compatible with that profession and that state, they stand on the same footing with other citizens. The entrance into a religious order does not, in this country at least, work civil death, and as the members of religious orders retain here all their civil rights, they remain under all their civil obligations as citizens. In France a few years ago, where the civil legislation suppressed the Jesuits as a religious corporation, they, notwithstanding their vows of religion, pleaded and made available their rights as citizens. If they can plead their rights as citizens against the nation, what is to prevent the nation from pleading their duties as citizens against the society? Civil rights and duties are correlatives.

For ourselves, we are friends of what we Catholics call the religious life, and of all religious orders or congregations that are subject to no authority that resides outside of the nation itself; but religious orders organized for the whole world, under one supreme central authority, as are the Jesuits, are in our judgment, in modern times, not desirable. We find no fault with the Benedictines, or any of the orders that are not subject to a foreign jurisdiction, and leave the order in each diocese, each province, or in each nation complete in itself—a self-governing body, without foreign dependence. The same objection, though often urged, does not lie against the papacy, because the papacy is of divine, not human constitution, and

because the divine constitution of the church is sufficiently flexible to leave the church in each nation the chief management of her own temporalities, and in all things not repugnant to the divine law free to follow the genius, the peculiarities, the politics, and the local interests of the nation. The legitimate papal unity is perfectly compatible with national diversity. But all religious orders are human institutions, inasmuch as they are created and exist by human legislation; and when organized in imitation of the papal constitution of the church, they tend to swallow up national diversity in the unity of the order, and sometimes form a body that tends to absorb ecclesiastical diversity in complete papal centralism. No little of the present centralism which obtains in the administration of ecclesiastical affairs, and which deprives the episcopacy of so much of its former independence, has been due to the centralizing influence of this very Society of Jesus. There is no church without the pope, but at the same time there is no pope without the church; and the tendency which we not seldom meet to make the pope alone the church, is as dangerous as the tendency to make the episcopacy the church without the papacy. The bishops receive their jurisdiction from the pope; yet as they are an order created in the church immediately by our Lord, they must have certain rights not held from the pope, but immediately from God himself. If the constitution of the church is essentially papal, it is also essentially episcopal, which it could not be if the episcopacy had no rights not derived from the pope, and of which he cannot deprive them, unless they first abuse and forfeit them. So at least it was generally held, before the Jesuit Laynez taught a contrary doctrine in his famous speech on the subject in the Council of Trent.

If the Jesuits in this country were independent of every foreign body, and subject only to a superior whose jurisdiction did not extend beyond this nation, we should find no fault with their society. For then they could take the tone of the nation, study its special wants, and, under the direction of the episcopacy, apply themselves to meet them. Still, as a rule, we like and reverence the Jesuits as men, and as priests, and we frankly acknowledge the eminent services the society for a long time rendered the Catholic cause. The gravamen of our charge against them, in their collective capacity, or as a religious community, was, that they are not adapted to our age, and especially to our country. We did not suppose, in

stating this, we should be committing a grievous offence, for it was nothing more than many of the ablest, most intelligent, and most influential and trusted Jesuits we have ever known, have themselves avowed and deplored in their conversations with us. The fact they have frankly conceded, and have expressed their hope to remedy it, by filling up their ranks with American recruits. But this hope we cannot indulge, because the society has its moulds, in which every one entering the society must be re-cast. The American is either assimilated to the body as already formed, or is rejected as unfit to belong to it. The thing is necessarily so, and the society cannot, however well disposed, make it otherwise. It will not do any good to put new wine into old bottles. It is the inevitable fate of all human institutions, when they have done their work, finished their mission, to die, and give place to others. While their original work is unfinished, their mission unfulfilled, you can reform them, if they become corrupt; but when the special work for which they were designed by Providence is done there is for them no recuperation, and every attempt to mend them, or to assign them a new work or mission, only hastens the hour of their dissolution. Only the church is perennial, for her constitution only is divine, and her work is never done; but even in the church, all that is human and separable from the divine is subject to the same law, and undergoes, from nation to nation, and from age to age, continual transformations. All that is the work of men's hands grows old and changes, though the men are moved by the Holy Ghost, as, no doubt, was St. Ignatius; and though they are the greatest and best men that ever lived. Decay and death are written on the face of every thing human, and they who would follow their Lord must leave "the dead to bury their dead."

In putting forth these views we violate, so far as we are aware, no canon of faith or discipline, and therefore give no one the right even to suspect our Catholic faith or piety. The church makes devotion to no religious order the test of either, and nobody has the right to insist on more or less than the law of the church prescribes. They who have denounced us as no Catholic because we have argued that the Society of Jesus is not adapted to our times and country, have gone beyond not only the limits of Catholic charity, but of Catholic doctrine, and are themselves more deserving of denunciation than we. We may be wrong in our views, un-

sound in our judgments, and incorrect in our statements; if so, meet us candidly, fairly, seriously, and prove us so by appropriate reasons and facts, and we shall be most happy to correct them, and to retract any errors into which we may have fallen. Our views were seriously held, seriously stated, from no private pique or personal motive whatever; and to meet them with coarse denunciation, and vulgar abuse of us personally, is neither Christian nor gentlemanly. If we are wrong, we can be proved to be so, and when we are proved to be so, we shall certainly retract, and that, too, without any urging. But our good friends, who have so berated us for what they call our "wanton attack on the Jesuits," and so noisily read us out of the church, must bear in mind that it is possible that we know and love our religion as well as they do, and, at any rate, that scolding is not argument. We mean no offence, but we suggest that these friends would do not amiss to examine themselves, and in the light of divine truth endeavor to ascertain "what manner of spirit they are of."

With regard to the temporal sovereignty of the pope, we have never understood that Catholic faith or piety requires us to hold that the supreme pontiff, or visible head of Christ's kingdom on earth, must be a temporal sovereign. For seven or eight centuries, at least, the pope, though he had temporal possessions, had no temporal sovereignty, and we see not that in ceasing to be a temporal prince, he would cease to be pope. We do not understand that either the papacy or the church stands or falls with the temporal sovereignty. No Catholic maintains it, or dares maintain it. So much is and must be conceded on all sides. The temporal sovereignty is not essential to the papacy, and is held only by the same tenure as other temporal sovereignties. What then have we said to be complained of? Have we denied the Holy Father's right to be a temporal sovereign? Not at all. Have we questioned the validity of his title to the sovereignty of Rome and what are called the States of the Church? By no means. Have we made, approved, or recommended any attack on his rights, or defended, in any way, shape, or manner, those who have attempted by violence or intrigue to wrest his temporal states from him, and incorporate them into the new kingdom of Italy? Certainly not. Nobody can pretend it, for we have never done any thing of the sort; never since, or for some years before we became a Catholic, have we for a moment defended revolution or revolutionists. We opposed earnestly the French

campaign in Italy, chiefly because we feared it would involve in its consequences the loss of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy Father ; and after the preliminary peace of Villafranca, we approved the efforts of the Holy Father to save his states and Naples from the grasp of Piedmont. But when he failed, and we saw no practicable way of saving his temporal principality, or preventing the formation of the kingdom of Italy, we expressed the opinion that the interests of religion and civilization would be better promoted by yielding to the logic of events, and making a merit of accepting the new kingdom, than by maintaining a hopeless struggle against it. We supported our opinion by the best reasons in our power. But we recognized the Holy Father as the judge in the case, and urged nothing except as approved of, or assented to, by him. That in this we erred, is possible, though we have seen no reason as yet to think so ; but we violated no canon of the church, no rule of discipline with regard to the pope's temporal states; and nothing can be more idle than to pretend that we have fallen under the sentence of excommunication said to be pronounced against the members of the Sardinian government. We simply gave our free and honest opinion, as a Catholic publicist, on a subject of very general public discussion. In this we were guilty of no arrogance, presumption, or impertinence.

Undoubtedly, our personal conviction is that it would be an advantage to religion for the pope to be free from the cares and anxieties of his temporal sovereignty, especially in this age, when might is the only right acknowledged by the leading civilized nations of the world. We believe he would be freer and more independent. But this is simply our conviction, one which we have the right as a Catholic to hold, but not one which we have the right to enforce against the will of the sovereign, or the judgment of the pope. Undoubtedly, we believe, and have expressed the belief, that the temporal sovereignty will have ultimately to go, for we believe that the whole of that mixed system of civil and ecclesiastical government, of which it is the last vestige, will have to go, and a system similar to our own will have to be generally adopted. Whether the world will gain or lose by it, is more than we know, for all changes are not for the better. Yet we regard it as inevitable, and we resign ourselves to it. There is, in our judgment, whether we like it or dislike it, no use in fighting against it. But in this we may be mistaken ; and at any rate

the change is not one which we are at liberty to effect, or to defend against the authority of the church, or in defiance of a papal decision. Such are, and always have been, our dispositions. We would for ourselves personally rather err by obeying beyond what may be legitimately demanded of us, than by insisting on even our extreme rights. But for those outside we wish to leave the margin of liberty as wide as the divine law leaves it. We know our age and country, and though we would not trim to escape their censure, or yield a single iota of Catholic principle or doctrine to gain their good will, we would not willingly demand any thing more than the law itself renders obligatory. For their sake, not our own, we are tenacious.

Among Catholic publicists, few, if any, have gone further in their defence of what is called ultramontaniam than we have, and we have gone so far as to incur the unofficial rebuke of a large number of our American bishops. We have not essentially changed our views; we have merely modified our language, which, in point of fact, expressed more to theological readers than we ever really meant. Were we to write our essays on the papacy to-day, we should not write them precisely as they now stand, for the danger we feel it necessary now to guard against comes from another quarter; but the doctrine would be substantially the same. Certain terms which we then used we should now omit, or use in a less unqualified sense, and which should give more prominence to the limitations which we all along presupposed than we judged it then necessary to do. All the power we ever understood ourselves as claiming for the pope in regard to temporal princes we still claim, as inherent in the natural supremacy, if we may so speak, of the spiritual over the temporal; but we hold, and never held otherwise, that this power is spiritual and not temporal, and extends to the acts of sovereign princes, as to those of other persons, only under their spiritual relations. "I judge," says Innocent III. to Philip Augustus, "not the fief, but the sin." We hold that sovereign princes are subject to the discipline of the church in like manner as private persons, and for their public as well as their private acts, when their public acts contravene the law of God. So far we defend the doctrine as we have always held it. Beyond this the pope exercised during the middle ages, in temporal affairs, a sort of arbitratorship, which rested partly on the *jus publicum* of the time, and partly on the agreement of parties, as contended by

Mr. Gosselin. We do not accept the four articles of the Gallican clergy in 1682, especially the first; but we should place more stress than we formerly did on the admitted fact that a man can hold them without impeachment of his Catholic faith or piety. While, therefore, we would reason with a Gallican, and convince him, if possible, that ours is the sounder opinion, we should frankly admit that he has as good a right to hold his opinion as we have to hold ours. The reproaches and suspicions we cast on him formerly we should withdraw. We now maintain that if a man really believes all the church requires of him, his faith is above reproach, above suspicion, although it falls short of what is very widely maintained by theologians, and what we ourselves hold to be the better opinion.

Here we touch another question, on which we are supposed to have in late years become unsound, or at least to have manifested an unecatholic spirit. We hold ourselves free to accept or reject, for good and sufficient reasons, any conclusions drawn by theologians for which we have only a theological authority. In this *Review*, we have always maintained, as we were taught, that while faith is divine, theology is a human science. The conclusions of theologians, save when both premises are from revelation, and the argument by which they are obtained is purely explicative, are not of faith, and cannot be insisted on as such. The conclusion follows always the weaker premise; and when one of the premises is taken from revelation and the other from natural reason, the conclusion has only the certainty of natural reason, therefore is not and cannot be defined, as of faith. This is the doctrine that we opposed to Dr. Newman's theory of development, and we have seen no reason to suppose that we were wrong. It may be doubted, indeed, whether we rightly understood Dr. Newman's theory, or whether he ever meant to advocate development in the sense in which we opposed it, and we are inclined to think he did not. What we opposed was not a development and growth in men's understanding and appropriation of the faith, as subjected to the action of their own minds, but the supposition that there is a growth in the revealed truth, objectively considered. We hold that nothing can be included under the head of faith not positively revealed, and that what the human mind may deduce from the revealed truth, or build up around it, is theology, not faith. We certainly should not insist on narrower limits to Christian doctrine now than we did then, and probably not so narrow.

Now, as theology is a human science, created by the human mind operating on the revealed data, it has only a human authority, and binds no further than it convinces the reason. If I can show by good reason that the theologian has misconceived the revealed dogma, or that he has reasoned illogically, I am not bound by his conclusion, and may without temerity dispute it. If the conclusion has been received very generally and for a long time by able and learned theologians, it is a strong presumption in its favor, but not conclusive; because nothing is more common than for theologians, as it is for historians, to quote from their predecessors, without going into any original and independent investigation for themselves. Thus you may have a catena of great theologians stretching through centuries, and yet really have only the authority of the first of the chain. If we could presume that each one had examined the point independently, for himself, and not simply taken it on the authority of his predecessor, the case would be greatly changed, and no one could in any important respect depart from the general current of theology without temerity. But, after all, the theologian has to-day all the right of independent examination, and freedom of reason, that had St. Thomas or St. Augustine. It is not that we really differ from St. Augustine or St. Thomas, but that in matters of human reason we take them as helps, not as final and conclusive authority. We respect, we reverence the great theologians of all ages of the church, and never permit ourselves to differ from them without what seems to us to be strong and ample reasons; but we hold that our reason was born as free as theirs, and that the theologian of to-day has all the freedom of thought and right of independent investigation that any of his predecessors had. We hold this not from pride or obstinacy, not from an overweening conceit of our own ability, nor from any want of consciousness of our own immense inferiority, but because it is true, and the principle involved cannot be surrendered without great injury to both faith and science.

Faith, objectively considered, is infallible, and the church is infallible, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, in teaching and defining it. But the faith is to us practically as if it were not, save in so far as it is actively received and appropriated by our own minds. This, we presume, is what Dr. Newman meant when he said: Christianity came into the world a naked idea, which the mind develops or realizes by its own ac-

tion. Now in realizing, in actively receiving and appropriating the Christian dogma, or the faith, our minds are not infallible. We never conceive it adequately, or take in explicitly all that is in it; and we may, and often do, under various aspects, even misconceive it. Here is, if we understand it, the basis of Dr. Newman's Essay, and if so, our objections to it were irrelevant, and though well founded, as against the doctrine we deduced from it, they are not as against that which the author held, and intended to set forth, and perhaps did set forth to the minds of all who admire his book. We have long suspected that we did him injustice, though we have not changed our own views of the soundness of the theology we opposed to him, or thought we were opposing to him. The fact is, his book was profounder than we supposed and was designed to solve theological difficulties which we had not then encountered in our own intellectual life and experience. This acknowledgement, spontaneously made, we hope will be accepted by the illustrious convert and his friends, as some slight atonement for any injustice we may have done him or them, since whatever injustice we may have done was done unwittingly and unintentionally.

On the fact of the inadequacy of our conceptions, and our liability even to wrong conceptions, Dr. Newman bases his doctrine of development on the one hand, and of the necessity, on the other, of a living and ever-present infallible authority in the church, to preserve the original revelation in its integrity, and to define and to condemn the errors which from time to time may arise in the process of development. We do not agree that the definitions of the church give us new articles or even new dogmas of faith; they are negative rather than positive, and tell us what the faith is not rather than what it is, or what cannot be held without denying or injuring the faith. In other respects, we fully accept what was probably Dr. Newman's doctrine. There is always in the church an infallible authority to maintain the symbol in its integrity, and to condemn all errors that tend to deny or impair it. But this authority, while it maintains the symbol, cannot give me understanding, or render my conception of the dogma or even of the definition itself adequate or infallible. The human mind never in its efforts at appropriation or realization, whether in the individual consciousness or in society and civilization, takes in at once the whole Christian idea, and its realizations are always inadequate, and sometimes not unmingled

with fatal errors. The Christian work in society and in the individual soul is to struggle to render the human conceptions of the Christian idea less and less inadequate, and to eliminate more and more the errors that mingle with them, so as to advance nearer and nearer to the perfect day, or to a full and complete realization in the understanding, in individual and social life, of the whole Christian idea, or, the perfect formation of Christ within us, and our perfect union with God, possible in its fulness only in the beatific vision. the consummation alike of creation and redemption.

Now, unless you can render the human mind as infallible as the divine mind, there will always be more or less of imperfection and error in our understanding and appropriation of the Christian idea, or the faith as objectively revealed and proposed. Hence theology is not a divine and infallible science; and while the faith in itself is complete and invariable, theology, or its scientific realization is always incomplete and variable. It may grow from age to age, and the theology which is too high and too broad for one age may be too narrow and too low for another. Hence, any attempt to bind the human mind, thought, or reason back to the theology of any past age is hostile to the interests alike of religion and civilization. To require us to receive as authority not to be questioned or examined, not the faith, but the theology or philosophy of the mediæval doctors, or even the great theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is to suppose that the work of realization is completed, and human reason in this life has no further work, which were intellectual death or mental stagnation; or, which amounts to the same thing, that no further realization is practicable or permissible in Christian truth.

Here is where we have incurred the censure of contemporary theologians. As a matter of fact, we yield to none of them in our reverence for the theology of the fathers or of the scholastics, and in our own judgment, we follow more truly the mind of St. Thomas than do our friends who think it their duty not to controvert but to denounce us. We think the great Greek and Roman fathers, especially the Greek, have much to teach us, and we should be delighted to find the man who had mastered all the truth there is even in St. Thomas. The point of divergence is not here. Our quarrel with the Jesuits, whether belonging to the society or not, is not that they follow St. Thomas in theology or philosophy, but that

they require us to receive him as conclusive authority, and insist that we have no more right to deviate from the general current of the doctrine of the great theologians and Christian philosophers, than from faith itself. We hold that nothing can be authoritatively imposed in matter of doctrine that is not of faith, or necessary to its preservation in a sound and healthy state. In neither theology nor philosophy am I free to maintain any opinion or theory that the infallible authority has defined to be against faith or injurious to sound doctrine. Faith and sound doctrine saved, nothing, except in discipline, can be insisted on as obligatory, any further than reason itself is obligatory, or approves it.

This conclusion is evidently permissible, for there are different schools both of philosophy and theology among Catholics. St. Augustine in philosophy inclines to Plato, St. Thomas follows Aristotle; Guillaume de Champeaux is a realist, St. Thomas a conceptualist. There are various schools of theology, as the Thomists, the Scotists, the Augustinians, and the Molinists. The differences between these schools are very great, and yet they are all Catholic, all orthodox, because their differences are regarded by authority as *extra fidem*. When you tell us that we must in philosophy and theology follow the general current, you should tell us whether you mean the general current of the Thomists or the Scotists, the Augustinians or the Molinists, or at least indicate the means a poor man has to find out the general concurrence which is to be law for his reason and conscience. If not, you must concede that all opinions outside of faith, not condemned by authority, as opposed to sound doctrine, are free, and we are responsible in regard to them, only for the honest and diligent use of our reason according to our state, our means, and our ability.

Certain it is, that the opinions of theologians are not obligatory, though to be treated seriously and respectfully, for they are not invariable. The theologians and philosophers held and taught for centuries the geocentric theory, and as the only theory warranted by the Holy Scriptures and compatible with faith and sound doctrine; now they almost universally hold and teach the heliocentric theory. If they were right formerly, they are wrong now; and if right now, they were wrong then. Do not say that this difference does not touch theology, for a pontifical congregation, in the case of Galileo, has decided that it touches even faith, for it declared

the heliocentric theory not only false in science, but *formaliter* heretical, and the denial of the geocentric theory as rash and subversive of faith. We say not that the congregation erred, but whether it did or did not, this much is certain, that there may be very generally received and maintained, without censure, by theologians, opinions that are not true. Are we bound to follow the general current of theological doctrine before Galileo, or that of the theologians and philosophers since? We cannot well follow both, since the two theories are not only contraries, but contradictories. Moreover, theologians do not always agree as to the meaning of papal definitions. Pope Pius V. condemned, *in the sense of the assertors*, the 55th proposition of Baius, that "God could not have created man from the beginning such as he is now born;" therefore, say one class of theologians, God could have created man in a state of pure nature, for a purely natural beatitude, and hence integral nature is *indebita*; he could not have created man in a state of pure nature, say another class, nor for a purely natural beatitude, that is, a created good, and therefore integral nature is not *indebita*, but *debita*, and our nature, in losing it at the fall, suffered a positive, not a merely negative loss. Which class are we to follow? Both are Catholic, both are orthodox, neither can accuse the other of heresy, or of what is technically termed *erroneous*, and yet both cannot be right. The faith may remain the same on either system, but our whole theology as a system changes as we adopt the one or the other. Can any thing more be needed to prove that the opinions of theologians are not obligatory, and that, faith saved, we are free to follow in theology our own honest and independent convictions? Seeing these things, we have, in theology, in philosophy, and in the sciences, followed what has seemed to us the true doctrine or the sounder opinion, due obedience paid to all the decisions of authority, and due respect paid also to the reason and judgment of great men in all past ages, as far as known to us. This is the doctrine we have defended on this subject, and by which we have regulated our own practice. If we have been wrong we must be set right, either by argument or the formal judgment of authority.

It has been charged against us that we have denied the infallibility of the pontifical congregations. We are not aware of ever having disobeyed or controverted any decision of any pontifical congregation, whether in matters of doctrine or dis-

cipline now in force; but we have been taught that we are not required to believe these congregations infallible, or to take them as the voice of the church. They have no infallibility, except that of the pope himself, who approves their decisions, and that the pope is infallible is no article of Catholic faith. One may deny his infallibility, and maintain that his definitions are reformable, and yet be a good orthodox Catholic, as we see in the case of the Gallicans. Then, again, the decisions of the congregations often touch matters of which the reigning pope may be ignorant, as in the divorce case of Henry VIII., and they are usually made by theologians and canonists, without much investigation or even interference on his part. From the nature of the case they have only an administrative authority, or authority as discipline, and bind to obedience, as do all disciplinary orders from the supreme visible head of the church, but no further. The decisions of these congregations may be rendered on a false statement of facts, they may be influenced by personal prejudices or passions, and controlled by the system of philosophy in vogue, or held by the consultors and judges. Their decisions too are sometimes reversed. Bellarmine's great work was ordered on the index by one pope, and ordered off by another. The congregation of the Holy Office condemned in the seventeenth century the heliocentric theory as a heresy, and forbid it to be taught, and in the nineteenth century removed the prohibition. We cannot, then, say that these congregations are infallible; and therefore must hold that obedience to them is regulated by the same principles and rules that regulate our general obedience to the pope as supreme pastor and governor of the church. Any order of the pope in the spiritual order we hold ourselves bound to obey, even though we doubt its wisdom or expediency, just as we obey any law of the state in the temporal order, though we may dislike it. But, if the pope should give us a command in the civil order, we should not feel bound to obey it any more than we should feel bound to obey a command given by our temporal sovereign in the spiritual order. The pope has no right to order any thing against the rights of the temporal, and the temporal has no right to order any thing against the rights of the spiritual. So far we have gone on this question, and never any further. We believe the rights of the pope are defined by law, as well as those of the state, and we hold it our duty to obey, never to rebel, and even when the order is reformable, to submit to it till it can be legally or constitutionally changed.

It has been further alleged against us, that we maintain that the Catholic faith as popularly held has become grossly corrupt. This is stating the case too strongly. That we have maintained that dogmas, in our practical understanding of them, may be, and often are, misconceived or misinterpreted, is evident from what we have said, and that a Catholic people may associate with their faith, or not sharply distinguish from it, a multitude of notions, which, though they may not hold them precisely and distinctly as faith, they feel are not to be questioned, and that it would be as bad as questioning faith itself to question them, we do not deny. These are notions in great part derived from the legends of saints, alleged private revelations, or visions of some saintly monk, or some devout nun, which may float about without much harm in religious houses, and often be read for edification with profit, but which are no basis of Catholic faith, and of no authority in the interpretation of Catholic dogma. Things of this sort overlay the faith in many minds, and encourage a credulous and superstitious spirit. We have endeavored to free Catholic faith and Catholic doctrine from them, leaving them to go for what they are worth, and where they belong. So also we have several times spoken of popular practices which we have regarded as superstitious, and popular devotions, good in themselves, but often abused, and placed far above the more solid virtues of faith and the love of God and our neighbor. People will run after indulgences, without reflecting that the indulgence is not gained when to gain it is more the motive of action than the breaking off from our sins, and placing ourselves in union with God. In a word, while we have prized the flowers of Catholic piety, we have pointed out the inutility and danger of seeking them where there is no root to bear them. We want a strong faith, and a robust piety, that can stand the wear and tear of the rough and tumble of this work-day world. In this surely there is nothing uncatholic, at least in thought or intention.

It is charged against us, that we do not appreciate or like the Catholic population of this country, nor indeed of any other. Catholic nations compared with non-Catholic stand as a rule high in our love and esteem; but compared with what they might be, and ought to be, they stand by no means so high. In our own country, better, nobler, holier people, than many Catholics, no matter of what race or nationality, we have known, we never expect to meet this side of heaven; but

there are large numbers who are no more moral, truthful, highminded, or conscientious than non-Catholics of their own class. We have never attributed this to their religion or to their race, or been unwilling to attribute it to causes for which non-Catholics are in a measure responsible. We know the circumstances in which Catholics in England and Ireland have been placed for three hundred years and over. They have been treated as pariahs, as political and social outcasts, and even now nowhere in the British empire are they placed on a footing of political and social equality with non-Catholics. They have been excluded from power, from the national schools and universities, and from all lot or part in the national life, compelled to form, in relation to their own nation, an unpopular sect apart, but too happy if they could be permitted to live and worship God in the way their fathers worshipped, and in the way the greater part of Christendom still worship, without having their throats cut or their goods confiscated. Even in this country, Catholics, though placed as to civil and political rights on a footing of perfect equality with non-Catholics, have not yet been recognized as socially equal. With us society is non-Catholic, and the old prejudices against Catholics, the old Protestant traditions, retain a strong hold on the community, and create for Catholics great disadvantages, which they are only gradually and slowly overcoming. These things naturally gave to Catholics a character, a tone of mind, manners, and habits with which we who had lived a national life could not wholly sympathize, any more than they could fully sympathize with us. We thought them wanting in manliness, outspokenness, and also in interest in the great and stirring questions of the age, and they thought us proud, overbearing, wanting in meekness, gentleness, and humility. We were too defiant, and not sufficiently conciliatory.

We think neither side made sufficient allowance for what was regarded as defects in the other. We are willing to admit that we retain too much of the old Puritan spirit, though far less than was supposed, and in our dislike of reticence, circumlocution, and apology, spoke out in stronger and rougher tones than was either wise or prudent, and did not make, though at the time we thought we did, sufficient allowance for the painful and depressing circumstances in which English-speaking Catholics had for so many centuries been placed. We at a much earlier moment became aware of it than was believed; but the violent tone of the Catholic press towards us,

its constant appeal not to Catholic tradition, but to the local traditions of Catholics, or popular opinion, for which we have not and never had much respect, rendered it impossible for us to show it, or to effect a good understanding between us and the Catholics led by that press. Every thing we said was misinterpreted, perverted; and every attempt to correct one misunderstanding created half a dozen others. We were *suspect*, and all our words and actions were taken in an evil sense. Much that was said by the journals was, no doubt, taken by us as meaning more than it did, but it kept our minds more intent on the defects than on the virtues of Catholics. So matters went on till we deemed it prudent to withdraw from the theological field, under the conviction that our labors in it could be of no further use to the Catholic cause. Yet we have remained, according to our light and understanding, a sincere and earnest Catholic, and have never ceased to feel that we have our home only among Catholics; and though we do not regard every Catholic as a saint, our sympathies are with Catholics. They are our people, and we belong to them. I love my country, I love my countrymen, I am ready to give my life for it and them, as my brave and noble son, whose body lies, while I am writing, in the adjoining room, waiting the funeral rites of his church, freely and without a murmur, gave his; but my church is dearer, and my Catholic brethren are nearer; my non-Catholic countrymen are my kindred after the flesh; Catholics are my brothers in soul and spirit.

There is but one more accusation that we shall take notice of; that, being a layman, we have no right to take upon us the discussion of theological questions. We were avowedly a Catholic publicist, and we naturally supposed that it was within our province to treat as well as we could any question which we found, at home or abroad, the subject of public discussion. But our position as a Catholic publicist was not self-assumed; we were called to it by the unanimous voice of the ecclesiastical authorities of our own country. This well-known fact ought to relieve us from the charge of mingling in discussions improper for laymen. We have never professed to teach by authority, and have always insisted that our utterances should be taken on their merits, and simply go for what they are worth.

We have made these explanations and observations, because we have felt them due to ourselves, to our personal friends, and to the Catholic public, generally. In them we have sought not to

defend, but simply to explain ourselves, and to do it without giving any new offence. We think the greater part of the fault found with us has originated either in misapprehension of Catholic doctrine itself, or of our real meaning and disposition. We have never written for the mob, or for popularity, and many of the questions we have discussed have not been such as the popular mind is familiar with, or prepared to appreciate. Whether our explanations will be satisfactory to any one who has been dissatisfied, or will facilitate a better understanding of our views and aims, we leave to the judgment of others. We have received some wrongs, but they are forgiven and well-nigh forgotten. We, perhaps, have done much wrong; if so, we hope it will be likewise forgiven and forgotten. We may have rendered some service to the cause of religion and to that of our country; if we have, God knows it, and will reward it. We only wish Catholics who sustained us liberally for years, and for whom we have only love and kindness, should not continue to misapprehend us, and regret their former liberality and confidence. We are deeply grateful to the large number of clerical and other friends who have never seriously misunderstood us, or had their confidence in us as a sincere and earnest Catholic in the least impaired, and who have never allowed popular clamor, or even differences of opinion, to affect them. They have stood by us in good report and in evil, have borne with our infirmities, cheered us when our courage failed, and consoled us in our afflictions. We cannot reward them, but we can never forget them.

We pretend to no extraordinary knowledge, to no infallibility of judgment. There may be propositions in our explanations that are unsound, and we may be far from having removed by them the objections that many Catholics have urged against us. All we say is, we have not attempted to soften or explain away any thing we have really ever meant or supposed we were maintaining. We have wished to present our views such as they honestly were. Wrong they may be, uncatholic in intention we know they are not. We have never, since we became a Catholic, written a line that we regarded as unorthodox, and not intended to serve the cause of Catholic faith and civilization. From our youth up we have loved truth, and wooed her as a bride, and we wish to die in her embrace. We have never adhered from pride or obstinacy to any opinion we had once entertained, and have always been ready—some would say too ready—to abandon any opinion once

held the moment we were satisfied of its unsoundness. We repeat, in conclusion, what we have said over and over again in our pages, and to the supreme authority at Rome, that we submit all our writings to the judgment of the church; and any doctrine or proposition in them that the Holy See will point out as contrary to faith, to sound doctrine, or to the spirit of obedience which should animate every Catholic, we will modify, alter, or retract, in such way and manner as she shall prescribe. More we cannot say, and less no Catholic ought to say. We abide the judgment of the church, as pronounced by the Holy See. We never have been disobedient to authority, and we never shall be.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LAST SERIES.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1873.]

WHEN, at the conclusion of the volume for 1864, I suspended the publication of *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, my Catholic loyalty was widely distrusted; and in many Catholic, as well as non-Catholic circles, I was regarded as on the point of abandoning the church and returning to some form of Protestantism or infidelity. The distrust was unmerited, and though I have written enough during the last six or seven years in the *Catholic World* and the *New York Tablet* to dissipate it, and to prove the sincerity of my Catholic faith, and devotion to the Holy See; yet as my articles in those periodicals have been published without my name, very few, except those who never distrusted me, know that they are mine. Up to this time, hardly a Catholic organ in the country has even attempted any vindication of my Catholic reputation; and for the public at large the cloud that hung over me in 1864 hangs, I apprehend, over me still, so far as I am not forgotten, or thought of as already dead and buried.

I am not willing that my name should go down to posterity with the slightest suspicion resting on it of disloyalty to the church; not, indeed, that I care much for it on my own personal account, but for the sake of the Catholic cause, which I hold dearer than life, and which I would not have suffer the least detriment through me or my ill reputation; and also for the sake of my surviving children, to whom I can leave

no inheritance, but that of an untarnished name. It was almost the last wish expressed to me by my late wife, whose judgment I never found at fault, that I should revive my *Review*, if only for a single year, and prove to the world that my faith has never wavered; that I am still an humble but devoted son of the church; and that I am, as I always professed to be, an uncompromising Catholic and a thorough-going papist. These considerations have weighed with me; and, combined with the conviction, well or ill founded, that I have a few more words to say, not inappropriate to the times,—and which I can say only in a periodical under my own control; and the urgent request of a large number of clerical friends, have finally, after much hesitation and many misgivings, induced me to revive the *Review*, and to appear once more before the public in my own name and character as a Catholic reviewer.

I have no palinode to sing; I enter on no explanations of the causes of the opposition I encountered from some of my own brethren: such explanations would be mistimed and misplaced, and could edify nobody. I willingly admit that I made many mistakes; but I regard as the greatest of all the mistakes into which I fell during the last three or four years that I published my *Review*, that of holding back the stronger points of the Catholic faith, on which I had previously insisted; of laboring to present Catholicity in a form as little repulsive to my non-Catholic countrymen as possible; and of insisting on only the minimum of Catholicity, or what had been expressly defined by the Holy See or a general council.

I am not likely to fall into that mistake again. My experiment was not very successful; and, besides, the syllabus and the decrees of the council of the Vatican, published since, would protect me from it, if nothing else would. I have no ambition to be regarded as a *liberal* Catholic. A *liberal* Catholic I am not, never was, save in appearance for a brief moment, and never can be. I have no element of liberal Catholicity in my nature or in my convictions, and the times, if I read them aright, demand Catholicity in its strength, not in its weakness; in its supernatural authority and power, not as reduced to pure rationalism or mere human sentimentality.

What is most needed in these times—perhaps in all times—is the truth that condemns, point-blank, the spirit of the age, and gives no quarter to its dominant errors; and nothing can

be more fatal than to seek to effect a compromise with them, or to form an alliance with what is called liberalism,—a polite name for sedition, rebellion, and revolutionism. I confess I was not highly pleased even with the notice, in the *Catholic World*, of my “Liberalism and the Church,” kind, generous, flattering, and well meant, as it certainly was. It represented me as holding firmly to the syllabus, and as being at the same time thoroughly American. The first is true; the second is a misapprehension. Time was when I paraded my Americanism, in order to repel the charge, that an American cannot become a convert to the church without ceasing to feel and act as an American patriot. I have lived long enough to snap my fingers at all charges of that sort. I love my country, and, in her hour of trial, I and my two sons, Catholics like myself, did our best to preserve her integrity and save her constitution; and there is no sacrifice in my power that I would not make to bring “my kinsmen after the flesh” to Christ; but, after all, the church is my true country, and the faithful are my real countrymen. Let the American people become truly Catholic and submissive children of the Holy Father, and their republic is safe; let them refuse and seek safety for the secular order in sectarianism or secularism, and nothing can save it from destruction.

I do not think my respect for my American countrymen is so great as it was some years ago. They seem to me to have wonderfully deteriorated during the last third of a century, both intellectually and morally, and with a rapidity unequalled in any other people whose history is known. Their religiousness seems to have wellnigh become extinct, and their minds to be turned outward and downward. They have lost all spiritual conceptions, and have no longer any spiritual aspirations. Their sectarian religion has ceased to be either spiritual or intellectual, and lapses into a puny sentimentalism or pure emotionalism. Methodism is their highest and most cherished form of religion, and Methodism is a compound of sentimentalism and animalism. Nearly all the sects are more or less tainted with it, and rely on animal excitement instead of rational conviction, and a free and deliberate submission of the will to the law of God. Sectarianism ceases to be dogmatic, and places religion primarily and almost exclusively in feeling, or an affection of our emotional nature. It makes little or no demand on the intellectual powers of the soul. What of intellectual activity there is among my countrymen

is turned in the direction of business, mechanical inventions, or the physical sciences.

It fares no better with morality, always separated by Protestantism from religion; it becomes with the bulk of the American people either external decorum, or simply thrift,—the art of getting on in the world. It inquires not “what is true, what is right?” but “what is popular? what will the people approve? or what will succeed?” No heathen people ever more devoutly worshipped the fickle goddess Fortune, than do the American; or more strictly maintained success to be the test of merit. They place, even in their best moods, the ground of moral obligation in a natural sentiment called philanthropy, which atones in their estimation for a lifetime spent in transferring by fraud, chicanery, overreaching, and stock-gambling, the money of others into one’s own pockets, by founding professorships in sectarian or secular colleges, for promoting a false theology, or false science; or in erecting seminaries, houses of refuge for the reformation of juvenile offenders, or Magdalen asylums destined to be simply nurseries of error, vice, and crime.

We have politicians, shrewd, adroit managers of elections, and manipulators of parties; but I look in vain for a statesman in office, or a candidate for office, whether state or federal. A man, to be elected, must carry light weight, and be one whom the politicians and business men can use for the promotion of their private interests or personal ambition. Nobody, who wants office, whether legislative or executive, cares to study the principles of civil polity, or the science of statesmanship. It would only make him carry weight, and impede his chances of success. The popular vote will supply any conceivable lack of brains, or want of moral character. I wrote in the *Democratic Review*, thirty years ago, that never again would a first-class man be elected to the presidency of the Union; and experience, thus far, has done justice to the assertion. Mr. Van Buren was the last man of superior ability, and with some statesmanlike attainments, that has filled the presidential chair. Since his defeat, in 1840, by the election of “Tippecanoe and Tyler too,” there has been a continual descent, each successive president proving inferior to his predecessor.

I confess therefore, though my interest in my country and countrymen is as great as ever, I do not consider it a high compliment to be credited with an intense Americanism.

Where the people are Catholic and submissive to the law of God, as declared and applied by the vicar of Christ and supreme pastor of the church, democracy may be a good form of government ; but combined with Protestantism or infidelity in the people, its inevitable tendency is to lower the standard of morality, to enfeeble intellect, to abase character, and to retard civilization, as even our short American experience amply proves. Our republic may have had a material expansion and growth ; but every observing and reflecting American, whose memory goes back, as mine does, over fifty years, sees that in all else it is tending downward, and is on the declivity to utter barbarism.

No ; I am by no means wedded to Americanism as understood and practised by my non-Catholic countrymen. It may be destined to "make the tour of the globe," but I do not look to it or to any other possible political system for the regeneration of modern society, or the salvation even of my own country. God may overrule evil for good, but no political constitutions, changes, revolutions, arrangements, or adjustments whatever, if taken alone, can do any thing for the progress of man and society. Without the Catholic Church, they are, to use a threadbare illustration, "the play of Hamlet with the part of the prince of Denmark left out;" they lack the light, the warmth, and the life-giving power of the sun, and are what our material world would be, were there no sun in the heavens.

I place little value on what is called material progress, and I regard the boasted progress of modern civilization, in all other respects, as a deterioration. Modern civilization is substantially that of the gentile world before its conversion to Christianity. The "glorious reformation" of the sixteenth century was an apostasy from Christ, as was gentilism from the patriarchal religion, and, in principle, a return to pure heathenism. The sects have nothing of Christ but the name, to which they have no just title, as but few of their members are even baptized. They are as much in the dark as to the origin and end of man as were the heathen themselves, and just as uncertain and anxious about the future. They are as unsettled about the principle of duty or moral obligation ; they are equally wedded to the earth ; and equally with them worship MIGHT and adore SUCCESS. Indeed Christendom has become heathenized, and Protestantism is only carnal Judaism revived. Hence I can have no disposition to concede any thing to it, or

sympathy with those who demand an alliance of the church with modern civilization. The syllabus tells us what we are to think of those who advise the church to sanction and bless it, and seek strength in calling to her aid the spirit of the age, or, rather, the "prince of this world."

There is, and always will be, enmity between Christ and Satan, and consequently between the church and the world. The Christian cannot follow or conform to the spirit of this, or any other age, without betraying his Lord and going over to the enemy. They who object to the church, because she resists the spirit of the age or the popular tendencies of the times, prove the spirit that moves them is the spirit of Satan, not by any means the spirit of Christ the Lord. The damning error of Gioberti was not in his speculative philosophy or theology, but in his effort to effect a union or concord between Christian civilization and gentilism; which is like seeking to establish concord between Christ and Belial. Hence the Jesuits, though perhaps not always justified in their criticisms on his speculative philosophy, felt instinctively the anticatholic tendency of his writings, and opposed him *à outrance*: for, whatever may be said of the children of St. Ignatius, it must be conceded that they have truly Catholic instincts, and a remarkable gift of almost unerringly detecting, through any and every disguise, the real enemies of the church of God. They may be *oseurantisti*, but only in relation to the false lights of the age or of modern liberalism, to which the Holy Father has justly attributed the calamities of modern society, especially in France.

For myself, I accept the statement of the anticatholic, sectarian, and secular press, that the syllabus condemns all the distinctive features of what is called "modern civilization;" and draws the line between Catholicity and the world in bondage to Satan, so clearly and distinctly, that there is no mistaking it. It presents the true issue; and those who are not with the pope are against God, and therefore against the rights and interests of men and nations. The *Review*, as long as I am able to continue it, will, to the best of my knowledge and ability, defend the issue which the Holy Father has made, without any compromise with the world, without seeking its favor, or shrinking from its wrath. The age, as I have said, needs Catholicity in its strength, not in its weakness; in the sense that it condemns its errors, exposes its false principles and maxims, and offers a barrier to its destructive tendencies. Nobody must expect from the *Review* any

soothing words for the enemies of the church, any effort to conciliate the despoilers and revilers of St. Peter. Those who desire such words must seek them elsewhere than in its pages.

These remarks sufficiently indicate the spirit and tendency of the *Review* in the future. It will aim, above all things, to be thoroughly Catholic—papistical, if the reader prefers; it will study to conform to the syllabus and the decrees of the Council of the Vatican, and will insist on the supremacy of the successor of Peter in the see of Rome in governing, and on his infallibility in teaching the universal church, as integral and essential dogmas of the Catholic faith. It will not go out of its way to offend the sects, but it will not recognize them as having any part or lot in the church of Christ; but will, whatever their pretensions, treat them as aliens from the kingdom of God, and as rebels to their rightful sovereign. It will hold them to be separated from the church, therefore from Christ, and therefore, again, out of the way of salvation. It will not judge their individual members, but it will hold out to them no hope of salvation, unless they desert their heretical or schismatic communions, and become reconciled to the one holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church, for, as St. Cyprian says: “He who has not the church for his mother cannot have God for his Father:” and none, who are not children of God, can be joint heirs with Christ, or reign with him in glory. Invincible ignorance excuses from sin in that of which one is invincibly ignorant; but unless “a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.” There is no salvation without faith, hope, and charity; and these are supernatural virtues, not attainable by our natural powers, or without the assistance of divine grace; and charity, the greatest of these, without which the others avail nothing, cannot, as says St. Augustine, “be kept out of unity.” Heresies and schisms are deadly sins; and though the state, may, and often must, tolerate them, the church, representing the divine order on earth, does not and cannot.

I have not sought anew the approbation of my own or any other bishop in resuming the publication of my *Review*, and no one but myself, is responsible for it. If it meets the approval of the ecclesiastical authorities, and if, in their judgment, it is likely to serve the cause of truth, they will permit its publication; if it should incur their disapprobation, or be judged by them more likely to do harm than good, its publi-

cation will be discontinued the moment I am made aware that such is the fact. I cannot in any case, old as I am, be expected to continue it through many years, and nobody is likely to continue it after I am gone. I think—and many highly esteemed clergymen have expressed the same conviction—that there is just now a vacant niche into which none of our periodicals, learned, able, and excellent as they are, can be exactly filled; and yet it is a niche my *Review* once filled, and perhaps for a brief time may fill again: at least such is my hope.

The *Review* will certainly interfere with no existing periodical or journal, and with no new enterprise that any Catholic writer or publisher, may contemplate. It will have a character of its own, which will be borne by no other periodical, though others may be far abler, more important and more popular. It will not have a large circulation, for it will not be addressed to a numerous public. It will be addressed only to the cultivated and thoughtful few, the reverend clergy and educated laymen; and will be confined almost exclusively to the discussion of the first principles of philosophy, theology, ethics, and civil polity. Its aim will be to oppose Catholic principles to the false principles and errors of the proud and arrogant non-Catholic world, which flatters itself that it is on the eve of triumphing over the invincible church of God. I shall find, I trust, “a fit audience, though few.”

With these remarks, I commit this last series of the *Review* with filial submission to divine providence; to the patronage of my old friends, who have not forgotten me: and to the fresh young minds and hearts, just from our colleges and seminaries, who have never known me, but whom I hope to make my friends, at least to assist, however feebly, in their efforts to serve our holy mother, the church.

ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1874].

"THE two articles of the last number of *Brownson's Review* that struck us most were that on 'Constitutional Guaranties,' which is very powerful, and which expresses in the main our own opinions, and that entitled '*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*,'* with some portions of which we cannot altogether agree.

"Dr. Brownson's teaching in this latter article may, we think, be reduced to the three following principles:—

"1. Whoever is not actually a member of the visible *body* of the Catholic Church cannot belong to the *soul* of the same church, and therefore cannot be saved. The exceptions to this universal rule that are brought forward are mere theological subtleties, which make the dogma unintelligible to the faithful, and favor latitudinarianism.

"2. Nevertheless, children validly baptized in non-Catholic sects, if they die before they attain the use of reason, are saved; and catechumens may be saved, though they die without being able to receive the sacrament of baptism, provided the church has admitted them to the rank of aspirants to the sacrament.

"3. Those who were baptized and justified in infancy, but, having reached the age of discretion, remain separated from the *body* of the Catholic Church through invincible ignorance, are excused from sin; but they lose the habit of faith, and are consequently out of the way of salvation.

"Now, we would desire to learn from the reviewer: 1. Whether the absolute impossibility he maintains of belonging to the *soul* of the church of Christ by faith and charity, when one is not actually a member of the *body* of this same church, is founded on the very nature of things, or founded on a free and positive decree of our Lord? In other words, does this impossibility come from the fact that God *cannot* have it otherwise, or that in his good pleasure he *does not choose* to have it otherwise? The lengthy metaphysical arguments of Dr. Brownson seem to be all in favor of the first supposition; but our common sense tells us that God can, if he so wish, sanctify and save by the immediate operation of his grace, without admitting them officially into his visible church, just as many souls as he pleases.

"But if it be granted that this impossibility rests on a merely positive decree of God, from the effects of which our Lord will not dispense anybody, we think that, on a matter of fact of this nature, safer guides can be found than Dr. Brownson in the great Catholic theologians, who, after having sounded all the depths of divine tradition, teach *unanimously* that actual entrance into the body of the Catholic Church is the general and ordinary means of entering into the soul of the same church; strictly obligatory when it is possible, but not indispensably necessary. Father Perrone, no mean authority, after proving that purely natural virtue is found in non-Catholic sects, but that the virtue which proceeds from sanctifying grace and charity can be found only in that body or society with which Christ is in intimate communion, that is, the Catholic Church,

*Brownson's works, vol. V, p. 572.

adds: *Excipiendi tamen illi sunt, qui, ut aiunt, bona fide in aliqua secta versantur, quos spiritu saltem ad ecclesiam pertinere ostendimus.* (*De Locis Theol. part. 1, cap. 2, art. 3, difficult. 2, ad 2um.*)

"2. However, Dr. Brownson himself admits two classes of exceptions that will not square with the mathematical rigor of his principles. For in what way can he attach to the *visible body* of the church children of which the Catholic Church takes no cognizance, and which are officially counted among the neophytes of a sect of perdition? And how can the desire of catechumens, who die before being baptized, to enter the church, and the desire of the church's ministers to receive them, avail unto salvation, if actual and real admission into the church is, by a positive decree of God, an indispensable means of salvation?

"3. As to the child, which, after having been baptized and sanctified in infancy, comes afterwards to the use of reason and remains in ignorance of the truths of which an explicit knowledge is strictly necessary to make an act of supernatural faith: (1) The very moment he commits (as indeed he may commit) a mortal sin of heresy or infidelity, the whole edifice of baptismal grace within him is destroyed to its very foundation, that is, to the habit of faith inclusively. Thus teach all the theologians. (2.) As soon as he commits a mortal sin against any other virtue besides faith, for example, against justice, or against temperance, he immediately loses the treasure of charity and sanctifying grace, which he cannot recover without making *that act of faith*, required by the Council of Trent from all sinners without exception, as the first step toward justification, and without complying with other conditions not necessary to mention here; but he preserves *the habit of faith*, which, according to Suarez, certainly cannot be lost without sin: *Supponimus ut certum, fidei habitum semel infusum non amitti nisi per peccatum* —and immediately afterwards he proves that the sins which are not directly against faith cannot destroy this virtue (Suarez *De Fide disp. 7, sect 3, n. 1*) De Lugo (*De Virtute Fidei div. disp. 20, sect. 6, n. 187*) says expressly: *Si infans baptizatus nutriatur postea a quod paganus vel Judæos, et eorum doctrinam sectetur, non erit proprie infidelis, nec amittit habitum fidei infusæ, donec fidem sibi sufficienter propositam respuat: quod idem est de infante baptizato et apud hæreticos nutrito.* In such a soul the treasure of faith lies buried and unknown, and is sterile; but it will subsist till a positive sin of heresy or infidelity destroy it. (3.) If this baptized child remain in invincible ignorance which renders him incapable of making an act of faith, and dies in this state, but without having committed any mortal sin, we believe that certainly he will be saved, and the contrary assertion of Dr. Brownson cannot be maintained. For the only reason for this opinion the reviewer alleges is, that the act of faith is an indispensable condition of salvation for all who have reached the use of reason. But this principle, though admitted by all theologians, with regard to adults in the state of either original sin or of grievous actual sin, is not extended by any of them to adults already justified, for whom the act of faith is a mere precept (*sub gravi*, it is true), of which the involuntary omission cannot be a hindrance to eternal salvation. Again, we ask: What will be the lot in eternity of this child which, according to Dr. Brownson's supposition, has lost the habit of faith without having ever committed a mortal sin? The bliss of heaven? No; for faith is the root of the supernatural life, and, according to the hypothesis, he no longer possesses faith. The lot of children who die unbaptized? No; for his original sin has been forever washed away. Hell properly so-called? No; for God plunges into that abyss only those who die guilty of a *personal, grievous, and perfectly voluntary transgression of his commandments.* The reviewer, then, must have recourse to annihilation, or in-

vent a fourth condition after death thus far unknown to the theologians of the Catholic Church.

"We, of course, accept in its full force the principle *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*; but we think Dr. Brownson wanting in accuracy when he attempts to show who are in the church and who are out of it, and that he needs to study the theologians more, and to trust his own individual reasonings less. Catholic theology is learned traditionally; it is not wrought out from individual conceptions, or by mathematical deductions.

"In this same number Dr. Brownson ironically terms *tender-hearted theologians* those who think that the loss of the intuitive or beatific vision does not cause children who have died without baptism to *suffer*.

"Dr. Brownson proves to his own satisfaction that it is absurd to suppose that these children are exempted from suffering; but he has forgotten, if he ever knew, who the *tender-hearted theologians* are that believe in this absurdity. The reader will be astonished to learn that they are St. Thomas, who says, concerning these children: *Nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinæ*, (*supplem. qu. 71, art. 2*); St. Bonaventure (*2 a. p. distinct. qu. 2*); Suarez (*de peccatis, disp. 2, sect. 6*); and others of at least as much authority in such matters as the editor of *Brownson's Quarterly Review*.

"If he will take the trouble to study the reasons they give in favor of their opinion which they regard as at least the more probable, he will no doubt follow them, and abandon the doctrine of Gregory of Rimini, to whom Catholic instinct has applied the energetic epithet of *tortor puerorum*,: 'the children's torturer.'

"We must not forget to mention, among the contributions to the April number, the able and interesting 'Letter from Sacerdos,' who complains of some of the reviewer's criticisms. The insertion of this letter does honor to Dr. Brownson, for it shows that, if he sometimes makes mistakes he also knows how to make the *amende honorable*."—*Boston Pilot*.

DEAR DOCTOR,—

One of your admirers, when you do not swerve from the straight line (Indignor quandoque bonus dormitat *Orestes*), begs you to recall the passage of the REVIEW for last April (p. 162 *), where you say: "Even the eternally lost are gainers by their existence . . . To be is always better than not to be." Is this reconcilable with the words of our Lord, regarding Judas, "Bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset"?

True, you quote St. Augustine, but if you consult St. Thomas in *Supplemento* q. 98, art. 3, you will find the meaning of the Bishop of Hippo. The Angelical Doctor thus concludes his article: "Licet non esse maxime sit malum, in quantum privat esse, est tamen valde bonum, in quantum privat miseria, quæ est maximum malorum."

Your correspondent was also much surprised to read your words of censure on Boniface VIII, and St. Louis, in the January Number, pp. 137, 138. † How, Doctor, can you presume to blame a pope like Boniface, indeed any pope, in relation to canonization? Still worse, how could you write, to authorize your disrespectful remarks, that "the pope is infallible in the canonization of saints, is not, we believe, *de fide*?" Many theologians hold that it is. Should it be certain that it is not of faith, are you therefore at liberty to deny it, or even to doubt it? Can it not be *most certain*, without its being *de fide*? And is it not a sin to call in question any religious truth universally taught by divines as *certain* though not as an article of faith?

You are bound, dear sir, to counteract the bad impression you must have caused in some minds by these objectionable passages, especially the one respecting "the eternally lost." He who makes of hell an en-

*Brownson's Works, vol. II. p. 83. †Ibid. vol. XVIII. p. 561

urable abode, assumes a fearful responsibility; for the fear of hell is the main, if not the only, curb on the passions of the great majority of mankind.

Your sincere friend.

P. S. Before sending the foregoing criticism, I wanted to glance at the July Number of the REVIEW, hoping to see something in reference to the subject. So far, I have discovered nothing. If you are unwilling to retract, you might at least publish my observations.

There is a slight mistake in the last Number, p. 292. St. Elizabeth, mentioned in that place was not "Queen of Hungary," but only the daughter of a King of Hungary.

ANONYMOUS.

The objections urged in the article from the *Boston Pilot*, which we insert entire, are founded on a misreading of our article on the Catholic dogma which no one can deny without heresy, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. The writer in the *Pilot* assumes that we maintained that "whoever is not *actually* a member of the visible *body* of the church cannot belong to the soul of the church." This is not what we wrote, and is not what we hold. The error is in the surreptitious insertion of the little word *actually*. We said and we say that whoever is not a member, at least an inchoate member, of the body of the church cannot belong to the soul of the church, and therefore cannot be saved, if the dogmatic definition, "*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*," means anything; for the body and soul of the church, though distinguishable, are not separable, we might say, no more separable than are the body and soul and the human and divine natures of our Lord. Men may, as St. Augustine says, be *in* the church without being *of* it; but that they can be *of* it, without being *in* it, or that men can belong to the soul of the church without belonging *in any sense* to the body of the church and united to the sacred humanity of Christ, he does not say, and we do not believe and would not believe, though forty thousand Perrones or even an angel from heaven should teach it, for there is one God, and one Mediator of God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus: that is, Christ mediates and saves in his human nature, hypostatically united to his divine person, not in his divine nature alone. Otherwise the Incarnation would perform no office in the economy of mediation and salvation.

Has the *Pilot* writer ever asked himself what he means by the soul of the church as distinguished from the body? The soul of the church is, we take it, the Holy Ghost who dwells

and operates in her, and therefore regenerates and sanctifies through the incarnate Word, so that in the work of salvation, as in the work of creation, the three persons of the Godhead concur. Exclude the church, you exclude the human nature of God and make the Son concur as mediator in his divine nature alone, and thus follow the spirit that dissolveth Jesus, which, according to St. John, is Antichrist: 1 St. John iv, 2. You make the Holy Ghost, without the mediation of the *incarnate* Word, without the concurrence of the Word made flesh, or any action of God in his human nature, as truly, as substantially, and as indissolubly his nature, as the divine nature itself, the Mediator. This will not do, for it is to reject the Word made flesh, and to adopt the Protestant error of the invisible church, to deny the whole sacramental system, as well as the whole sacerdotal system of mediatorial grace, and to make the regeneration, justification, and salvation of the soul the work of the Holy Ghost, or of God in his divine nature alone, which would logically involve the rejection of the entire Catholic faith, and the whole *cultus sanctorum*, including the worship of the Blessed Virgin, as understood and practised by Catholics. To assume that one can belong to the soul of the church without being in any sense really a member of the visible body of the church, would be to reject the entire Christian order as we have been taught it. Even the just that lived and died before the Incarnation could not enter heaven till the incarnate Word visited them in the prison where they were detained, preached to them, and united them to him in his humanity.

The *Pilot* man says he would desire to learn from us "whether the absolute impossibility," he pretends we maintain, "of belonging to the *soul* of the church of Christ by faith and charity when one is not *actually* a member of the body of this same church, is founded on the very nature of things, or on the free and positive decree of our Lord?" As we maintain nothing of the sort, as is evident from his own statement that we admit that catechumens dying before the church is ready to confer on them the visible sacrament of baptism may be saved, we are under no obligation to answer this question. We hold that the visible church is the visible medium by which one becomes united to the soul of the church. The *Pilot* man says he accepts in its full force the principle, that "*extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*" What, then, is he quarrelling with us about? What else do we say?

What did the council, the fourth Lateran, that defined that out of the church no one can ever be saved,—“*extra ecclesiam nullus omnino salvatur*”—mean by the *church*? Did it mean the visible or an invisible church or the soul of the church, that is, the Holy Ghost apart from the body in which he dwells, and in and through which he operates? When the Holy Scriptures, the fathers, the popes, and councils speak of the church, in connection with salvation, they always, as far as we have observed, speak of the visible church, or the church in the concrete, not of an invisible church, or the church as a disembodied spirit. In a letter I addressed through a theologian to the late cardinal prefect of the Propaganda, mindful of the qualifications some modern theologians give to the dogma, and of some articles I had read in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, I said: “I shall never leave the church, for I am certain that there is no salvation out of her communion, *at least for me.*” The cardinal noted the apparent limitation, and in the name of the Holy See, rebuked it, and asked, “Does il Signore Brownson believe that there is salvation for any one else out of the communion of the church?”

The *Pilot* man must hold that there is no salvation out of the church, or not be a Catholic. Archbishop Kenrick, of Baltimore, kindly contributed an article to our *Review* on Dr. White’s “Life of Mother Seton,” and the value of Protestant piety. While seeming in the outset to make the most liberal concessions to the latitudinarian theologians who would seem to hold that nobody but bad Catholics is in danger of being damned, he concluded by being more rigid and exclusive if possible, than the *Review* had ever been. Bishop Hay, in his tract “On Exclusive Salvation,” takes the dogma literally, in its plain, natural sense, and goes further than we have ever ventured to go in any of our writings, and yet we are not aware that he has ever been accused of heterodoxy. The late bishop of Boston, of immortal memory, was the soundest theologian, and one of the ablest, as well as most modest, men we have ever known, whose doctrine and whose judgment we never found at fault. Well, the greater part of the article criticised as Dr. Brownson’s theology is republished from an article in the *Review* for October, 1847, which was written at his command, revised and approved by him before it was published. We think he was as good a theologian, and as high an authority, as the *Boston Pilot*.

The only question on this subject on which Catholics do or

can differ is, Who are in the church? The *Pilot* man, while accepting the principle,—dogma or fact—he should say,—*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*,—says, he thinks “Dr. Brownson wanting in accuracy when he attempts to show who are in the church and who are out of it, and that he needs to study the theologians more and to trust his own individual reasonings less.” Very possibly. Dr. Brownson does not pretend to be a learned theologian, but the *Pilot* cites no theologian except De Lugo, with whose works he has not been rather intimately acquainted for many years, as well as with many others hardly less authoritative. A man’s learning, however, is not to be estimated by the number of authors he has read or studied. To profit by the study of the theologians, one needs a theological aptitude, or at least a capacity to understand the author studied. Our learned critic, judging from his criticism of our poor essay, has the contrary capacity, if capacity it can be called, an aptitude to misunderstand and to misstate the language as well as the sense of his author, for we have not discovered an instance in which he has given correctly our meaning or the doctrine we defend. As for our “individual reasonings,” he shuns them as carefully as if they had the small-pox, and invalidates, or attempts to invalidate, not one of them. Nor has he taken notice of a single one of the authorities we cited in support of the doctrine we maintained.—authorities express to our purpose, and, to say the least, as numerous and as weighty as those he cites against us.

The *Pilot* man says, we admit that catechumens may be saved, though they die without being actually baptized “*provided the church admits them to the rank of aspirants to the sacrament.*” The tautological provision italicized is the *Pilot* man’s, not ours, for we do not understand how one can be admitted as a catechumen, without being “admitted to the rank of an aspirant to the sacrament.” He thinks or writes quite too loosely to be permitted to accuse others of a want of accuracy. He calls our arguments drawn from the teleological purpose, in the divine plan of creation, of the Christian order, and the relation of the church to the Incarnation, “*metaphysical arguments,*” and has the admirable simplicity to ask us whether we hold that the absolute impossibility we assert of belonging to the soul of the church of Christ, without being in some sense a member of the visible body of that same church, “*is founded on (in) the nature of things, or on the free and positive decree of our Lord?*” Does this learned critic

pretend to be a theologian without being able to distinguish between *ratio theologica* and *ratio metaphysica*? We use not a single metaphysical argument in our whole essay; and all the arguments we adduce in defence of our thesis are theological, drawn from theological principles. We aimed to prove from theological principles, or from the nature, not of things, but of the Christian order itself, as supernaturally revealed, that the dogma, Out of the church there is no salvation, cannot be denied without denying Christianity itself as the theological order. All the dogmas of the church are CATHOLIC, founded on catholic or universal principles, and admit no exception. An exception would destroy their catholicity and be an anomaly in the Creator's works all of which are and must be strictly dialectic, since made by the WORD, who is the Logos, the supreme Logic, or, as Plato would say, Logic in itself. This is as true of the new creation, or palingenesiac order, as of the cosmic, or genesiac order. Here is no metaphysical reasoning; it is strictly, from beginning to end, theological reasoning, and rests on principles known only from divine revelation.

Unhappily, the theologian of the *Pilot* understands nothing of all this, and sees no distinction between principle and dogma, and consequently no reason in the nature of the church or Christian kingdom for the dogma. His claim to be a theologian is, therefore, of the slenderest sort. The dogma or doctrine is not the principle, but its embodiment or infallible expression: and it is the business of the theologian, while he takes the dogmas from the infallible teaching of the church, or the infallible definitions of the pope, to trace them up to the catholic principles they embody, and to show not only the external authority which enjoins them, but also the intrinsic reason for them, intrinsic in the Christian order itself, and their dialectic relations to one another, and with the principles of the natural order or the cosmos. The half-fledged theologians of our journals have very little theological science in this higher sense, and when they find a writer who has some little conception of it, perhaps some little acquaintance with it, they look upon him with suspicion, denounce him, or admonish him "to study the theologians more, and to trust his individual reasonings less."

In order to be saved, or in ordinary times to discharge acceptably one's duty even as a priest or parochus, it is not necessary that one should look any deeper into the Christian

order than to the dogmas and the external infallible authority that enjoins them ; but no one who has not looked further and grasped the principles embodied or expressed in them, the reasons for holding them intrinsic in the Christian order itself, has any right to regard himself as a master of theological science. We need not say that we are far from being a master of theological science : all we do or can claim is, that we have learned there is such a science, and that the routinists whom we meet at every turn hardly suspect its existence, and seldom attain to any adequate understanding even of the more recondite dogmas themselves.

In answer to the *Pilot's* question, however, we say that the necessity of belonging to the visible church in order to be saved, which, we assert, is not founded in the nature of things, but in the nature of the church, founded by the free, positive decree of God, inasmuch as God was free to found or not found the teleological order, or to become incarnate, and found on the Incarnation, the new creation or Christian order, consisting of palingenesia and glorification. This, commonly called by theologians the supernatural order, sometimes the order of grace, as distinguished from the order of nature or natural generation, God was, as Gioberti pretends, not obliged or necessitated to found. We, indeed, perceive not, supposing God determined in the beginning to carry the creative act to its highest power, and to raise men to a perfect beatitude in a supernatural union with himself or to a participation of his divine nature (2 Peter), how he could have done it otherwise than by the Incarnation, and founding on it the Christian or teleological order, or the Catholic Church as the medium of effecting his purpose. But we do not pretend to measure by our feeble reason the resources of the divine wisdom, or to restrict either the divine freedom or the divine power. God can do any thing but contradict, that is, annihilate himself. We do not know that he was under any necessity, extrinsic or intrinsic, to carry his creative act to its highest power, or of raising men, as their final cause, to a participation of his own divine nature : hence the necessity we assert is simply a necessity *æ suppositione*. Supposing God resolved to do what we know from revelation he did resolve from the foundation of the world, then it is necessary, in order to be saved, to belong in some sense to the visible church, the kingdom of God on earth.

The *Pilot* man, had he read the extract from Father

Perrone—not, by the way, very high authority—and our comments on it, in the foot-note,* would have seen that we by no means maintain that the necessity we assert, is a necessity which God cannot break through if he chooses. God, by a miracle or some extraordinary means, as Perrone says, we admit, may save sinners without their union with the visible church, for we are not discussing what is possible *via extraordinaria*, but what is possible *via ordinaria*, in the order of his grace. In the order established by God, there is no salvation out of the church. This is *de fide*. Thus the church decrees in the fourth council of the Lateran, chapter 1: “Una vero est fidelium universalis ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur.” All theologians must believe and hold that there is no salvation out of the one Catholic church, or not be Catholics. So much is certain. Hence the efforts of theologians to prove that those who, they contend, are or can be saved, do in *some sense* belong to the visible church, for no one of any authority dares adopt the Protestant figment of an invisible church. Bellarmine holds, as do most theologians, on the authority of St. Ambrose, that catechumens, dying before receiving the visible sacrament of baptism *in re*, may be saved; but he feels a difficulty in the case. How can this be, since there is no salvation out of the church, and catechumens are not *actu et proprie* in the church? But this, though a difficulty to Bellarmine, would be none to the theologian of the *Pilot*, for he would say: “Very true, they are not members of the body of the church, but they, by their faith and charity, belong to the soul of the church, and that suffices.” Bellarmine, though an eminent theologian, and generally regarded as a high authority, appears to have been ignorant of this easy way of solving the difficulty, and he labors hard to prove that “catechumens are after all, in the church, not actually and properly, but only potentially, as a man conceived, but not yet formed and born, is called man only potentially.” Billuart, as we showed in our former article, solves the difficulty in the same way, and maintains that catechumens may be said to be in the church “proximately and in desire,” or, as St. Augustine says, “in voto et proxima dispositione,” as one may be said to be in the house because he is in the vestibule for the purpose of immediately entering. “They belong to the church inchoately,” that is,

are inchoate members, and the church in her prayer for them on Good Friday calls them hers—"Our catechumens:" "Oremus pro catechumenis nostris," evidently implying that they belong to her, and are under her care, subject in some sense to her jurisdiction.

Whether these explanations prove that catechumens belong to the visible church or not, they prove that the theologians who offer them believe and hold that, in order to be saved, one must be in some sense, *vel re, vel voto*, a member of the body of the church, and, therefore, that they understand the dogma precisely as we do, namely, out of the *visible* church of Christ there is no salvation. They do not seem to hold the Protestant heresy of an invisible church, or salvation by union with the disembodied soul of the church, in which the *flesh* assumed by the WORD in the womb of the Virgin, has no office or representative, since the Holy Ghost did not become incarnate, and is not the Mediator of God and men. Nor does Perrone, whose erudition we rate higher than we do his speculative theology, really differ from the other theologians, or hold any thing on this point that we have questioned. He says,* in answer to the objection that were the true church to fail in whole or in part, it would not follow that men would be destitute of all means of salvation, for God might supply the defect by internal means; men might be joined, at least in spirit, to the true church of Christ [when the church has failed?]. "Non sequeretur homines omni destitui medio *extraordinario*, transeat, vel concedo; *ordinario*, nego. Jamvero quando Christus condidit ecclesiam suam, intendit præbere hominibus medium *ordinarium*, seu potius collectionem *mediorum*, quibus omnes indiscriminatim uti quovis tempore possent ad salutem sibi comparandam. *Si Deus voluisset ope interiorum mediorum nostram operari salutem, NULLA FUISSET ECCLESIE INSTITUENDÆ RATIO*," and much more which is quoted by us in the article criticised. Here Perrone distinctly maintains that the church is instituted to be the medium, and is the only *ordinary* medium of salvation; and that if God had willed to save men without her, there would have been no reason for her institution. This is enough for our purpose, for we are not treating what God may or may not do in some extraordinary manner, by means out of the order of salvation which he has instituted.

**De Loc. Theologic* part. 1, c. 4, a. 1

It is well here to remember what Perrone sometimes forgets, the relation the church bears to the Incarnation, which he elsewhere, in a passage quoted from Moehler's *Symbolik*, acknowledges and sustains by several texts of Scripture, from St. Paul; namely, that the church is, *veluti*, the visible continuation of the Incarnation. If he understands himself, he must then hold that what takes away all reason for the institution of the church, takes away all reason for the Incarnation, and really denies that "the MAN Christ Jesus is the one Mediator of God and men." Our Lord says, "No man cometh to me except the Father draw him." The Father may draw men to the incarnate Word, or to the church, his body, in various and even extraordinary ways; but that God ever saves men by extraordinary means or without the *medium ordinarium*, is, so far as our knowledge goes, authorized by no decision of the church, by no *consensus theologorum*, by no analogy of faith, by no *ratio theologica*, and is expressly contradicted by the decree of the fourth council of Lateran already cited. That he may use extraordinary means to bring men to the *medium ordinarium*, as in the case of the eunuch of Queen Candace, Cornelius the centurion, and hundreds of others recorded in the relations of our missionaries, especially those of the illustrious Company of Jesus, we know; and it seems to us much more in accordance with the order of his providence or the order of grace that God should bring men *via extraordinaria* to the church to be saved *via ordinaria*, than that he should save them, *via extraordinaria*, or irrespective of the order he himself has established and declared to be the only medium of salvation, without which no one at all—*omnino*—is ever saved. Even Perrone does not venture to say that one can belong to the soul of the church without being in some sense a member of the body of the church, and he recognizes and defends principles which contradict it. A little more logic and a deeper insight into the dialectic character of the Creator's works, as disclosed by the Christian revelation, would, perhaps, have done the erudite Roman professor, any more than the *Pilot's* theologian, no serious harm.

The theologian of the *Pilot*, while we, he owns, admit that infants validly baptized in heretical sects, if they die before attaining to the use of reason, are saved, makes us maintain that "having reached the age of discretion, even though justified in infancy, excused from sin through invincible ignorance, if they remain separated from the *body* of the church, they lose

the habit of faith, and are consequently out of the way of salvation." With his permission we must tell him that he either does not know what we said, or he knowingly misstates it. We said, invincible ignorance excuses from sin in that whereof one is invincibly ignorant, but we never said or implied that those who adhere to heretical sects are excused from sin, or that without sin against faith the habit of faith is or can be lost. Consequently all the authorities he cites to prove that the habit of faith received in baptism cannot be lost without sin, are nothing to the purpose—are not *ad rem*, and show a lack either of honesty or logic on the part of the critic.

The habit of faith and sanctity the infant receives in baptism suffices so long as one remains an infant, but when one comes to the use of reason, the habit does not suffice, for then the obligation to elicit the act of faith comes up; and if the baptized person refuses or omits to elicit the act, he loses the habit, and commits a sin against faith. This sin may be committed in two ways, either by a positive act of infidelity, or by the omission to elicit the act of faith. Now, we argued that, in our country, none whom the Catholic preacher's voice can reach, and where the church is everywhere present, for we expressly confined our remarks to our own country, can be excused for adhering to the sects or omitting to elicit the act of faith, which is elicitable in no sect, for no one of itself presents the credible object. In other words, we denied the fact of the pretended *invincible* ignorance as to the Catholic faith.

We do not believe that in our times there is much, if any, invincible ignorance among Protestant sects, or many instances of what is called good faith. Some such there undoubtedly are, for some such we find among the converts to the church; but we have no evidence that all such are not gathered into the one fold before they die, even though it may not be till the last moment. We have many instances where persons brought up in Protestant sects have learned, the grace of God assisting, the Catholic faith, and been led to the Catholic Church by a diligent reading of the Protestant mutilated edition and unfaithful version of the Scriptures. One very dear to us was so led: what hinders others in the same exterior circumstances, and possessing the same means, from being led in like manner? No reason can be assigned, but prejudice and the lack of the proper interior disposition. But that prejudice or that want of interior disposition prevents one from seeking, *cauta solici-*

itudine, for the truth, as St. Augustine says, simply proves that they are not prepared to embrace the truth, when presented to them, disproves their good faith, and renders them guilty of the sin of unbelief. No member of an heretical sect is in good faith or inculpably ignorant, who does not seek with all the diligence and earnestness for the truth which a prudent man carries into his worldly affairs: at least so says the able and learned Thomist, Billuart, as high authority, to say the least, as Perrone or the *Pilot* man.

The church is a city set on a hill, and her light shines out through all the region round, even to those in the valley. Her missionaries are in all nations, and there is not one in any Protestant nation that need remain ignorant of the church or her titles, if he cares to know them, or is in earnest to save his soul. The fact that persons from all ranks and conditions, learned or unlearned, freemen or slaves, have been converted, St. John Chrysostom urges, in one of his homilies, as a proof that all might, if they would. We are not a little scandalized when we find Catholic theologians, or pretended theologians, urging the bitter prejudices instilled into the minds of Protestants by calumnies against the church, as a valid excuse for their not seeking the truth, and as in no sense incompatible with their good faith, as if those prejudices themselves which blind the eyes of Protestants were not the work of the devil, and sinful.—or as if they did not prove them to be in bad faith and in bondage to Satan. Every Protestant has ample means of knowing the truth, for his very Protestantism itself bears witness to the Catholic Church as the one only church of Christ, and would be absolutely unintelligible without it. No Protestant has, or believes he has, faith. He knows he has only opinions, which may be true or may be false; but he hugs the delusion that nobody has any thing better, and so does not seek. And why should he seek when Catholic theologians tell him, as he understands them, and as we understood them before our conversion, that they are most likely in good faith, and by no means necessarily out of the way of salvation? Yet not one of these same theologians would open the doors of heaven to any of them that the doctrine we defend would exclude. Even Dr. Hawarden, in his *Charity and Truth*, apparently one of the most latitudinarian of our theologians, winds up by stating that it is very doubtful if any not in the communion of the church, and who die out of it, can ever enter the kingdom of heaven.

Invincible ignorance, which is sometimes spoken of as if it were a positive virtue, is a negative quantity, and though it excuses from sin wherein one is invincibly ignorant, has no positive merit, and advances one not a step towards heaven. St. Augustine says :* “Quia ipsa ignorantia in eis qui intelligere noluerunt, sine dubitatione, peccatum est; in eis autem qui non *potuerunt*, pœna peccati. Ergo, in utrisque non est justa excusatio, sed justa damnatio.” Yet St. Augustine is higher authority than the theologian of the *Boston Pilot*, however much he has studied the theologians, and however little he may have trusted to his individual reasonings.

We do not pretend to be a theologian, but we do claim to have some logic, and a little common-sense, though God forbid we should presume to measure ourselves with the learned and acute theologian of the *Pilot*, a noble and accomplished young athlete, from whom we trust the universal church has much to hope. But we are sustained under his strictures by our intimate conviction that, if he had read or understood our humble article, he would have found very little as a learned Catholic to censure in it. He would have seen that we differ from the school he follows or leads, only in demanding an explicit *rotum* where it appears to be satisfied with an implicit *rotum* or vague desire. We ask not that these people who have been baptized and brought up in the sects, should be *actu et proprie* in the Catholic communion, but that they should stand in relation to the sacrament of reconciliation as catechumens do in relation to the sacrament of regeneration, that is, knowing explicitly that there is such a sacrament, and explicitly desiring it; otherwise, we cannot reconcile the assertion of their salvation with the Catholic dogma, “Extra ecclesiam nullus omnino salvatur.” We have not presumed to question the explanations modern theologians give of the dogma: we say not *exceptions*, for every dogma is catholic, and what is catholic, as we have said, admits no exception. We have only endeavored to fix after theological reasoning and the greater theologians the limits of these explanations, and thus check the latitudinarianism which the popular understanding deduces from them. This latitudinarianism out of the schools is much greater, we apprehend, than is commonly suspected, even by our clergy. How far and how fatally it extends, one may easily learn from the sermons of some

*Tom. ii, Ep. 194. *Ad Sixtum*, c. 27, p. 1085. Paris: Gaume Frères.

popular preachers, not remarkable for their theological exactness. We have never found ourselves in lay Catholic society where we could assert the dogma as the church defines it, without being contradicted. Take up the silly and inflated book, by a young Oxford man, entitled "For Husks, Food." The author appears to have been drawn to the church by her æsthetic excellence, not for the purpose of saving his soul, which he seems never to have imagined for a moment to be in the least danger while in the bosom of Anglicanism of the ritualistic stamp. He makes his Catholic priest visit the grave of his Protestant brother, gather up a handful of earth from it, put it in a silk bag, and wear it next his heart till his death, not as the memorial of fraternal affection, but as the sacred relic of a saint; he represents a Catholic bishop as assuring a batch of Protestant women playing at nuns, whom he meets on shipboard, that they are in good faith; and when wrecked at sea, and they and he are going down, as giving them absolution, as if they were good Catholics. The priest has no apprehensions for the soul of his old father, the Anglican bishop of Aytoun. His father was in good faith, for he was a Howard, and his taste in church millinery or decoration was perfect; and he was in invincible ignorance, though living in the midst of Catholics and possessing a superb library, which contained the works of nearly all the standard Catholic writers from St. Augustine down to Newman and Manning. The *Catholic World* brings the angels down, and makes them bear the soul of a Protestant woman of high birth and breeding up direct to heaven, without suffering her to be detained even a moment in purgatory,—a favor reserved for very few Catholics: and what is the theologian of the *Pilot* doing but holding us up as ignorant of theology, and accusing us of grave error, because we have the simplicity to believe that, when the church declares that out of the church there is no salvation, she knows and means what she says? Will he pardon us if we suggest that he, perhaps, would be better employed in combating this rampant latitudinarianism which is now devouring Catholic nations, than in making war on the old reviewer for errors into which he has never fallen?

But it seems in the estimation of the *Pilot's* theologian erred in representing unbaptized infants dying in infancy, and of course in invincible ignorance, as suffering from the loss of heaven, and he quotes St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Suarez, and others, to prove the contrary. Does he suppose the pos-

session of heaven is a small affair? That they suffered the pain of sense we have never pretended; but it is certain that they do suffer the pain, that is, the penalty of loss. That they do not suffer the pain of sense in consequence of being deprived of the beatific vision, is the common opinion of theologians, and we have not the temerity to contradict them; but, deprived of that vision, they remain and must for ever remain infinitely below their destiny, with the end for which they were created unattained and unattainable: and every rational creature necessarily suffers, morally and spiritually, if not sensibly, so long as it remains below its destiny, with the end for which it exists unrealized. Hence Pope St. Gregory the Great recognizes but two states after death; the one, happiness in heaven, and the other, suffering in hell. The holy council of Florence defines that unbaptized infants dying in infancy go to hell, "in infernum." That God may hide from them all sense of their loss, and provide for them a flowery sort of delight in which they will be conscious of no suffering, of no loss even, is a theological opinion; but we understand not how it can be without a miracle of divine mercy. And if we suppose a miracle for so much, we can see no reason why we may not just as well suppose a miracle big enough to admit them to the vision of God in glory. The loss of heaven is the greatest of all possible evils.

The *Pilot* is very generous in assuming that we inserted the Letter of "Sacerdos" as an *amende honorable*. We did not feel and do not now feel that there was any *amende due*, for between him and us there was and is no doctrinal difference. He concedes that the presumption is, that persons converted from the sects have not been validly baptized; and that is all that we maintained, though we thought the criticisms of the writer in the *Mirror* on "The Threshold of the Church," uncalled for and captious. Our difference turned on practical questions. We inserted the letter, because it was written by a learned and able theologian, and an old and highly esteemed friend; because it was rather sharp upon us, and, finally, because, disabled at the time from writing, we were in want of matter to fill out the number. If we could have held a pen, we should have accompanied the publication with some correctives, which have since been happily and better supplied by a priest and theologian no less learned and even more distinguished, and with a far wider experience.

So much for our Boston theologian, who was not, we ap-

prehend, trained, as we were, in the school of the late illustrious bishop of Boston, a theologian, whose exactness and soundness we, every day as we advance in life, find confirmed, and whose teachings we but feebly reproduce. May he who was our spiritual father on earth, still remember and watch over the spiritual son with whom he had so much affectionate patience, and whom he took so much pains to instruct in the principles, doctrines, and precepts of our holy religion! Never can we repay to his memory, for ever blessed, his labor and pains, his uniform sweetness, unfailing kindness, and, above all, his tender and unaffected piety, and profound and courageous love of truth. God has, we trust, rewarded him.

We turn now to the anonymous letter, our chief objection to which is, that it is anonymous. With the exception of articles in the *Catholic World* and *N. Y. Tablet*, we have never published any thing since our Catholic life began that bears not our name, and for which we do not hold ourselves responsible. It is hardly fair for a writer to send us a communication without his name, and, ordinarily, such a communication would be thrown into the waste basket unread. But happening to read a page of the present communication, before observing that it was unsigned, and discovering that it arraigned our orthodoxy, and that the matter could be treated independently of the writer, we make in this case an exception to our rule, for which the writer may not thank us.

The first objection Mr. Anonymous urges against us is, that we assert that "the eternally lost are gainers by their existence, for it is always better to be than not to be." We say this in accordance with philosophy, which, as we have learned it, and as we have supposed all theologians maintain, teaches that *Ens*, *Bonum*, and *Verum*, are identical, because all are infinite, and there can be but one infinite. God is being in its plenitude, and in that he is being he is good. All existences are existences, or exist by virtue of their participation of being, *mediate* the creative act of Being. Hence all existences, in that they participate of being, participate of good. But, as the damned or eternally lost do really exist, they really participate of good, in so far as they participate of being, and therefore we conclude that they are gainers by their existence, for it is "better to be, and even to be miserable," as St. Augustine says,* "than to be nothing," which, as the privation of all be-

* *Liberum Arbitrium*, l. iii. cap. vii.

ing, is the privation of all good, and cannot be willed, or in itself desirable.

To this Anonymous opposes the words of our Lord referring to Judas, "Good were it for that man if he had never been born," and what St. Thomas said of these words and the words of St. Augustine. Here is what St. Thomas says in the passage referred to: "*Ad tertium, quod licet non esse maxime sit malum, in quantum privat esse; est tamen valde bonum, in quantum privat miseria quæ est maximum malorum.*" This makes nothing against us or St. Augustine. St. Thomas says in the body of the article: "Quod non esse potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, et sic nullo modo est appetibile cum non habeat aliquam rationem boni, sed sit pura privatio. Alio modo, potest considerari, in quantum est ablativum pœnalis vitæ, seu alienj miseriæ et sic non esse accipit rationem boni. . . . Et per hunc modum melius est damnatis non esse quam miseros esse. Unde Matth. xxvi, 24, dicitur: *Bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset homo ille.*" From this we gather that, while we cannot say that it would have been absolutely good, or good in itself, for Judas and the damned if they had not been born or existed, we can only say it would have been relatively or accidentally good, in the respect they would not have suffered. This, if we understand it, explains how our Lord could say that it would have been good for Judas if he had never been born, that is, good in that he would not have suffered misery, without contradicting what St. Augustine holds, and we after him, that *Ens* is always good, and that it is always better to be than not to be, and therefore the eternally lost are gainers by their existence. We may be wrong, but the passage from St. Thomas does not prove it, and Anonymous fails to convict us of error.

The second objection brought by Anonymous to prove that the "bonus Orestes" sometimes nods, is drawn from what we said respecting the canonization of St. Louis of France. Boniface VIII. is in most respects our ideal pope. We make two statements, and the first, one only, if we could make it without irreverence, to which exception is taken: 1. That the pope, perhaps, among other reasons, was moved to canonize the king as a stroke of policy; and 2. That the pope is infallible in the canonization of saints, is not, we believe, *de fide*. We were endeavoring to disprove the French pretension that the kings of France had always been the devoted servants of the church or the papacy. The Frank sovereigns, who were Germans

not French, though sovereigns of the country now called France, did serve the church, and it was the Franks not the French; for France, as we now understand it, did not come into existence till the end of the Carolingian dynasty; but the kings of France proper, with the exception of Louis IX or St. Louis, we maintained, had almost uniformly been unfaithful to the papacy. The church owed the great western schism to France; Protestantism itself had a French origin, and but for the French government Protestantism would have been extinguished within the first century of its existence. We were led to speak rather disparagingly of St. Louis as a king, by no means as a man, by the fact that he decided in favor of the Emperor Frederic II. against the pope, constantly maintained friendly relations with him, and exhorted the pope to moderation in dealing with that perfidious Hohenstaufen, who for so many years warred against the church. We never doubted his virtues, so to speak, as a domestic king, or his rare heroism in adversity, but he always seemed to us a *pious* but narrow-minded politician. We may have erred, and not unlikely did err more or less, in our judgment of history; but, treating of historical facts, we could not well avoid passing some judgment on them, and we aimed to be just.

Yet we had no thought of setting up our judgment against that of the pope, and never doubted or dreamed of doubting the heroic sanctity of St. Louis as a man, or that he was rightly canonized. We never said, and never supposed, that Boniface canonized him, solely or chiefly for political reasons, or as a stroke of policy without judging him to merit canonization for his heroic sanctity, especially as displayed in his captivity in Africa. We merely intimated, but with reverence, that possibly the pope might also have been influenced, to a greater or less extent, by just political reasons. We touched the matter only incidentally, for it was not the thesis we were defending, or attempting to defend, nor was it essential to the line of defence we had taken up, and we are willing to concede that our language might and probably should have been more guarded.

That the pope is infallible in the canonization of saints, we have always supposed to be an open question, and therefore not strictly *de fide*. If our memory does not deceive us,—for we cannot readily lay our hands on the book itself, though it belongs to our library—the eminent Jesuit, Fr.

Nampon, in his Lectures at Geneva "on Catholic doctrine as defined by the Council of Trent," places it in his list of questions not yet defined, and therefore makes it an open question. Even Benedict XIV., in his Treatise on Canonization, which we suppose is the work meant by the Boston *Pilot* in its second and very offensive article on "More Palpable Errors of Brownson," assumes that it is not *de fide*, for he says simply: "In fine, if not a heretic, he is at least guilty of grave censure and most grievous punishment who dares to assert that the pontiff *has* erred in any canonization, or that any one who has been canonized is not to be worshipped as a saint." If it was certainly *de fide*, the denial would have been heresy, and Benedict would not have said, "*if not a heretic,*" but would have marked the denial in question with the note of heresy, instead of branding it with an inferior note. Even the *Pilot* man is in doubt whether it is *de fide* or not, for he says, "If only it has not been declared to be *de fide*, it is at least *proxima fidei*." But a thing may be very near another, and yet not be it. "And it cannot be questioned without grievously culpable rashness." Here we suspect the theologian of the *Pilot* is out in his canon-law. Benedict XIV does not say he who denies that the general proposition, that the pope is infallible in the canonization of saints, is *de fide*, but he who dares assert that the pontiff *has erred* in any canonization, or that any one who has been canonized (by the pontiff, we presume, is meant,) is not to be worshipped, "is guilty," &c. Does the *Pilot* understand the distinction? Whether the papal definitions were infallible *per se* or not, was, before the late definition, an open question, but no one could ever dispute any actual definition made and promulgated by the pontiff, without incurring most grievous censure and punishment. We have simply said, that the pope is infallible in the canonization of saints we believe is not *de fide*, but we have never said or thought that he has erred in canonizing Louis of France, or that he has ever erred in any particular or actual canonization, or denied that any one actually canonized by him is to be worshipped as a saint. Where, then, is "Brownson's palpable error," or the proof that the "bonus Orestes" sometimes nods? The most that can be said under this head is, that we questioned the exceptional merit of St. Louis as a king or politician, to which may be added his skill and capacity as a general, but never questioned his heroic sanctity as a man, nor denied that he ought to be

worshipped as a saint. In all this, if we have erred, it has, as we have just said, only been as an historian and as a defender of the supremacy of the apostolic see against Gallicanism, not as a Catholic theologian, nor in any thing we supposed that we were obliged as a Catholic theologian to maintain.

Anonymous is right as to our "slight mistake" in calling the dear St. Elizabeth *Queen* of Hungary, which was a *lapsus memorice* or a *lapsus pennæ*, not absolutely unpardonable in an old man whose eyes have in measure failed him, who is obliged to rely mainly on his memory of former reading.

Through the mercy, the great mercy, of God, without any merit or effort of our own, and while we were foolishly engaged in a vain effort to build up a church of our own to serve as the church of the future for humanity, we were brought into the church of Christ, just thirty years ago, the 20th of this very month of October, 1874. Certainly we were no saint before our conversion, and have not been sinless since, but from our admission into the Catholic fold we have, with the permission, nay, at the request of the venerable bishops of the country, or the greater part of them, communicated to us by the late Benedict Joseph Fenwick, second bishop of Boston, devoted our thoughts, studies, and unwearied labors as a publicist, to the best of our ability, to the cause of Catholicity, at home and abroad. Mistakes, even some grave errors, we certainly have committed, but we have never for a moment, since the waters of conditional baptism touched our forehead and we received confirmation, which we did immediately after, wavered in our faith or in our loyalty to the church; and we have been for the most part the first to detect and correct our errors and mistakes, while most of those we have been accused of, have been imaginary and grown out of national susceptibilities, our refusal to confound the traditions of Catholics with Catholic tradition, or our preference of one school in theology and philosophy allowed by the church to another.

Of the value or utility of our labors it is not for us to speak, but the more intelligent and solid portion of the Catholic community have rated them the highest, have been the most lenient to our shortcomings, and, indeed, have always, in our own judgment, rated them far beyond their merits, far higher than we do or can, with all our vanity and self-love,

rate them ourselves. But almost from the first, when we published hardly a line without first submitting it to the revision and correction of one of the very ablest theologians in the country, we have been assailed by a number of waspish journals, which uniformly misinterpreted us, and misrepresented and denounced us before a public that never saw a number of the *Review*, and knew of its existence only through them. From this cause we suffered, that is, the *Review* suffered before its suspension, more than it is easy to say, and its influence was in a measure neutralized. Indeed, we received far worse treatment, less courtesy, candor, and fair dealing from a portion of the Catholic press than from the non-Catholic journals. We regret to perceive that, though there has been a great improvement in the Catholic press generally during the last ten years, there are still so-called Catholic journals that retain quite too much of the old inability to understand what does not lie on the surface, too decided a tendency to suspect evil where they do not comprehend, quite too much of the old snarling or fault-finding and carping spirit, and, worse than all, the same ignorance and disregard of principle. We are too old and have too short a time to live on the earth to care for these things for our own sake. The earthly reputation of the editor of this *Review*, such as it is, is made, and could neither be enhanced nor diminished, even were it worth a thought, by any number of petty scribblers, who, as a former editor of the *Boston Pilot* was wont to say, "read with their toes and understand with their elbows."

But it should be the aim of all our Catholic journals and periodicals to instruct and elevate the Catholic public, and encourage the creation of a high-toned, solid Catholic literature. We cannot deny that we as Catholics have by no means, that moral weight in the American community to which we are entitled by our wealth, intelligence, and numbers. The most enlightened, intelligent, best-informed, as well as the most honest, purest, and most conscientious, straightforward, and virtuous portion of the American people, even in the natural order, are unquestionably to be found among Catholics, no matter of what nationality; but, unhappily, there is another class, a noisy and brawling class, who are below, if any thing, in honesty, candor, and fair dealing, and in vice and crime, the average Protestant, and it is by these our moral weight in the community is determined. The good are quiet, unobtrusive, and in politics and public affairs either

take no part, or follow the lead of their unprincipled, intriguing, and tricky demagogues. It is the business of the press to correct this evil, and to bring the lay-power into subordination to the great principles of our religion. To this end we need not only a Catholic education for the young, but a rich, living, and solid Catholic literature for the education of the people, the adult generation.

But how are we to get such a literature, if the press puffs every book that is issued by a Catholic publisher, or snaps and snarls at every one that rises above the common level, or passes it over in silence, because it is too profound for the journalist to comprehend?

The press cannot, as things now are, grapple with a book of any depth or real merit, without betraying its ignorance and mental imbecility. With a few honorable exceptions, the press is not conducted by living, thinking men, and, instead of being an auxiliary, it is not seldom an embarrassment to the clergy. It, as a rule, lacks critical capacity, as well as good taste. How, then, is it to aid us in creating such a literature as we need to give us our just moral weight in the community? We should show ourselves superior in every department of honest literature, and every department of living thought, to non-Catholic Americans, and it is the duty of the Catholic press to aid us in doing it.

The Boston *Pilot* has taken us severely to task, because we have insisted strictly on the dogma which its theologian cannot deny without being even a formal heretic. He simply attempts to explain away what he dares not deny, and blames us for preferring the dogma as defined by the church to what at best is only the opinion of some liberalizing or tender-hearted theologians. Now, while we are writing, there comes to us a letter from an earnest priest, written in a very different strain, and with his name and permission to make use of it as we please. We insert an extract:

MY DEAR DR. BROWNSON:—

With the greatest pleasure I read carefully, again and again, your article, "Nulla est salus extra Ecclesiam."

The reason I took so much interest in it was, because I studied in Carlow, Ireland, where since my childhood I heard always that "no one except Catholics would be saved:" so steadfastly do the Irish Catholics cling to this opinion, that they would not so much as pray God to have mercy on a dead Protestant.

Second reason: For your article appeared to me in the same light in which I received that opinion last year when studying that question in College.

Third reason: Because I spent some time in the Country Mission one hundred and forty-six miles north of this city. I often preached the Catholic doctrine in Protestant churches, court-houses, public halls, and school-houses to heretics and infidels, in its naked simplicity as I learned it. I spoke of the one true Church and of the necessity for being members of it. I think that this teaching offended some, even Catholics. Some said that a greater insult could not be offered Protestants or infidels, than to say that they should become Catholics in order to save their souls.

I am glad to see that you are going to continue this article in the October number, because it is a terrible evil to see so many good people going daily to destruction; but it seems to me to be also blamable on the part of those commissioned by our dear Lord to teach the doctrine of salvation, not to mildly and sweetly in a St. Francis de Sales-like manner, admonish them of the necessity of belonging to the one true Church.

Our reverend friend is perfectly right, and experience, so far as we have any on the subject, agrees with him, that if we wish to convert Protestants and infidels we must preach in all its rigor the naked dogma. Give them the smallest peg, or what appears so, not to you, but to them;—the smallest peg, on which to hang a hope of salvation without being in or actually reconciled to the church by the sacrament of penance,—and all the arguments you can address to them to prove the necessity of being in the church in order to be saved, will have no more effect on them than rain on a duck's back. You may bring them into the church for æsthetic reasons, by the grandeur and pomp of your liturgy, your taste in church decoration, your solemn and soul-entrancing music, even for intellectual reasons, but never as the necessary means of saving their souls. St. Augustine wrote his "Confessions," but not usually do those converts write the history of their conversion, who were led to the church by the need they felt of getting rid of their sins, and of supernatural grace to assist them to lead an upright spiritual life. We did not in our "Convert" present the moral aspects of our conversion, and the late archbishop of Baltimore, then bishop of Louisville, complained of us, because it contained no *peccati*, and it contained none, because we wrote only with the special design of showing the intellectual continuity we maintained through all the various changes we underwent. From reading the histories of their conversions, written in the form of novels by old women and young women, one would be led to conclude that our Lord "came to call the righteous, not sinners, to repentance." Not one of the noble heroines is oppressed with sin, nor cries out in the agony of her soul, "What shall I do to be saved?" Nothing is more deceptive than these autobiog-

raphies of converts. It is a great mistake to suppose the chief difficulties of heretics and infidels are intellectual difficulties; else why is it that Protestants convert so many in their "protracted meetings," and lose them only because they have nothing to give them? Let the Catholic preach to them as if they were bad Catholics, or sinners rather, crowding the broad road to destruction, in imminent danger of being damned, and his converts will outnumber those of Protestant preachers, and he will retain them, for he has something to give them, wherewithal to feed and fill their souls.

There can be no more fatal mistake than to soften, liberalize, or latitudinize this terrible dogma, "Out of the church there is no salvation," or to give a man an opportunity to persuade himself that he belongs to the soul of the church, though an alien from the body. But enough. We have for once taken up the objections urged against us, and formally replied to them, but it is the last time. If objections, or cavils rather, continue to be urged anonymously or in the weekly press, we shall silently correct such errors as we really fall into, but we shall take no further notice of the objections. We have no time to spend in profitless or petty controversy. We do not wish the tranquillity of old age to be disturbed, nor will we be diverted from the work before us, which we must soon perform or not at all. If the journals must have a tussle, let them seek out a younger athlete who, perhaps, will feel honored by their notice, and who is "spoiling for a fight," for which we are not, at least with Catholics who should assist us instead of arming themselves against us, and hindering us all in their power.

P. S.—Since writing the foregoing, we have received the following anonymous letter, postmarked Baltimore, Md.

TO O. A. BROWNSON, LL. D.

DEAR SIR:

As fraternal correction is a duty, you will not take it amiss if I tell you that your remarks on the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, in the REVIEW for July, breathe an anti-Catholic spirit. What! a devotion sanctioned by the highest ecclesiastical authorities, and looked upon by the faithful at large as a providential means to obtain the cessation of the fearful storm now raging against the church, is compared to fashions, which earthly-minded people invent for the sake of gain or to satisfy personal vanity! You have committed a most serious fault by speaking so disrespectfully of so pious a practice. You ought to know that such objections were formerly urged by the Jansenists, and therefore are suggested by the enemy of God and man. When a Catholic is so

unhappy as not to perceive the excellency of this devotion, and so phlegmatic as not to have his feelings stirred by it, he ought to feel humbled and beg of God to open his eyes and warm his heart, instead of publishing to the world his want of piety, and censuring what he is unable to appreciate. He should not forget what St. Paul wrote of a certain class of persons: "Animalis homo non percipit ea quæ sunt Spiritus Dei." The consequence of such aberrations on the part of Dr. Brownson will be, that he shall once more lose his influence for good, and oblige his real friends again to drop his *Review*.

NOT A JESUIT.
per X

"Fraternal correction," when administered in the spirit of charity, by one who is not ashamed of his name, and who disdains to shrink as a coward from the responsibility of his act, is always welcome to us, and gratefully received. As to the devotion of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, we are not aware that we have given any just cause of scandal. In our notice we confess our incompetency to treat the subject, having neglected to study it with the attention that we should, that is, ought to have done. We confess, also, as the reason for our having never properly studied it, that we had never been especially attracted to the devotion itself, and had been repelled by the pictures of the Sacred Heart which we had seen. We complained that they did not attract us nor excite us to devotion to our spiritual director, and asked him if it did not indicate something wrong in us. He, a learned and pious bishop and the most perfect master of spiritual life we have ever met with told us not to be uneasy about it, and said he himself had never been able to look upon those pictures without a shock. The picture always seemed to us the picture of a bleeding, not an inflamed heart, and no picture of mere physical pain, not even the purely physical sufferings of our Lord on the cross, ever deeply moves us. We are moved by the agony in the garden, produced, as we have always supposed, not by the dread of the physical pain our Lord was about to endure, but by his foresight of how few, comparatively, would profit by his cross and passion, and what numbers, in spite of all he had done and suffered, or was to do and suffer, would be eternally lost. This was the agony, this caused his bloody sweat and made him exclaim, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not my will, but thine be done." We cannot refrain from weeping with our Lord when he looked at Jerusalem, and seeing the afflictions about to befall that guilty city, he exclaimed: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thee as the hen gathers her brood under her

wings, but thou wouldst not." There must be moral sorrow, the suffering of the soul, to move us, and hence the *pœna sensus* counts for little with us in comparison with the *pœna damni*. The preacher does but slightly affect us by his vivid pictures of the physical sufferings and tortures of the damned; he moves us deeply only when he dwells on their eternal loss, the ceaseless regrets, the never-ending despair, the eternal privation of the heaven for which they were created, once within their reach, now lost for ever. The most terrible words to us in Dante's *Inferno* are: "Ye who enter here leave hope behind," which, the poet says, are inscribed over the gates of hell. Never to see the face of God in the beatific vision, to a rightly instructed mind, we have always supposed to be the only part of hell to be seriously dreaded. It is little that material fire and brimstone can add to it.

"Not a Jesuit" is scandalized at our saying the devotion to the Sacred Heart is just now the fashionable devotion, but such is undoubtedly the fact; and if the truth scandalizes, how are we to be held responsible? "Not a Jesuit" has no right to invent for us words and thoughts which are his, not ours. We have never made the comparison he accuses us of making. We said there are fashions in devotion as well as in dress, and he is no careful observer who does not know it; but we have never said that both spring from the same source. Fashions in devotion may spring from the interior operations of the Holy Spirit, and have for their end the defeat of some special device of the devil. We have said or implied nothing to the contrary. If the spread of the devotion to the Sacred Heart tends to quicken the perception and deepen the worship of God in his sacred humanity, its effect may be great in allaying the storm now raging against the church, and, in any case, it must be good and profitable to the soul.

We may have been wrongly taught, but we have been taught by those who had authority to teach us, that we are bound to treat as proper and useful every special devotion approved by the supreme authority of the church, that is to say, by the supreme pontiff, the vicar of Christ, and forbidden to do or say aught in its disparagement, or of those who piously observe it; but we have not been taught that it is made obligatory under pain of sin upon the faithful, nor that among approved devotions the Catholic is not free to follow that which has for him a special attraction, as he has, among canonized saints, to select for his special devotion the one or more to whom he is especially drawn. By what right, then, does

“Not a Jesuit” accuse us of a want of piety because we have avowed that we had had no special *attrait* to the special devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus? Have we not said, that the “approval of the church removes, of course, every theological or philosophical difficulty (such as were urged by the Jansenists, for instance) in the way of this devotion as she herself approves it”? The objections we suggested were suggested as bearing against certain expositions of the meaning of the devotion we had seen, and which we took not from the Jansenists, but from Benedict XIV., and were assigned by him as a reason for not approving the devotion at that time. We supposed that the church had approved the worship in a sense which escaped those objections, but which it seemed to us to bear against it, as explained by Father Preston and others. Our only difficulty was not with the devotion as approved by the church, but in finding out in what sense she has approved it. We found the books we had seen, treating the subject either in a loose, vague, and indeterminate or objectionable sense from the point of view of philosophy and theology as we had learned them.

So far as the worship of the sacred humanity of Christ, hypostatically united to his divine person, and thus made literally and substantially the human nature of God, for ever inseparable, but distinct from his divine nature, is promoted by the special devotion to the Sacred Heart, or any element of Catholic faith or doctrine is brought out, expressed or embodied in the practical devotions of the faithful, no Catholic can question it or be allowed to speak disparagingly of it. Nor have we ever done so. No Catholic writer has insisted at greater length or more earnestly than we on the worship of God in his humanity, or that it is God in his human nature who founds the entire Christian or teleological order, the “new creation,” who redeems us and is our only Mediator and Saviour; and it is by her and their relation to the God-Man by nature and by grace that is justified the worship we pay to Blessed Mary and the saints. To worship God in his human nature, to honor the Son as we honor the Father, is of precept. The fundamental error of Protestantism is the rejection of the worship of God in his human nature, or in separating the human nature of the WORD from the divine nature, thus dissolving Jesus, which the blessed Apostle John, as we have already said, tells us is the spirit of Antichrist who was even then in the world.

Again: If the Sacred Heart of Jesus is taken as the emblem or symbol of the human-divine love or affection of our Lord which redeems and saves, we have never had any difficulty with the special devotion introduced in its present form by the Blessed Margaret Mary, for, thus taken, it is only a special form, and a beautiful form, of adoration of the human-divine love that redeems and saves the world. But we have been told that this is not the sense in which we are to take it; that it is to be taken in a literal material sense, or as the material organ, in which sense we have never been able to see any special reason why we should worship the heart rather than any other organ of Christ's sacred body.

Finally: If "Not a Jesuit,"—God forgive him for his gross injustice to us, in supposing that a Jesuit would have less weight with us than one not a Jesuit, or because a Jesuit,—had read the concluding paragraph of our notice,* he might have saved himself the pain of writing his very uncharitable letter to us on the subject.

*The notice of works on devotion to the Sacred Heart referred to by "Not a Jesuit" is as follows:

The Life of Blessed Margaret Mary, with some Account of the Devotion to the Sacred Heart. By the REV. GEORGE TICKELL, S. J.—*Lectures upon the Devotions to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ.* By the VERY REV. THOMAS S. PRESTON, V. G.—*The Paradise of God; or, the Virtues of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.* By A FATHER OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.—*Devotions to the Sacred Heart of Jesus.* By REV. S. FRANCO, S. J. Translated from the Italian.

THIS Life of the Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque, the foundress of the special devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, is written from too special a point of view, and is confined too exclusively to the interior working of our Lord in her soul to please men who, like ourselves, have little spiritual-mindedness. Besides, there is too much repetition, and we have the same thing in substance over and over again through hundreds of wearisome pages. It is hard to say how much the incidents, natural or supernatural, narrated have been unconsciously colored by her lively imagination and the warmth of her temperament. We do not doubt her perfect truthfulness or her heroic virtues, but we do not regard it as impossible in very great saints not always to discriminate with perfect accuracy between what comes from their own exalted sentiments and excited imaginations, and what comes from a supernatural source, especially if they happen to be of an impressionable nature. Indeed very holy persons have made mistakes as to facts they believed to have been supernaturally revealed to them. Hence we listen always with a certain distrust to alleged private revelations, and the visions and prophecies of enthusiastic nuns. We do not deny that real divine revelations are made to private persons, that the saints have true visions, and do by aid of the Holy Spirit prophesy truly; such things may be and are in the church, and it is pious to believe them, but we are glad the church does not include them in the *objectum fidei Catholicæ*, or require us to make an act of Catholic faith in them.

Margaret Mary was an extraordinary person, and seems to have been from early life led and consumed by the love of our Blessed Lord, and ready to suffer any thing for him to make herself like him and to prove her love to him. The church has decided that her virtues through divine grace rose to the heroic degree. Our Holy Father Pius IX. has declared her Blessed, the process for her canonization is commenced, and it is highly probable that the faithful will soon have the joy of venerating her under the title of Saint as well as Blessed Margaret Mary. She is an honor and a glory of the Order of the Visitation of Mary, an order for which we have a strong affection, and there are no saints whom we love and venerate more than we do their holy founders St. Francis de Sales and St. Jane Frances de Chantal, saints who should be especially honored in this Calvinistic country by Catholics of American origin.

The other works placed at the head of this notice treating of the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, are, we presume, very excellent works of the kind, but we are not competent to speak of their merits, or of the subject as a special devotion of which they treat. Having never been specially attracted to it, and having been repelled by the pictures of the Sacred Heart we have seen, which have never excited our devotion, we have neglected to study this devotion with the attention we should. It is comparatively a new devotion, especially in the form introduced by Margaret Mary, and we are not easily drawn to new devotions. It is just now the fashionable devotion: all the bishops in the Union, and for aught we know in the whole world, have consecrated each his own diocese to the Sacred Heart, but we have yet to see that love and fidelity to Jesus keep pace with the spread of the devotion. There are fashions in devotion as well as in dress. We know that the new fashions that come up are not any better or more pleasing to our Blessed Lord than the old, that are suffered to grow obsolete. In regard to special devotions the church, we believe, leaves each individual free to follow his *attrait*, and one is not to be blamed, because he is not drawn to this or that particular devotion approved but not made obligatory by the church.

The approval of the church removes of course every theological or philosophical difficulty in the way of this devotion, as she herself approves it. The *heart* is usually spoken of in ordinary speech, and in the sacred Scriptures, as the synonyme of the affections of love and will, as when Wisdom says, "My son, give me thy heart," Prov. viii, and the material heart may be taken as the material seat or organ of the affection; but whether it is so or not is a philosophical question which we do not understand the church to have determined in approving the devotion of the Sacred Heart. We have always supposed that in this devotion the Heart of Jesus is taken as the material emblem of the affections, the burning love, and infinite tenderness of the God-Man. It is so we find the Holy Father reported as speaking of it in one of his recent addresses. But we find Father Preston, in his Lectures, speaking somewhat differently. "The *object* of our devotion," he says, "is the physical, fleshly heart of the Son of God, which beat in his bosom, which was the centre of his vital organism, and through which coursed the most precious blood. When we adore the Sacred Heart of Our Lord, it is no *symbolic* worship; it is a real and true adoration of the actual *organ* of our Redeemer;" Lect. i., p. 19. In adoring the incarnate God we adore in one and the same act both Divinity and Humanity hypostatically united in the one divine person. The humanity of Christ, which is by assumption the human nature of God, and as substantially so as the divine nature itself, though for ever distinct from it, includes, of course,

LETTER TO THE EDITOR.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1874.]

“DEAR DOCTOR:—

“As your most loyal friend, I must send you my criticism on some articles in the last or July number of your *Review*. To my great surprise, I found you, notwithstanding your promise to the contrary, at war with *members* of the church. I refer to your *bitter attack* on the teaching and proceedings of the members of the society, *insulting* at the same time numberless children of the church, and the church herself.

the human body and its organs, for “the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us.” St. John i, 14. We therefore in worshipping Christ worship the body of Christ and all its members, for his body and its members are included in the human nature of God. Thus far, we encounter no difficulty. But is it certain that the material organ called the heart is the seat or organ of the affections, or that, in adoring it, we adore the affections, the love and will of our blessed Lord, more than we should, if we directed our adoration to the hand or the foot? If not, and we do not know that it is, the devotion requires us to take the *heart* as standing not precisely for the fleshly organ, but for the affections, the love and will usually regarded as having their bodily seat in the heart. What is orthodox doctrine on this point we do not know, but are, we trust, prepared to accept and defend it, when it is made known to us, though we confess the picture, the model of which the Blessed Margaret Mary says she was shown by our Lord himself, strikes us not as a heart inflamed with love, but as a wounded and bleeding heart, and which repels rather than attracts us. It does not help our devotion.

Father Franco's work is more satisfactory to us than Father Preston's, and has made us suspect that our coldness towards this devotion, of which her English biographer calls Margaret Mary, in defiance of grammar, the apostle is not much to our credit, and proceeds from a misunderstanding of the theology involved in the devotion and the prejudice which is usually excited in us by what seems to us an excess of zeal on the part of our friends, the Jesuits, in its propagation, but in regard to which we suspect we shall ultimately find ourselves in the wrong. We hope we are not altogether wanting in love to our blessed Lord, and the first Catholic devotion to which we were drawn, was that of his blessed Mother, but we have no ecstasies, no raptures, indeed, we are not easily moved, and cannot vie in imagination and eloquent and soul-stirring description with the authors of most of the pious books sent us. Yet, a chapter from the old Hebrew prophets, or from St. Paul, will stir us up from the bottom of our heart, for they have sublime thoughts, and elevate the mind and soul as well as charm the ear. The fathers, the older ascetic writers, and the Jesuits of the first century of the existence of their society, have a depth, a solidity, an unction, a simple and touching eloquence, which we do not find in our contemporaries. We can admire them at a distance, reverence them, but fall infinitely below them in our least unsuccessful efforts.

*Letter to the Editor in regard to the Jesuits and the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. By A JESUIT AND A FRIEND.

"First, you criticise the *philosophical views* of the modern writers of the Society, rejecting them as unsound, and you even consider that some of their teachings lead logically to pantheism and atheism. Dear Doctor, you may with all freedom differ from them in your philosophical views, but remember that *you yourself* made once the remark, that the Jesuits, '*quasi instinctively*' side with the view of the church, hence the rage of her enemies against them. Possibly, this may also be the case concerning the point in question. Moreover, did you not say you wished to revive your *Review*, because you had yet to say to the world some important things before leaving it? Concerning your philosophical views, in numbers of the *old Review*, you told the world for years and years, *over and over again*, your meaning. I know your idea is to establish sound metaphysical principles; for if these be once fixed in the mind, the efforts of infidelity will avail little. But in this you are mistaken. The root of infidelity is not to be found in the *intellect*, but in the *heart* of man, according to the words of the Holy Ghost, '*Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus,*'—*in CORDE, non in INTELLECTU.*

"I often referred to your own axiom, when you gave the prudent advice to Catholic preachers, to treat with Protestants, not so much as *heretics*, but as *sinners*. Bring the infidel to repent of his sinful life, and the mists of his infidelity will soon vanish. If the religion of Christ were not the religion of self-abnegation and of the cross, worldly philosophy would not so persistently oppose it. If only the *heart* of man be right, he has according to the admonition of St. Paul, only to open his eyes and to look to the heavens, in order to come to the conclusion, that there must be a creator and ruler of the world. But you do not confine yourself to rejecting the philosophical teaching of the writers of the Society as men, who, while professing to follow St. Thomas, are *incapable of understanding* him. You go further, and without any provocation declare, that as *educators* they are but *imperfectly* performing the work of higher education, demanded by the times and the country in which we live. Nevertheless, at the same time, you admit that, after all, their colleges are the best we have. So, the blow must have been felt also by *all directors* of Catholic colleges in the country. Is *this* fighting only against outsiders and enemies of the Church? Is it not rather *rounding* her most faithful children, and doing injury to yourself? For if you take such a ground, how can the directors of such institutions recommend the reading of your *Review* to their students in the higher classes, as they have *actually done*, since you recommenced the present series? For instance, our college in Cincinnati subscribes for four or five copies for distribution in the different reading-rooms. But by such remarks you evidently undermine the respect and *confidence* of the students towards their teachers and educators, and this must paralyze their efforts in training their pupils. If you wanted to speak on education, you had only to encourage and advise them to employ more time and care in giving their pupils in the higher classes a complete Catholic instruction, to form men able to defend our holy religion, when an occasion so presents itself. Even Montalembert and Goerres were, in this regard, not as well trained as you are.

"And not satisfied with treating in such an *unjust* manner the efforts of the Society concerning education in our time, you plainly enough gave your readers to understand that, even in the *previous century*, Europe was indebted for her paganism to the preposterous manner in which the *Society* educated youth!!

"A *third* attack in that same number against the proceedings of the Society you made, censuring, as you think, their *indiscreet* zeal in spreading devotion to the *Sacred Heart* of Jesus. In order to repel this attack,

I must first call your attention to the wrong and incorrect view you have concerning the devotion itself.

“The devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus is not directed towards the adorable object, in preference to the other parts of the body of Christ, because it is the heart; but because the human heart was a chosen instrument by our Lord himself, that should be affected by sentiments of his love for mankind; and the instrument chosen by him for the most solemn *manifestations* of his love. That the *character of instrumentality* may form an especial foundation and *reason* for a *particular devotion*, the Church herself shows by celebrating the feast of the *nails*, the *crown of thorns*, and the *cross* itself. You yourself remarked that we could pay our devotions also direct to the hands and feet of our Saviour. Doubtless, having in view the manual labors of Christ, and the fatiguing journeys performed by him on foot during his apostolic life, we may in a particular manner make the hands and feet the object of our devotion. How much more reason, then, have we to make the *heart* the object of our devotion, since it was affected by the sentiments of the love of Jesus for us?”

“Holy Scripture and the common-sense of all nations point to a relation of the sentiments of love to the human heart. Hence St. Bernard was right when, addressing the Heart of Jesus, he expressed himself as follows: ‘Ad hoc perforatum est cor tuum, ut per vulnus *visibile* vulnus amoris *invisibilis* videamus. Carnale vulnus vulnus spirituale ostendit. Ad hoc templum, ad hoc Sanctum sanctorum, ad hanc arcam testamenti laudabo nomen Domini, dicens cum David: *Invenit cor meum, ut orem Deum meum. Hoc igitur corde tuo et meo dulcissime Jesu invento, orabo ad Deum meum, Admitte tantum in sacramentum exauditionis tue preces meas. Imo me totum in cor tuum trahere.*’

“But even should this connection be questioned, as you question it, it never can be denied that the human heart of Jesus was the instrument chosen by Christ for the most solemn *manifestations* of his love of mankind. The Holy Fathers unanimously teach that, as Eve came forth from the side of Adam, whilst he slept in Paradise, so the *Church* came forth from the *heart* of Jesus, asleep on the cross, when, sleeping the sleep of death, his heart was pierced by the lance. Listen to the words of St. Chrysostom: ‘Ut de latere Christi dormientis formaretur Ecclesia, divina ordinatione indultum est, ut unus militum lancea latus suum, illud aperiendo, perfoderet. Surge igitur anima, amica Christi, ibi *os oppone*, ut haurias aquas de fontibus Salvatoris.’

“Viewing in this light the devotion to the human heart of Jesus, it may be easily seen why it can and ought to be the object of our particular devotion, and at the same time how well calculated this devotion is to enkindle in our hearts the fire of divine love for our Saviour, and how worthy this devotion is of being propagated *with all our zeal*.

“Did not Moses long since admonish the people of God, after the proclamation of the Old Law, in these words, ‘And now what else does the Lord request of thee than that thou shouldst love him?’ These words, doubtless, come with still greater force and earnestness from the pierced heart of Jesus. The Jews, hearing that Christ wanted men to eat his flesh and drink his blood, were scandalized, yet, nevertheless, Christ wanted to have it done; but not in the *rude* and *carnal* sense of the Jews. In a similar way, the Church wishes that her children should foster a particular devotion to the *heart of flesh of Jesus*, but not in the carnal sense of the *Jansenists* and other *adversaries* of this devotion, but in the sense above explained.

“I wonder how it could have happened that a man like Dr. Brownson should not have at once *fully* grasped the complete bearing of this

devotion? I remember an article in your REVIEW, on the 'Mystical union of our soul and body with Christ in the most holy Eucharist,' I never read anything in my life more beautiful or more sublime; and I admired at the same time the *depths* of your ascetical thoughts. This time, permit me to say it frankly, I was, on the contrary, amazed at observing such a *shallowness* of thought. You speak the very language of the Jansenists, those embittered enemies of the Devotion, and that of the men of '*la petite Eglise*,'—you, otherwise their born antagonist!

"In order to justify the little attraction you feel in regard to the Devotion to the Sacred Heart, you say that even the sight of *pictures* of the Sacred Heart was never gratifying to you. But, dear doctor, did even any picture of the Most Holy Trinity increase your devotion to this mystery? I never saw in my life a picture of the Holy Trinity which did not rather provoke my pity, so that I often jestingly said, If I should be pope, I would prohibit all of them. But did these pictures even diminish my devotion to the mystery of the Holy Trinity? Certainly not. *Finally*, you call it rather contemptuously a *new* devotion. Yes, in some sense according to the exterior form of the devotion, but in the *true sense* mentioned above, no devotion is *older* than *this very one*, for it is coeval with the origin of the Church. Besides, you forget that *novelty* in regard to feasts is nothing *New*, but belongs to the historical development of them. Even the feast of *Corpus Christi* was not instituted for 1100 years after the Church's foundation. The tree of feasts stands in the Paradise of the Church, as a *fruit-tree*, bringing forth its fruit *tempore opportuno*. Christ himself, in one of his revelations to Blessed Margaret Mary, points out the reason why his Providence reserved the introduction of this devotion, in its exterior form, for the children of his Church in these latter times.

"You see, dear doctor, how *unjustly* you accused the Jesuit Fathers of an indiscreet zeal, and spoke *without due respect* for Blessed Margaret, and censured *implicitly numberless bishops* of the Catholic World and the *Church herself* together with her *head*, for introducing and fostering rather sentimental devotions. Concerning especially your *inveterate hatred* against the Jesuits, you, indeed, seem to soften the blow you directed against them, by affirming occasionally that you know how to appreciate their labors for the good of the Church and her children; but, as a psychologist, you know well that such a course of action rather increases the pain and weight of the blow. A man intending to inflict a very heavy blow first draws his arm back, as if he would avoid all contact with the object on which he inflicts that blow, but, by doing so, he makes the blow all the *surer* and *heavier*.

"Blessed Josaphat, the holy bishop of Polozk in Poland, used to say, '*Non est ex predestinatis, qui non est amicus societatis.*' Rather deny yourself, and live at peace with them, and instead of your metaphysical studies I would advise you now, as I did before, to make the whole context of the syllabus one of the leading parts of your REVIEW. There is no man living who combines so much *genius, erudition, logical and theological training*, and knowledge of the *American character* and *politics*, as you do, and therefore there is none so fit for this task as you. I know these my remarks will hurt your feelings, but I would not be your friend if I did not send you these remarks, or speak to you *as frankly* as I have done. Keep your promise, and let all the following numbers of your much esteemed REVIEW be written in *that spirit*, which recommended so much the *first numbers* of it, and all American Catholics and those of Europe will rejoice, and thank God that he has sent you in our times to defend his Church in this part of the world. Triumph, consolation, and joy will then be with you, and the blessing of God.

"*In SSmo Corde,*

"Yours."

“P. S.—I know, dear friend, that you will protest against my expression, your *inveterate* hatred against the Jesuits; and, nevertheless, this is the case with you. In proof of it, remember your manœuvring in that last number of your dying-out *old* REVIEW, kicking against the Jesuits, and employing your last strength to rather kick them out, if possible, from America altogether. *Bismarck* that time did not yet think of such a thing.—I considered this your behavior that time as the result of some violent excitement, and lived under the impression that long time ago you felt sorry for it, and that your conscience was unsettled, and that you were determined to avail yourself of the first occasion to repair the wrong you committed. But now in the reverse, instead to extinguish the fire you kindled, you rather are pouring new oil into the flames. I feel sorry indeed! Once meeting Jesus, you will yourself feel sorry for it.—Don’t follow in your way the footsteps of Count Montalembert.”

THE EDITOR’S COMMENTS.

The foregoing is from an eminent Jesuit Father, a most loyal friend of the *Review*, who, almost simultaneously with this severe criticism, sent us his check for one hundred dollars as his subscription for one copy of the *Review*, for 1875, his usual annual contribution. We are not quite certain whether he intended his letter for publication, or only for our private admonition. So we suppress his name, deservedly held everywhere in veneration, and by no one in higher veneration than by ourselves.

The criticisms are bold, frank, and manly, but severe; yet, with all deference to our venerable friend, we do not think them called for or just. We do most certainly protest against the charge of “inveterate hatred” of the Jesuits or their society. That we made some hard remarks against them in a former series of the *Review*, we do not deny.—remarks which were ill-advised, and which we had come to regret, long before the revival of the *Review*; and especially did we regret them when we saw the Jesuits selected as the first victims of the infamous Bismarckian policy in Germany, and we have wished more than once to recall them. But *scriptum manet*. Yet however prejudiced against the society we at one time may have been, there was never a time when we wished to drive them from the country, or when, if any attempt had been made to expel them, we would not have rushed to their defence, and given our life, if needed, to defend their rights as American citizens, or their freedom as religious and priests.

We found the Jesuits in the way of the policy we for a brief time unwisely adopted, that of liberalizing and americanizing, so to speak, Catholicity, and effecting a reconciliation

of the church and so-called modern civilization; and we opposed them as a logical necessity of our position, as *oscurantisti*, as the enemies of what we at the moment believed for the best interests of religion and the church. But we had hardly suspended the *Review* before our own reflections and the syllabus compelled us to abandon as untenable, as uncatholic, the policy we had followed for three or four years, and removed the grounds of our opposition to the Jesuits, and our prejudices against the society. This change separated us from the so-called liberal Catholic party at home and abroad, and placed us in some respects on the side of those we had hitherto opposed as *oscurantisti*, or denounced as men with their faces on the back sides of their heads, seeking Christ among the tombs, blindly warring against the future, &c. We did what we could through the columns of the *N. Y. Tablet*, the pages of the *Catholic World*, and our own little work, entitled "Conversations on Liberalism and the Church," to mark the change, to correct our former grave error, to oppose liberalism, and to follow out what we understood to be the teachings of the syllabus. It was in pursuance of the same purpose we revived our *Review*. The enemies we proposed to combat were the liberals, especially so-called liberal Catholics, the worst enemies the church has, and the chief cause of her present calamities, at least in France, if we may credit the assertion of our Holy Father Pius, IX, still gloriously reigning, though a prisoner.

We little expected to be charged with hostility to the Jesuits, to whom we know we are not hostile, but with whom, on the great question to which the *Review* is primarily devoted, we supposed we were in full accord, and our venerable critic has mistaken our *animus* towards them and does us great injustice. That we are not of their school in philosophy, nor on all points in theology, we do not deny, and we are not aware that any law of the church requires us to be; but we have never accused them of heterodoxy, or breathed a syllable against them as religious, as priests, or as masters of spiritual life. We have only exercised a right which even our venerable critic concedes us. We have criticised the text-books prepared by fathers of the society, and used in their and other Catholic colleges, and pointed out what we regard as erroneous and even dangerous in the philosophical system they set forth. Our strictures on these text-books were occasioned by a misrepresentation of the philosophy we defend, by the *Catholic*

World, in which we are directly or indirectly admonished to follow the philosophy taught in these same text-books as the traditional or authorized Catholic philosophy, and we could hardly do less than give our reasons for not heeding the admonition rather magisterially given. We did not dream that in this we were insulting either the society, or the Catholic public. Nor do we admit that in this we have broken any promise we made on reviving the *Review*.

We do not think we have travelled out of our province as a Catholic publicist, or broken any promise we ever made the public, by our remarks on the defects of the education given in our higher Catholic schools and colleges. We have only followed in the wake of the *Dublin Review*, and urged what the Catholic hierarchy in England and Ireland are engaged in doing. We have not taken part in the controversy respecting the use of the Greek and Roman classics in our higher schools and colleges; we have not objected, as has Mgr. Gaume, in his *Ver Rongeur*, to their use, but we have insisted that, in these times of reviving paganism, the education given our youth of either sex should rest on a Christian instead of a pagan basis, and be integrally and thoroughly Catholic. We ask that it imbue the student with the principles as well as with the doctrines and practice of our holy religion, and prepare him to keep and defend his faith against the false science and miserable sophistry of this shallow but pretentious age. We may be mistaken, but we do not think our schools and colleges do this; certainly, if they do, we have yet to see the proofs of it.

We have referred to the Jesuits in this connection, not only because they are our most approved educators, but because they exercise a powerful influence over the course of studies pursued, and the general spirit and character of the education given in all our higher schools and colleges, and as essential change could hardly be introduced against their decided opposition. The philosophy taught in the majority of these schools and colleges is theirs, and in most of them hardly a text-book can be introduced that they disapprove. Yet we do not hold the colleges wholly responsible for the meagre results of our higher education. In the first place, one half or two thirds of the boys committed to their care should never be sent to college or a high-school, for God never intended them to be scholars. Then, again, Catholic parents partake largely of the impatience characteristic of the age and country, and are

in too great a hurry to have their sons get through their course, and enter upon what is to be their profession or business in life. They will not permit them to remain in college to get more than a smattering of learning, especially when is taken into account the multitude of studies which it is judged necessary in our times for youth to become acquainted with. This difficulty it does not lie wholly with the college to remove. Where we think the college most fails, is in attempting to teach more than it is possible to teach thoroughly in the time at its command, and in not giving sufficient time and attention to the principles and doctrines of religion. In our times every educated man needs to be in some measure a theologian. Will our venerable critic say that, to demand this and to maintain that our colleges meet only imperfectly our educational wants, or that the Jesuits are but imperfectly performing their mission as educators, and which they feel far more deeply than we do, is "to insult the Jesuits and also the Catholic community"?

Our venerable friend knows better than we do, that our Catholic colleges, however much they are doing, do by no means merit the extravagant laudations they are in the habit of receiving from the Catholic press. He will not pretend that they are perfect, or deny that in the best of them there is room for improvement. But this improvement must be demanded and provided for by the public that supports the college, or it will not and cannot, in a country like ours, where the church has no revenues, and the civil government refuses its aid, be effected. We in all simplicity have supposed it our duty as a Catholic publicist, instead of joining in exaggerated and undeserved praises of our educational institutions as they are, to point out their defects, and to urge the need of a higher and more thorough education than they now give, and thus stimulate the Catholic public to furnish from their abundance the means needed to obtain it. Where in this do we offend? or what is there in it that calls for the severe censure our venerable friend bestows on us? Have we said any thing not true?

We think our friend forgot in some measure his Christian charity, and suffered himself to judge us from the ungenerous and unfounded suspicion that we write with an inveterate hostility to the Jesuits. This is unjust to us. We certainly do not hold the Jesuits to be the church, nor their general to be the pope, or endowed with papal authority. We hold that

there were great and holy men who served faithfully and effectively the church before the organization of the Company of Jesus, and that some such since have lived and labored and endeared themselves to the heart of the celestial Spouse who have not been affiliated to the Jesuits. There are some things in the society,—not in it alone,—which we do not like. We think them too intolerant to those who differ from them, not in faith, but in opinion, and that they are more ready to denounce or deery than to refute those from whom they differ. We think them too prone to parade the services of their own order, and to forget those of other orders, perhaps not less dear to our Lord than themselves. Yet, if not the church, they are an order in the church, approved by her, and have been, in our judgment, the most active, energetic, powerful, and efficient for three hundred years among her religious orders, unsurpassed by any in learning, science, zeal, disinterestedness, the spirit of self-sacrifice, and readiness to suffer martyrdom for the faith. We are told the society has counted among its members eight thousand authors and twelve thousand martyrs. To no order in the church, of which so much can be truly said, can any Catholic heart be hostile. We for ourselves admire their institute, and like hugely their military organization, which makes them a movable column, ready at a moment's notice, to be sent where danger is greatest, or their presence is most needed. We venerate and love the society and its members, but we do not hold ourselves bound to obey them as the infallible church, or prohibited from differing, for good reasons, from their opinions, or from questioning the soundness of the philosophy taught in their schools. They profess to follow St. Thomas, and so do we; but we admit no right in them to impose their reading of St. Thomas on us, any more than we have a right to impose ours on them. If they can show us that we are wrong and they are right, we shall cheerfully give up our philosophy and accept theirs; but till then, or we find our doctrine improbated by the Holy See, we shall abide by our own understanding of the Angelic Doctor and philosophical science. It would be useless for us to say any thing more; for, if what we have said does not satisfy our venerable critic that we are not moved by hatred of the Jesuits, or by unfriendly feelings towards them, nothing we could say would have that effect.

We agree with our venerable friend that men are not led into pantheism or atheism by the head alone, but if he had

personal experience of either, as we have had, he would know that the head has not a little to do with it, and that either is seldom, if ever, found except when and where a false philosophy has possession of the schools. We were personally led to deny the existence of God by the sensist philosophy as expounded by Locke and Hume, and by Dr. Thomas Brown, in his Lectures on *Physical Inquiry*, placed as an introduction to his course of philosophy. Hume asserts that the relation of cause and effect is and can be no fact of sensible experience; and Brown resolves, as does Professor Huxley, with the most esteemed scientists of the day, that relation into a simple relation of antecedence and consequence which excludes all idea of causative power. Exclude that idea, and the existence of God is not demonstrable, as St. Thomas himself teaches; for he says God is demonstrable only as the cause from the fact. Then, if that *God is* is not demonstrable, his existence cannot be asserted, and to maintain that *God is* cannot be asserted, is atheism. We were led to pantheism, by the philosophy that asserts with Cousin, that God is the one only substance; and that the universe is purely phenomenal, or that the cosmos is simply evolved from this one substance, and therefore, so far as it is real, it is identical with God. It seems to us, therefore, with all deference to our venerable friend, that it is not correct to say that an atheistical or pantheistical philosophy does not make atheists or pantheists. We know, from our own painful experience, to the contrary. It is not every one who can embrace a philosophy that logically leads to atheism or pantheism, and refrain from drawing the logical conclusion.

We agree with the reverend Jesuit father, that the pantheism or atheism—for pantheism is only a form of atheism—now so rife, is not curable by philosophy alone, but, as we hold, it originates in false philosophy, in speculative errors respecting the relation of cause and effect. We do look to the prevalence of a sound philosophy based on real principles, not on concepts or abstractions, and which presents things as they are in reality, as, at least, a powerful means of preventing these errors from spreading further, and of protecting such as yet stand from falling. Admit, if you insist, that pantheism or atheism is a moral disease, produced by satanic corruption, yet it is a false philosophy and false science that Satan uses as his instrument or medium of corruption; for atheism is the error of the *semi-dotti*, the half-learned, not of the vulgar, of

rustics or clowns; and it is this error of the false scientists that opens the heart to corruption. It is only by enlightening the intellect, teaching a true philosophy that rectifies the intelligence, and places it in its normal condition, that we can deprive Satan of the medium through which he works, and defeat his aims. Now, if we oppose the philosophy taught by the Jesuits, it is because, in our judgment, its principles are not the principles of things or reality, but are mental conceptions, abstractions, taken from reflective thought, which is secondary. They are psychological without necessarily asserting any objective reality, and, therefore, fail to correct the false principles from which pantheism or atheism is a logical deduction; and hence their philosophy is inadequate, although greatly superior to any of the philosophies taught outside of Catholic colleges, to meet and refute the errors the Catholic is here and now especially required to combat, to save religion and society.

With all deference, then, to the superior knowledge and judgment, wisdom and experience of our venerable critic, we do not consider the philosophical question we have raised of no, or even of slight, importance; and we think the Jesuits, as the dominant teaching or educational order in the church at present, cannot safely dismiss it with a sneer, by declaring it unimportant, or decrying those who take the side we do. Our *Review* is as open to them as it is to ourselves, and we can see no good reason why, if confident they are right, they should refuse to meet the question on its merits. We have no opinions we love better than the truth, and our whole life proves that we have no reluctance to abandon any views we entertain, when once shown that they are untenable. The philosophical question must be met sooner or later, for it is one of the great questions of the day, and lies at the very basis of the science of reason, which is, according to St. Thomas, the preamble to faith.

We have replied in advance to the principal strictures of our venerable friend on our incidental remarks, in a *Literary Notice*, on the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, in our reply, in the postscript to the last article to the *Letter from Baltimore* signed "Not a Jesuit," written before receiving his criticism, and we hardly need say any thing in addition here. Both the "Jesuit" and the "Not a Jesuit" treat us as if we had denied the propriety of the devotion, or were opposing or at least seeking to disparage it, which

we are far from doing. Both mistake the *animus* of our remarks, which were designed merely to explain why we had never investigated the subject, and felt ourselves incompetent to pass a critical judgment on the books before us treating the devotion to the Sacred Heart, now becoming so very popular and general, and which should have been taken as the expression of what had been our feelings in regard to that devotion as represented to us, rather than as of what they are now, or are likely to be when we understand better what the church means by it, or in what sense the Holy See has authorized it.

Catholics are forbidden by the fact, that the church authorizes the devotion, to question or deny its propriety on any ground whatever; and our critics should have taken it for granted that the investigation we spoke of could have relation only to what the church understands by it, or what is the object to which the devotion she has authorized is to be rendered. All other questions relating to it are closed by her authority. As we are known to be a Catholic, and to recognize, as a matter of course, the supreme authority, and in doctrine, or what pertains to doctrine, the *infallible* authority of the Holy See, they had no right to assume that we were or could be opposing the devotion itself, or asking for reasons for accepting it, thus treating the authorization of the Holy See as if it counted for nothing. This was, if considered, an insult to us.

Both the "Jesuit" and the "Not a Jesuit" accuse us of urging the arguments of the Jansenists against the devotion. We are ignorant of those arguments, having never to our knowledge read them or heard them stated; and, besides, we were not urging any arguments against the devotion itself. Its authorization by the church, we said expressly, removed, as a matter of course, all philosophical and theological objections to it. We accepted the special devotion, but owned that we had never been specially attracted towards it, never having been taught that the church had made it obligatory on all her children to practise it, and, therefore, we had neglected, wrongly neglected, it. Fr. Franco's work had made us suspect that our neglect to investigate it, that is, ascertain what the church means by it, or the sense in which the Holy See has approved it, was unwarranted. Neither the "Jesuit" nor the "Not a Jesuit" will, we presume, maintain that we are not free, among special devotions authorized by the church, to follow our own

attrait, or that we are bound under pain of sin to practise the special devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, though, of course, we are forbidden to oppose it, or to speak disparagingly of it: neither of which have we ever knowingly or intentionally done.

We confess that we have not yet been able to satisfy ourselves as to what the church really means by this special devotion, or by the Sacred Heart of Jesus. In ordinary use the heart means the affections, as the *head* means the mind or intellect, though the material organ of both is held by many to be the brain. In the Holy Scriptures the affections and the will are called the heart, as, "My son, give me thy heart." The heart, in either the scriptures or in ordinary language, means, not the physical organ called by anatomists the heart, but the moral or affective nature of man. The Sacred Heart of Jesus, therefore, would mean his love or affection, which moved him to suffer and die on the cross for the redemption and salvation of souls.

By the incarnation, God assumed human nature and made it literally and indissolubly his own nature. Wherefore Christ is perfect God and perfect man, two natures, for ever distinct, but inseparably and substantially united in one divine person, the Word or the Son, at once the Son of God and the Son of man. It is, as we have been taught, God in his human nature that founds the Christian order, that redeems or saves us, and is the medium of our regeneration and glorification, or our union with God by participation of his divine nature,—*naturæ consortes divinæ*. There is one God, and one Mediator of God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus, or God in his human nature. God in his humanity is the author of grace, and it was God in his human nature that was born of the Virgin, that dwelt among us, that went about doing good, when he had not where to lay his head, that became poor and a slave for our sakes, that suffered and died for us. Hence it is we are bound to love, serve, and worship God in his human nature. Understanding, by the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, devotion to the divine-human love of Jesus, called the *heart*, it is simply a special form of devotion to God in his humanity.

But the human nature of God includes the human body as well as the human soul, for the WORD was made flesh and dwelt among us. The human body includes or is the *réssumé* of the whole lower or material creation, and our Lord, in as-

suming the human body, assumed in some sense the whole animal and material world, and made it the body of God, and therefore, sacred and adorable. Hence St. Peter was forbidden to call any thing the Lord hath cleansed, "common or unclean." In the redemption of the human body, the whole creation was redeemed, delivered from bondage, and united to the Word as his body. This consecrates all nature, and shows a profound reason for the resurrection of the flesh or the body, as well as for the Catholic veneration of the relics and memorials of the saints, on which we regret that we have now no space to enlarge.

Now, if by devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus is meant a form of devotion to God in his human nature, which includes both the human soul and the human body in their henceforth indissoluble union, and therefore the human heart, in both its material and spiritual sense,—which is simply devotion to our Lord in the flesh, and, consequently, devotion to that divine-human love from which flows the grace that redeems, saves, and blesses us,—we see not how any Catholic can be otherwise than attracted by it. Certainly not we could be indifferent to it, for the burden of our writings for years has been the worship of God in his human nature, as the corrective of the great Protestant error we held and taught as a Unitarian. But while we hold that, by virtue of the incarnation or hypostatic union, every part of the body of our Lord is sacred and entitled to profound veneration, we hold that it is only in its living union with the soul, the *forma corporis*, or as the living human body and soul of the Word, that the heart is the seat or emblem of the divine-human love of our Lord, or that can be worshipped as the Sacred Heart of God.

But we are told by Father Preston and others—and their view seems to us to be confirmed by the picture of the Sacred Heart which Blessed Margaret Mary professed to have received from our Lord himself—that this is not what is meant by devotion to the Sacred Heart. They tell us that the object of the devotion is the literal material or physical organ, which as such is, to our understanding, not capable of love or any moral affection, and in our devotion to it we are only venerating, as it were, a sacred relic. It is to this view that we find it difficult to reconcile ourselves. For whether the heart be or be not the material or physical organ of the affections, the moral affections depend on its union with the soul, and it is only when united as the living heart to the soul, which is its

informing principle, its *forma*, that it is the organ of the love, the affection, the compassion of our Lord. It is only when the heart is taken in union with the living soul which informs it, and transforms it from a mere viscus into a living organ of moral and spiritual affection, that we can see in the devotion any thing to warrant the high eulogiums pronounced on it, or the extraordinary zeal of our friends the Jesuits in spreading it. We necessarily worship the material organ in worshipping God in his human nature, which includes it; but if taken as a purely material or physical organ, we see no reason why it, rather than any other portion of Christ's sacred flesh, should be selected as the object of special devotion. We worship, then, only a piece of matter.*

Now, what we have not yet ascertained is, whether we are or are not required to understand the devotion in this material sense. Having always understood that it is in this material sense we must take it, not simply as a special form of adoring God in his humanity, a form far less attractive to us than adoration of him in the Blessed Sacrament, we have

*The sacred body of our Lord separated by death from the soul and laid in the sepulchre is adorable and adored, and, in it, the entire material creation,—in it, we say, not out of it or separate from it; but this is because the body in the sepulchre, though separated from the soul, the *forma corporis*, is still hypostatically united to the WORD, and is still the material body of God. In adoring it we adore the material body of our Lord, but not the Divinity in his human soul, and, consequently, nothing that originates in or depends on the soul, as do all the moral and spiritual affections and operations of the heart. In adoring it we adore the divine love of Jesus, but not his *human* love, for that depends on the soul, which is absent. The divine person or the WORD does not supply, as some heretics have pretended, the human soul in assuming flesh, and become for it the *forma corporis*, for Christ is at once "perfect God and perfect man," and perfect man he could not be without a perfect human soul, since the perfect man is the union of soul and body. Consequently, in worshipping the body of the sepulchre, we worship God, indeed united to matter, but we assert only the divine love, not the divine-*human* love, for the human body without the soul cannot love. Hence the devotion to the literal physical heart of Jesus is simply devotion to God united in a mysterious manner to a material body, not to the loving heart of Jesus inflamed with a divine-human love, of which, we take it, the heart of Jesus is the material seat or emblem. The heart taken in a purely material sense is the heart without the soul, therefore a dead heart, and adorable only in the sense in which the sacred body of our Lord lying in the sepulchre is adorable, and therefore only the divine love is adored in it, whereas it is the divine-*human* love, not possible without the action of the human soul of Jesus, which we suppose the sacred heart of Jesus symbolizes in the devotion approved by the Holy See. It is the loving heart of Jesus, inflamed with divine-human love, —the love that redeems and saves. This is the sense in which we understand Pius VI. in the bull, *Auctorem Fidei*.

never been drawn specially to it. The works we have read on the subject have failed to relieve our doubt on this point. Fr. Franco's work threw a little light on the question, and our venerable critic, while severely censuring us, and even wondering at our indifference to this devotion, tells us that we must not take it in a purely material sense. Perhaps the church's sense after a while will get through our dull brain, and our coldness or indifference to a devotion which others find so beautiful and attractive, will melt away.

There are other points in our venerable friend's letter to which we intended to reply, but we have exhausted our space. We think we have said enough to show that his suspicions of our orthodoxy and of our piety are unfounded, and that his criticisms, however well meant, are neither generous nor just. We do not feel that we deserve them, and their first effect on us, as we read them in connection with others from different sources, was to make us feel that we are utterly incompetent to the post we occupy, and that duty as well as self-respect requires us to retire from it. But reflecting that all the reasons we had for reviving our *Review* remain in all their force, urged to continue it by friends among the clergy and the religious, as well as among the laity, and also thinking that there might be something cowardly in retiring from a field in which we may still do some service to religion and society, we have concluded to throw ourselves, for another year, on the forbearance and generosity of the Catholic public, and to do our best to continue the *Review*.

But we repeat that while we always are, and shall be, ready to correct any errors into which we may fall, when pointed out either by friend or foe, for we love truth more than our own opinions, we shall not hold ourselves bound to reply to every one who takes it into his head to criticise what we write. We are and will be independent of all cliques, coteries, or schools. We promised that our *Review* should be independent, and so it shall be. We hold ourselves responsible to the authorities of the church, but not to public opinion, even though the public opinion of Catholics. It is ungenerous to threaten us with the loss of subscribers, for we have never yet written a sentence with a view to gain, or to escape the loss of a subscriber, and we do not think we ever shall.

VALEDICTORY.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1875.]

THIS number not only completes the third volume of the present series, but closes the *Review* itself. The *Review* bears so much the personal character of the editor, is so completely the expression of his single mind, that none could continue it after him, or would be willing to attempt it. The *Review* originated with me. Though I have had much of valuable assistance in conducting it from dear friends,—most of whom, I trust, are in a better world,—for which I am duly grateful, it must die with me. Others may publish a quarterly review far more valuable than mine has ever been, but no other man can produce *Brownson's Quarterly Review*. Hundreds may produce a better periodical, but no one can produce it. This may be no cause for regret, but it is a reason why my *Review* must die when I cease to conduct it.

I close my *Review*, not from lack of support, nor from lack of sympathy on the part of those whose sympathy I prize. It is true that I have not pleased, nor have I sought to please, everybody; but no adverse criticism or antagonism causes me to discontinue it. I discontinue it solely on account of my precarious health, and the failure of my eyes; and circumstances render it inconvenient to keep a secretary, or to employ an amanuensis. I have been obliged to republish several articles from early volumes of the *Review*, because I was too ill to fill out the numbers with new matter expressly prepared for them. Much of the time for the present year I have been unable to hold a pen in my hand. The present number, indeed, with the exception of extracts from works reviewed, is all written with my own hand, and if I could be assured of being as well for the year to come as I am just now I would not discontinue the publication. But of that I have and can have no reasonable assurance. No man willingly gives up what has been his life's vocation, and I have loved my vocation as a reviewer: but I feel myself unequal to its continuance: many things admonish me that it is time for me to retire, and leave the field to younger and more vigorous labor-

ers, to men who have hands, eyes, and memory unimpaired.

In taking my leave of the Catholic public, with whom I have had the intimate relation of a Catholic reviewer, with the exception of eight years, since 1845, I have no complaints to make, and no apologies to offer. That there has been more or less of antagonism between the *Review* and a portion of the Irish Catholic press published in this country, it were idle to attempt to deny; and that the *Review* has, at times, forgotten that the Ethiopian cannot change his skin, nor the leopard his spots, it were equally idle to deny; but no antagonism of this sort has any thing to do with the discontinuance of the *Review*. The warmest and most esteemed friends of its editor, and its firmest and most generous supporters, have been among Catholics of Irish birth and Irish descent, as is the great body of our English-speaking Catholics.

I am as sensible, as any one can be, of the defects and mistakes of the *Review*, and I have never been able to realize in it my ideal of what a Catholic review should be; but I have done the best, being what I am, that I could. Others in my place might have done more and better, and I hope there will be no lack of others to try their hand at it, and no one will rejoice more than myself at their success. Yet none will be found more sincerely Catholic, or more earnestly devoted to Catholic interests, though, no doubt, men may be found with more prudence, and with a far better understanding of those interests, as well as ability to advance them.

I have recently received a letter signed "A Catholic" telling me that the bishops and clergy, have no confidence in me, and when they can no longer use me, they will repudiate me, knowing that I am too independent, when brought to the test, to submit to their tyranny. The letter goes on and exhorts me to open a correspondence with Dr. Dollinger, to repudiate the council of the Vatican, and to turn the *Review* to the defence of the "Old Catholics." By so doing, it assures me, I may become immensely popular, and gain for the *Review* an almost unlimited circulation; and, it might have added, belie all my convictions and the whole Catholic faith, and damn my own soul. If suggestions such as this could have moved me, I should never have become a Catholic. I did not seek admission into the church for the sake of wealth, honors, or popularity. If I am, as I know I am, measurably unpopular, even with Catholics, I can only say truly that I have never sought popularity, but rather have despised it. Yet I

have received more marks of confidence from our venerable bishops and clergy than I have deserved, more honor than I desired, and have been even more popular with Catholics than I ever expected to be. Speak of wealth! Why, what could I do with it, if I had it, standing, as I do, on the brink of the grave? The generosity of Catholics, in an annuity reasonably secure, has provided for my few personal wants. She, who, for nearly half a century, was my faithful companion and my devoted wife, is, I devoutly trust, safe with the saints; my children, three out of eight, all that are left me, are able to take care of themselves, and no one depends on me but an aged sister. What do I want of wealth? What do I care for popularity, which I never sought, and on which I turned my back when not yet of age?

I have, and I desire to have, no home out of the Catholic Church, with which I am more than satisfied, and which I love as the dearest, tenderest, and most affectionate mother. My only ambition is to live and die in her communion. I love my Catholic brethren, I love and venerate the bishops and clergy of the Catholic Church, especially of the church in my own country. I am deeply indebted to them, beyond any power of language of mine to express. I hope I am grateful to them, but only God can adequately reward them. To the Catholic community, both clergy and laity, whom for thirty-one years I have served as a Catholic publicist, less efficiently than I wished, I am deeply grateful for the generous support they have given, and the measure of confidence they have placed in me and my *Review*, and it is not without a pang at parting with old and dear friends, that I take my leave of them as a reviewer. But it must be; though, in some other way, I may continue to labor, as long as I am able, for the cause so dear to me and to them, and I hope they will not forget to remember me in their prayers. *Valete*, dear friends, and the blessing of God rest on you and your labors.

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ERRATA.

Vol. I.	Page	xiv.	Line 11	from bottom	for	Bossnet	read	Bossuet.
"	"	xvi.	" 9	" "	"	<i>Psychology</i>	read	<i>Philosophy</i> .
"	"	xxiv.	" 2	" top	"	Bownson	"	Brownson.
"	"	xxviii.	" 5	" "	"	head	"	heart
"	"	72,	" 4	" "	"	do	"	no
"	"	77,	" 1	" "	"	thet	"	that
"	"	"	" 4	" "	"	tha	"	the
"	"	79,	" 28	" bottom	"	no	"	not
"	"	80,	" 25	" "	"	always	"	always
"	"	84,	" 14	" top		comma	after involuntary	should
							be after intelligent,	
"	"	85,	" 13	" bottom	for	though	read	thought.
"	"	88,	after line 22	insert-subjective;	and	therefore,	of	course,
							must be regarded as	purely
"	"	123,	line 8	from bottom	for	our	read	or
"	"	201,	" 4	" top	"	<i>Begriffu</i>	"	<i>Begriffen</i>
"	"	247,	" 2	" "	"	conditions	"	condition
"	"	287,	" 2	" bottom	"	possible	"	possibility
"	"	354,	" 17	" "	"	theology	"	theodicy
"	"	379,	" 17	" top	"	briefe	"	briefer
"	"	396,	" 7	" bottom	"	hought	"	thought
"	"	429,	" 18	" "	"	object	"	objection
"	"	505,	" 7	" "	"	<i>presentiment</i>	read	<i>pressenti-</i>
								<i>ment</i>
"	"	516,	" 13	" top	"	Methodus	read	Methodus
"	"	"	" 14	" "	"	rationalisimum	read	rationa-
								limum
"	"	520,	" 15	" "	"	insert comma	after	instruction
Vol. II.	"	28,	" 21	" "	for	physical	read	physical
"	"	"	" 30	" "	"	principal	"	principle
"	"	88,	" 11	" "	"	theological	"	theological
"	"	169,	" 9	" bottom	"	<i>perchè</i>	"	<i>perchè</i>
"	"	283,	" 3	" "	"	covranaturale	read	sovranaturale
"	"	325,	" 18	" top	"	<i>Philosophic</i>	read	<i>Philosophis</i>
"	"	356,	" 9	" bottom	"	on	"	où
Vol. III.	"	45,	" 17	" "	"	anb	"	and
"	"	161,	" 13	" "	"	God in	"	in God
"	"	272,	Insert	"	"	<i>Christ the Spirit</i>	"	at the beginning of the foot
								note.
"	"	302,	line 13	from bottom	for	latterally	read	latterly
"	"	364,	" 6	" top	"	teleological	"	teleological
"	"	391,	" 2	" bottom	"	Quarter	"	Quarterly
"	"	432,	" 19	" "	"	in	"	an
"	"	472,	" 3	" "	"	Cest	"	C'est
"	"	514,	" 9	" top	"	not-natural	"	not natural.
"	"	563,	" 21	" bottom	"	Cure	"	Curé
"	"	579,	" 20	" top	"	superintelligible	read	super-
								intelligence
"	"	"	" 21	" "	"	superintelligence	read	super-
								intelligible

- Vol. IV. page 107, line 13 from bottom insert of after basis
 “ “ 392, “ 13 “ top for phenomon read phenomonon
 “ “ 483, “ 10 “ bottom insert comma after “ sin ” instead
 of “ redemanding ”
 “ “ 489, “ 5 “ top for $\Psi\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\delta\omicron\upsilon\tau$ read $\Psi\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\delta\omicron\varsigma$
 “ “ 409, “ 17 “ “ not not “ not
 Vol. V. “ 556, “ 2 “ bottom (note) for Rosseau read Rousseau
 for Catholicity “ Catholicity
 Vol. VI. “ 153, “ 12 “ “ before “ our feelings ” insert “ that
 is, he expresses in it, in a manner
 Vol. VII. “ 81, “ 11 “ “ most impressive to ”
 “ “ 90, “ 10 “ “ for it read is
 “ “ 348, “ 3 “ “ “ proter “ propter
 “ “ 448, “ 20 “ “ “ contained “ continued
 “ “ 508, “ 4 “ “ “ worthy “ unworthy
 “ “ 575, “ 17 “ “ “ premits “ permits
 Vol. VIII. page 126, line 8 from top for *shetrinah* read *shekinah*
 “ “ “ 16 “ bottom “ this “ as
 “ “ 144, “ 20 “ top insert “ of the ” before “ error ”
 “ “ 167, “ 8 “ bottom for hypostasic read hypostatic
 “ “ 170, “ 12 “ top “ independen tright read in-
 dependent right
 “ “ 494, “ 4 “ bottom “ testimony ” should be in
 brackets,
 Vol. IX. page 112, line 19 from top for is read it
 “ “ 384, “ 17 “ bottom “ accordingly “ according
 Vol. X. “ 524, “ 13 “ “ “ seem “ seems
 “ “ 558, “ 17 “ “ “ fifteen “ fifteenth
 Vol. XI. “ 68, “ 21 “ “ “ Concilabulum “ Conciliabul-
 um
 “ “ 239, “ 6 “ “ “ successfully “ successively
 Vol. XII. “ 233, “ 9 “ top “ statue “ statute
 “ “ 387, “ 9 “ “ “ ny “ by
 “ “ “ 14 “ “ “ cabons “ canons
 “ “ 570, “ 14 “ “ “ in “ is
 “ “ 597, “ 21 “ bottom “ is “ in
 Vol. XIII. “ 121, “ 5 “ “ “ emnates “ emanates
 Vol. XIV. page 61, line from top for *probatam* read *prolatam*
 “ “ “ 13 “ “ “ *profectus* “ *profectum*
 “ “ “ 24 “ “ “ *laclantium* “ *lactentium*
 “ “ 120, “ 22 “ bottom “ of our “ of his
 “ “ 125, “ 3 “ (note) “ nim “ enim
 “ “ 131, “ 7 “ bottom “ handee “ handed
 “ “ 304, “ 4 “ (note) “ *dele* comma after “ *Cur* ”
 “ “ 305, “ “ bottom “ “ “ *quodlibet*
 “ “ 338, “ 12 “ top “ Happeals read H. appeals
 “ “ “ 14 “ bottom “ trying “ trying
 “ “ 513, “ 19 “ “ “ hersy “ heresy
 “ “ “ 13 “ “ “ forsee “ foresee
 “ “ 548, “ 8 “ “ “ Protestanism “ Protestant-
 ism
 Vol. XV. page 13, line 15 from top for bonds read bounds
 Vol. XVI. “ 392, “ 21 “ “ “ It “ If
 Vol. XVII. page 189, line 11 from bottom for abolitionist read abolition-
 ists

